La cuestión planteada por la Sentencia del TS -y por la Sentencia previa del TS también comentada en la anterior entrada- está relacionada con la prohibición del "bis in idem". Esta es la doctrina del TEDH sobre la misma:
"20. The non bis in idem principle prohibits prosecution or trial for the “same offence”. In Sergey Zolotukhinv. Russia [GC] the Court acknowledged that it had adopted a variety of approaches in the past, placing the emphasis either on identity of the facts irrespective of their legal characterisation (the “same conduct”, idem factum, Gradinger v. Austria, § 55), on the legal classification, accepting that the same facts could give rise to different offences (“concours ideal d’infractions”, see Oliveira v. Switzerland, §§ 25-29), or on the existence or otherwise of “essential elements” common to both offences (Franz Fischer v. Austria). After examining the scope of the right not to be tried and punished twice as set forth in other international instruments (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and American Convention on Human Rights) and noting that the approach which emphasised the legal characterisation of the two offences was too restrictive on the rights of the individual, the Court took the view that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 should be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of an individual for a second “offence” in so far as it arose from identical facts or facts which were “substantially” the same as those underlying the first offence (§§ 79-82; see also A and B v. Norway [GC], § 108). The starting point for the determination of whether the facts in both proceedings were identical or substantially the same should be the statements of fact concerning both the offence for which the applicant had already been tried and the offence of which he or she stands accused (§ 83). The Court emphasised that it was irrelevant which parts of the new charges were eventually upheld or dismissed in the subsequent proceedings, because Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 contains a safeguard against being tried or being liable to be tried again in new proceedings rather than a prohibition on a second conviction or acquittal. It held that its inquiry should therefore focus on those facts which constitute a set of concrete factual circumstances involving the same defendant and inextricably linked together in time and space, the existence of which must be demonstrated in order to secure a conviction or institute criminal proceedings (§§ 83-84)."
Lo anterior debería resultar aplicable incluso después de la reforma del CP de 2015:
"La reforma de 2015 ha introducido un subtipo agravado en el remodelado alzamiento de bienes cuando la deuda eludida deriva de la comisión de un delito contra la Hacienda Pública. Que se adicione ese inciso al lado de los casos de deudas de derecho público en que la acreedora es una Administración Pública parece abonar el entendimiento de que las deudas tributarias no se han incluido hasta 2015 y desde esa fecha solo se incluyen cuando derivan de un delito."
Siempre que concurran las circunstancias señaladas por la STS 747/2022, de 27 de julio de 2022 (Ponente Antonio del Moral García) y por la doctrina del TEDH aquí mencionada:
"En efecto: el contenido de injusto es idéntico; y la equiparabilidad del nivel de antijuricidad de la conducta de quien omite el pago de tributos engañando en las declaraciones u omitiéndolas; a la de quien lo hace mediante el expediente de ocultar los bienes es plena. No hay diferencia alguna. Solo cuando el alzamiento se conviertaen una conducta posterior y autónoma (v.gr., producción del alzamiento después del descubrimiento de la ocultación) y existe solución de continuidad, podremos hablar de concurso de delitos."
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