TRIBUNAL DE CUENTAS EUROPEO: El fondo multimillonario para el COVID no es suficientemente transparente

 

 

«Los ciudadanos tienen menos confianza en las finanzas públicas si el dinero no se gasta con total transparencia», afirma Ivana Maletić, Miembro del Tribunal responsable de la auditoría. «No disponemos de una visión completa de cómo se utilizan los fondos del MRR. Los ciudadanos tienen derecho a saber cómo se utilizan los fondos públicos, quién los recibe y cuánto se gasta realmente. Estas lagunas en materia de transparencia del MRR no deberían extenderse a los futuros presupuestos de la UE».

Los auditores constataron que, si bien los fondos son rastreables y transparentes hasta cierto punto, la imagen sigue siendo incompleta. En cuanto a la trazabilidad, los países suelen cumplir los requisitos normativos y la mayoría puede hacer un seguimiento de los pagos del MRR desde el origen hasta el uso final. Sin embargo, no todos los países recopilan sistemáticamente los datos necesarios y, en algunos casos, la información solo se facilita previa solicitud, lo que da lugar a retrasos que pueden prolongarse durante varios meses. Esto hace que la información sea menos útil para la rendición de cuentas y el análisis.

La Comisión Europea no recopila datos sobre los importes reales pagados por cada medida del MRR, ni siquiera cuando los Estados miembros disponen de tales datos. Esta falta de información socava la capacidad de la Comisión para evaluar si los Estados miembros han utilizado los fondos del MRR de manera eficiente. Además, en el ámbito de los Estados miembros, la información sobre los costes reales de las medidas del MRR es importante para ajustar las estimaciones de costes y garantizar que la financiación recibida por cada país se mantenga próxima a los costes reales. Sin embargo, los países no utilizan sistemáticamente los datos de costes reales para actualizar las estimaciones en caso de ahorros o sobrecostes. Aunque algunas medidas experimentaron sobrecostes, en varios países los costes reales de la mayoría de las medidas finalizadas incluidas en la muestra de los auditores fueron inferiores a los estimados. Si se mantiene esta tendencia, es posible que la financiación total recibida por un Estado miembro no se aproxime razonablemente a los costes reales.

En cuanto a la transparencia, la Comisión y los Estados miembros publican información conforme a las normas del MRR y proporcionan una transparencia adecuada sobre la consecución de los hitos y objetivos. Sin embargo, dado que estos suelen estar orientados a las realizaciones más que a los resultados, la información sobre los resultados y el cumplimiento de los objetivos generales es mínima. Además, las normas de transparencia del MRR no prevén la divulgación completa del flujo de fondos. Aunque todos los Estados miembros publican la lista exigida de los cien mayores perceptores finales, esta lista no refleja adecuadamente el uso global del dinero. En primer lugar, los organismos públicos, como los ministerios, representan más de la mitad de los perceptores, y los Estados miembros no están obligados a publicar los pagos posteriores que estas autoridades realizan a los contratistas a través de la contratación pública, de modo que no los publican. En segundo lugar, ninguno de los diez países examinados por los auditores había superado el número mínimo de cien en sus listas publicadas. Por lo tanto, la información pública sobre quién se beneficia en última instancia del MRR y en qué medida es incompleta.

Información de referencia

El MRR se creó en febrero de 2021 como un instrumento único para ayudar a los países de la UE a recuperarse de la pandemia y a construir economías resilientes. La Comisión ejecuta el Mecanismo en régimen de gestión directa y asume la responsabilidad última. El MRR tenía un valor total máximo de 723 800 millones de euros y, a finales de enero de 2026, la Comisión había comprometido 577 000 millones de euros (360 000 millones de euros en subvenciones y 217 000 millones de euros en préstamos) para los 27 Estados miembros. El MRR financia medidas en ámbitos como las transiciones ecológica y digital y finalizará en agosto de 2026, mientras que los pagos a los Estados miembros podrán efectuarse hasta finales de este año.

La transparencia en la presentación de informes, incluida la información sobre los costes reales, contribuye a mejorar la toma de decisiones y a promover la rendición de cuentas. El Parlamento Europeo, el Defensor del Pueblo Europeo y la OCDE ya han planteado cuestiones específicas relacionadas con la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas del MRR. El Tribunal ha publicado una serie de informes de auditoría sobre el MRR, incluido un análisis, en 2025, de las lecciones extraídas; todas estas publicaciones están disponibles aquí. En esta auditoría, los auditores examinaron una muestra de diez Estados miembros: Alemania, Austria, Bulgaria, España, Estonia, Francia, Letonia, Malta, Países Bajos y Rumanía.

NOTA DE PRENSA

INFORME TRIBUNAL DE CUENTAS EUROPEO

 

 

 

 

LA DESDOLARIZACIÓN NO ESTÁ SUCEDIENDO DE LA FORMA QUE TODO EL MUNDO PIENSA (TOM LUONGO)

Once it was mutually assured nuclear destruction that deterred two superpowers from going to war. Today, it is mutually assured financial destruction. That is a big difference between Cold War I and Cold War II. https://t.co/UoxHyAy0v5

— Niall Ferguson (@nfergus) September 10, 2023

Nuclear catastrophe hovered over Cold War I. Economic catastrophe hovers over Cold War II, writes @nfergus https://t.co/g4NPlFtVaT

— Bloomberg Opinion (@opinion) September 10, 2023

Oops.

Here's the right link:https://t.co/fEYfBOSLbs https://t.co/8OIu4qxG3A

— Tom Luongo (Head Sneetch) (@TFL1728) September 12, 2023

Gary North is one of my personal heroes because of essays like this. https://t.co/BkhrHhZo4V

— Tom Luongo (Head Sneetch) (@TFL1728) September 12, 2023

Do you really think they control those things or do they control the money which then, in turn, controls those things.

Power, food, energy are all produced locally. Only so long as local populations play by the rules of overlords do these rules matter. You just stop complying…

— Tom Luongo (Head Sneetch) (@TFL1728) September 13, 2023

LA #DESDOLARIZACIÓN NO ESTÁ SUCEDIENDO DE LA FORMA QUE TODO EL MUNDO PIENSA (#TOMLUONGO) https://t.co/Tvf4u5S42G @TFL1728 #Luongo explica entre otras cosas cómo financieramente la #UE, el #Bundesbank y el #BCE están atrapados en un callejón sin salida y la deuda en cuestión

— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) September 14, 2023

QUÉ SANCIONES HA IMPUESTO EL MUNDO A RUSIA (I)

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States and a number of allies issued a joint statement on Feb. 26 announcing that they were taking dramatic steps to prevent Russia’s central bank from accessing its substantial foreign exchange reserves. Analysts had posited that these reserves, sometimes referred to as “Fortress Russia,” might allow Russia to withstand the effects of economic sanctions for an extended period. But on Feb. 28, OFAC issued a new Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024 that prohibits any transactions with the Central Bank of Russia, Russia’s Ministry of Finance, or its National Wealth Fund, including foreign exchange transactions, involving U.S. persons, U.S. institutions or the U.S. dollar. 

This is by far the most dramatic step the United States and its allies have taken. The effective blocking of central bank assets is a severe measure that has previously been applied only to hostile foreign regimes, such as Iran, North Korea and Syria. Doing so prevents Russia from accessing most if not all of its substantial foreign exchange reserves, severely reducing its ability to stabilize its currency, compensate for its lack of access to global debt markets or otherwise take steps to stabilize its economy. Among other economic effects, this ensures that the broader sanctions imposed by the international community have their maximum effect.

Notably, OFAC has put in place a number of exceptions to these sanctions th

Notably, OFAC has put in place a number of exceptions to these sanctions through a series of licenses. Most appear to be aimed at mitigating some of the impact of the sanctions on non-Russian entities and the broader global economy. Some permit certain routine financial interactions, like the servicing of debt obligations, while others permit a wind-down or divestment period for entities holding Russian debt or other investments that fall under the new sanctions. Others permit transactions relating to certain official functions, emergency services, or the export of agricultural commodities, medical devices, software updates, and other goods and services on which outsiders might disproportionately rely. Perhaps the most important exception  applies to Russia’s substantial energy exports and permits transactions with many sanctioned entities, including Russia’s central bank, so long as they relate to nearly any aspect of the energy sector, ranging from coal and petroleum to nuclear fuel, through at least June 24. While these transactions will no doubt provide a lifeline to the Russian economy, they also prevent a supply shock to energy markets. 

Among the G-20 countries representing the world’s largest economies, nine governments—Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey—have thus far declined to implement any sanctions measures against Russia. Neither have Russian client states, like Cuba, Nicaragua, Syria and Venezuela; other common strategic rivals of the United States and its allies, like Iran and North Korea; or states with strong cultural and economic ties to

Russia, including Israel and most former Soviet states outside of Europe. Still, there are few outlets for Russia to alleviate the sanctions pressure. Only China seems like it might have the ability to aid Russia in evading the worst consequences of the current sanctions regimes by increasing their trade ties and allowing Russian banks to continue to use its SWIFT alternative, its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). But it is not yet clear whether China is willing and able to do so, despite the recent strengthening of bilateral ties between the two nations. 

EU legislation enacted on Feb. 28 targets Russia’s central bank, prohibiting any transaction with the bank or any representative thereof and freezes the reserves of the central bank held within the EU. These measures were imposed, according to a Feb. 26 statement, to “prevent the Russian Central Bank from deploying its international reserves in ways that undermine the impact of [the EU’s] sanctions.” These measures, however, do not freeze the assets of Russia’s three largest banks: Sberbank, VTB, and Gazprombank.

Economists have estimated that the Russian economy could shrink a full 7 percent by the end of 2022, introducing the greatest recession in recent memory and severely undermining the quality of

life for nearly every Russian citizen. Meanwhile, export controls and debt limitations promise to seriously hinder strategic sectors of Russia’s economy. These moves could slow development in these sectors in a way that could endure well past the end of any sanctions.

Some experts, however, have argued that the focus may need to shift from implementing new sanctions to planning for how to roll back those already in place. Given that the sanctions were originally intended to motivate a change in Russia’s political behavior, the United States and its allies need to figure out what sanctions they are willing to rescind if Russia does prove willing to enter negotiations or otherwise take steps toward ending its operations in Ukraine. Some calibration may also be needed if the sanctions have unforeseen or unintentionally severe consequences for the general population of Russia, such as shortages in food and medicine or other potential humanitarian crises—or if the consequences of Russia’s impending economic collapse begin to ripple more broadly throughout the global economy. In other words, to send the strongest possible message to Putin, the Biden administration and its allies chose to jump straight to the top of the escalation ladder. Now they may need to spend some time thinking about the best way to climb back down.

Doing so, however, may ultimately be easier said than done. While some of the consequences of these economic sanctions are likely to go away when they are lifted, others may not. The stigma that has suddenly surrounded economic entanglement with Russia may well linger among investors and corporations with ties to the United States and other sanctioning economies. After all, even if sanctions are lifted, there is always the risk they will be reimposed over some other dispute down the line. Nor is Russia likely to be enthusiastic about re-creating the economic ties that the United States and its allies are now using against it. This may lead Russia to turn even further inward and to further strengthen ties with China and other countries that are unwilling to cooperate with U.S.-led sanctions efforts. Hence, even if the United States and its allies are successful in bringing peace to Ukraine, the steps they have had to take to do so may deepen cleavages in the global system of economic interdependence that has helped to promote stability for much of the past century.

https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-sanctions-has-world-put-russia