LA SATISFACCIÓN EQUITATIVA REFERIDA A INTERESES O RECARGOS SATISFECHOS EN EL CASO YUKOS V. RUSIA (TEDH)

 

 

"A.  Pecuniary damage

(...) 

2.  The Court’s assessment

(a)  Violation of Article 6 of the Convention

18.  At the outset the Court would point out that in its principal judgment it found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on account of the haste with which the domestic courts had conducted the 2000 Tax Assessment proceedings against the applicant company, both at first instance and on appeal. The Court cannot speculate as to what the outcome of these proceedings might have been had the violation of the Convention not occurred (see, for example, Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, § 128, ECHR 2006‑IX, and Martinie v. France [GC], no. 58675/00, § 59, ECHR 2006‑VI).

19.  It finds that there is insufficient proof of a causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage allegedly sustained by the applicant company. There is therefore no ground for an award in this respect.

(b)  Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the retroactive imposition of the penalties for the years 2000 and 2001

20.  The Court observes that in the principal judgment it concluded that the penalties in the 2000 Tax Assessment and certain of the penalties in the 2001 Tax Assessment were unlawful and in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The amounts in question, RUB 19,185,272,697 (approximately 543,623,045 euros) in respect of the year 2000, and RUB 19,556,570,413 (approximately 569,898,525 euros) in respect of the year 2001, were effectively paid by the applicant company during the enforcement proceedings and thus represented a clear pecuniary loss, which, in the Court’s view, should be compensated under Article 41 of the Convention.

21.  Despite the Government’s objections, the Court sees no good reasons to depart from the principle of restitutio in integrum, firmly established in its case-law, in assessing the amount of pecuniary compensation in the present case. In its principal judgment it found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerning the imposition of the penalties for the year 2000 and in part for the year 2001. The Court ruled that the penalties were unlawful as such, and did not represent an irregularity of a merely procedural nature (see, by contrast, Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC] (just satisfaction), no. 25701/94, §§ 78‑79, 28 November 2002; and Beyeler v. Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 33202/96, § 20, 28 May 2002).

22.  The Court considers that the figure of RUB 38,741,843,110, representing the amount of penalties for the year 2000 and one half of the penalties for the year 2001 (see paragraph 20 above), was effectively paid by the applicant company on 12 November 2007 at the latest (see paragraph 303 of the principal judgment). This sum equalled EUR 1,078,246,919 at the conversion rate on that date.

23.  In addition, the Court also recalls that the applicant company was compelled to pay the 7% enforcement fee in respect of the mentioned unlawful penalties. The Court decides that since it has declared the original penalties unlawful, the payment of the 7% enforcement fee in respect of these penalties was unlawful as well.

24.  The Court notes in this connection that the applicant company was required to pay the enforcement fee of RUB 1,342,969,088.79 (approximately EUR 37,353,983) in respect of the penalties for the year 2000 and the enforcement fee of RUB 1,368,959,928.91 (approximately EUR  36,636,218) in respect of one half of the penalties for the year 2001, both sums having been effectively paid by the applicant company on 12  November 2007 at the latest (see paragraph 303 of the principal judgment).

25.  These sums represented clear pecuniary losses sustained by the applicant company, in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They should thus be compensated under Article 41 of the Convention. The amount of RUB 2,711,929,017.7, consisting of RUB 1,342,969,088.79 for the year 2000 and RUB 1,368,959,928.91 for the year 2001, equalled EUR 75,477,284 at the conversion rate on that date.

26.  Taking into account the inflation rate of 12.62% for the euro between that date and the present time, the Court assesses the amount of pecuniary damage to the applicant company resulting from the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the retroactive imposition of the penalties (see paragraph 22 above) and the payment of the enforcement fee on these unlawful penalties (see paragraph 25 above) for the years 2000 and 2001 at EUR 1,299,324,198.

(c)  Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the enforcement proceedings

27.  The Court refers to its finding in the principal judgment that the domestic authorities failed to strike a fair balance between the legitimate aim of the enforcement proceedings in respect of the applicant company and the measures employed, by being inflexible regarding the pace of the proceedings, obliging the company to pay excessive fees and failing to give explicit account of all of the relevant factors. The above considerations led the Court to conclude that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the enforcement proceedings in respect of the applicant company.

28.  In this respect, the Court notes that the working assumptions used by the applicant company in its assessment of the prospects of the applicant company’s survival and its value in the aftermath of the events remain at least in part speculative (see, for example, Credit and Industrial Bank v. the Czech Republic, no. 29010/95, § 88, ECHR 2003‑XI (extracts)). In its principal judgment the Court did not conclude, as alleged by the applicant company, that the applicant company would have survived the enforcement proceedings had it not been for the aforementioned shortcomings in these proceedings. Therefore, the Court cannot accept the applicant company’s claim in full (see, for example, Goddi v. Italy, 9 April 1984, § 35, Series A no. 76; Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 7 July 1989, § 66, Series A no. 159; Beaumartin v. France, 24 November 1994, § 44, Series A no. 296‑B; Kingsley v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35605/97, § 43, ECHR 2002‑IV; Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39665/98 and 40086/98, §§ 141 and 143, ECHR 2003‑X and Martinie v. France [GC], cited above, § 59).

29.  Even if it cannot be said that the above-cited defects alone caused the applicant company’s liquidation, they nevertheless seriously contributed to it, directly resulting in pecuniary damage satisfying the causality criteria of Article 41 of the Convention.

30.  In this respect, the Court recalls that in paragraph 655 of the principal judgment it has clearly stated that the above-mentioned defects very seriously contributed to the applicant company’s demise, having identified:

“... [a] factor which seriously affected the company’s situation in the enforcement proceedings. The applicant company was subjected to a 7% enforcement fee in connection with the entire amount of its tax-related liability, which constituted an additional hefty sum of over RUB 43 billion (EUR 1.16 billion), the payment of which could not be suspended or rescheduled (see paragraphs 484-486). This was a flat-rate fee which the authorities apparently refused to reduce, and these sums had to be paid even before the company could begin repaying the main body of the debt (see paragraph 484). The fee was by its nature unrelated to the actual amount of the enforcement expenses borne by the bailiffs. Whilst the Court may accept that there is nothing wrong as a matter of principle with requiring a debtor to pay for the expenses relating to the enforcement of a debt or to threaten a debtor with a sanction to incite his or her voluntary compliance with enforcement writs, in the circumstances of the case the resulting sum was completely out of proportion to the amount of the enforcement expenses which could have possibly been expected to be borne or had actually been borne by the bailiffs. Because of its rigid application, instead of inciting voluntary compliance, it contributed very seriously to the applicant company’s demise.”

31.  The 7% enforcement fee (levied on unpaid taxes, interests and penalties) in respect of the applicant company amounted to:

-  RUB 6,848,291,175 (approximately EUR 190,481,640) for the year 2000;

-  RUB 12,652,063,176 (approximately EUR 345,770,570) for the year 2001;

-  RUB 13,477,590,451 (approximately EUR 360,688,386) for the year 2002;

-  RUB 11,926,766,600 (approximately EUR 355,784,986) for the year 2003.

The enforcement fee for the tax liability for the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 totalled RUB 44,904,711,402.82 (approximately EUR 1,252,725,582). As indicated above, this lead the Court to conclude that in the circumstances of the case the resulting sum was “completely out of proportion to the amount of the enforcement expenses which could have possibly been expected to be borne or had actually been borne by the bailiffs” (see paragraph 655 in the principal judgment).

32.  Making a reasonable assessment of the enforcement fee and having regard to the parties’ submissions in this respect, the Court accepts the Government’s indication of an appropriate rate of 4%, which they made in their submissions of 30 March 2013. The Court accordingly decides that in order to satisfy the requirements of proportionality the enforcement fee should have been reduced to 4%.

33.  In order to calculate the amount of the applicant company’s pecuniary loss in this connection, the Court deducts the amount of RUB 2,711,929,017.7 (EUR 75,477,284) representing the 7% enforcement fee paid by the applicant company on the unlawful portion of the penalties for the years 2000 and 2001 (see paragraph 25 above), from the entire amount of the enforcement fee of RUB 44,904,711,402.82 (approximately EUR 1,252,725,582) mentioned in paragraph 31 to arrive at the figure of RUB 42,192,782,385.12 (approximately EUR 1,177,070,056).

34.  It then follows that the applicant company sustained a clear pecuniary loss of RUB 18,082,621,022, representing the difference between RUB 42,192,782,385.12 (see paragraph 33 above) and the amount of that fee calculated at a 4% rate (RUB 24,110,161,362). The Court observes that the enforcement fee was effectively paid by the applicant company on 12 November 2007 at the latest (see paragraph 303 of the principal judgment). The stated amount equalled EUR 503,268,013 at the conversion rate on that date.

35.  Taking into account the inflation rate of 12.62% for the euro between that date and the present time, the Court assesses the amount of pecuniary damage to the applicant company resulting from the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the manner in which the authorities conducted the enforcement proceedings at EUR 566,780,436.

(d)  The method of distribution of the award

36.  The Court has concluded that the applicant company sustained pecuniary damage as a result of the violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the retroactive imposition of the penalties for the years 2000 and 2001 and the payment of the 7% enforcement fee on these penalties (see subpart (b) in paragraphs 20-26 above) and the disproportionate character of the enforcement proceedings (see subpart (c) in paragraphs 27-35 above). It has rejected the remainder of the applicant company’s claim under this head as unsubstantiated. The overall amount of pecuniary damage, including compensation for inflationary losses, sustained by the applicant company in the present case thus amounts to EUR 1,866,104,634 (see paragraphs 26 and 35 above).

37.  With regard to the appropriate method of distribution of this award, the Court does not accept the applicant company’s suggestion that payment be made to the Yukos International Foundation, as the case file contains no evidence confirming who exactly in such a circumstance would benefit from the award in this case.

38.  Regard being had to the fact that the applicant company ceased to exist (compare to Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, § 121, ECHR 2001‑IX; and Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, no. 49429/99, § 80, ECHR 2005‑XII (extracts)), the Court decides that the aforementioned amount should be paid by the respondent Government to the applicant company’s shareholders and their legal successors and heirs, as the case may be, in proportion to their nominal participation in the company’s stock (see, mutatis mutandis, Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. Bulgaria (just satisfaction), nos. 412/03 and 35677/04, § 39, 16 September 2010; Sophia Andreou v. Turkey (just satisfaction), no. 18360/91, §§ 33-38, 22 June 2010; and Lordos and Others v. Turkey (just satisfaction), no. 15973/90, §§ 61-70, 10 January 2012). In order to facilitate the Government’s task, the Court refers to the list of the applicant company’s shareholders, as they stood at the time of the company’s liquidation, which is held by ZAO VTB Registrator, the company which had held and ran the register of the applicant company.

39.  Further, given the nature of the violation found, the Court does not consider relevant the Government’s references to the allegedly fraudulent conduct of the applicant company’s management and some of its shareholders. The applicant company has already been held liable for the actions described in the various tax and enforcement proceedings and the Court sees no reasons to reduce the amount of award to take account of conduct for which the applicant company has already been punished.

40.  With regard to the Government’s reference to the applicant company’s allegedly unmet liabilities, amounting to over USD 8 billion at the time of its liquidation, the Court takes the view that this argument is similar to the applicant company’s evaluation of the consequences of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the enforcement proceedings (see paragraph 28 above) and remains speculative (see, mutatis mutandis, S.A. Dangeville v. France, no. 36677/97, § 70, ECHR 2002‑III).

41.  In this respect, the Court would note that it is clear from the course of the enforcement and liquidation proceedings that the domestic authorities chose not to seek repayment of the entirety of the applicant company’s debt by, for instance, granting the applicant company more time. Rather, they decided to precipitate the proceedings by auctioning the applicant company’s main production unit and liquidating it, notwithstanding the risk of being subsequently unable to recover some of the company’s liabilities. The existence and scale of the allegedly unmet liabilities referred to by the Government resulted at least in part from the method used by the domestic authorities to recover the applicant company’s tax liability.

42.  Moreover, the fact remains that any liabilities that the applicant company may have had in respect of its creditors were either met or extinguished within the framework of the enforcement and liquidation proceedings in November 2007, and there is nothing in the case file or the parties’ submissions to suggest that under domestic law the applicant company or its shareholders remain liable for any payments in favour of any of its creditors resulting from the above-mentioned enforcement or liquidation proceedings. In view of the above, the Court rejects the Government’s argument as unfounded.

43.  In so far as the respondent Government referred to various parallel proceedings allegedly brought by some of the applicant company’s shareholders in other international fora, the Court notes that there have been two final arbitral awards in cases brought against the Russian Federation by a group of the applicant company’s minority shareholders under bilateral investment treaties. These awards were made on 12 September 2010 and 20 July 2012 respectively by the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. There is also a pending set of arbitration proceedings brought by the applicant company’s majority shareholders (see paragraphs 519-526 of the principal judgment), in which no final award has been adopted so far.

44.  As regards the former two cases, the Court would note that the case file contains no information regarding the enforcement of these awards. In such circumstances, the Court does not find it necessary to take this information into account in the context of the present judgment and at this stage of the proceedings. The Government’s reference to the pending case is thus irrelevant.

B.  Non-pecuniary damage

45.  The applicant company submitted that the principal judgment was in itself sufficient just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

46.  The respondent Government did not object.

47.  The Court considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, the findings of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 constitute sufficient just satisfaction for the applicant company in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

C.  Costs and expenses

48.  The applicant company requested payment of GBP 4,333,105 in respect of the legal fees charged by its counsel Mr Piers Gardner for the work on the case prior to the principal judgment, USD 174,000 in respect of the costs of an expert report and USD 588,148 in respect of various fees incurred as a result of the preparation of submissions on Article 41 of the Convention.

49.  The Government asked the Court to take into account the fact that the initial application had been unsuccessful on most of the points of principle and that this should be reflected in any award under this head.

50.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as a violation of the Convention has been established and it has been shown that these costs and expenses have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in the Court’s possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award a lump sum of EUR 300,000 covering costs under all heads, to be paid to the Yukos International Foundation directly, as requested by the applicant company.

D.  Default interest

51.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1.  Holds unanimously that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant company;

 

2.  Holds, by five votes to two,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant company’s shareholders as they stood at the time of the company’s liquidation and, as the case may be, their legal successors and heirs EUR 1,866,104,634 (one billion, eight hundred sixty six million, hundred and four thousand, six hundred thirty four euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b)  that the respondent State must produce, in co-operation with the Committee of Ministers, within six months from the date on which this judgment becomes final, a comprehensive plan, including a binding time frame, for distribution of this award of just satisfaction;

 

3.  Holds, by six votes to one,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 300,000 (three hundred thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses, which sum is to be paid to the Yukos International Foundation, at the request of the applicant company;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

 

4.  Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicant company’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 31 July 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court."

Por tanto, en la Sentencia del caso YUKOS, el TEDH decidió:

1) Que la satisfacción equitativa (art. 41 CEDH) incluía las sanciones retroactivas e indebidas pagadas

2) Que la satisfacción equitativa incluye los "recargos ejecutivos" indebidos del 7 por ciento sobre las sanciones retroactivas e indebidas igualmente pagadas

3) Que la totalidad de los "recargos ejecutivos" en exceso del 4 por ciento deben considerarse igualmente satisfacción equitativa por los pagos indebidos de los mismos (exceso). Este importe se actualiza con la inflación.

4) Que la pérdida monetaria anterior, sufrida por los socios personas físicas, debe aumentarse en cualquier gravamen tributario exigible sobre la compensación o indemnización con ocasión de su pago.La satisfacción equitativa es, por tanto, neta de impuestos debidos sobre la misma.  

Lo anterior se ha resumido por el TEDH de la siguiente manera:

 

 

La justificación del tratamiento tributario indicado se encuentra en el artículo 41 del CEDH y en las propias indicaciones del TEDH sobre el mismo:

 

 

 

EL TRIBUNAL EUROPEO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS COMO JUEZ TRIBUTARIO (YUKOS V. RUSIA)

EL TRIBUNAL EUROPEO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS COMO JUEZ TRIBUTARIO (YUKOS V. RUSIA): El tedh como juez tributario (yukos v. rusia), 25 01-2012, cc View more documents from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero .  

 INTRODUCCION

El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH) ha resuelto, mediantesentencia de fecha 20 de septiembre de 2011, la demanda interpuesta por “OAONeftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos” contra Rusia (nº 14902/04) por infracción delConvenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos (CEDH) en relación con diferentesactuaciones tributarias de las autoridades y Tribunales rusos.
El caso resuelto por el TEDH tuvo muchas otras ramificaciones legales, dada laimportancia de la compañía y las circunstancias que condujeron a su quiebra.
Dan una idea de la complejidad e importancia del caso sometido a conocimientoel TEDH la longitud de la sentencia resolutoria del mismo (136 páginas y 671apartados), así como la minuciosidad y precisa argumentación de todo elcontenido de la misma y de los votos particulares disidentes.
Por su contenido, puede decirse que el TEDH ha actuado como un juez derevisión de la adecuación de las actuaciones tributarias impugnadas a los derechosprotegidos por el CEDH e invocados por las partes, enjuiciando, con arreglo a lademanda y a la contestación de las autoridades rusas, la infracción o no de losartículos 6.1 y 18 del CEDH, del artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH y delartículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH en relación con el artículo 14 del CEDH.
La característica más destacada de toda la sentencia es la utilización de losartículos invocados, más otros indirectamente afectados, como cánones deadecuación de las actividades tributarias impugnadas a los derechos protegidospor el CEDH.
Aunque dicha actividad revisora no es ni mucho menos nueva en la jurisprudencia
del TEDH, sí puede decirse, sin embargo, que en este caso alcanza unaimportancia y desarrollo, por la naturaleza y variedad de los problemas tratados,que no tenía precedentes en resoluciones anteriores.

TRASCENDENCIA DE LA DOCTRINA “YUKOS V. RUSIA” DEL TEDH
EN EL ORDENAMIENTO TRIBUTARIO INTERNO

La trascendencia en el ordenamiento interno de la doctrina contenida en lasentencia del TEDH aquí comentada deriva de lo siguiente:
1. De las obligaciones asumidas por el Estado español al ratificar el CEDH ysus Protocolos, con la posibilidad de demandar sus infracciones antes y unavez agotadas las instancias internas.
El artículo 13 del CEDH establece el “derecho a la concesión de un recursoefectivo ante una instancia nacional” frente a las violaciones de los derechosy libertades reconocidos por el CEDH.
Un recurso efectivo es, cuando menos, un recurso que obliga al Tribunalnacional a conocer de la violación sometida a su consideración y que délugar a un examen efectivo por el Tribunal nacional de la misma.
2. De la obligación constitucional de interpretar los derechos y libertadesreconocidos por la Constitución Española de conformidad con los acuerdosinternacionales ratificados por España (artículo 10.2 CE) y de suinterpretación por el TEDH.
Esta obligación constitucional tiene un paralelismo evidente con lacontenida en el artículo 5.1 de la Ley Orgánica 6/1985 del Poder Judicial enrelación con “todos los Jueces y Tribunales”.
Con arreglo a la misma, el Tribunal Constitucional debería seguir ladoctrina consolidada establecida por el TEDH en relación con los derechoseconocidos por el CEDH, siempre y cuando concurrieran los supuestosexigidos por la misma en los recursos de amparo constitucional o porinfracción de derechos fundamentales planteados en el ámbito interno.
La sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 155/2009 ha reconocidoexpresamente esta posibilidad al otorgar “especial trascendenciaconstitucional” a efectos del recurso de amparo a los supuestos en los cualesexiste y se invoca la jurisprudencia del TEDH desconocida por los actos yresoluciones dictados en el ámbito interno:
“Tales casos serán los siguientes casos: a) el de un recurso queplantee un problema o una faceta de un derecho fundamentalsusceptible de amparo sobre el que no haya doctrina del TribunalConstitucional, supuesto ya enunciado en la STC 70/2009, de 23 demarzo; b) o que dé ocasión al Tribunal Constitucional para aclararo cambiar su doctrina, como consecuencia de un proceso dereflexión interna, como acontece en el caso que nos ocupa, o por el surgimiento de nuevas realidades sociales o de cambios normativosrelevantes para la configuración del contenido del derechofundamental, o de un cambio de doctrina de los órganos de garantíaencargados de la interpretación de los tratados y acuerdosinternacionales a los que se refiere el art. 10.2 CE (…)” (F.J. 2)
Desde el punto de vista sustantivo, la trascendencia de la doctrina contenidaen la sentencia del TEDH afectaría, en nuestra opinión, al menos a lassiguientes materias y cuestiones:
(i) A las limitaciones derivadas de los plazos procesalesimprorrogables en aquellos supuestos de especial complejidadde los asuntos objeto de recurso.
(ii) A la consideración de la prescripción y, en particular, de laprescripción tributaria como una cuestión con relevancia en elamparo de los derechos protegidos por el CEDH. En especial,pero no exclusivamente, por el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1. Estaha sido un área jurídica de continuada fricción y colisión entreel TC y el TS español. Según el TDHE, no puede ni debeconsiderarse como de “mera legalidad ordinaria”.1
(iii) Al derecho a invocar el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH enrelación con los recursos internos planteados por loscontribuyentes contra actuaciones de liquidación y ejecucióntributarias incompatibles con el mismo.
Dicha invocación podría realizarse bien directamente y/o bienmediante la invocación del derecho constitucional más próximoal reconocido por el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH.
En la actualidad, el artículo 219.2 de la Ley 36/2011 de 10 deoctubre, reguladora de la Jurisdicción Social ya establece, porejemplo, que podrá alegarse como doctrina de contradicción “laestablecida en las sentencias dictadas por el TribunalConstitucional y los órganos jurisdiccionales instituidos en losTratados y Acuerdos Internacionales en materia de derechoshumanos y libertades fundamentales ratificados por España,siempre que se cumplan los presupuestos del número anteriorreferidos a la pretensión de tutela de tales derechos y libertades”.

 A pesar de lo anterior, debe indicarse que la STC 38/2011, de 28de marzo, desestimó un recurso de amparo interpuesto por uncontribuyente en relación con una sentencia del TribunalSupremo que confirmó la actuación ejecutiva derivada de unrecargo cameral declarado inconstitucional, sin constancia en elexpediente administrativo del título ejecutivo que justificó lamisma.
Sobre la posibilidad de invocar a efectos de la violacióndenunciada el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH, además deos derechos fundamentales íntimamente relacionados con elmismo y recogidos en la Constitución, la citada STC 38/2011declara lo siguiente:
"2. En primer término, ha de rechazarse -comoacertadamente han afirmado el Abogado del Estado y elMinisterio Fiscal- la queja relativa a la vulneración delderecho de propiedad, que no puede ser objeto del presenteproceso, pues este derecho constitucional, recogido en el art.33.1 CE, no se encuentra entre los que pueden ser protegidospor la vía excepcional y subsidiaria del recurso de amparo,como claramente se desprende del art. 53.2, en relación conel art. 161.1 b) y del art. 41.1 de la Ley Orgánica delTribunal Constitucional (LOTC), que queda restringida alos derechos y libertades contenidos en los arts. 14 a 29 CE, alos que se ha de unir el derecho a la objeción de concienciaconsagrado en el art. 30 CE (SSTC 59/1994, de 28 defebrero, FJ 1, y 140/1995, de 28 de septiembre, FJ 2, entreotras), de manera que "la única medida de enjuiciamientoaplicable, tanto en este proceso constitucional de amparocomo en el proceso preferente y sumario seguido ante losTribunales ordinarios ex art. 53.2 C.E., es la integrada porlos preceptos C.E. que reconocen aquellos derechosfundamentales y libertades públicas" [STC 64/1991, de 22 de
marzo, FJ 4 a)].
Bien es cierto que en la demanda de amparo no se invoca elart. 33 CE, sino que se fundamenta la violación denunciadaen el art. 1 del Protocolo núm. 1 adicional al Convenio
Europeo de los Derechos Humanos y de las LibertadesFundamentales. Sin embargo, esta circunstancia no altera lapremisa de partida -la no inclusión del derecho de propiedadentre los derechos susceptibles de amparo constitucional-,pues, aunque el contenido y alcance de los derechosfundamentales recogidos en los arts. 14 a 30 CE debaninterpretarse de conformidad con los tratados y acuerdos internacionales a que hace referencia el art. 10.2 CE, esafunción hermenéutica no convierte a tales tratados yacuerdos internacionales en canon autónomo de validez delas normas y actos de los poderes públicos desde la
perspectiva de los derechos fundamentales. Así no cabe dudade que la validez de las disposiciones y actos impugnados enamparo debe medirse sólo por referencia a los preceptosconstitucionales que reconocen los derechos y libertadessusceptibles de protección en esta clase de litigios, siendo lostextos y acuerdos internacionales, a que se refiere el art. 10.2,una fuente interpretativa que contribuye a la mejoridentificación del contenido de los derechos cuya tutela sepide a este Tribunal Constitucional [STC 64/1991, FJ 4 a)],
así como un elemento más para verificar la consistencia oinconsistencia de la infracción denunciada (STC 41/2002, de25 de febrero, FJ 2)."

Frente a lo anterior, parece que debería poder decirse que no seentienden las obligaciones asumidas por el Estado español en elCEDH, si no está jurídicamente obligado a que un tribunalnacional conozca de las mismas en un recurso efectivo. Y eltribunal no podría conocer si declara que el derecho reconocidopor el CEDH e invocado por el recurrente no se encuentra dentrode ningún ámbito nacional de protección del derecho invocado.
Tal declaración implicaría, por sí misma y como mínimo, elreconocimiento de una infracción del artículo 13 del CEDH.
(iv) A la aplicabilidad en el ámbito sancionador tributario de los derechos y doctrina invocables en relación con las infracciones de naturaleza “penal”, tanto por lo que se refiere a lretroactividad interpretativa abordada por la sentencia del TEDH, como en relación con la doble instancia de revisión jurisdiccional (artículo 2 del Protocolo 7), la prohibición del“bis in idem”2 (artículo 4 del Protocolo 7) y, en su caso, del derecho a la indemnización en caso de error judicial (artículo 3del Protocolo 7).
Como consecuencia de la mencionada doctrina, las modificaciones introducidas por la Ley 37/2011 de 10 deoctubre, de Medidas de Agilización Procesal, podrían resultarincompatibles con la doble instancia de revisión jurisdiccional,en el caso de sanciones tributarias inferiores a 30.000 o a600.000 euros que hayan contado con una sola instancia derevisión jurisdiccional.
(v) A la incompatibilidad con el CEDH de los recargos ejecutivoscuando concurran situaciones similares a las consideradas porla sentencia del TEDH objeto de comentario.
(vi) A la vinculación de la suspensión de las actuaciones tributariasejecutivas a los derechos y límites contenidos en el CEDH, conobjeto de evitar los daños injustificados que pudieran en otrocaso derivarse por la falta de suspensión de la ejecución.
Esta cuestión tiene especial importancia en relación con lasuspensión sin garantía de la ejecución de las sancionesrecurridas en vía jurisdiccional y con las cuestiones a tener en
cuenta en relación con el tipo y suficiencia de las garantíasexigidas a efectos de suspensión, con la finalidad de alcanzar eljusto equilibrio a que se refiere la sentencia objeto decomentario.
La suspensión sin garantía de la ejecución de las sancionesrecurridas en vía jurisdiccional resultaría exigible, tanto comoconsecuencia de la naturaleza “penal” de las mismas según la
jurisprudencia del TEDH, como del régimen legal desuspensión establecido para las sentencias penales objeto derecurso.

 

TEDH: COMPENSACION EQUITATIVA EN EL CASO YUKOS V. RUSIA

Case of oao neftyanaya kompaniya yukos v. russia (1) just satisfaction 31 july 2014 from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero