Article 11 of the Convention
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”
C. Scope of the right to freedom of assembly
14. In view of its importance the right to freedom of assembly should not be interpreted restrictively(Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 91; Tsaava and Others v. Georgia [GC], 2025, § 414).
To avert the risk of a restrictive interpretation, the Court has refrained from formulating the notion of an assembly or exhaustively listing the criteria which would define it (Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 98).
15. The concept of “assembly” is an autonomous one; it covers, in particular, gatherings which are not subject to domestic legal regulation, irrespective of whether they require notification or authorisation or whether they are exempt from such procedures. Thus, the Court found Article 11 applicable to a peaceful “walkabout” gathering whereby groups of persons acted in a coordinated and purposeful way, to express a political message; the applicant did not consider them “marches” or “meetings” subject to notification under the applicable national law (Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 108). Likewise, the Court found that the gathering described by the applicant as a “flash mob” could be considered an assembly irrespective of whether it fell under the notions of “public event” or “static demonstration” set out in domestic law (Obote v. Russia, 2019, § 35), with reference to the autonomous concept of “assembly” under the Convention.
16. Assembly is defined, in particular, by a common purpose of its participants and is to be distinguished from a random agglomeration of individuals each pursuing their own cause, such as a queue to enter a public building. Thus a group of activists present outside a courthouse for the purpose of attending a court hearing in a criminal case of a political nature fell within the notion of “assembly” on the basis that by their attendance they meant to express personal involvement in a matter of public importance. The Court distinguished this unintended gathering from a situation where a passer-by becomes accidentally mixed up in a demonstration and is mistaken for someone taking part in it(Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 110).
17. Lengthy occupation of premises that is peaceful, even though it is clearly in breach of domestic law, may be regarded as a “peaceful assembly” (Cisse v. France, 2002, §§ 39-40; Tuskia and Others v. Georgia, 2018, § 73; Annenkov and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 123).
18. Even if the existence of an assembly is beyond doubt, the admissibility of an Article 11 complaint may be called into question in relation to a particular applicant if he or she denies before the Court having taken part in that assembly. There must be a clear and acknowledged link between the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly by the applicants and the measures taken against them (Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, 2014, § 52). In establishing such link the Court takes into account the applicant’s initial intention, the extent of actual involvement in the assembly and the content of the pleading before the national instances and the Court (Agit Demir v. Turkey, 2018, § 68; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, §§ 109-111; Zulkuf Murat Kahraman v. Turkey, 2019, § 45, Obote v. Russia, 2019, § 35; Kazan v. Türkiye, 2023, § 56). The fact that the applicant was sanctioned for participating in the assembly is not in itself sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Article 11 if the applicant had consistently claimed that he was mistaken for a participant (Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013,§ 72). Article 11 of the Convention can be found to be applicable to persons merely observing a demonstration (see, for example, Galstyan v. Armenia, 2007, § 100), although they would need to make a persuasive argument that the mere presence at the rally for the purpose of observing eventscould be considered an exercise of their right to peaceful assembly (Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, § 487).
19. Although there has been no case to-date concerning a negative right to freedom of assembly, the right not to be compelled to participate in an assembly may be inferred from its case-law (Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark [GC], 2006, § 54; Novikova and Others v. Russia, 2016, § 91).
1. Form and type of assembly
20. This right covers both private meetings and meetings in public places, whether static or in the form of a procession; in addition, it can be exercised by individual participants and by the persons organising the gathering (Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 91; Djavit An v. Turkey, 2003, § 56).
21. Although the primary purpose of Article 11 is to protect the right of political peaceful demonstration and participation in the democratic process, it would be an unacceptably narrow interpretation of that Article to confine it only to that kind of assembly, just as it would be too narrow an interpretation of Article 10 to restrict it to expressions of opinion of a political character (Friend, the Countryside Alliance and others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2009, § 50). Article 11 has thus been found to apply to assemblies of an essentially social character (Emin Huseynov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, § 91, concerning police intervention in a gathering at a private café; Djavit An v. Turkey, 2003, § 60, concerning the refusal of the authorities to allow the applicant to cross the “green line” into southern Cyprus in order to participate in bi-communal meetings), as well as to cultural gatherings (The Gypsy Council and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); and religious and spiritual meetings (Barankevich v. Russia, 2007, § 15). Official meetings, notably parliamentary sessions, also fall within the scope of Article 11 (Forcadell i lluis v. Spain (dec.), 2019, § 24).
2. Freedom of forum
22. The right to freedom of assembly includes the right to choose the time, place and manner of conduct of the assembly, within the limits established in paragraph 2 of Article 11 (Sáska v. Hungary, 2012, § 21). Therefore, where the location of the assembly is crucial to the participants, an order to change it may constitute an interference with their freedom of assembly under Article 11 of the Convention (The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, 2005, § 103; Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 405; Mustafa Hajili and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2022, § 65).
