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Saturday, September 10, 2022

NIALL FERGUSON'S WARNING: Why Shouldn't It Be as Bad as the 1970s? (II)

 

 



(3) #CIVILIZATION WILL NOT LAST, #FREEDOM WILL NOT SURVIVE, PEACE WILL NOT BE KEPT, UNLESS A VERY LARGE MAJORITY OF MANKIND UNITE TOGETHER TO DEFEND THEM AND SHOW THEMSELVES POSSESED OF A CONSTABULARY POWER BEFORE WHICH BARBARIC AND ATAVISTIC FORCES WILL STAND IN AWE #CHURCHILL

NIALL FERGUSON'S WARNING: Why Shouldn't It Be as Bad as the 1970s?

Thursday, September 1, 2022

ENTERING THE SUPERBUBBLES FINAL ACT (JEREMY GRANTHAM, (III))

 

 

 

 Our best guess is that the level of explained P/E will fall toward 15x, compared to the current level of explained P/E of just under 20x, while the actual P/E just rose from 30x to 34x in mid-August in what was probably a bear market rally.

SUPERBUBBLE: JEREMY GRANTHAM (II)

 

 

 (3) Thus we could say the current event, so far, is looking eerily similar to these other historic superbubbles





SUPERBUBBLE: JEREMY GRANTHAM (I)




 

Wednesday, August 31, 2022

GUERRA Y POLÍTICA INDUSTRIAL (ZOLTAN POZSAR, 24-08-2022 (III) CRISIS DEL "SISTEMA-MUNDO")

Tuesday, August 30, 2022

GUERRA Y POLÍTICA INDUSTRIAL (ZOLTAN POZSAR (24-08-2022, (II))

GUERRA Y POLÍTICA INDUSTRIAL (ZOLTAN POZSAR (24-08-2022), (I))

 


 But when trust is gone, everything is gone, which is the scary conclusion from Dale Copeland’s book:

Economic Interdependence and War

Reviewing 200 years of history, including the Napoleonic and Crimean wars, the book explains that when great powers have positive expectations of the future trade environment, they want to remain at peace in order to secure the economic benefits that enhance long-term economic power. When, however, these expectations turn negative, leaders are likely to fear a loss of access to raw materials and markets, giving them an incentive to initiate crises to protect their commercial interests”. This “theory of trade expectations” holds lessons for understanding not only today’s conflict between the U.S. on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other, but also the outlook for inflation. Put simply…

…if there is trust, trade works. If trust is gone, it doesn’t. Today, trust is gone: Chimerica does not work anymore and Eurussia does not work either. Instead, we have a special relationship between Russia and China, the core economies of the BRICS block and the “king” and the “queen” on the Eurasian chessboard – a new “heavenly match”, forged from the divorce of Chimerica and Eurussia…

 

(….)

 

Energy transition was the only big item on the to-do-list before the war and was a formidable economic challenge to begin with. After the war, the list got longer and so the challenge became even more formidable.

I think that the above four themes (re-arm, re-shore, re-stock, and re-wire the electric grid) will be the defining aims of industrial policy over the next five years. How much the G7 will spend on these items is an open question, but given that the global order is at stake, they will likely not be penny pinching. If Tim Geithner were in charge, he’d put “a lot of money in the window” to show who’s in charge.

And hopefully it will be like that…

…and if so, any investor will have to be mindful that the above to-do-list is:

(1) commodity intensive

(2) capital intensive

(3) interest rate insensitive

(4) uninvestable for the East

Commodity intensity means that inflation will be a nagging problem as the West executes on the above list. Re-arming, re-shoring, re-stocking, and re-wiring need a lot of commodities – it’s a demand shock. It’s a demand shock in a macro environment in which the commodities sector is woefully underinvested – a legacy of a decade of ESG policies. Underinvestment means supply constraints, and geopolitics means even more supply constraints: resource nationalism – see Russia’s stance or Mexico’s recent decision to nationalize lithium mines – means that the supply you think is there to meet the surge in demand isn’t there: prices can thus surge. Executing on the to-do-list can easily drive another commodity super cycle, like the one we had after China joined the WTO in 2000. But that super cycle happened in the context of a peaceful, unipolar world order in which great powers had positive expectations of the future trade environment (see the “theory of trade expectations” above). But that’s not the case anymore.

Capital intensity means that governments and also the private sector will have to borrow long-term to execute the to-dos. Re-arming and re-stocking are the domains of the government, and re-shoring and re-wiring the grid will involve public-private partnerships. Private firms will have to issue debt and raise equity to build things: ships, F-35s, factories, commodity warehouses, and wind turbines.

Insensitivity to interest rates means that the to-do-list will have to be executed regardless of whether the Fed hikes rates to 3.5% or 7%. Hell or high water, executing on the to-do-list is imperative. Industrial sovereignty depends on it. On the other hand, private equity is sensitive to interest rates, and industrial policy done right, with overwhelming force, will eventually “crowd out” private equity. Finance is about multi-decade cycles. Private equity rode the “lowflation” cycle and the cycle of globalization that, post-GFC, enabled decades of money printing.

That cycle is over…

…it broke like FX pegs broke in 1997 and like private money broke in 2008.

Finally, uninvestability means that for certain large countries in the global East, it makes absolutely and categorically no logical sense to roll their investments in G7 debt claims. Not just because of what happened to Russia’s FX reserves, but also because rolling a $1 trillion portfolio of U.S. Treasury securities means that you will fund the West’s effort to re-arm, re-shore, re-stock, and re-wire…

…against the East.

And we are back to where we started on the cover page: Dale Copeland’s theory of trade expectations is the right frame to think about world from here, and sadly things make no sense to continue like they used to, be either from a real (trade/production) perspective or a financial (FX reserves) perspective…

…which is why Bretton Woods III is destined to happen. It’s already happening, and we will explore the Bretton Woods III topic in detail in our upcoming dispatch:

War and Currency Statecraft.

 

ZOLTAN POZSAR (WAR AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 24-08-2022)

 

https://plus2.credit-suisse.com/shorturlpdf.html?v=5amR-YP34-V&t=-1e4y7st99l5d0a0be21hgr5ht

 


 

Monday, August 1, 2022

EL EXCESO DE MUERTES EN ESPAÑA EN EL PERÍODO MAYO-JUNIO 2022 (NÚMERO DE DESVIACIONES ESTÁNDAR, JOSE GEFAELL)

ESPAÑA ES UN SIGMA 15 EN FALLECIMIENTOS

TAIWAN FUE UN SIGMA 26 EN LA CAÍDA EN LA TASA DE NACIMIENTOS

SIGMAS EN EL  S&P 500



JUNE 24, 2016


Sunday, July 31, 2022

EL EXCESO DE MUERTES EN ESPAÑA EN EL PERÍODO MAYO-JULIO 2022 (JOSE GEFAELL)

 

 

 El exceso muertes de 18.500 es mayor que los muertos ucranianos en Mayo–Julio. ¿Qué acción mediática se ha tomado? Centrarse en la viruela. Ni mención a que los 6k Covid tenían casi todos 3 dosis, ni a que los +9k muertos en exceso por causas desconocidas son récord histórico.

Saturday, July 30, 2022

LLAMADA INTERNACIONAL A LOS PEDIATRAS PARA DETENER LA VACUNACIÓN COVID INFANTIL (29-07-2022)

 

 

 

We call for an immediate halt to the mass COVID vaccination of children, until proper scientific dialogue and thorough re-evaluation of the COVID vaccination campaign has occurred. We urgently and strongly encourage pediatricians around the world to join us in that call for an immediate halt. It is our hope that the three Open Letters 3 will stimulate, facilitate, and focus dialogue on the most profoundly important aspects of the COVID situation. We encourage proponents of the mass COVID vaccination campaign to review the information presented in the three Open Letters and respectfully challenge aspects with which they disagree. We welcome such challenge, for that is the purpose and the tradition of healthy scientific dialogue

Please share this letter as widely as possible---with parents, friends, colleagues, and organizations. 

Robert Rennebohm, MD

 Geert Vanden Bossche, DVM, PhD

Wednesday, July 27, 2022

LA GENTE CLAVE EN LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE LOS FILES DE UBER (ICIJ)



The leaked text messages, emails, briefing notes, presentations and other documents in the Uber Files reveal a picture of close working relationships between top Uber executives, government bureaucrats and world leaders. Here is a selection of some of the most influential people who feature in the investigation:

November, 2015


Neelie Kroes

The Netherlands


July 2015

Emmanuel Macron

French minister of economy, industry and digital affairs (2014-2016)

Head of Uber’s Public Policy Advisory Board (2016-2018)

Travis KalanickUber Co-founder & CEO (2009-2017)

Jan 29, 2016



Wednesday, July 20, 2022

PERRY V. UNITED STATES (DEUDA PÚBLICA Y CÁUSULA VALOR ORO (II))

PERRY V. UNITED STATES: DEUDA PÚBLICA Y CLAUSULA VALOR ORO (I)

PERRY V. UNITED STATES: DEUDA PÚBLICA Y CLAUSULA VALOR ORO (I)



Perry v. United States

Majority

The question of damages. In this view of the binding quality of the Government's obligations, we come to the question as to the plaintiff's right to recover damages. That is a distinct question. Because the Government is not at liberty to alter or repudiate its obligations, it does not follow that the claim advanced by the plaintiff should be sustained. The action is for breach of contract. As a remedy for breach, plaintiff can recover no more than the loss he has suffered and of which he may rightfully complain. He is not entitled to be enriched. Plaintiff seeks judgment for $16,931.25, in present legal tender currency, on his bond for $10,000. The question is whether he has shown damage to that extent, or any actual damage, as the Court of Claims has no authority to entertain an action for nominal damages. Grant v. United States, 7 Wall. 331, 338; Marion R.V. Ry. Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 280, 282; Nortz v. United States, decided this day, ante, p. 317. 355 12 Perry v. United States 294 U.S. 330 (1935) Plaintiff computes his claim for $16,931.25 by taking the weight of the gold dollar as fixed by the President's proclamation of January 31, 1934, under the Act of May 12, 1933 ( 48 Stat. 52, 53), as amended by the Act of January 30, 1934 ( 48 Stat. 342), that is, at 15 5/21 grains nine-tenths fine, as compared with the weight fixed by the Act of March 14, 1900 ( 31 Stat. 45), or 25.8 grains nine-tenths fine. But the change in the weight of the gold dollar did not necessarily cause loss to the plaintiff of the amount claimed. The question of actual loss cannot fairly be determined without considering the economic situation at the time the Government offered to pay him the $10,000, the face of his bond, in legal tender currency. The case is not the same as if gold coin had remained in circulation. That was the situation at the time of the decisions under the legal tender acts of 1862 and 1863. Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229, 251; Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687, 695; Thompson v. Butler, 95 U.S. 694, 696, 697. Before the change in the weight of the gold dollar in 1934, gold coin had been withdrawn from circulation. The Congress had authorized the prohibition of the exportation of gold coin and the placing of restrictions upon transactions in foreign exchange. Acts of March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1; January 30, 1934, 48 Stat. 337. Such dealings could be had only for limited purposes and under license. Executive Orders of April 20, 1933, August 28, 1933, and January 15, 1934; Regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, January 30 and 31, 1934. That action the Congress was entitled to take by virtue of its authority to deal with gold coin as a medium of exchange. And the restraint thus imposed upon holders of gold coin was incident to the limitations which inhered in their ownership of that coin and gave them no right of action. Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302, 310, 311. The Court said in that case: "Conceding the title of the owner of such coins, yet there is attached to such ownership those limitations which public policy may require by reason of their quality as a legal tender and as a medium of exchange. These limitations are due to the fact that public law gives to such coinage a value which does not attach as a mere consequence of intrinsic value. Their quality as a legal tender is an attribute of law aside from their bullion value. They bear, therefore, the impress of sovereign power which fixes value and authorizes their use and exchange. . . . However unwise a law may be, aimed at the exportation of such coins, in the face of the axioms against obstructing the free flow of commerce, there can be no serious doubt that the power to coin money includes the power to prevent its outflow from the country of its origin." The same reasoning is applicable to the imposition of restraints upon transactions in foreign exchange. We cannot say, in view of the conditions that existed, that the Congress, having this power, exercised it arbitrarily or capriciously. And the holder of an obligation, or bond, of the United States, payable in gold coin of the former standard, so far as the restraint upon the right to export gold coin or to engage in transactions in foreign exchange is concerned, was in no better case than the holder of gold coin itself. In its Report of May 27, 1933, it was stated by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency: "By the Emergency Banking Act and the existing Executive Orders gold is not now paid, or obtainable for payment, on obligations public or private." Sen. Rep. No. 99, 73d Cong., 1st sess. In considering what damages, if any, the plaintiff has sustained by the alleged breach of his bond, it is hence inadmissible to assume that he was entitled to obtain gold coin for recourse to foreign markets, or for dealings in foreign exchange, or for other purposes contrary to the control over gold coin which the Congress had the power to exert, and had exerted, in its monetary regulation. Plaintiff's damages could not be assessed without regard to the internal economy of the country at the time the alleged breach occurred. The discontinuance of gold payments and the establishment of legal tender currency on a standard unit of value with which "all forms of money" of the United States were to be "maintained at a parity," had a controlling influence upon the domestic economy. It was adjusted to the new basis. A free domestic market for gold was non-existent. 13 Perry v. United States 294 U.S. 330 (Plaintiff demands the "equivalent" in currency of the gold coin promised. But "equivalent" cannot mean more than the amount of money which the promised gold coin would be worth to the bondholder for the purposes for which it could legally be used. That equivalence or worth could not properly be ascertained save in the light of the domestic and restricted market which the Congress had lawfully established. In the domestic transactions to which the plaintiff was limited, in the absence of special license, determination of the value of the gold coin would necessarily have regard to its use as legal tender and as a medium of exchange under a single monetary system with an established parity of all currency and coins. And in view of the control of export and foreign exchange, and the restricted domestic use, the question of value, in relation to transactions legally available to the plaintiff, would require a consideration of the purchasing power of the dollars which the plaintiff could have received. Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that in relation to buying power he has sustained any loss whatever. On the contrary, in view of the adjustment of the internal economy to the single measure of value as established by the legislation of the Congress, and the universal availability and use throughout the country of the legal tender currency in meeting all engagements, the payment to the plaintiff of the amount which he demands would appear to constitute not a recoupment of loss in any proper sense but an unjustified enrichment. Plaintiff seeks to make his case solely upon the theory that by reason of the change in the weight of the dollar he is entitled to one dollar and sixty-nine cents in the present currency for every dollar promised by the bond, regardless of any actual loss he has suffered with respect to any transaction in which his dollars may be used. We think that position is untenable. In the view that the facts alleged by the petition fail to show a cause of action for actual damages, the first question submitted by the Court of Claims is answered in the negative. It is not necessary to answer the second question. Question No. 1 is answered "No."

Minority

By various orders of the President and the Treasury from April 5 to December 28, 1933, persons holding gold certificates were required to deliver them, and accept "an equivalent amount of any form of coin or currency coined or issued under the laws of the United States designated by the Secretary of the Treasury." Heavy penalties were provided for failure to comply.

 

The Act of March 14, 1900, 31 Stat., c. 41, 45, 47, as amended, in effect until January 31, 1934, provided: "That the dollar consisting of twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of gold nine-tenths fine, . . . shall be the standard unit of value, and all forms of money issued or coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value with this standard,"

By Executive Orders, April 5, and April 20, 1933, the President undertook to require owners of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates, to deliver them on or before May 1st to a Federal Reserve Bank, and to prohibit the exportation of gold coin, gold bullion or gold certificates. As a consequence the United States were off the gold standard and their paper money began a rapid decline in the markets of the world. Gold coin, gold certificates and gold bullion were no longer obtainable. "Gold is not now paid nor is it available for payment upon public or private debts" was declared in Treasury statement of May 27, 1933; and this is still true. All gold coins have been melted into bars.

The Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934, 48 Stat., c. 6, p. 337, 342, undertook to ratify preceding Presidential orders and proclamations requiring surrender of gold but prohibited him from establishing the weight of the gold dollar "at more than 60 per centum of its present weight." By proclamation, January 31, 1934, he directed that thereafter the standard should contain 15 5/21 grains of gold, nine-tenths fine. (The weight had been 25.8 grains since 1837.) No such dollar has been coined at any time. The fundamental problem now presented is whether recent statutes passed by Congress in respect of money and credits, were designed to attain a legitimate end. Or whether, under the guise of pursuing a monetary policy, Congress really has inaugurated a plan primarily designed to destroy private obligations, repudiate national debts and drive into the Treasury all gold within the country, in exchange for inconvertible promises to pay, of much less value. Considering all the circumstances, we must conclude they show that the plan disclosed is of the latter description and its enforcement would deprive the parties before us of their rights under the Constitution. Consequently the Court should do what it can to afford adequate relief.

Considering all the circumstances, we must conclude they show that the plan disclosed is of the latter description and its enforcement would deprive the parties before us of their rights under the Constitution. Consequently the Court should do what it can to afford adequate relief.

Can the Government, obliged as though a private person to observe the terms of its contracts, destroy them by legislative changes in the currency and by statutes forbidding one to hold the thing which it has agreed to deliver? If an individual should undertake to annul or lessen his obligation by secreting or manipulating his assets with the intent to place them beyond the reach of creditors, the attempt would be denounced as 381 fraudulent, wholly ineffective. Counsel for the Government and railway companies asserted with emphasis that incalculable financial disaster would follow refusal to uphold, as authorized by the Constitution, impairment and repudiation of private obligations and public debts. Their forecast is discredited by manifest exaggeration. But, whatever may be the situation now confronting us, it is the outcome of attempts to destroy lawful undertakings by legislative action; and this we think the Court should disapprove in no uncertain terms

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS, MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, and MR. JUSTICE BUTLER dissent

Congress responded to the ambiguous Perry ruling with an additional resolution (Pub. Res. 74–63) that provided sovereign immunity of the federal government against claims for damage resulting from the devaluation of currency or other federal obligations

We want a Supreme Court,” declared President Franklin Roosevelt in March 1937, “which will do justice under the Constitution — not over it. In our courts, we want a government of laws and not of men.”

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/5118

(a)In this section—

(1)gold clause” means a provision in or related to an obligation alleging to give the obligee a right to require payment in—

(A)

gold;

(B)

a particular United States coin or currency; or

(C)

United States money measured in gold or a particular United States coin or currency.

(2)

public debt obligation” means a domestic obligation issued or guaranteed by the United States Government to repay money or interest.

(b)

The United States Government may not pay out any gold coin. A person lawfully holding United States coins and currency may present the coins and currency to the Secretary of the Treasury for exchange (dollar for dollar) for other United States coins and currency (other than gold and silver coins) that may be lawfully held. The Secretary shall make the exchange under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

(c)

(1)The Government withdraws its consent given to anyone to assert against the Government, its agencies, or its officers, employees, or agents, a claim—

(A)

on a gold clause public debt obligation or interest on the obligation;

(B)

for United States coins or currency; or

(C)

arising out of the surrender, requisition, seizure, or acquisition of United States coins or currency, gold, or silver involving the effect or validity of a change in the metallic content of the dollar or in a regulation about the value of money.

(2)

Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a proceeding in which no claim is made for payment or credit in an amount greater than the face or nominal value in dollars of public debt obligations or United States coins or currency involved in the proceeding.

(3)

Except when consent is not withdrawn under this subsection, an amount appropriated for payment on public debt obligations and for United States coins and currency may be expended only dollar for dollar.

(d)

(1)

In this subsection, “obligation” means any obligation (except United States currency) payable in United States money.

(2)

An obligation issued containing a gold clause or governed by a gold clause is discharged on payment (dollar for dollar) in United States coin or currency that is legal tender at the time of payment. This paragraph does not apply to an obligation issued after October 27, 1977.

#GOLDCLAUSECASES hashtag#SCOTUS hashtag#HUGHESCOURT hashtag#LIBERTYBOND hashtag#PERRYVUNITEDSTATES (1) PERRY V. UNITED STATES 294 US 330 (1935)

PERRY V. UNITED STATES, LIBERTY BOND, DEUDA PÚBLICA Y CLAUSULA VALOR ORO, SCOTUS, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,