Licencia Creative Commons

Sunday, July 31, 2022

EL EXCESO DE MUERTES EN ESPAÑA EN EL PERÍODO MAYO-JULIO 2022 (JOSE GEFAELL)

 

 

 El exceso muertes de 18.500 es mayor que los muertos ucranianos en Mayo–Julio. ¿Qué acción mediática se ha tomado? Centrarse en la viruela. Ni mención a que los 6k Covid tenían casi todos 3 dosis, ni a que los +9k muertos en exceso por causas desconocidas son récord histórico.

Saturday, July 30, 2022

LLAMADA INTERNACIONAL A LOS PEDIATRAS PARA DETENER LA VACUNACIÓN COVID INFANTIL (29-07-2022)

 

 

 

We call for an immediate halt to the mass COVID vaccination of children, until proper scientific dialogue and thorough re-evaluation of the COVID vaccination campaign has occurred. We urgently and strongly encourage pediatricians around the world to join us in that call for an immediate halt. It is our hope that the three Open Letters 3 will stimulate, facilitate, and focus dialogue on the most profoundly important aspects of the COVID situation. We encourage proponents of the mass COVID vaccination campaign to review the information presented in the three Open Letters and respectfully challenge aspects with which they disagree. We welcome such challenge, for that is the purpose and the tradition of healthy scientific dialogue

Please share this letter as widely as possible---with parents, friends, colleagues, and organizations. 

Robert Rennebohm, MD

 Geert Vanden Bossche, DVM, PhD

Wednesday, July 27, 2022

LA GENTE CLAVE EN LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE LOS FILES DE UBER (ICIJ)



The leaked text messages, emails, briefing notes, presentations and other documents in the Uber Files reveal a picture of close working relationships between top Uber executives, government bureaucrats and world leaders. Here is a selection of some of the most influential people who feature in the investigation:

November, 2015


Neelie Kroes

The Netherlands


July 2015

Emmanuel Macron

French minister of economy, industry and digital affairs (2014-2016)

Head of Uber’s Public Policy Advisory Board (2016-2018)

Travis KalanickUber Co-founder & CEO (2009-2017)

Jan 29, 2016



Wednesday, July 20, 2022

PERRY V. UNITED STATES (DEUDA PÚBLICA Y CÁUSULA VALOR ORO (II))

PERRY V. UNITED STATES: DEUDA PÚBLICA Y CLAUSULA VALOR ORO (I)

PERRY V. UNITED STATES: DEUDA PÚBLICA Y CLAUSULA VALOR ORO (I)



Perry v. United States

Majority

The question of damages. In this view of the binding quality of the Government's obligations, we come to the question as to the plaintiff's right to recover damages. That is a distinct question. Because the Government is not at liberty to alter or repudiate its obligations, it does not follow that the claim advanced by the plaintiff should be sustained. The action is for breach of contract. As a remedy for breach, plaintiff can recover no more than the loss he has suffered and of which he may rightfully complain. He is not entitled to be enriched. Plaintiff seeks judgment for $16,931.25, in present legal tender currency, on his bond for $10,000. The question is whether he has shown damage to that extent, or any actual damage, as the Court of Claims has no authority to entertain an action for nominal damages. Grant v. United States, 7 Wall. 331, 338; Marion R.V. Ry. Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 280, 282; Nortz v. United States, decided this day, ante, p. 317. 355 12 Perry v. United States 294 U.S. 330 (1935) Plaintiff computes his claim for $16,931.25 by taking the weight of the gold dollar as fixed by the President's proclamation of January 31, 1934, under the Act of May 12, 1933 ( 48 Stat. 52, 53), as amended by the Act of January 30, 1934 ( 48 Stat. 342), that is, at 15 5/21 grains nine-tenths fine, as compared with the weight fixed by the Act of March 14, 1900 ( 31 Stat. 45), or 25.8 grains nine-tenths fine. But the change in the weight of the gold dollar did not necessarily cause loss to the plaintiff of the amount claimed. The question of actual loss cannot fairly be determined without considering the economic situation at the time the Government offered to pay him the $10,000, the face of his bond, in legal tender currency. The case is not the same as if gold coin had remained in circulation. That was the situation at the time of the decisions under the legal tender acts of 1862 and 1863. Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229, 251; Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687, 695; Thompson v. Butler, 95 U.S. 694, 696, 697. Before the change in the weight of the gold dollar in 1934, gold coin had been withdrawn from circulation. The Congress had authorized the prohibition of the exportation of gold coin and the placing of restrictions upon transactions in foreign exchange. Acts of March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1; January 30, 1934, 48 Stat. 337. Such dealings could be had only for limited purposes and under license. Executive Orders of April 20, 1933, August 28, 1933, and January 15, 1934; Regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, January 30 and 31, 1934. That action the Congress was entitled to take by virtue of its authority to deal with gold coin as a medium of exchange. And the restraint thus imposed upon holders of gold coin was incident to the limitations which inhered in their ownership of that coin and gave them no right of action. Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302, 310, 311. The Court said in that case: "Conceding the title of the owner of such coins, yet there is attached to such ownership those limitations which public policy may require by reason of their quality as a legal tender and as a medium of exchange. These limitations are due to the fact that public law gives to such coinage a value which does not attach as a mere consequence of intrinsic value. Their quality as a legal tender is an attribute of law aside from their bullion value. They bear, therefore, the impress of sovereign power which fixes value and authorizes their use and exchange. . . . However unwise a law may be, aimed at the exportation of such coins, in the face of the axioms against obstructing the free flow of commerce, there can be no serious doubt that the power to coin money includes the power to prevent its outflow from the country of its origin." The same reasoning is applicable to the imposition of restraints upon transactions in foreign exchange. We cannot say, in view of the conditions that existed, that the Congress, having this power, exercised it arbitrarily or capriciously. And the holder of an obligation, or bond, of the United States, payable in gold coin of the former standard, so far as the restraint upon the right to export gold coin or to engage in transactions in foreign exchange is concerned, was in no better case than the holder of gold coin itself. In its Report of May 27, 1933, it was stated by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency: "By the Emergency Banking Act and the existing Executive Orders gold is not now paid, or obtainable for payment, on obligations public or private." Sen. Rep. No. 99, 73d Cong., 1st sess. In considering what damages, if any, the plaintiff has sustained by the alleged breach of his bond, it is hence inadmissible to assume that he was entitled to obtain gold coin for recourse to foreign markets, or for dealings in foreign exchange, or for other purposes contrary to the control over gold coin which the Congress had the power to exert, and had exerted, in its monetary regulation. Plaintiff's damages could not be assessed without regard to the internal economy of the country at the time the alleged breach occurred. The discontinuance of gold payments and the establishment of legal tender currency on a standard unit of value with which "all forms of money" of the United States were to be "maintained at a parity," had a controlling influence upon the domestic economy. It was adjusted to the new basis. A free domestic market for gold was non-existent. 13 Perry v. United States 294 U.S. 330 (Plaintiff demands the "equivalent" in currency of the gold coin promised. But "equivalent" cannot mean more than the amount of money which the promised gold coin would be worth to the bondholder for the purposes for which it could legally be used. That equivalence or worth could not properly be ascertained save in the light of the domestic and restricted market which the Congress had lawfully established. In the domestic transactions to which the plaintiff was limited, in the absence of special license, determination of the value of the gold coin would necessarily have regard to its use as legal tender and as a medium of exchange under a single monetary system with an established parity of all currency and coins. And in view of the control of export and foreign exchange, and the restricted domestic use, the question of value, in relation to transactions legally available to the plaintiff, would require a consideration of the purchasing power of the dollars which the plaintiff could have received. Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that in relation to buying power he has sustained any loss whatever. On the contrary, in view of the adjustment of the internal economy to the single measure of value as established by the legislation of the Congress, and the universal availability and use throughout the country of the legal tender currency in meeting all engagements, the payment to the plaintiff of the amount which he demands would appear to constitute not a recoupment of loss in any proper sense but an unjustified enrichment. Plaintiff seeks to make his case solely upon the theory that by reason of the change in the weight of the dollar he is entitled to one dollar and sixty-nine cents in the present currency for every dollar promised by the bond, regardless of any actual loss he has suffered with respect to any transaction in which his dollars may be used. We think that position is untenable. In the view that the facts alleged by the petition fail to show a cause of action for actual damages, the first question submitted by the Court of Claims is answered in the negative. It is not necessary to answer the second question. Question No. 1 is answered "No."

Minority

By various orders of the President and the Treasury from April 5 to December 28, 1933, persons holding gold certificates were required to deliver them, and accept "an equivalent amount of any form of coin or currency coined or issued under the laws of the United States designated by the Secretary of the Treasury." Heavy penalties were provided for failure to comply.

 

The Act of March 14, 1900, 31 Stat., c. 41, 45, 47, as amended, in effect until January 31, 1934, provided: "That the dollar consisting of twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of gold nine-tenths fine, . . . shall be the standard unit of value, and all forms of money issued or coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value with this standard,"

By Executive Orders, April 5, and April 20, 1933, the President undertook to require owners of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates, to deliver them on or before May 1st to a Federal Reserve Bank, and to prohibit the exportation of gold coin, gold bullion or gold certificates. As a consequence the United States were off the gold standard and their paper money began a rapid decline in the markets of the world. Gold coin, gold certificates and gold bullion were no longer obtainable. "Gold is not now paid nor is it available for payment upon public or private debts" was declared in Treasury statement of May 27, 1933; and this is still true. All gold coins have been melted into bars.

The Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934, 48 Stat., c. 6, p. 337, 342, undertook to ratify preceding Presidential orders and proclamations requiring surrender of gold but prohibited him from establishing the weight of the gold dollar "at more than 60 per centum of its present weight." By proclamation, January 31, 1934, he directed that thereafter the standard should contain 15 5/21 grains of gold, nine-tenths fine. (The weight had been 25.8 grains since 1837.) No such dollar has been coined at any time. The fundamental problem now presented is whether recent statutes passed by Congress in respect of money and credits, were designed to attain a legitimate end. Or whether, under the guise of pursuing a monetary policy, Congress really has inaugurated a plan primarily designed to destroy private obligations, repudiate national debts and drive into the Treasury all gold within the country, in exchange for inconvertible promises to pay, of much less value. Considering all the circumstances, we must conclude they show that the plan disclosed is of the latter description and its enforcement would deprive the parties before us of their rights under the Constitution. Consequently the Court should do what it can to afford adequate relief.

Considering all the circumstances, we must conclude they show that the plan disclosed is of the latter description and its enforcement would deprive the parties before us of their rights under the Constitution. Consequently the Court should do what it can to afford adequate relief.

Can the Government, obliged as though a private person to observe the terms of its contracts, destroy them by legislative changes in the currency and by statutes forbidding one to hold the thing which it has agreed to deliver? If an individual should undertake to annul or lessen his obligation by secreting or manipulating his assets with the intent to place them beyond the reach of creditors, the attempt would be denounced as 381 fraudulent, wholly ineffective. Counsel for the Government and railway companies asserted with emphasis that incalculable financial disaster would follow refusal to uphold, as authorized by the Constitution, impairment and repudiation of private obligations and public debts. Their forecast is discredited by manifest exaggeration. But, whatever may be the situation now confronting us, it is the outcome of attempts to destroy lawful undertakings by legislative action; and this we think the Court should disapprove in no uncertain terms

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS, MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, and MR. JUSTICE BUTLER dissent

Congress responded to the ambiguous Perry ruling with an additional resolution (Pub. Res. 74–63) that provided sovereign immunity of the federal government against claims for damage resulting from the devaluation of currency or other federal obligations

We want a Supreme Court,” declared President Franklin Roosevelt in March 1937, “which will do justice under the Constitution — not over it. In our courts, we want a government of laws and not of men.”

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/5118

(a)In this section—

(1)gold clause” means a provision in or related to an obligation alleging to give the obligee a right to require payment in—

(A)

gold;

(B)

a particular United States coin or currency; or

(C)

United States money measured in gold or a particular United States coin or currency.

(2)

public debt obligation” means a domestic obligation issued or guaranteed by the United States Government to repay money or interest.

(b)

The United States Government may not pay out any gold coin. A person lawfully holding United States coins and currency may present the coins and currency to the Secretary of the Treasury for exchange (dollar for dollar) for other United States coins and currency (other than gold and silver coins) that may be lawfully held. The Secretary shall make the exchange under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

(c)

(1)The Government withdraws its consent given to anyone to assert against the Government, its agencies, or its officers, employees, or agents, a claim—

(A)

on a gold clause public debt obligation or interest on the obligation;

(B)

for United States coins or currency; or

(C)

arising out of the surrender, requisition, seizure, or acquisition of United States coins or currency, gold, or silver involving the effect or validity of a change in the metallic content of the dollar or in a regulation about the value of money.

(2)

Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a proceeding in which no claim is made for payment or credit in an amount greater than the face or nominal value in dollars of public debt obligations or United States coins or currency involved in the proceeding.

(3)

Except when consent is not withdrawn under this subsection, an amount appropriated for payment on public debt obligations and for United States coins and currency may be expended only dollar for dollar.

(d)

(1)

In this subsection, “obligation” means any obligation (except United States currency) payable in United States money.

(2)

An obligation issued containing a gold clause or governed by a gold clause is discharged on payment (dollar for dollar) in United States coin or currency that is legal tender at the time of payment. This paragraph does not apply to an obligation issued after October 27, 1977.

#GOLDCLAUSECASES hashtag#SCOTUS hashtag#HUGHESCOURT hashtag#LIBERTYBOND hashtag#PERRYVUNITEDSTATES (1) PERRY V. UNITED STATES 294 US 330 (1935)

PERRY V. UNITED STATES, LIBERTY BOND, DEUDA PÚBLICA Y CLAUSULA VALOR ORO, SCOTUS, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

 

Tuesday, July 19, 2022

LA STC 97/2019 Y LA LISTA FALCIANI

LA STC 97/2019 Y LA LISTA FALCIANI

 

 

 

 

AUTO DEL TS DE 25-05-2022 Y ANTEPROYECTO DE LEY DE INFORMANTES

 

El Auto del Tribunal Supremo de 25-05-2022 (rec. nº 5321/2021) admite recurso de casación sobre la siguiente cuestión:

"TERCERO. Normas que deberán ser interpretadas.

A estos efectos, el recurrente plantea la necesidad de interpretar el artículo 11.1 de la Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1de julio, del Poder Judicial (BOE de 2 de julio) ["LOPJ"], en relación con el artículo 14 de la Constitución Española["CE"] y la doctrina contenida en la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional de 16 de julio de 2019 (ES:TC:2019:97).

CUARTO. Cuestión en la que se entiende que existe interés casacional.

Conforme a lo indicado anteriormente y, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 88.1 LJCA, en relación con el 90.4 de la misma norma, procede admitir a trámite este recurso de casación, precisando que la cuestión con interés casacional objetivo para la formación de jurisprudencia consiste en:

Determinar, en el ámbito de la inspección tributaria, los efectos probatorios que deben reconocerse a los datos y documentación que sirven de base para una regularización tributaria, cuando para la obtención de aquellos,directa o indirectamente, se hubiere podido vulnerar los derechos o libertades fundamentales, de conformidad con lo previsto en el artículo 11.1 LOPJ, no habiendo entrado, la sala de instancia, a desarrollar el juicio de ponderación establecido por el Tribunal Constitucional en su sentencia del Pleno nº 97/2019 de 16 de julio(1085/2017; ECLI:ES:TC:2019:97) ( Caso Falciani) y, teniendo en cuenta a este respecto, la doctrina que sobre el particular ha fijado el TEDH en su sentencia de 5 de noviembre de 2020, asunto Æwik c. Polonia, (31454/10 )."

Y precisa también:

"5. La Sala de instancia es conocedora del origen de la información en virtud de la cual la Inspección ha regularizado la situación tributaria de la recurrente, a saber, los datos aportados por el antiguo trabajador a los que había accedido cuando estaba en la empresa y para cuya apropiación no estaba autorizado por la entidad mercantil, actuaciones, sin embargo, que la sentencia no califica, lo que le permite considerar no probada"ninguna ilegalidad por parte de la Administración tributaria que utiliza los indicios y las pruebas aportadas por el denunciante para contrastarla y someterla a verificación por los Servicios de Inspección que terminan considerando la no declaración de determinadas actividades ni operaciones y que comportan la comisión de infracciones tributarias" (sic), lo cual podría no ajustarse a los cánones de ponderación establecidos en la STC97/2019, al no efectuar el primer elemento de juicio de ponderación que dicha jurisprudencia prescribe sobre los intereses en conflicto, cuando se valora la exclusión de una prueba ilícitamente obtenida, al abstenerse de determinar la índole de la ilicitud verificada en el acto de obtención de elementos probatorios, para dilucidar si esta consiste en la vulneración de un derecho fundamental de libertad o sustantivo, ni tampoco el segundo juicio de ponderación exigido, sobre el vínculo entre la vulneración y el proceso, al no practicar un examen del parámetro de control interno, como es la conexión instrumental de la obtención de la prueba para hacerla valer en un procedimiento frente a la recurrente, y ello con independencia de que el autor de la vulneración hubiera sido un particular, y porque al mismo tiempo deja de valorar la exclusión de la prueba sólo con base en considerarla derivada o fuente de conocimiento indirecto."

En el ámbito de las relaciones laborales, en el momento actual, la cuestión exigiría tener en cuenta lo previsto en el Anteproyecto de Ley reguladora de la protección de las personas que informen sobre infracciones normativas y de lucha contra la corrupción por la que se transpone la Directiva (UE) 2019/1937 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 23 de octubre de 2019, relativa a la protección de las personas que informen sobre infracciones del Derecho de la Unión.Así como en la citada Directiva.

Y, en especial, los siguientes preceptos (Anteproyecto):

Artículo 2. Ámbito material de aplicación. 

1. La presente ley protege a las personas físicas que informen, a través de alguno de los procedimientos previstos en ella de: 

a) Cualesquiera acciones u omisiones que puedan constituir infracciones del Derecho de la Unión Europea siempre que entren dentro del ámbito de aplicación de los actos de la Unión enumerados en el Anexo de la Directiva (UE) 2019/1937, con independencia de la calificación que de las mismas realice el ordenamiento jurídico interno, afecten a los intereses financieros de la Unión tal y como se contemplan en el artículo 325 del TFUE o incidan en el mercado interior, tal y como se contemplan en el artículo 26, apartado 2 del TFUE, incluidas las infracciones de las normas de la Unión en materia de competencia y ayudas otorgadas por los Estados, así como las infracciones relativas al mercado interior en relación con los actos que infrinjan las normas del impuesto sobre sociedades o a prácticas cuya finalidad sea obtener una ventaja fiscal que desvirtúe el objeto o la finalidad de la legislación aplicable al impuesto sobre sociedades.

b) Acciones u omisiones que puedan ser constitutivas de infracción penal o administrativa grave o muy grave o cualquier vulneración del resto del ordenamiento jurídico siempre que, en cualquiera de los casos, afecten o menoscaben directamente el interés general, y no cuenten con una regulación específica. En todo caso, se entenderá afectado el interés general cuando la acción u omisión de que se trate implique quebranto económico para la Hacienda Pública.

Artículo 3. Ámbito personal de aplicación. 

1. La presente ley se aplicará a los informantes que trabajen en el sector privado o público y que hayan obtenido información sobre infracciones en un contexto laboral o profesional, comprendiendo en todo caso: a) las personas que tengan la condición de empleados públicos y trabajadores por cuenta ajena; b) los autónomos; c) los accionistas, partícipes y personas pertenecientes al órgano de administración, dirección o supervisión de una empresa, incluidos los miembros no ejecutivos; d) cualquier persona que trabaje para o bajo la supervisión y la dirección de contratistas, subcontratistas y proveedores

2. La presente ley también se aplicará a los informantes que comuniquen o revelen públicamente información sobre infracciones obtenida en el marco de una relación laboral o estatutaria ya finalizada, voluntarios, becarios, trabajadores en periodos de formación con independencia de que perciban o no una remuneración, así como a aquéllos cuya relación laboral todavía no haya comenzado, en los casos en que la información sobre infracciones haya sido obtenida durante el proceso de selección o de negociación precontractual.

(...)

Artículo 38. Medidas de protección frente a represalias. 

1. No se considerará que las personas que comuniquen información sobre las acciones u omisiones recogidas en esta ley o que hagan una revelación pública de conformidad con la presente ley hayan infringido ninguna restricción de revelación de información, y éstas no incurrirán en responsabilidad de ningún tipo en relación con dicha comunicación o revelación pública, siempre que tuvieran motivos razonables para pensar que la comunicación o revelación pública de dicha información era necesaria para revelar una acción u omisión en virtud de la presente ley, todo ello sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 2.3. Esta medida no afectará a las responsabilidades de carácter penal

Lo previsto en el párrafo anterior se extiende a la comunicación de informaciones realizadas por los representantes de las personas trabajadoras, aunque se encuentren sometidas a obligaciones legales de sigilo o de no revelar información reservada. Todo ello sin perjuicio de las normas específicas de protección aplicables conforme a la normativa laboral. 

2. Los informantes no incurrirán en responsabilidad respecto de la adquisición o el acceso a la información que es comunicada o revelada públicamente, siempre que dicha adquisición o acceso no constituya un delito

3. Cualquier otra posible responsabilidad de los informantes derivada de actos u omisiones que no estén relacionados con la comunicación o la revelación pública o que no sean necesarios para revelar una infracción en virtud de la presente ley serán exigibles conforme a la normativa aplicable. 

4. En los procedimientos laborales ante un órgano jurisdiccional relativos a los perjuicios sufridos por los informantes, una vez que el informante haya demostrado razonablemente que ha comunicado o ha hecho una revelación pública de conformidad con la presente ley y que ha sufrido un perjuicio, se presumirá que el perjuicio se produjo como represalia por informar o por hacer una revelación pública. En tales casos, corresponderá a la persona que haya tomado la medida perjudicial probar que esa medida se basó en motivos debidamente justificados no vinculadas a la comunicación o revelación pública."

Los artículos 199 y 200 del Código Penal establecen lo siguiente:

Artículo 199.

1. El que revelare secretos ajenos, de los que tenga conocimiento por razón de su oficio o sus relaciones laborales, será castigado con la pena de prisión de uno a tres años y multa de seis a doce meses.

2. El profesional que, con incumplimiento de su obligación de sigilo o reserva, divulgue los secretos de otra persona, será castigado con la pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años, multa de doce a veinticuatro meses e inhabilitación especial para dicha profesión por tiempo de dos a seis años.

Artículo 200.

Lo dispuesto en este capítulo será aplicable al que descubriere, revelare o cediere datos reservados de personas jurídicas, sin el consentimiento de sus representantes, salvo lo dispuesto en otros preceptos de este Código.

El Anteproyecto y la Directiva consideran que las personas que comuniquen información sobre las acciones u omisiones recogidas en esta ley o que hagan una revelación pública de conformidad con la presente ley (no han) infringido ninguna restricción de revelación de información

La mera actividad de revelación o información de "secretos" o "datos reservados" directos (propios de la relación empleado/empresario como en el caso del Auto o -quizás- de una relación cliente/profesional) cubierta por el Anteproyecto y la Directiva no parece que pueda considerarse ahora ilícita, siempre que su adquisición o acceso no constituya un delito

Por tanto, las cuestiones planteadas por el Auto exigirían tener en cuenta en qué medida afecta lo anterior a las denuncias de información tributaria reservada de un empresario conocida u obtenida sin incurrir en delito alguno por empleados del mismo

Resultaría, en nuestra opinión, difícil considerar que la revelación de información protegida por el Anteproyecto y la Directiva se califique y considere , a efectos tributarios, como prueba ilícitamente obtenida

Es asimismo importante lo establecido en el art. 201.1 del CP:

Para proceder por los delitos previstos en este Capítulo será necesaria denuncia de la persona agraviada o de su representante legal.

Quien invoca la ilicitud del medio de prueba debería, parece, actuar en consecuencia

La doctrina de la Sentencia Falciani (STC 97/2019), a la que se remite el Auto, se refiere a un supuesto de información en soporte electrónico, indirectamente obtenida de un empleado y referida a datos no de su empleador sino de clientes del mismo, y objeto de protección penal en el país de origen (Suiza). La misma no se consideró ilícita a efectos tributarios