STEDH_FER...PDF
View more documents from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero.
Licencia Creative Commons
Esta obra está bajo una Licencia Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional.
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Sunday, September 26, 2010
TEDH: FERRE GISBERT CONTRA ESPAÑA
Este es el resumen del caso "Ferré Gisbert contra España" según la propia Memoria del Tribunal Constitucional español:
"El 3 de septiembre de 2008, el Presidente de la Sala Tercera había comunicado a las partes el caso Ferré Gisbert c. España. Se trataba de un procedimiento sumario de la Ley Hipotecaria en el que el demandante presentó un incidente de nulidad, alegando defectos de forma en las notificaciones que le privaron del conocimiento efectivo del procedimiento iniciado en su contra. El incidente se inadmitió el 1 de octubre 2001, pues el mismo no estaba previsto por la ley, debiendo el demandante hacer valer sus prete
nsiones en el marco de un procedimiento declarativo ordinario. Como consecuencia de esta afirmación, el demandante entabló el procedimiento en cuestión, viéndose desestimadas sus pretensiones en apelación, por Sentencia de 19 de noviembre de 2003. El recurso de amparo que el demandante interpuso fue inadmitido por extemporáneo, pues el plazo de 20 días comenzó a contar, según el Tribunal Constitucional, desde la inadmisión del incidente de nulidad. La demanda fue comunicada a la luz del derecho de acceso al recurso y a un recurso efectivo, garantizados por los artículos 6 par. 1 y 13 del Convenio. Por Sentencia de 13 de octubre de 2009, el Tribunal (Europeo de Derechos Humanos) apreció la vulneración de la primera disposición citada por entender que la motivación del Tribunal Constitucional era incoherente con las decisiones de las jurisdicciones civiles y estimó que se había impuesto al demandante una carga desproporcionada que rompía el equilibrio entre, por una parte, el objetivo legítimo de asegurar el respeto de los requisitos formales para acudir a la jurisdicción constitucional y, por otra, el derecho de acceso a dicha instancia, considerándose la inadmisión del recurso de amparo por extemporaneidad contraria al principio de seguridad jurídica."
nsiones en el marco de un procedimiento declarativo ordinario. Como consecuencia de esta afirmación, el demandante entabló el procedimiento en cuestión, viéndose desestimadas sus pretensiones en apelación, por Sentencia de 19 de noviembre de 2003. El recurso de amparo que el demandante interpuso fue inadmitido por extemporáneo, pues el plazo de 20 días comenzó a contar, según el Tribunal Constitucional, desde la inadmisión del incidente de nulidad. La demanda fue comunicada a la luz del derecho de acceso al recurso y a un recurso efectivo, garantizados por los artículos 6 par. 1 y 13 del Convenio. Por Sentencia de 13 de octubre de 2009, el Tribunal (Europeo de Derechos Humanos) apreció la vulneración de la primera disposición citada por entender que la motivación del Tribunal Constitucional era incoherente con las decisiones de las jurisdicciones civiles y estimó que se había impuesto al demandante una carga desproporcionada que rompía el equilibrio entre, por una parte, el objetivo legítimo de asegurar el respeto de los requisitos formales para acudir a la jurisdicción constitucional y, por otra, el derecho de acceso a dicha instancia, considerándose la inadmisión del recurso de amparo por extemporaneidad contraria al principio de seguridad jurídica."Sunday, September 12, 2010
FONDO EUROPEO PARA LA ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA: COMENTARIOS
Los importantes comentarios (en inglés) son de Satyahit Das:
The structure also faces a high risk of rating migration (a fall in security ratings). If the cushion is reduced by problems of an Euro-zone member, then the EFSF securities may be downgraded. Any such ratings downgrade would result in mark-to-market losses to investors. Recent downgrades to the credit rating of Portugal and Ireland highlight this risk.
(…)
This means that investors may be cautious about investing in EFSF bonds and, at a minimum, may seek a significant yield premium. The ability of the EFSF to raise funds at the assumed low cost is not assured.
Major economies have over the last decades transferred debt from companies to consumers and finally onto public balance sheets. The reality is that a problem of too much debt is being solved with even more debt. Deeply troubled members of the Euro-zone cannot bail out each other as the significant levels of existing debt limit the ability to borrow additional amounts and finance any bailout. As Albert Einstein noted: "You cannot fix a problem with the kind of thinking that created it."
A huge amount of securities and risk now is held by central banks and governments, which are not designed for such long-term ownership of these assets. There are now no more balance sheets that can be leveraged to support the current levels of debt. The effect of the EFSF is that stronger countries’ balance sheets are being contaminated by the bailout. Like sharing dirty needles, the risk of infection for all has drastically increased.
The EFSF is primarily a debt shuffling exercise which may be self defeating and unworkable.
(…) “
© 2010 Satyajit Das
“Increasingly attention may focus on the European Financial Stability Facility ("EFSF"), which is a key component of Europe’s financial contingency plan. Details of the structure reveal doubts about its efficacy.
The structure echoes the ill-fated Collateralised Debt Obligations ("CDOs") and Structured Investment Vehicles ("SIV") (as pointed out by Gillian Tett in the Financial Times). The recently appointed head of the EFSF also had a brief stint at Moore Capital, a macro-hedge fund, entirely consistent with the fact that the EFSF is placing a historical macro-economic bet.
In order to raise money to lend to finance member countries as needed, the EFSF is seeking the highest possible credit rating – AAA. The EFSF’s structure raises significant doubts about its credit worthiness and funding arrangements. In turn, this creates uncertainty about its support for financially challenged Euro-zone members with significant implications for markets.
The €440 billion ($520 billion) rescue package establishes a special purpose vehicle ("SPV"), backed by individual guarantees provided by all 19-member countries. Significantly, the guarantees are not joint and several, reflecting the political necessity, especially for Germany, of avoiding joint liability. The risk that an individual guarantor fails to supply its share of funds is covered by a surplus "cushion", requiring countries to guarantee an extra 20% beyond their ECB shares. An unspecified cash reserve will provide additional support.
Given the well-publicised financial problems of some Euro-zone members, the effectiveness of the 20% cushion is crucial. The arrangement is similar to the over-collateralisation used in CDO’s to protect investors in higher quality AAA rated senior securities. Investors in subordinated securities, ranking below the senior investors, absorb the first losses up to a specified point (the attachment point). Losses are considered statistically unlikely to reach this attachment point, allowing the senior securities to be rated AAA. The same logic is to be utilised in rating EFSF bonds.
If 16.7% of guarantors (20% divided by 120%) are unable to fund the EFSF, lenders to the structure will be exposed to losses. Coincidentally, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland happen to represent around this proportion of the guaranteed amount. If a larger Euro-zone member also encountered financial problems, then the viability of the EFSF would be in serious jeopardy. There are significant difficulties in determining the adequacy of the 20% cushion.
Investors will assume – "wrong way correlation risk". This is the potential risk that if one peripheral Euro-zone members has a problem then others will have similar problems. This means if one country required financing, guarantors of the EFSF will faces demands at the exact time that they themselves will be financially vulnerable.
The structure echoes the ill-fated Collateralised Debt Obligations ("CDOs") and Structured Investment Vehicles ("SIV") (as pointed out by Gillian Tett in the Financial Times). The recently appointed head of the EFSF also had a brief stint at Moore Capital, a macro-hedge fund, entirely consistent with the fact that the EFSF is placing a historical macro-economic bet.
In order to raise money to lend to finance member countries as needed, the EFSF is seeking the highest possible credit rating – AAA. The EFSF’s structure raises significant doubts about its credit worthiness and funding arrangements. In turn, this creates uncertainty about its support for financially challenged Euro-zone members with significant implications for markets.
The €440 billion ($520 billion) rescue package establishes a special purpose vehicle ("SPV"), backed by individual guarantees provided by all 19-member countries. Significantly, the guarantees are not joint and several, reflecting the political necessity, especially for Germany, of avoiding joint liability. The risk that an individual guarantor fails to supply its share of funds is covered by a surplus "cushion", requiring countries to guarantee an extra 20% beyond their ECB shares. An unspecified cash reserve will provide additional support.
Given the well-publicised financial problems of some Euro-zone members, the effectiveness of the 20% cushion is crucial. The arrangement is similar to the over-collateralisation used in CDO’s to protect investors in higher quality AAA rated senior securities. Investors in subordinated securities, ranking below the senior investors, absorb the first losses up to a specified point (the attachment point). Losses are considered statistically unlikely to reach this attachment point, allowing the senior securities to be rated AAA. The same logic is to be utilised in rating EFSF bonds.
If 16.7% of guarantors (20% divided by 120%) are unable to fund the EFSF, lenders to the structure will be exposed to losses. Coincidentally, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland happen to represent around this proportion of the guaranteed amount. If a larger Euro-zone member also encountered financial problems, then the viability of the EFSF would be in serious jeopardy. There are significant difficulties in determining the adequacy of the 20% cushion.
Investors will assume – "wrong way correlation risk". This is the potential risk that if one peripheral Euro-zone members has a problem then others will have similar problems. This means if one country required financing, guarantors of the EFSF will faces demands at the exact time that they themselves will be financially vulnerable.
The structure also faces a high risk of rating migration (a fall in security ratings). If the cushion is reduced by problems of an Euro-zone member, then the EFSF securities may be downgraded. Any such ratings downgrade would result in mark-to-market losses to investors. Recent downgrades to the credit rating of Portugal and Ireland highlight this risk.
(…)
This means that investors may be cautious about investing in EFSF bonds and, at a minimum, may seek a significant yield premium. The ability of the EFSF to raise funds at the assumed low cost is not assured.
Major economies have over the last decades transferred debt from companies to consumers and finally onto public balance sheets. The reality is that a problem of too much debt is being solved with even more debt. Deeply troubled members of the Euro-zone cannot bail out each other as the significant levels of existing debt limit the ability to borrow additional amounts and finance any bailout. As Albert Einstein noted: "You cannot fix a problem with the kind of thinking that created it."
A huge amount of securities and risk now is held by central banks and governments, which are not designed for such long-term ownership of these assets. There are now no more balance sheets that can be leveraged to support the current levels of debt. The effect of the EFSF is that stronger countries’ balance sheets are being contaminated by the bailout. Like sharing dirty needles, the risk of infection for all has drastically increased.
The EFSF is primarily a debt shuffling exercise which may be self defeating and unworkable.
(…) “
© 2010 Satyajit Das
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)