Why are markets crashing?
Contracting bank credit always ends in a
crisis of some sort. With a long-term average of ten years, this cycle
of bank credit has been exceptionally long in the tooth. Before we even
consider the specific factors behind a withdrawal of credit, we can
assume that the longer the period of credit expansion that precedes it,
the greater the slump in economic activity that follows.
Whenever the dollar slipped, by lowering
interest rates instead of raising them the Fed could encourage foreign
portfolio buying. Lower interest rates increased flows of currency and
credit into financial assets instead of debasing the currency in the
non-financial economy.
Thus, the creation of extra bank credit was
directed increasingly into financial speculation in bond and equity
markets. There were bubbles, such as the dotcoms in the late-1990s and
in mortgage financing preceding the financial crisis of 2008/09. Despite
these interruptions, the US authorities made sure that global
investment flows primarily supported US financial interests.
As markets caught on, interest rates
declined to the point where they disappeared altogether. But as Triffin
observed, policies to ensure that a currency is available as the world’s
reserve are economically destructive in the long run, and the whole
trend set in motion from London’s big bang onwards has now concluded
with rising interest rates. It amounts to a super cycle of bank credit
expansion certain to end more dramatically than a single cycle.
Therefore, this bear market and its systemic issues can be expected to
be of a greater magnitude than those which followed the dotcoms and the
Lehman failure.
With interest rates so far beneath the rate
at which prices are rising, which is mainly the consequence of earlier
monetary debasement, losses are now accumulating for all those who
bought into the financialisation story and have failed to bail out of
it. Top of a hubristic list are the central banks themselves which
augmented monetary expansion with the acquisition of substantial bond
portfolios through quantitative easing. Those assets are now collapsing
in value, wiping out central bank equity many times over. The central
banks themselves will need recapitalising before they can tackle the
problems of a widespread systemic collapse in the commercial banking
network.
How to recapitalise a central bank
The Fed recently admitted that unrealised
losses on the bonds on the asset side of its balance sheet stood at
$330bn at end-March, which wipes out its balance sheet equity of $50bn
more than six times over. Since then, bond yields have risen a further
1%, increasing the deficit to closer to $500bn. But in the Fed’s case,
two differences from other central banks should be noted. First, the
profile of US Treasury debt is shorter term in average maturity than in
other advanced economies with high levels of government debt, confirmed
by the Fed’s intention to retain debt to maturity rather than selling
it. This means that price volatility is lessened. And secondly, some of
the debt is agency debt (Fanny Mae, Ginny Mae, and Freddy Mac) which on
early mortgage redemptions distributes payments to mortgage-backed
securities holders. In effect, the maturity profile is shortened by
these repayments, increasing their yield, and reducing their notional
volatility
But the Bank of Japan and the ECB are in an
entirely different situation. And so their ability to underwrite their
commercial banking networks is extremely impaired.
The G-SIBs’ balance sheets have deteriorated significantly
To see any banks with asset to equity
ratios for their ordinary shareholders of more than twenty times, let
alone the two French G-SIBs which appear to be over seventy, is simply
jaw-dropping.
Of particular concern is the bunching of
risk, with the Eurozone’s G-SIB cohort most vulnerable to shocks,
closely followed by the three Japanese banks. That banks in these two
jurisdictions are the most highly leveraged groups is partly a
consequence of negative interest rates. Credit margins have been tightly
compressed, and so long as banking regulations are complied with, the
management of these banks have been encouraged to maintain profitability
by increasing credit leverage.
Furthermore, as discussed below, the
European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan themselves will need to be
recapitalised if they are to underwrite the losses in the commercial
banking sector which are certain to quickly develop as interest rates
rise and bank credit contracts.
The ECB’s impossible position
Economic reality and the ECB’s monetary
policies have only occasionally had a tangential relationship, with the
ECB bullying its way over markets. The falsity of its position is now
being exposed.
Clearly, non-performing loans are rapidly
becoming an issue. Additionally, energy, food, and escalating producer
prices will make the situation far worse in the coming months. The
ability of the Eurozone’s banks to survive all these headwinds will be
increasingly questioned. The news here is exceedingly grim, with balance
sheet common equity to asset ratios in the stratosphere for the
Eurozone G-SIBs. Local banks, upon which most of the non-financial
burden of Eurozone credit defaults will fall will not be so highly
leveraged, being run by sensible local and regional managers in the
main. But in the deteriorating conditions the Eurozone now faces, even
asset to equity ratios of as little as ten times could prove fatal to a
bank’s future.
With respect to their underlying
shareholders, the Eurozone’s G-SIBs are the most highly leveraged
banking cohort. In the face of rising interest rates and the contraction
of bank credit, there can be little doubt that the first G-SIB failures
are likely to be among these banks. The ability of the ECB and its
network of shareholding national central banks to weather a credit storm
will be challenged and almost certainly found wanting.
At the end of 2021, the ECB’s balance
sheet showed assets of €8,466bn and share capital of €109bn. That’s a
ratio of assets to shareholder capital of 78 times. A high ratio is
tolerable for a central bank so long as it sticks to issuing bank notes.
But by last December the ECB had also accumulated Eurozone government
and other bonds totalling €4,886bn.
Since
the year-end, by last Friday the value of these bonds has fallen
sharply, as shown in Table 2, of selected 10-year Eurozone government
bonds.
But just assuming an average loss of 25% on
its bond holdings as of end-December, there is a loss to the ECB’s
assets from this source alone of €1,222bn. That’s a valuation write-off
of over eleven times the ECB’s capital account.
A recapitalisation of the ECB is due as a
matter of urgency before it is called upon along with the relevant
national central banks (NCBs — which are similarly insolvent) to
undertake the rescue of the Eurozone’s G-SIBs. We can see from their
exceptionally high gearing that they are likely to be the first victims
of bank credit contraction.
There are no easy options. It is possible
to conceive of a systemic failure at the central bank level threatening
the existence of the euro itself. Certainly, the foreign exchanges are
likely to be brutal in this matter.
Bank of Japan is in deepening trouble
The Bank of Japan has been conducting QE
since 2000, and to date has accumulated 80% of the country’s ETFs
amounting to 52 trillion yen ($420bn), as well as 538 trillion yen ($3.7
trillion) in bond purchases.It appears that these investments are
carried at cost on the BoJ’s balance sheet. The combined losses amount
to approximately 14 trillion yen ($104bn) since the year-end compared
with balance sheet capital consisting of equity and reserves of 4.7
trillion yen (USD35bn). That’s a rapidly rising ratio of net liabilities
to capital of 3:1.
The Bank of Japan is trying to save
itself from further financial embarrassment by ensuring bond yields rise
no further. It has drawn a line in the sand for the 10-year JGB yield
at 0.25% and has cleaned out the market at this maturity. The price is
now in Humpty Dumpty territory: what the BoJ says is the price, is the
price.
The cost has been yen weakness, which is now accelerating. Figure 1 shows the chart of the yen priced in US dollars.
However, permitting yen interest rates to
rise will lead to further problems for Japan’s commercial banks, which
at equity shareholder level are very highly leveraged, as the table
below illustrates.
The Bank of England has dug a hole for itself as well
How will the Fed respond to global problems?
a Fed funds rate of1.5%—1.75% is still a
long way behind the curve. They are bound to go considerably higher,
collapsing bond and financial collateral values. It will lead to a
crisis in financial markets. And given that the commercial banks in the
Eurozone and Japan possess extremely high shareholder leverage, that can
be expected to occur very soon.
Unless the Fed is prepared to let markets
sort this mess out — a course of action we can dismiss out of hand — the
Fed’s only possible response will be to inflate the dollar to
compensate for the contraction of bank credit. The means by which this
will be done is not the point. There will be no alternative, as the
Fed’s priority will be to save the financial system and to minimise the
consequences for the wider American economy and particularly for the
Federal Government’s finances. The other central banks mentioned in this
article will have to follow suit, where they can. Expect swap lines
between them to be expanded to enable them to do so. Expect bond markets
to be closed by diktat, perhaps for more than a day or two. As helpless
bystanders, we will all be looking into an abyss, fearful that there is
no resolution to an unsolvable crisis.
The outturn could be very different, but
logic suggests the following. Interest rates will rise until bank
failures materialise. Meanwhile, financial assets will have fallen in
value, possibly very quickly. Then we can expect monetary policy to
expand to rescue the commercial banks, supress bond yields and to
finance soaring government deficits.
At this side of the crisis, which is only
in its initial stages, the euro is slated as the first currency to
collapse entirely, not just because it is a fiat designed by committee,
but because of the depth of the structural problems in the ECB and its
shareholders.
Will the authorities respond by suppressing
prices like latter day Diocletians, banning gold ownership as well?
These would be stupid moves, but extremely likely. Gold markets could be
simply closed, denying access to those belatedly fleeing fiat.
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