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Monday, March 28, 2022
TEDH (N.M. OTHERS V. FRANCE): INDEMNIZACIÓN POR ANOMALÍAS NO DETECTADAS EN DIAGNÓSTICO PRENATAL
In today’s Chamber judgment1 in the case of N.M. and Others v. France (application no. 66328/14)
the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been:
a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
The case concerns the dismissal, by the administrative courts, of the arguments submitted by the
parents in their claim for compensation for the special costs arising from their child’s disability. This
disability had not been detected at the time of the prenatal diagnosis. Legislative provisions arising
from the Law of 4 March 2002, and codified under Article L. 114-5 of the Social Action and Family
Code (CASF) – which prohibited the inclusion of these costs when calculating the prejudice for which
compensation was payable, and which had entered into force after the child’s birth but prior to the
parents’ legal action for compensation – were applied to the dispute.
This case follows on from the cases of Maurice and Draon against France (Draon v. France [GC],
no. 1513/03, and Maurice v. France [GC], no. 11810/03).
The Court held, firstly, that the applicants could legitimately have expected to be able to obtain
compensation for the prejudice they had sustained, corresponding to the costs of caring for their
disabled child, as soon as that damage occurred, namely from the child’s birth, and that they had
therefore had a “possession” within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
It then noted that, under the Constitutional Council’s decision no. 2010-2 QPC, all of the transitional
provisions requiring the retrospective application of Article L. 114-5 of the CASF had been repealed.
Although the abolition of these transitional provisions immediately left scope for application of the
rules of ordinary law governing application of the law over time, the Court found a divergence
between the interpretation adopted by the Conseil d’État and that adopted by the Court of
Cassation regarding the possibility of applying Article L. 114-5 of the CASF to events which arose
prior to the entry into force of the Law of 4 March 2002 (that is, 7 March 2002). Although in its
judgment of 15 December 2011, the Court of Cassation had ruled out the application of Article L.
114-5 of the CASF to events which had occurred prior to 7 March 2002, irrespective of the date on
which the action for compensation was brought, the Conseil d’Etat had settled the dispute in line
with its decision of 13 May 2011 which, for its part, had maintained a certain retrospective scope to
this provision.
The Court concluded that it was unable to find that the legality of the interference resulting from the
Conseil d’État’s application of Article L. 114-5 of the CASF in its decision of 31 March 2014 could be
derived from the settled and stabilised case-law of the domestic courts. In the Court’s view, the
retrospective interference with the applicants’ possessions could not therefore be regarded as
having been "provided for by law" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
1.
Sunday, March 27, 2022
Friday, March 25, 2022
EL LENGUAJE DE LA HISTORIA Y LA DESORIENTACIÓN EUROPEA (III, NIALL FERGUSON)
Putin Misunderstands History. So, Unfortunately, Does the U.S. -AND EUROPE Biden is making a colossal mistake in thinking he can bleed Russia dry, topple Putin and signal to China to keep its hands off Taiwan. “The language people speak in the corridors of power,” former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter once observed, “is not economics or politics. It is history.” “The only end game now,” a senior administration official was heard to say at a private event earlier this month, “is the end of Putin regime. Until then, all the time Putin stays, [Russia] will be a pariah state that will never be welcomed back into the community of nations. China has made a huge error in thinking Putin will get away with it. Seeing Russia get cut off will not look like a good vector and they’ll have to re-evaluate the Sino-Russia axis. All this is to say that democracy and the West may well look back on this as a pivotal strengthening moment.” I gather that senior British figures are talking in similar terms. There is a belief that “the U.K.’s No. 1 option is for the conflict to be extended and thereby bleed Putin.” Again and again, I hear such language. It helps explain, among other things, the lack of any diplomatic effort by the U.S. to secure a cease-fire. It also explains the readiness of President Joe Biden to call Putin a war criminal. The optimism, however, is the assumption that allowing the war to keep going will necessarily undermine Putin’s position; and that his humiliation in turn will serve as a deterrent to China. I fear these assumptions may be badly wrong and reflect a misunderstanding of the relevant history. I would put it like this: Cold War II is like a strange mirror-image of Cold War I. In the First Cold War, the senior partner was Russia, the junior partner was China — now the roles are reversed. In Cold War I, the first hot war was in Asia (Korea) — now it’s in Europe (Ukraine). In Cold War I, Korea was just the first of many confrontations with aggressive Soviet-backed proxies — today the crisis in Ukraine will likely be followed by crises in the Middle East (Iran) and Far East (Taiwan). History talks in the corridors of power. But it speaks in different voices, according to where the corridors are located. In my view — and I really would love to be wrong about this — the Biden administration is making a colossal mistake in thinking that it can protract the war in Ukraine, bleed Russia dry, topple Putin and signal to China to keep its hands off Taiwan. And China watches all this with a growing sense of certainty that it is not up against the U.S. of Truman and Kennan. For that America — the one that so confidently waged the opening phase of Cold War I — is itself now history.Betting on a Russian revolution is betting on an exceedingly rare event, even if the war continues to go badly for Putin, writes @nfergus https://t.co/ZknQQWMxYp via @bopinion #NIALLFERGUSON
— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) March 25, 2022
The language people speak in the corridors of power is not economics ... It is history
LA BRÚJULA Y LA DESORIENTACIÓN EUROPEA (II, FEDERICO SANTOPINTO)
Monday, March 21, 2022
"LA BRÚJULA ESTRATÉGICA" DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA, LOS TRATADOS DE LA UE Y LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA (I)
La participación de España, al menos, no contaría con el respaldo de los Tratados de la UE firmados (arts 3 y 4 TFUE), constituye una cesión de soberanía en el área de la defensa no cubierta por los mismos ni por la Constitución Española (arts 93 y 94) y requería, por todo ello, la intervención y ratificación de las Cortes
Y lo mismo sucedería respecto de los restantes Estados miembros
Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea
Artículo 1
1. El presente Tratado organiza el funcionamiento de la Unión y determina los ámbitos, la delimitación y las condiciones de ejercicio de sus competencias.
2. El presente Tratado y el Tratado de la Unión Europea constituyen los Tratados sobre los que se fundamenta la Unión. Estos dos Tratados, que tienen el mismo valor jurídico, se designarán con la expresión «los Tratados».
TÍTULO I CATEGORÍAS Y ÁMBITOS DE COMPETENCIAS DE LA UNIÓN
Artículo 2
1. Cuando los Tratados atribuyan a la Unión una competencia exclusiva en un ámbito determinado, sólo la Unión podrá legislar y adoptar actos jurídicamente vinculantes, mientras que los Estados miembros, en cuanto tales, únicamente podrán hacerlo si son facultados por la Unión o para aplicar actos de la Unión.
2. Cuando los Tratados atribuyan a la Unión una competencia compartida con los Estados miembros en un ámbito determinado, la Unión y los Estados miembros podrán legislar y adoptar actos jurídicamente vinculantes en dicho ámbito. Los Estados miembros ejercerán su competencia en la medida en que la Unión no haya ejercido la suya. Los Estados miembros ejercerán de nuevo su competencia en la medida en que la Unión haya decidido dejar de ejercer la suya.
3. Los Estados miembros coordinarán sus políticas económicas y de empleo según las modalidades establecidas en el presente Tratado, para cuya definición la Unión dispondrá de competencia.
4. La Unión dispondrá de competencia, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Tratado de la Unión Europea, para definir y aplicar una política exterior y de seguridad común, incluida la definición progresiva de una política común de defensa.
5. En determinados ámbitos y en las condiciones establecidas en los Tratados, la Unión dispondrá de competencia para llevar a cabo acciones con el fin de apoyar, coordinar o complementar la acción de los Estados miembros, sin por ello sustituir la competencia de éstos en dichos ámbitos. Los actos jurídicamente vinculantes de la Unión adoptados en virtud de las disposiciones de los Tratados relativas a esos ámbitos no podrán conllevar armonización alguna de las disposiciones legales y reglamentarias de los Estados miembros.
6. El alcance y las condiciones de ejercicio de las competencias de la Unión se determinarán en las disposiciones de los Tratados relativas a cada ámbito.
Artículo 3
1. La Unión dispondrá de competencia exclusiva en los ámbitos siguientes: a) la unión aduanera; b) el establecimiento de las normas sobre competencia necesarias para el funcionamiento del mercado interior; c) la política monetaria de los Estados miembros cuya moneda es el euro; d) la conservación de los recursos biológicos marinos dentro de la política pesquera común; e) la política comercial común.
2. La Unión dispondrá también de competencia exclusiva para la celebración de un acuerdo internacional cuando dicha celebración esté prevista en un acto legislativo de la Unión, cuando sea necesaria para permitirle ejercer su competencia interna o en la medida en que pueda afectar a normas comunes o alterar el alcance de las mismas.
Artículo 4
1. La Unión dispondrá de competencia compartida con los Estados miembros cuando los Tratados le atribuyan una competencia que no corresponda a los ámbitos mencionados en los artículos 3 y 6.
2. Las competencias compartidas entre la Unión y los Estados miembros se aplicarán a los siguientes ámbitos principales: a) el mercado interior; b) la política social, en los aspectos definidos en el presente Tratado; c) la cohesión económica, social y territorial; d) la agricultura y la pesca, con exclusión de la conservación de los recursos biológicos marinos; e) el medio ambiente; f) la protección de los consumidores; g) los transportes; h) las redes transeuropeas; i) la energía; j) el espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia; k) los asuntos comunes de seguridad en materia de salud pública, en los aspectos definidos en el presente Tratado.
3. En los ámbitos de la investigación, el desarrollo tecnológico y el espacio, la Unión dispondrá de competencia para llevar a cabo acciones, en particular destinadas a definir y realizar programas, sin que el ejercicio de esta competencia pueda tener por efecto impedir a los Estados miembros ejercer la suya.
4. En los ámbitos de la cooperación para el desarrollo y de la ayuda humanitaria, la Unión dispondrá de competencia para llevar a cabo acciones y una política común, sin que el ejercicio de esta competencia pueda tener por efecto impedir a los Estados miembros ejercer la suya.
Friday, March 18, 2022
LA DEFINICIÓN DE ÉLITE DE CARL SCHMITT ("LEGIBUS SOLUTUS")
"YOU MUST THEN KEEP YOUR PACE CLOSE TO THE ELITE'S ONE IN EACH MOMENT.BUT YOU SHOULD HAVE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING:
1) TODAY'S ELITE IS NOT YESTERDAY'S ELITE AND MUCH LESS TOMORROW'S AND THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW ELITE
2) ELITE ARE THOSE WHO PAY LESS TAXES WITH MORE INCOME
3) ELITE ARE THOSE WHO CAN OBLIGE OTHERS TO FULFILL FORMS AND PETITIONS.ELITE ARE THOSE WHO CAN DEMAND INDEMNITIES FROM THEIR VICTIMS
4) ELITE ARE THOSE WHO DO NOT SEEK JUSTICE IN COURTS AND WHO ARE NOT AFRAID OF BEING BROUGHT TO COURT DUE TO THEIR WRONGDOINGS
5) ELITE ARE THOSE WHO DO NOT NEED TO SEEK PASSPORTS FROM THE POLICE
6) ELITE ARE THOSE WHOSE SOCIOLOGY NO ONE DARES TO WRITE. ELITE ARE THOSE WHO CHARGE OTHERS WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT BEING CHARGED BY OTHERS
7) ELITE ARE THOSE WHO CAN RESIST "TU QUOQUE""
CS
(JULY 22, 1948)
TRANSLATION FROM THE SPANISH TRANSLATION BY FERNANDO GONZÁLEZ VIÑAS:
"MANTENTE POR TANTO SIEMPRE JUNTO A LA ÉLITE DEL MOMENTO.PERO TEN EN CUENTA:
1) LA ÉLITE DE HOY NO ES LA DE AYER Y MUCHO MENOS LA DE MAÑANA O PASADO MAÑANA
2) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE PAGAN MENOS IMPUESTOS CON MÁS INGRESOS
3) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE PUEDEN EXIGIRLES A OTROS QUE LES RELLENEN FORMULARIOS. ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE PUEDEN EXIGIRLE INDEMNIZACIÓN TOTAL A SU VÍCTIMA
4) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE NO BUSCAN SU JUSTICIA EN LOS TRIBUNALES Y QUE POR SU INJUSTICIA NO NECESITAN TEMER A LOS TRIBUNALES
5) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE, MIENTRAS QUE TENGAN PASAPORTES, NO NECESITAN RECOGERLOS EN LA POLICÍA
6) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS CUYA SOCIOLOGÍA NADIE SE ATREVE A ESCRIBIR.ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE ACUSAN SIN TENER QUE TEMER SER ACUSADOS
7) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE PUEDEN TOLERARSE EL "TU QUOQUE""
CARL SCHMITT'S DEFINITIONS OF ELITE ("LEGIBUS SOLUTUS")
"YOU MUST THEN KEEP YOUR PACE CLOSE TO THE ELITE'S ONE IN EACH MOMENT.BUT YOU SHOULD HAVE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING: 1) TODAY'S ELITE IS NOT YESTERDAY'S ELITE AND MUCH LESS TOMORROW'S AND THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW ELITE 2) ELITE ARE THOSE WHO PAY LESS TAXES WITH MORE INCOME 3) ELITE ARE THOSE WHO CAN OBLIGE OTHERS TO FULFILL FORMS AND PETITIONS.ELITE ARE THOSE WHO CAN DEMAND INDEMNITIES FROM THEIR VICTIMS 4) ELITE ARE THOSE WHO DO NOT SEEK JUSTICE IN COURTS AND WHO ARE NOT AFRAID OF BEING BROUGHT TO COURT DUE TO THEIR WRONGDOINGS 5) ELITE ARE THOSE WHO DO NOT NEED TO SEEK PASSPORTS FROM THE POLICE 6) ELITE ARE THOSE WHOSE SOCIOLOGY NO ONE DARES TO WRITE. ELITE ARE THOSE WHO CHARGE OTHERS WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT BEING CHARGED BY OTHERS 7) ELITE ARE THOSE WHO CAN RESIST "TU QUOQUE" CS (JULY 22, 1948) TRANSLATION FROM THE SPANISH TRANSLATION BY FERNANDO GONZÁLEZ VIÑAS: MANTENTE POR TANTO SIEMPRE JUNTO A LA ÉLITE DEL MOMENTO.PERO TEN EN CUENTA: 1) LA ÉLITE DE HOY NO ES LA DE AYER Y MUCHO MENOS LA DE MAÑANA O PASADO MAÑANA 2) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE PAGAN MENOS IMPUESTOS CON MÁS INGRESOS 3) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE PUEDEN EXIGIRLES A OTROS QUE LES RELLENEN FORMULARIOS. ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE PUEDEN EXIGIRLE INDEMNIZACIÓN TOTAL A SU VÍCTIMA 4) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE NO BUSCAN SU JUSTICIA EN LOS TRIBUNALES Y QUE POR SU INJUSTICIA NO NECESITAN TEMER A LOS TRIBUNALES 5) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE, MIENTRAS QUE TENGAN PASAPORTES, NO NECESITAN RECOGERLOS EN LA POLICÍA 6) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS CUYA SOCIOLOGÍA NADIE SE ATREVE A ESCRIBIR.ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE ACUSAN SIN TENER QUE TEMER SER ACUSADOS 7) ÉLITE SON AQUELLOS QUE PUEDEN TOLERARSE EL TU QUOQUE@ralphwilde
— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) March 17, 2022
Thank you
"Tu quoque" is indeed a fallacy
However, both in the context of national and international law, we should not forget Carl Schmitt's characterization for it:
"elite ("legibus solutus") are those who can resist "tu quoque"" https://t.co/T9aPQTt8pz
RESOLUCIÓN DEL COMITÉ DE MINISTROS QUE EXCLUYE A RUSIA DEL CONSEJO DE EUROPA Y DEL TEDH (16/03/2022)
As a direct consequence of its war of aggression in Ukraine, Russia ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe (CoE), with effect from 16 March, as confirmed by a resolution of the Committee of Ministers (CM). This represents uncharted territory – until now, no state had ever been expelled from the organisation, and the only instance of state withdrawal was carried out by a military junta in Greece in 1969 (before it could be expelled). However, there was much uncertainty in the days leading up to the CM resolution. The CoE statute prescribes two routes for a state’s departure: withdrawal (Article 7) and expulsion (Article 8). On 25 February, the CM had taken the decision to suspend Russia from its rights of representation in the CM and in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) with immediate effect (under Article 8 of the Statute), but the Ministers’ Deputies took pains to clarify that Russia was still subject to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its additional obligations. A statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 March suggested that withdrawal was likely: ‘Russia will not participate in the transformation by NATO and the EU obediently following them of the oldest European organisation into another platform for incantations about Western superiority and narcissism. Let them enjoy communicating with each other, without Russia’. This led some media organisations to announce Russia’s departure from the CoE, in a bid to avoid being kicked out. However, that was not yet the case. Also on 10 March, the Ministers’ Deputies decided to consult PACE about further steps to be taken under Article 8. At an extraordinary plenary session on 14 and 15 March, PACE described the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a ‘serious breach’ of Article 3 of the CoE Statute, which was contrary to ‘the obligations and commitments which the Russian Federation undertook upon accession’. As a result, it adopted an opinion to the effect that the CM should request the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw from the CoE, and that if Russia did not do so, the CM should decide ‘the immediate possible date’ when Russia would cease to be a CoE member. Also on 15 March, the Russian Government purportedly informed the CoE Secretary General of its withdrawal from the CoE and of its intention to denounce the ECHR (under Article 58). On the following day, the CM passed a resolution which noted Russia’s withdrawal and which decided, ‘in the context of the procedure launched under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, that the Russian Federation ceases to be a member of the Council of Europe as from 16 March 2022’. This post focus on some of the consequences for potential applicants to the European Court (whose immediate response on 16 March was to suspend its examination of all Russian cases). However, it would appear that ECHR violations allegedly committed by Russia which take place after 16 March 2022 cannot be challenged at the European Court. This is nothing short of a tragedy, given victims’ loss of ECHR protection. Róisín Pillay of the International Commission of Jurists has said: ‘Nowhere has the ECtHR been more of a lifeline than in Russia. Victims of the most brutal human rights violations, failed by their national systems, found some hope of vindication there’. Karinna Moskalenko, a Russian lawyer and one of the founders of the CURE campaign (Campaign to Uphold Rights in Europe), has suggested that the inability to petition the European Court is ‘a punishment for ordinary people, not for the government’. This was also the view of leading Russian human rights defenders, discussing the risk of Russia’s expulsion or withdrawal from the CoE back in 2018: ‘Those who wish to punish the Kremlin miss the target: it is not the Russian government, but the Russian public who would suffer the most. For millions of people residing in Russia … the ECtHR has been an ultimate hope for justice, which in many cases they cannot find in Russia. Thousands of its judgments have had a significant positive impact on Russian laws and judicial practice’.#RESOLUCIÓN DEL COMITÉ DE MINISTROS QUE #EXCLUYE A RUSIA DEL #CONSEJO DE #EUROPAhttps://t.co/Jmsjq19u47
— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) March 18, 2022
Resolution CM/Res(2022)2 on the
cessation of the membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 16 March 2022)
Wednesday, March 16, 2022
TEORIA DE LA ILUSION FINANCIERA (AMILCARE PUVIANI)
En 1903 publicó Teoría de la ilusión financiera (Teoria dell’illusione finanziaria), un libro de Economía y Sociología en el que plantea su teoría de la ilusión financiera, según la cual la clase dirigente del Estado consigue, a través de diversos medios —básicamente, la falta de transparencia del Sector público, unida a la ignorancia de los ciudadanos acerca de la actividad financiera—, que la ciudadanía tenga ideas erróneas acerca de la realidad de la financiación pública y del destino de los recursos públicos y que se mantenga alto el umbral de tolerancia de la ciudadanía hacia los fallos del Sector público
COMERCIALIZADORES DE ELECTRICIDAD PIDEN INTERVENCIÓN PARA EVITAR EL FEED-BACK DE POSICIONES A CUBRIR
— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) March 16, 2022
The FT writes that in a letter it had seen, the European Federation of Energy Traders, a trade body that counts BP, Shell and commodity traders Vitol and the margin-call stricken Trafigura as members, said the industry needed “time-limited emergency liquidity support to ensure that wholesale gas and power markets continued to function”.
“Since the end of February 2022, an already challenging situation has worsened and more [European] energy participants are in [a] position where their ability to source additional liquidity is severely reduced or, in some cases, exhausted,” EFET said in its letter, dated March 8 and sent to market participants and regulators.
It was "not infeasible to foresee . . . generally sound and healthy energy companies . . . unable to access cash", the letter warned, clearly ignoring that "generally sound" companies would have anticipated such a fat tailed scenario. The fact that they didn't suggests that they were either not "generally sound", or "healthy" and certainly did not plan accordingly. And yet somehow their stupidity and/or greed makes them eligible for Fed bailouts?
According to the letter, the EFET wants state entities such as the European Investment Bank or central banks, such as the European Central Bank or the Bank of England, to provide support through lenders, to soften the impact of margin calls.
“The overriding objective is to keep an orderly market for futures and other derivative energy contracts open,” said Peter Styles, executive vice-chair of the EFET board, in an interview. “Gas producers, European gas importers and power suppliers must retain the opportunity to hedge their positions.”
Well, why not: central banks bailed out everyone during the covid crash, may as well continue the practice of bailing out everyone else in the process. Oh, and for anyone doubting if the Fed will step in and save stock markets - what China just did a few hours ago - this should answer your question.
That said, speaking at a conference on Wednesday, Rostin Behnam, chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the top US derivatives regulator, said appropriate margins must “unfailingly” be maintained.
“We must hold fast to our regulatory structures and resist the urge to make ad hoc decisions to avoid the natural outcomes of market forces,” he said.
TRIBUNAL INTERNACIONAL DE JUSTICIA (UCRANIA V. FEDERACIÓN RUSA, MEDIDAS PROVISIONALES (I))
86. For these reasons,
THE COURT,
Indicates the following provisional measures:
(1) By thirteen votes to two,
The Russian Federation shall immediately suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine;
IN FAVOUR: President Donoghue; Judges Tomka, Abraham, Bennouna, Yusuf, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Robinson, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte, Charlesworth; Judge ad hoc Daudet;
AGAINST: Vice-President Gevorgian; Judge Xue;
(2) By thirteen votes to two, The Russian Federation shall ensure that any military or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control or direction, take no steps in furtherance of the military operations referred to in point (1) above;
IN FAVOUR: President Donoghue; Judges Tomka, Abraham, Bennouna, Yusuf, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Robinson, Salam, Iwasawa, Nolte, Charlesworth; Judge ad hoc Daudet;
AGAINST: Vice-President Gevorgian; Judge Xue;
(3) Unanimously, Both Parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixteenth day of March, two thousand and twenty-two, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation, respectively.
(Signed) Joan E. DONOGHUE, President.
(Signed) Philippe GAUTIER, Registrar.
Tuesday, March 15, 2022
Sunday, March 13, 2022
FAO: LA IMPORTANCIA DE UCRANIA Y RUSIA PARA LOS MERCADOS AGRICOLAS GLOBALES Y LOS RIESGOS ASOCIADOS (II)
Despite the fact that the sanctions exempt agricultural products, they have rendered doing business with Russian firms anathema ...further disrupting the flow of wheat and other goods to Africa and the Middle East#dominikaleusderhttps://t.co/bjwx56WkgQ https://t.co/WMgAFBwnAa
— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) March 13, 2022
CAPITALISMO UNIVERSAL O PLANIFICACIÓN REGIONAL (II, POLANYI+LEUSDER)
THE ART OF MONETARY WAR DOMINIK A LEUSDERhttps://t.co/bjwx56WkgQ
— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) March 13, 2022
To echo something Putin himself once admitted about communism: Russia has been led into a blind alley—far away from the mainstream of globalization#dominikaleusder https://t.co/yzQb7M0i8c
Saturday, March 12, 2022
FAO: LA IMPORTANCIA DE UCRANIA Y RUSIA PARA LOS MERCADOS AGRICOLAS GLOBALES Y LOS RIESGOS ASOCIADOS
Friday, March 11, 2022
CAPITALISMO UNIVERSAL O PLANIFICACIÓN REGIONAL (KARL POLANYI, 1945+2022)
¿JUSTICIA VIRAL? VIRAL JUSTICE? (II), DAVID KELLY)
¿JUSTICIA VIRAL? VIRAL JUSTICE?
Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero @ruiz_zapatero 4m "VIRAL" REPLICATES THE SAME THING "JUSTICE" PRODUCES A UNIQUE THING (CASE) FROM NOMOS IT SEEMS SINCE ARISTOTLE AT LEASTThis is the book we need. https://t.co/a8LgNRczHD
— SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN 🗽🤘🏽 (@sivavaid) March 11, 2022
Thursday, March 10, 2022
QUÉ SANCIONES HA IMPUESTO EL MUNDO A RUSIA (I)
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States and a number of allies issued a joint statement on Feb. 26 announcing that they were taking dramatic steps to prevent Russia’s central bank from accessing its substantial foreign exchange reserves. Analysts had posited that these reserves, sometimes referred to as “Fortress Russia,” might allow Russia to withstand the effects of economic sanctions for an extended period. But on Feb. 28, OFAC issued a new Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024 that prohibits any transactions with the Central Bank of Russia, Russia’s Ministry of Finance, or its National Wealth Fund, including foreign exchange transactions, involving U.S. persons, U.S. institutions or the U.S. dollar.
This is by far the most dramatic step the United States and its allies have taken. The effective blocking of central bank assets is a severe measure that has previously been applied only to hostile foreign regimes, such as Iran, North Korea and Syria. Doing so prevents Russia from accessing most if not all of its substantial foreign exchange reserves, severely reducing its ability to stabilize its currency, compensate for its lack of access to global debt markets or otherwise take steps to stabilize its economy. Among other economic effects, this ensures that the broader sanctions imposed by the international community have their maximum effect.
Notably, OFAC has put in place a number of exceptions to these sanctions th
Notably, OFAC has put in place a number of exceptions to these sanctions through a series of licenses. Most appear to be aimed at mitigating some of the impact of the sanctions on non-Russian entities and the broader global economy. Some permit certain routine financial interactions, like the servicing of debt obligations, while others permit a wind-down or divestment period for entities holding Russian debt or other investments that fall under the new sanctions. Others permit transactions relating to certain official functions, emergency services, or the export of agricultural commodities, medical devices, software updates, and other goods and services on which outsiders might disproportionately rely. Perhaps the most important exception applies to Russia’s substantial energy exports and permits transactions with many sanctioned entities, including Russia’s central bank, so long as they relate to nearly any aspect of the energy sector, ranging from coal and petroleum to nuclear fuel, through at least June 24. While these transactions will no doubt provide a lifeline to the Russian economy, they also prevent a supply shock to energy markets.
Among the G-20 countries representing the world’s largest economies, nine governments—Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey—have thus far declined to implement any sanctions measures against Russia. Neither have Russian client states, like Cuba, Nicaragua, Syria and Venezuela; other common strategic rivals of the United States and its allies, like Iran and North Korea; or states with strong cultural and economic ties to
Russia, including Israel and most former Soviet states outside of Europe. Still, there are few outlets for Russia to alleviate the sanctions pressure. Only China seems like it might have the ability to aid Russia in evading the worst consequences of the current sanctions regimes by increasing their trade ties and allowing Russian banks to continue to use its SWIFT alternative, its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). But it is not yet clear whether China is willing and able to do so, despite the recent strengthening of bilateral ties between the two nations.
EU legislation enacted on Feb. 28 targets Russia’s central bank, prohibiting any transaction with the bank or any representative thereof and freezes the reserves of the central bank held within the EU. These measures were imposed, according to a Feb. 26 statement, to “prevent the Russian Central Bank from deploying its international reserves in ways that undermine the impact of [the EU’s] sanctions.” These measures, however, do not freeze the assets of Russia’s three largest banks: Sberbank, VTB, and Gazprombank.
Economists have estimated that the Russian economy could shrink a full 7 percent by the end of 2022, introducing the greatest recession in recent memory and severely undermining the quality of
life for nearly every Russian citizen. Meanwhile, export controls and debt limitations promise to seriously hinder strategic sectors of Russia’s economy. These moves could slow development in these sectors in a way that could endure well past the end of any sanctions.
Some experts, however, have argued that the focus may need to shift from implementing new sanctions to planning for how to roll back those already in place. Given that the sanctions were originally intended to motivate a change in Russia’s political behavior, the United States and its allies need to figure out what sanctions they are willing to rescind if Russia does prove willing to enter negotiations or otherwise take steps toward ending its operations in Ukraine. Some calibration may also be needed if the sanctions have unforeseen or unintentionally severe consequences for the general population of Russia, such as shortages in food and medicine or other potential humanitarian crises—or if the consequences of Russia’s impending economic collapse begin to ripple more broadly throughout the global economy. In other words, to send the strongest possible message to Putin, the Biden administration and its allies chose to jump straight to the top of the escalation ladder. Now they may need to spend some time thinking about the best way to climb back down.
Doing so, however, may ultimately be easier said than done. While some of the consequences of these economic sanctions are likely to go away when they are lifted, others may not. The stigma that has suddenly surrounded economic entanglement with Russia may well linger among investors and corporations with ties to the United States and other sanctioning economies. After all, even if sanctions are lifted, there is always the risk they will be reimposed over some other dispute down the line. Nor is Russia likely to be enthusiastic about re-creating the economic ties that the United States and its allies are now using against it. This may lead Russia to turn even further inward and to further strengthen ties with China and other countries that are unwilling to cooperate with U.S.-led sanctions efforts. Hence, even if the United States and its allies are successful in bringing peace to Ukraine, the steps they have had to take to do so may deepen cleavages in the global system of economic interdependence that has helped to promote stability for much of the past century.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-sanctions-has-world-put-russia