Sunday, September 7, 2008


El Gobierno Federal de los Estados Unidos ha anunciado finalmente el rescate de Freddie y Fannie. Según el FT puede tratarse del mayor rescate de la economía mundial:

1) Inyecciones de capital de hasta 100 billones (americanos) de USD para cada una de las entidades.

2) Compras de bonos hipotecarios emitidos por ambas entidades, comenzando por 5 billones de USD y autorizando a las compañías a aumentar su cartera en más de 100 billones de USD.

3) Auxilio de liquidez de cuantía ilimitada.

Este es un breve comentario sobre el rescate de Mohamed El-Erian en el FT:

“First, the success of the action depends partly on whether it “crowds in” capital from both domestic and foreign sources.

This is key to stabilising markets and drawing a line under the process of global economic decline. Here, a commitment of the government’s balance sheet is necessary but not sufficient. Since the US government is already running a growing fiscal deficit and the country as a whole has a current account deficit, its balance sheet must be supported by other capital inflows, especially on the part of foreign holders of US debt who have become increasingly skittish in recent weeks.


Over the next few weeks we will get a lot of information as to whether these conditions are being met. If they are, this latest levy will prove effective in stopping the deleveraging hurricane and allowing for clean-up operations to start – including reconciling markets to the new realities on the ground and leading to the establishment of better preventive measures against future hurricane formations.

If, however, the conditions are not met, the global economy will experience further significant devastation that will go well beyond housing and the financial sector. In this scenario, consumers residing in highly leveraged economies such as the US and the UK will feel even sharper and more prolonged pain, followed by those in several emerging economies.”

The writer, co-chief executive and co-chief investment officer of Pimco, is author of When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change (McGraw Hill)

La economía española está igualmente apalancada en extremo y bajo un proceso de desapalancamiento acelerado.

Esta es la opinión de Nouriel Roubini que ha estado especialmente acertado en pronosticar el desenlace final con gran antelación, y que expresa sus críticas a la forma en que se lleva a cabo:

Como antecedente exhaustivo de la situación y de lo que la misma representa, puede descargarse gratuitamente el interesante libro La Primera Crisis Financiera Global del Siglo XXI” en los links abajo indicados y con el contenido que igualmente se reproduce:

“The First Global Financial Crisis of 21 st Century”

Edited by Andrew Felton and Carmen M. Reinhart


Section 1 Why Did the Crisis Happen?

The relationship between the recent boom and the current delinquencies in subprime mortgages
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Deniz Igan and Luc Laeven

Why bank risk models failed
Avinash Persaud

Blame the models
Jon Danielsson

The subprime crisis: observations on the emerging debate
Charles Wyplosz

The subprime series, part 1: Financial crises are not going away
Stephen G. Cecchetti

The subprime series, part 2: Deposit insurance and the lender of last resort
Stephen G. Cecchetti

The subprime series, part 3: Why central banks should be financial supervisors
Stephen G. Cecchetti

The subprime series, part 4: Does well-designed monetary policy encourage risk- taking?
Stephen G. Cecchetti

The subprime crisis: Greenspan’s Legacy
Tito Boeri and Luigi Guiso

The impact of short-term interest rates on risk-taking: hard evidence
Vasso Ioannidou, Steven Ongena and Jose Luis Peydró

Why did bank supervision fail?
Guido Tabellini

The subprime crisis and credit risk transfer: something amiss
Luigi Spaventa

The crisis of 2007: some lessons from history
Michael D. Bordo

Reflections on the international dimensions and policy lessons of the US subprime crisis
Carmen Reinhart

Section 2 How Is the Crisis Unfolding?

Federal Reserve policy actions in August 2007: frequently asked questions (updated)
Stephen G. Cecchetti

An extensive but benign crisis?
Tommaso Monacelli

Not (yet) a ‘Minsky moment’
Charles W. Calomiris

A B & B future for subprime borrowers?
Willem Buiter

Double counting 101: the useful distinction between inside and outside assets
Willem Buiter

Bagehot, central banking and the financial crisis
Xavier Vives

The financial crisis: why it may last
Angel Ubide

Fallout from the credit crunch
Dennis J. Snower

Four mega-dangers international financial markets face
Dennis J. Snower

Federal Reserve policy responses to the crisis of 2007–8: a summary
Stephen G. Cecchetti

While the ECB ponders, the Fed moves – and cleverly at that
Charles Wyplosz

Section 3 What Can Be Done?

The subprime crisis: Who pays and what needs fixing
Marco Onado

Filling the information gap
Alberto Giovannini and Luigi Spaventa

Lessons from the North Atlantic financial crisis
Willem Buiter

Lessons from Northern Rock: banking and shadow banking
Willem Buiter

Lessons from Northern Rock: how to handle failure
Willem Buiter

Ratings agency reform
Richard Portes

How to avoid further credit and liquidity confidence crises
Guillermo de la Dehesa

The inappropriateness of financial regulation
Avinash Persaud

There is more to central banking than inflation targeting
Paul De Grauwe

Can monetary policy really be used to stabilize asset prices?
Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche and Stefan Gerlach

A missed opportunity for the Fed
Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert

The central bank as the market-maker of last resort: from lender of last resort to market-maker of last resort
Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert

Avoiding disorderly deleveraging
Luigi Spaventa


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