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Showing posts with label ARTICULO 100 DIRECTIVA 2018/1972. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ARTICULO 100 DIRECTIVA 2018/1972. Show all posts

Sunday, September 10, 2023

CIFRADO DE LOS MENSAJES DE WHATSAPP (ESPAÑA Y EL ARTICULO 100 DEL CODIGO DE LAS COMUNICACIONES ELECTRÓNICAS)

 SPAIN

(E2EE, END TO END ENCRYPTION)

1. To what extent can encrypted CSA material be affected by a detection order? Are you in
favour of including some wording in the Regulation excluding the weakening of E2EE (see, for
example, recital 25 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232)?

If a detection order is issued in connection with the use of encrypted CSA material, the encrypted
material may be significantly affected. First, in many cases, the ISP will be able to access encrypted data. This means that the provider may have the ability to decrypt the encrypted CSA material.


Secondly, the Law Enforcement Authority (LEA) could request access to the encrypted material
and, if the internet service provider refuses to provide it, the LEA could present a judicial order to
obtain access to the encrypted data. If the judicial order is issued, then the encrypted material could
be decrypted.


Ideally, in our view, it would be desirable to legislatively prevent EU-based service providers from
implementing end-to-end encryption.

 
This is highly controversial, proposing as a solution that encryption with automatic decryption be
carried out at some intermediate server of the communication. Obviously, this endpoint should be
informed to the user, being an automatic detection not accessible to the user, being an automatic
detection not accessible to any human operator.


There is no specific wording in Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 that explicitly refers to E2EE
weakening. However, recital 25 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 concerns the protection of personal
data through the adoption of appropriate technical and organisational measures, including
information security. Therefore, language excluding E2EE weakening could be discouraged to
ensure an adequate level of protection of other personal data, even to the detriment of early
detection of CSA. However, the exact level of E2EE weakening that would be excluded should be
determined by EU Member States according to their national regulations.


Law enforcement authorities must have the means to be able to continue to fulfil their legal
obligations now that many criminals have moved to the virtual world.

It is imperative that we have access to the data - for which they must be retained - and it is equally
imperative that we have the capacity to analyse them, no matter how large the volume.

It is our obligation, this is not an option: we must have the necessary technical, human, innovation
and training resources. And among those resources we need to, at least, maintain our current levels
of effectiveness against crime, as well as an advanced, flexible and balanced legal framework that
encourages innovation while fully respecting the citizens' rights and freedoms.


2. Are you in favour of exploring if voluntary detection should be continued? If so, would you
rather prolong the Temporary Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, or include its content in the CSA
proposal?


Yes, we are in favour of continuing voluntary screening by service providers. It is interesting to
extend the Temporary Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 to give companies and organisations more time
to adapt to the requirements of CFS detection. This would allow for a gradual transition and allow agencies to adapt to the new requirements without undue pressure.

 
Regarding this question, we support the Czech delegation's statement. The idea of developing this
new proposal is due to the weaknesses presented by the voluntary content of the temporary
regulation.

 3. Are you in favour of including audio communications in the scope of the CSA proposal, or
would you rather exclude it as in Regulation (EU) 2021/1232?


We do agree on including audio communications in the scope of the CSA proposal. We believe that,
as proposed by the Hungarian Delegation, the Proposal should delete the concrete references to the
different kind of materials (images, texts, videos or audios) and be more general so the proposal
tackles any kind of CSA-related material online.


We would like to highlight that Article 3(1) of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
and Article 24(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states that in all actions related to
children, whether undertaken by public authorities or private institutions, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration. It is also noted that the definition of child pornography was
already outlined by the Council of Europe in 1989 as "any audio or visual material in which a child
is used in a sexual context" (Recommendation (91) 11). This debate is something that should have
been resolved, bearing in mind the latest technological developments.


4. With a view to detecting CSA, do you wish that detection be performed on interpersonal
communications and publicly accessible content, or be limited to publicly accessible content?


As it is done by major service providers in the US, automatic content detection in interpersonal
communications
is the key. Automatic detection informed to the user in the terms of use of the
services, so as not to infringe the user's right to privacy.


It is recommended that detection is carried out both in interpersonal communications and in
publicly accessible content. This would help to ensure that any CSA-related content is identified

and appropriate assistance is provided to victims. We reiterate what was reported in Question 1.

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23819681/law-enforcement-working-party-document-encryption.pdf

 


 

Artículo 100 

Salvaguardias de derechos fundamentales 

1. Las medidas nacionales relativas al acceso o al uso por parte de los usuarios finales de los servicios y las aplicaciones a través de redes de comunicaciones electrónicas respetarán la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea (en lo sucesivo, «Carta») y los principios generales del Derecho de la Unión. 

 2. Cualquier medida relativa al acceso o al uso por parte de los usuarios finales de los servicios y las aplicaciones a través de redes de comunicaciones electrónicas, que sea susceptible de limitar el ejercicio de los derechos y libertades reconocidos en la Carta solo podrá imponerse si está prevista por ley y respeta tales derechos o libertades, es proporcionada, necesaria, y responde efectivamente a objetivos de interés general reconocidos por el Derecho de la Unión o a la necesidad de protección de los derechos y libertades de los demás en línea con el artículo 52, apartado 1, de la Carta y con los principios generales del Derecho de la Unión, que incluyen el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva y a un juicio justo. Por lo tanto, dichas medidas solo podrán ser adoptadas respetando debidamente el principio de presunción de inocencia y el derecho a la intimidad. Se garantizará un procedimiento previo, justo e imparcial, que incluirá el derecho de los interesados a ser oídos, sin perjuicio de que concurran las condiciones y los arreglos procesales adecuados en los casos de urgencia debidamente justificados, de conformidad con la Carta. 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32018L1972

 

 

 

Tuesday, March 26, 2019

MACAULAY (HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1841)-PARLAMENTO EUROPEO



Macaulay se dirigía a los Comunes, en Febrero de 1841, con ocasión de una extensión rechazada en la duración de los derechos de propiedad intelectual en estos términos, que no han perdido actualidad, a la vista de la decisión del Parlamento Europeo de hoy:

"Copyright is monopoly, and produces all the effects which the general voice of mankind attributes to monopoly. My honourable and learned friend talks very contemptuously of those who are led away by the theory that monopoly makes things dear. That monopoly makes things dear is certainly a theory, as all the great truths which have been established by the experience of all ages and nations, and which are taken for granted in all reasonings, may be said to be theories. It is a theory in the same sense in which it is a theory that day and night follow each other, that lead is heavier than water, that bread nourishes, that arsenic poisons, that alcohol intoxicates. If, as my honourable and learned friend seems to think, the whole world is in the wrong on this point, if the real effect of monopoly is to make articles good and cheap, why does he stop short in his career of change? Why does he limit the operation of so salutary a principle to sixty years? Why does he consent to anything short of a perpetuity? He told us that in consenting to anything short of a perpetuity he was making a compromise between extreme right and expediency. But if his opinion about monopoly be correct, extreme right and expediency would coincide. Or rather, why should we not restore the monopoly of the East India trade to the East India Company? (...)

The question of copyright, Sir, like most questions of civil prudence, is neither black nor white, but grey.The system of copyright has great advantages and great disadvantages; and it is our business to ascertain what these are, and then to make an arrangement under which the advantages may be as far as possible secured, and the disadvantages as far as possible excluded. The charge which I bring against my honourable and learned friend's bill is this, that it leaves the advantages nearly what they are at present, and increases the disadvantages at least fourfold

(...)

Now, I will not affirm that the existing law is perfect, that it exactly hits the point at which the monopoly ought to cease; but this I confidently say, that the existing law is very much nearer that point than the law proposed by my honourable and learned friend. For consider this; the evil effects of the monopoly are proportioned to the length of its duration. But the good effects for the sake of which we bear with the evil effects are by no means proportioned to the length of its duration. A monopoly of sixty years produces twice as much evil as a monopoly of thirty years, and thrice as much evil as a monopoly of twenty years. But it is by no means the fact that a posthumous monopoly of sixty years gives to an author thrice as much pleasure and thrice as strong a motive as a posthumous monopoly of twenty years. On the contrary, the difference is so small as to be hardly perceptible.”

Preguntas para nuestros ilustres europarlamentarios y para el defensor del proyecto Herr Voss:

¿Quién cobra y explota por el derecho sobre el protocolo de internet que hace posible su existencia y difusión y la de todos los contenidos disponibles en la misma?

¿Cuántos "layers" adicionales de derechos sin cobro y explotación hacen posible su existencia y difusión y la de todos los contenidos disponibles en la red?

¿Cómo es posible que el protocolo de internet y todas las innovaciones necesarias para su ejecución se hayan desarrollado sin los incentivos y modificaciones que la actual reforma dice introducir en beneficio de los autores?

¿Qué es lo que dicen los estudios empíricos del pasado con copyright sobre la retribución de los autores?

¿En qué modo debe estar garantizada la libertad constitucional -y garantizada por la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea- de expresión en internet y hasta qué punto puede limitarse en la forma establecida?

¿Se ha tenido en cuenta el artículo 100 de la Directiva 2018/1972 (Salvaguardias de derechos fundamentales)?:

“1. Las medidas nacionales relativas al acceso o al uso por parte de los usuarios finales de los servicios y las aplicaciones a través de redes de comunicaciones electrónicas respetarán la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea (en lo sucesivo, «Carta») y los principios generales del Derecho de la Unión.
2.Cualquier medida relativa al acceso o al uso por parte de los usuarios finales de los servicios y las aplicaciones a través de redes de comunicaciones electrónicas, que sea susceptible de limitar el ejercicio de los derechos y libertades reconocidos en la Carta solo podrá imponerse si está prevista por ley y respeta tales derechos o libertades, es proporcionada, necesaria, y responde efectivamente a objetivos de interés general reconocidos por el Derecho de la Unión o a la necesidad de protección de los derechos y libertades de los demás en línea con el artículo 52, apartado 1, de la Carta y con los principios generales del Derecho de la Unión, que incluyen el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva y a un juicio justo. Por lo tanto, dichas medidas solo podrán ser adoptadas respetando debidamente el principio de presunción de inocencia y el derecho a la intimidad. Se garantizará un procedimiento previo, justo e imparcial, que incluirá el derecho de los interesados a ser oídos, sin perjuicio de que concurran las condiciones y los arreglos procesales adecuados en los casos de urgencia debidamente justificados, de conformidad con la Carta.”

No Sr. De Grandes, no es cierto lo que afirma:

"Los derechos de autor son un derecho de propiedad como cualquier otro derecho de propiedad, sea este material o no. Y existe para que los artistas puedan vivir de sus obras, por eso nuestro deber es protegerlo, sin los derechos de autor muchas obras, sean musicales, cinematográficas o de otro tipo, no existirían", afirmó De Grandes

Macaulay lo dijo ya hace 188 años. Lo recordamos de nuevo debidamente traducido:

El copyright es un monopolio y produce todos los efectos que el consenso general de la humanidad atribuye a los monopolios (…) El sistema de copyright tiene grandes ventajas y grandes desventajas, y es nuestro cometido determinar unas y otras y adoptar una decisión que asegure, todo lo posible, las ventajas y excluya, todo lo posible, las desventajas. La acusación que traigo contra el proyecto legislativo de mi honorable e instruido amigo es que deja las ventajas tal y como son en la actualidad e incrementa las desventajas al menos cuatro veces.

(Macaulay, alocución en The House of Commons, 1841)

Eso –debidamente actualizado teniendo en cuenta el nacimiento y desarrollo de internet- es lo que en esencia han dicho la inmensa mayoría de los expertos y no expertos en Europa y fuera de Europa en contra de la reforma aprobada hoy por los europarlamentarios.

Lo mismo indicó Mancur Olson ya en 1982:


Las coaliciones de distribución retardan la capacidad de una sociedad para adoptar nuevas tecnologías y para reasignar recursos en respuesta a las condiciones cambiantes, reduciendo así la tasa de crecimiento económico.

NOTA PARA ESPAÑA:

Los eurodiputados de PP, PSOE, Ciudadanos, PDeCAT y PNV votaron a favor del texto este martes en Estrasburgo. En contra se pronunciaron Podemos, ERC, ICV y EQUO.