PRESERVANDO LOS BIENES COMUNES (COMMONS)

"This textbook will discuss the main framework, concepts and applications of the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues for an undergraduate audience. We began teaching a course on collective and the commons in 2007 at Arizona State University. Initially we made use of Ostrom’s classic book “Governing the Commons”, but this book was not written for an undergraduate audience. Moreover, many new insights have been developed since the 1990 publication of “Governing the Commons”. Therefore we decided to write our own textbook, which we have been using since the Spring of 2012.

In this book you will learn about institutions–the rules and norms that guide the interactions among us. Those rules and norms can be found from traffic rules, rules in sports, regulations on when and where alcohol can be consumed, to constitutional rules that define who can become president of the United States of America. Rules and norms guide us to cooperative outcomes of so-called collective action problems. If we rely on voluntary contributions only to get anything done, this may not lead to the best results. But research also shows that coercion of people to comply to strict rules do not necessary lead to good outcomes. What combination of sticks and carrots is needed to be successful to solve collective action problems such as sustaining the commons?

The book is based on the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. Ostrom is best known as the 2009 co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”. Elinor Ostrom was a professor at Indiana University since the mid 1960s, and a part-time research professor at Arizona State University since 2006. She was active in research and teaching until her death at the age of 78 on June 12, 2012."

More information on the work of Elinor Ostrom can be found at:

Nobel Prize website
Website at Indiana University

Some related websites you may find of interest:
Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity (CSID), Arizona State University – the authors’ research center.
The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University – the research center founded by the Ostroms in 1973.
International Association to Study the Commons – an international society for scholars who study the commons.

Examples of  commons:
www.cancercommons.org
www.creativecommons.org
www.commonsrising.ning.com
www.otherworldsarepossible.org/defending-global-commons
www.onthecommons.org
www.flickr.com/commons/

Descargadel libro ·Sustaining the Commons”

Cuadro sobre tipos de reglas como variables exógenas que afectan a una situación, incluido en el libro:

EZ crisis and historical trilemmas | vox LA CRISIS DE LA EUROZONA Y LOS TRILEMAS HISTORICOS

EZ crisis and historical trilemmas | vox

The European crisis in the context of historical trilemmas

Michael Bordo, Harold James, 19 October 2013

The Eurozone’s tangle of conflicting goals – a series of ‘trilemmas’ – is not without precedent. This column argues that it is reminiscent of the interwar situation. The interwar slump was so intractable not just due to financial issues, but also a crisis of democracy, of social stability, and of the international political system. The big difference in the EZ is that nations cannot go off the euro as they went off the gold standard. That is why the initial EZ crisis may not have been so acute as some of the gold standard sudden stops, but the recovery or bounce back is painfully slow and protracted.

Esta columna sostiene que la crisis de objetivos contradictorios revive la situación de entreguerras.El deterioro del período no fue debido solo a cuestiones financieras sino también a un crisis de la democracia, de la estabilidad social y del sistema político internacional.La principal diferencia en la EZ es que las naciones no pueden abandonar el euro como abandonaron el patrón oro.Esta es la razón por la que la criss de la EZ puede no haber sido tan aguda como alguno de los repentinos parones del patrón oro, pero la recuperación o vuelta atrás es penosamente lenta y prolongada. 

The linkages of these issues can be summarized as a series of impossible trinities or trilemmas.

1. The macroeconomic classic – fixed exchange rates, capital flows, autonomous monetary policy;

2. The financial sector – fixed exchange rates, capital flows, financial stability;

3. The international relations setting – fixed exchange rates, capital flows, national policy independence; 

and

4. The political economy – fixed exchange rates, capital flows, democratization.

STEDH DELVINA V. ALBANIA, 8-03-2013

Case of delvina v. albania (merits) 8 03-2011 from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

60 ANIVERSARIO DE LA ENTRADA EN VIGOR DEL CEDH

The European Convention on Human Rights, which was signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953. Under Article 66 of the Convention, the Convention’s entry into force was triggered by the deposit in Strasbourg of the tenth instrument of ratification, which was deposited by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

President Dean Spielmann expressed satisfaction at the anniversary, saying: “Those who deposited the instrument of ratification believed that the Convention would form the bedrock of democratic Europe, an enterprise for peace and freedom. They considered it a great honour for Luxembourg to make possible the entry into force of what they described as ‘the finest European undertaking to date’. Sixty years on, we strive every day to continue on the course they charted for us.”

Since 1953, over 500,000 applications have been dealt with by the machinery set up under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Court has delivered approximately 16,500 judgments.

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4475019-5391788#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-4475019-5391788%22]}

To end the Eurozone crisis, bury the debt forever | vox

To end the Eurozone crisis, bury the debt forever | vox

La contribución completa de Pâris y Wiplosz

CRISIS DE DEUDA DE LA EUROZONA: UNA OPCION

 Lo más relevante de la contribución de Pâris y Wyplosz

 

To end the Eurozone crisis, bury the debt forever

Pierre Pâris, Charles Wyplosz, 6 August 2013

The Eurozone’s debt crisis is getting worse despite appearances to the contrary. How can we end it? This column presents five major options for reducing crisis countries’ debt. Looking into the details, it seems the only option that is both realistic and effective is for countries to default by selling monetised debt to the ECB. Moral hazard aside, burying the debt seems to be the only way we can end the crisis.

(…)

 

How to gauge the Eurozone debt crisis

This leaves us with a coarser measure – the evolution of public debts – as a ratio to GDP. Spreads were clearly better indicators before OMT. There are plenty of problems with debt-to-GDP ratios:

• Gross debts are gross, i.e. they ignore public assets.
• Gross debts ignore unfunded public liabilities such as pensions and healthcare.

In most countries the unfunded liabilities – which include the potential costs of bailing out banks when and if they fail – are vastly bigger than the public assets that can be disposed of.

• GDP is a static measure of the ability to pay; GDP growth also matters.³

Noting that Eurozone growth seems to have slipped into a go-slow phase, the GDP denominator is likely to grow slower than it did in the 1990s. 
The three points taken together suggest that debt-to-GDP ratios of the 2010s paint a more optimistic picture of sustainability than the same levels in the 1990s.
Be that as it may, Figure 1 displays the public debt to GDP ratio for the Eurozone as a whole, along with the highest and lowest member country ratios (ignoring the two special cases of Estonia and Luxembourg).

• Even including optimistic forecasts for 2013, the figure can only confirm that the situation is getting worse.

If public debt seemed likely to be unsustainable in 2008, the likelihood is even higher now. Strikingly, this holds even for Greece, in spite of the restructuring of its public debt in 2011, which was large enough to bankrupt the Cypriot banking system. Put differently, not only the initial problem has not been solved, it has also been made worse.
There can be no surprise here. Budget stabilisation cannot work during a recession as was pointed out at the outset of crisis (Giavazzi 2010, Wyplosz 2010).
Figure 1. Debt to GDP ratios in the Eurozone (%)

Source: AMECO-on-line, European Commission.
(…)

Option 5: Debt monetisation

As often when numbers become too big for governments, the central bank emerges as the lender of last resort. De Grauwe (2011) has made the crucial observation that the fundamental reason why the debt crisis has been circumscribed to the Eurozone is that the markets did not believe that the ECB was ready to backstop public debts.
The success of the ECB’s OMT programme so far, in spite of its conditional nature, shows the role that a central bank can play when it moves in the direction of accepting its role as a lender of last resort. But stabilising spreads is merely a temporary stopgap. The legacy of crippling and threatening public debts remains to be dealt with.
This is why debt monetisation emerges as another solution.⁵ But a mere purchase of bonds by the ECB will not work for two reasons:

• First, each country must pay interest on its bonds, including those held by the central bank.

These payments would go into the ECB’s profits to be paid back to its shareholders, i.e. to all member countries. As shown by De Grauwe and Ji (2013), this would be a transfer “in the wrong direction” from the country being “helped” to the “helping” countries. The only relief to a country would be through its own share of rebated payments.

• Second, when the debt matures, the country will have to pay back the principal.

All in all, the relief is bound to be very limited.⁶ 

How the ECB could deal with the debt

For debt monetisation to allow for relief, the debt must be somehow eliminated once it has been acquired by the ECB. One way of achieving this goal is as follows:

• First, the ECB buys bonds of a country, say for a value of €100.
• Second, it exchanges these bonds against a perpetual, interest-free loan of €100.

The loan will remain indefinitely as an asset on the book of the ECB but, in effect, it will never be paid back (unless the ECB is liquidated).
The counterpart of this operation will appear on the liability side of the ECB’s balance sheet as a €100 increase in the monetary base. This is the cost of the debt monetisation.
Debt monetisation has a bad reputation, which is justified by the fact that it has often led in the past to runaway inflation.
Under current conditions, this is most unlikely to be inflationary. Given the icy state of credit markets, increases in the money base do not translate into increases of the actual money supply; in effect, the money multiplier is about zero.
In addition, high unemployment has created a deflationary environment. But, hopefully, the credit market will be revived one day and the recession will come to an end. At this stage, the money base will have to be shrunk. This is the exit problem (Wyplosz 2013). An alternative is to raise reserve requirements to reduce the size of the money multiplier. Either way, the balance sheet expansion need not lead to inflation.
One solution is for the ECB to sterilise its entire bond buying under this programme by issuing its own debt instruments, leaving the size of the money base unchanged. This can be done at the time of bond purchases or later, when exit will be undertaken.
Of course, the ECB will have to pay interest on its debt instruments, which will reduce profits and seigniorage to all member countries, both the defaulting ones and the others. This transfer ‘in the right direction’ is the way all member countries will share the loss inherent to debt restructuring.⁷
As always, we have to accept the tyranny of numbers. Today’s balance sheet of the ECB amounts to €2430 billion. The big bang example examined above would add €1200 billion, an increase of 50%. This is huge, but not unprecedented. In July 2007, the ECB balance sheet was €1190 billion – half of what it is today.

Conclusion

At the end of the day, except for Option 1, which is the classic virtuous approach, and Option 2, the disposable of public assets, none of the other options is appealing.
But if Options 1 and 2 are impossible, one has to choose among bad options.
Option 3 is clearly the least desirable because it would shake the markets and possibly take down large segments of the banking system. Option 4 is not just politically explosive; it could trigger a debt crisis among the countries currently perceived as healthy. This leaves us with Option 5.
Of course, defaulting through the ECB is merely a fig leaf to hide the cost of debt restructuring. In addition to spreading the impact over the long run, it has the advantage that the non-virtuous countries will share the costs in the form of reduced profit transfers from the ECB over the long run.
Obviously, debt cancellation entails a huge moral hazard that needs to be dealt with. Here it bears to emphasise that bringing the crisis to an end requires two conceptually different actions:

• One is dealing with the legacy of unsustainable debts, which is what the options presented here do (note that it is proposed to deal with the debt stock legacy, not to finance on-going deficits. A once-for-all action is far less dangerous than a permanent moral hazard).
• The other is to make sure that it will never happen again.

This calls for the adoption of a rock-solid fiscal discipline framework. Solutions other than the ineffective Stability and Growth Pact exist, but this is not the topic of this article. The ECB must require that this be done, and done well, before stepping into the quagmire.
Topics: EU institutions, Macroeconomic policy
Tags: Debt crisis, debt monetisation, Eurozone crisis

Pierre Pâris

CEO and Founding partner, Banque Pâris Bertrand Sturdza

Charles Wyplosz

Professor of International Economics, Graduate Institute, Geneva; Director, International Centre for Money and Banking Studies; CEPR Research Fellow

ESPAÑA, UNA TEMPORADA EN EL INFIERNO

Comentario de Jordi Amat en La Vanguardia sobre el libro de Juan Pedro Quiñonero "Tú que no puedes"

"La confianza en las instituciones seguirá siendo la más baja de Europa" (es un decir)

Blog de Juan Pedro Quiñonero

JUSTICIA PARA ERIZOS DE RONALD DWORKIN

Iureamicorum: Justicia para erizos de Dworkin: Muy bueno el Link del blog de Roberto Gargarella sobre el Seminario que se realizó en la Boston University sobre el último libro de Ronal...


Referencias importantes del libro último del autor de "Tomando los derechos en serio"

STEDH "N.K.M. v HUNGRIA"

Case of n.k.m. v. hungary 14 05-2013 from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero