STJUE C-416-10, KRIZAN Y OTROS V. ESLOVAQUIA

Stjue 15 01-2013, c-416-10, krizan y otros v.slovenska. from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

STJUE 15-01-2013, C-416-10, KRIZAN V.ESLOVAQUIA

Esta STJUE plantea de la cuestión del "rango" constitucional del Derecho de la Unión en lo que se refiere a una cuestión prejudicial planteada por el Tribunal Supremo de Eslovaquia antes de decidir un caso previamente decidido por él y anulado por el Tribunal Constitucional de dicho país. 

El caso se refiere a la aplicación del Derecho de la Unión en un pleito medioambiental sobre una planta de reciclado de residuos.

Después de la anulación de la STS por la STC, el primer Tribunal plantea al TJUE, además de cuestiones sustantivas sobre la intrepretación del Derecho de la Unión, la cuestión prejudicial de si el Derecho de la Unión es vinculante a pesar de su obligación de decidir según la indicación del TC. 

Esta es la contestación del TJUE: 

"62 Mediante su primera cuestión, el órgano jurisdiccional remitente pregunta, en esencia, si el artículo 267 TFUE debe interpretarse en el sentido de que un órgano jurisdiccional nacional puede plantear de oficio al Tribunal de Justicia una petición de decisión prejudicial incluso cuando conoce del asunto tras habérsele devuelto los autos a raíz de la casación de su primera resolución por parte del tribunal constitucional del Estado miembro de que se trata y cuando una norma nacional le obliga a resolver el litigio siguiendo la apreciación jurídica de dicho tribunal constitucional. También se pregunta si el artículo 267 TFUE debe interpretarse en el sentido de que obliga a ese órgano jurisdiccional nacional a acudir ante el Tribunal de Justicia cuando sus resoluciones pueden ser objeto de un recurso, ante un órgano jurisdiccional constitucional, limitado al examen de una supuesta vulneración de los derechos y libertades garantizados por la Constitución nacional o por un convenio internacional. 

63 Con carácter preliminar, procede señalar que, mediante su primera cuestión, el Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky pretende también que se determine si el Derecho de la Unión le permite dejar de aplicar una norma nacional que le prohíbe formular un motivo basado en la vulneración de un derecho que no ha sido invocado por las partes en el litigio principal. No obstante, de la resolución de remisión se desprende que dicho interrogante únicamente se refiere a la Directiva 85/337 y, en consecuencia, sólo procederá pronunciarse al respecto si, a la luz de la respuesta dada a la tercera cuestión, dicha Directiva resulta aplicable en el litigio principal. 

64 Respecto de los demás aspectos de la primera cuestión prejudicial, según jurisprudencia reiterada el artículo 267 TFUE otorga a los órganos jurisdiccionales nacionales una amplísima facultad para someter una petición de decisión prejudicial al Tribunal de Justicia si consideran que un asunto pendiente ante ellos plantea cuestiones que exigen la interpretación o la apreciación de la validez de disposiciones del Derecho de la Unión necesarias para la resolución del litigio del que conocen (sentencias de 27 de junio de 1991, Mecanarte, C 348/89, Rec. p. I 3277, apartado 44, y de 5 de octubre de 2010, Elchinov, C 173/09, Rec. p. I 8889, apartado 26). 

65 Por tanto, el artículo 267 TFUE otorga a los órganos jurisdiccionales nacionales la facultad y, en su caso, les impone la obligación de efectuar la remisión prejudicial cuando comprueben, de oficio o a instancia de las partes, que el fondo del litigio versa sobre un extremo contemplado en el párrafo primero de dicho artículo (sentencias de 10 de julio de 1997, Palmisani, C 261/95, Rec. p. I 4025, apartado 20, y de 21 de julio de 2011, Kelly, C 104/10, Rec. p. I 0000, apartado 61). Por ello, el hecho de que las partes en el litigio principal no hayan suscitado ante el órgano jurisdiccional remitente un problema de Derecho de la Unión no impide que éste se pueda remitir al Tribunal de Justicia (sentencias de 16 de junio de 1981, Salonia, 126/80, Rec. p. 1563, apartado 7, y de 8 de marzo de 2012, Huet, C 251/11, Rec. p. I 0000, apartado 23). 

66 En efecto, el procedimiento prejudicial se basa en un diálogo entre jueces cuya iniciativa depende en su totalidad de la apreciación que el órgano jurisdiccional nacional haga de la pertinencia y la necesidad de dicha remisión (sentencias de 16 de diciembre de 2008, Cartesio, C 210/06, Rec. p. I 9641, apartado 91, y de 9 de noviembre de 2010, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, C 137/08, Rec. p. I 10847, apartado 29). 

67 Por otra parte, la existencia de una norma nacional de Derecho procesal no puede poner en entredicho la facultad que tienen los órganos jurisdiccionales nacionales de plantear al Tribunal de Justicia una petición de decisión prejudicial cuando, como en el caso de autos, albergan dudas acerca de la interpretación del Derecho de la Uniónº (sentencias Elchinov, antes citada, apartado 25, y de 20 de octubre de 2011, Interedil, C 396/09, Rec. p. I 0000, apartado 35). 

68 Una norma de Derecho nacional, en virtud de la cual las valoraciones efectuadas por el órgano jurisdiccional superior vinculan a otro órgano jurisdiccional, no puede privar a éste de la facultad de someter al Tribunal de Justicia cuestiones de interpretación del Derecho de la Unión al que se refieran tales valoraciones jurídicas. En efecto, el órgano jurisdiccional nacional debe tener la libertad de someter al Tribunal de Justicia las cuestiones que le preocupan, si considera que la valoración jurídica efectuada por el órgano de rango superior pudiera llevarle a dictar una sentencia contraria al Derecho de la Unión (sentencias de 9 de marzo de 2010, ERG y otros, C 378/08, Rec. p. I 1919, apartado 32, y Elchinov, antes citada, apartado 27). 

69 En este punto, procede destacar que el juez nacional que ha ejercido la facultad que le otorga el artículo 267 TFUE está vinculado, a la hora de resolver el litigio principal, por la interpretación de las disposiciones de que se trate realizada por el Tribunal de Justicia y debe, en su caso, dejar de lado las valoraciones del órgano jurisdiccional superior si, habida cuenta de dicha interpretación, estima que las referidas valoraciones no son compatibles con el Derecho de la Unión (sentencia Elchinov, antes citada, apartado 30). 

70 Los principios que se enuncian en los apartados anteriores se imponen del mismo modo al órgano jurisdiccional remitente por lo que atañe a la apreciación jurídica adoptada, en el presente asunto principal, por el órgano jurisdiccional constitucional del Estado miembro de que se trata en la medida en que, según reiterada jurisprudencia, no puede admitirse que normas de Derecho nacional, aunque sean de rango constitucional, menoscaben la unidad y la eficacia del Derecho de la Unión (sentencias de 17 de diciembre de 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/70, Rec. p. 1125, apartado 3, y de 8 de septiembre de 2010, Winner Wetten, C 409/06, Rec. p. I 8015, apartado 61). Por otra parte, el Tribunal de Justicia ya ha declarado que dichos principios se aplican a las relaciones entre un órgano jurisdiccional constitucional y cualquier otro órgano jurisdiccional nacional (sentencia de 22 de junio de 2010, Melki y Abdeli, C 188/10 y C 189/10, Rec. p. I 5667, apartados 41 a 45). 

71 Por tanto, la norma nacional que obliga al Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky a seguir la apreciación jurídica del Ústavný súd Slovenskej republiky no impide que el juez remitente pueda plantear al Tribunal de Justicia una petición de decisión prejudicial en cualquier momento del procedimiento que considere oportuno y dejar de lado, en su caso, las valoraciones formuladas por el Ústavný súd Slovenskej republiky que resulten contrarias al Derecho de la Unión. 

72 Por último, en su condición de Tribunal supremo, el Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky está incluso obligado a plantear al Tribunal de Justicia una petición de decisión prejudicial en cuanto constate que uno de los extremos sobre los que versa el fondo del litigio está comprendido en el ámbito de aplicación del primer párrafo del artículo 267 TFUE. En efecto, la calificación de un órgano jurisdiccional nacional como órgano jurisdiccional nacional cuyas decisiones no son susceptibles de ulterior recurso jurisdiccional de Derecho interno, en el sentido del artículo 267 TFUE, párrafo tercero, no resulta afectada por el hecho de que contra las decisiones de ese órgano jurisdiccional pueda interponerse ante el Tribunal constitucional del Estado miembro de que se trate un recurso limitado al examen de una posible violación de los derechos y de las libertades garantizados por la Constitución nacional o por un convenio internacional. 

73 Habida cuenta de las consideraciones anteriores, procede responder a la primera cuestión que el artículo 267 TFUE debe interpretarse en el sentido de que un órgano jurisdiccional nacional, como el tribunal remitente, está obligado a plantear de oficio ante el Tribunal de Justicia una petición de decisión prejudicial incluso cuando se pronuncia tras la devolución de los autos a raíz de la casación de su primera resolución por parte del tribunal constitucional del Estado miembro de que se trata y cuando una norma nacional le obliga a resolver el litigio siguiendo la apreciación jurídica formulada de este último tribunal." 

Por tanto, el "rango" constitucional del Derecho de la Unión se impone a cualquier órgano judicial nacional, incluído el Tribunal Constitucional.

La contrapartida solo puede ser que los nacionales del Estado miembro tienen el derecho en cualquier pleito, y también en un recurso de amparo o cuestión de inconstitucioanlidad, a que se plantee la cuestión prejudicial del artículo 267 TFUE y/o a que se decida el asunto según la jurisprudencia del propio TJUE en materia de Derecho de la Unión.  

Sobre el pluralismo constitucional que resulta de ello puede seguirse este link a entradas previas

NO EUROZONE WITHOUT EURO-DIVIDEND

El trabajo de Philippe van Parijs NO EUROZONE WITHOUT EURO-DIVIDEND señala, más allá de su propuesta concreta, los problemas fundamentales del diseño de la eurozona y los derivados de las limitaciones políticas que se superponen a ellos.

Esta es su conclusión:

“Let us sum up. If the analysis proposed here is correct, the euro-dividend

would equip the Eurozone with an essential transfer-based stabilization mechanism analogous to the one supplied to the dollar zone by the far more

complex and extensive American welfare state. In addition, the euro-dividend would not make things worse but, if anything, significantly better in terms of two other features whose presence contributes to the sustainability of a currency area. Bearing this in mind, we can now turn to a final question.

Suppose one is convinced by the need for a euro-dividend, how is it to become politically feasible.

Firstly, perception is of the greatest importance. There is little prospect for a euro-dividend if it is successfully depicted as a mega-bureaucratic machine that threatens the valuable democratically shaped diversity of national social protection systems and ends up channelling masses of money from countries well run to countries sloppily run, thereby perpetuating the latter’s sloppiness.

It is important that European citizens should understand that a euro-dividend is not a threat to the diversity of European welfare state, but instead, for the reasons explained above, an essential tool to prevent the constraints of the single market and the single currency from gradually forcing all of them to trim down and converge to a minimalist form of social protection. Even more important, the euro-dividend should at the same time be viewed as a way of making as sure as possible that every European citizen should share in the material benefits of European integration. How high these benefits are is impossible to assess with any precision. To imagine the relevant counterfactual, one must find some inspiration in the contrast between the aftermath of World War I and that of World War II. The very fact that it is hard to think of a military build up and armed conflict between European countries, let alone to estimate what they would cost us, is not a reason to ignore them in the assessment of the material benefits every European derives from the creation and perpetuation of the European Union. They must on the contrary be taken into account as a bulky and lasting component of what the EU keeps doing for us.

There are, in addition, the considerable material benefits of a common market in terms of breaking monopolies, stimulating innovation, facilitating specialization, etc., mostly reflected in the difference between the prices Europeans pay for the goods and services they consume and the prices they would have paid had the trade and investment barriers remained what they were prior to the European Economic Community. Arguably, this type of benefit is directly shared by all, but it is so to various extents, as the bundle of goods consumed by rich and poor is not the same. Moreover, greater transnational competition also makes many jobs and many regions more vulnerable. For the reasons discussed above, this vulnerability has been further increased by monetary unification. Lower prices than would otherwise be the case are therefore no guarantee of universal gain. In this context, the euro-dividend would not prevent some people and regions from gaining a lot from European integration nor some others from losing out. But it would give everyone a tangible share in part of the overall material gain that can be safely attributed to the very existence of the EU. Indexing the level of the dividend on the EU wide per capita level of value added (or GDP) — or its average over the last five years or so to make it less bumpy — would make this link more explicit: the prosperity of the whole would then be clearly seen to benefit each of its parts — member states, regions and households.

There are no doubt also background institutional conditions that will favour this perception of the euro-dividend and thereby its acceptability by the population, rather than a perception in terms of immediate country-level net losses and net gains. As long as key decisions are taken by politicians who are accountable exclusively to the electorate of a single country, it will be very difficult to prevent electoral competition from getting the issue framed in terms of net gainer and net loosing countries. This is the case to the extent that the key decisions are taken by heads of government gathered in the European Council. But it does not need to be different if more power is exercised by the European Parliament, meant to emanate from the EU population as a whole rather than from its member states. As things stand, MEPs are also electorally accountable only to the citizens of their own country. In the US and in European nations, an inclusive rhetoric and policy orientation is facilitated by direct presidential elections or centralized political parties. At EU level, there are good reasons to believe that we shall never have either. The next best option is the development of strong pan-EU federations of national parties, which itself will remain a pipe dream in the absence of an EU-wide constituency for part of the seats of the European Parliament, coupled with a direct link between the composition of the EU executive and the electoral results in this constituency.

More broadly still, the political achievability and sustainability of a euro dividend— and of any other major redistributive scheme at EU level — requires the existence and liveliness of an EU-wide democratic forum. An EU-wide parliamentary constituency should help, but will not suffice. Institutional innovations such as the European Citizens’ Initiatives should also help, because of the opportunities and incentives they create to meet, argue and mobilize across national borders. The most fundamental obstacle, however, is the EU’s linguistic diversity. National welfare states were not born out of the blue through some top-down decree. They were the laborious outcomes of long struggles. Such struggles could only be successful because of efficient communication, trust building, coordination and mobilization across the nation made possible by a shared national language. The wonderful yet expensive and stiffening services of translators and interpreters will never supply an adequate alternative to a shared language. As mentioned before, competence in English is spreading rapidly among the younger cohorts of the European population. But this lingua franca should not and will not replace national languages. It will not therefore be able to play quite the same role as national languages in cementing trust and fostering solidarity. Nonetheless a minimal condition for the political sustainability of institutionalized solidarity is that the people among whom this solidarity operates should be able to address and understand each other. The democratization and appropriation of English as a lingua franca throughout Europe is therefore at least as crucial to the political feasibility of EU-wide redistribution as institutional engineering.

What follows from this brief discussion of political feasibility is not that we might as well give up. It is rather that it is not enough to spell out blueprints of what is needed to get to the roots of our present problems, submit them to critical scrutiny and advocate what emerges as the most robust version. At the same time, one must fight and progress on many different, seemingly unconnected fronts. Banning the dubbing of films may be no less crucial to the sustainability of an EU-wide transfer system than removing the cap on the EU’s taxing powers.”

(Philippe van Parijs: No Eurozone without euro-dividend)

TOMAS PRINGLE V. IRELAND, C-370/12

EL RACIONAMIENTO DE LA JUSTICIA

"Si pretendemos conservar nuestra democracia, debe existir un mandamiento: no racionarás la justicia"

(Juez Learned Hand, Speech a la Sociedad de Ayuda Legal de Nueva York, 1951)

“If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou shall not ration justice.”

HOLMES, HAND, DWORKIN, TAXES

En su trabajo "Roland Dworkin-un solitario entre los juristas" (¡Ay, Europa!), Habermas cita la siguiente anécdota que Dworkin conocía por Hand:

"En una ocasión , en la época en que era juez del Tribunal Supremo, Holmes llevo al juzgado en su coche al joven Learned Hand.Al llegar a su destino, Hand descendió del coche y se despidióagitando la mano y gritando alegremente hacia el coche que ya se alejaba: ¡cuide usted de la justicia, juez Holmes!".Holmes pidó al conductor que detuviese el coche y diese marcha atrás en dirección al sorprendido Hand, para asomarse por la ventanilla y decirle: "That’s not my job".A continuación el coche volvió a girar y condujo a Holmes a su trabajo, que supuestamente no consitía en cuidar de la justicia."

La anécdota no oculta la complejidad de Holmes.Una frase suya del  caso tributario "COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS v. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL, 275 U.S. 87 (1927)" es la que consta inscrita en el edificio del Internal Revenue Service: "Taxes are what we paid for civilized society" (ver fotografía).La frase a su vez tampoco deja de ser compleja porque "civilized society" sería un requisito que debería cumplirse para la legitimación tributaria.

En el mismo, Holmes votó con la minoría:

"Mr. Justice HOLMES (dissenting). 

This is a suit to recover the amount of a tax alleged to have been illegally imposed. The plaintiff is a Spanish corporation licensed to do business in the Philippine Islands and having an office in Manila. In 1922 from time to time it bought goods and put them into its Philippine warehouses. It notified its head office in Barcelona, Spain, of the value of the goods and that office thereupon insured them under open policies issued by a company of London. From time to time also the Philippine branch shipped the goods abroad for sale and secured insurance upon the shipments in the same manner, the premiums being charged to it in both cases. By section 192 of the Philippine Insurance Act No. 2427, as amended by Act No. 2430, where owners of property obtain insurance directly with foreign companies the owners are required to report each case to the Collector of Internal Revenue and to 'pay the tax of one per centum on premium paid, in the manner required by law of insurance companies.' The defendant Collector collected this tax on the above mentioned premiums from the plaintiff against its protest. The plaintiff bases its suit upon the contentions that the statute is contrary to the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, c. 416, 3 (the Jones Act), 39 Stat. 545, 546, 547, as depriving it of its property without due process of law, and also as departing from the requirement in the same section that the rules of taxation shall be uniform. The Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld the tax. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. 271 U.S. 655 , 46 S. Ct. 486. [275 U.S. 87, 100]   The plaintiff's reliance is upon Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 , 17 S. Ct. 427, in which it was held that a fine could not be imposed by the State for sending a notice similar to the present to an insurance company out of the State. But it seems to me that the tax was justified and that this case is distinguished from that of Allgeyer and from St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 , 43 S. Ct. 125, by the difference between a penalty and a tax. It is true, as indicated in the last cited case, that every exaction of money for an act is a discouragement to the extent of the payment required, but that which in its immediacy is a discouragement may be part of an encouragement when seen in its organic connection with the whole. Taxes are what we pay for civilized society, including the chance to insure. A penalty on the other hand is intended altogether to prevent the thing punished. It readily may be seen that a State may tax things that under the Constitution as interpreted it can not prevent. The constitutional right asserted in Allgeyer v. Louisiana to earn one's livelihood by any lawful calling certainly is consistent, as we all know, with the calling being taxed.

Sometimes there may be a difficulty in deciding whether an imposition is a tax or a penalty, but generally the intent to prohibit when it exists is plainly expressed. Sometimes even when it is called a tax the requirement is shown to be a penalty by its excess in amount over the tax in similar cases, as in St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas. But in the present instance there is no room for doubt. The charge not only is called a tax but is the same in amount as that imposed where the right to impose it is not denied.

The government has the insured within its jurisdiction. I can see no ground for denying its right to use its power to tax unless it can be shown that it has conferred no benefit of a kind that would justify the tax, as is held with regard to property outside of a State belonging to one within it. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 489 , 45 S. Ct. 603, 42 A.L.R. 316. [275 U.S. 87, 101]   But here an act was done in the Islands that was intended by the plaintiff to be and was an essential step towards the insurance, and, if that is not enough, the government of the Islands was protecting the property at the very moment in respect of which it levied the tax. Precisely this question was met and disposed of in Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 143, 147 , 35 S. Ct. 829

The result of upholding the government's action is just. When it taxes domestic insurance it reasonably may endeavor not to let the foreign insurance escape. If it does not discriminate against the latter it naturally does not want to discriminate against its own.

The suggestion that the rule of taxation is not uniform may be disposed of in a few words. The uniformity required is uniformity in substance not in form. The insurance is taxed uniformly, and although in the case of domestic insurance the tax is laid upon the company whereas here it is laid upon the insured, it must be presumed that in the former case the company passes the tax on to the insured as an element in the premium charged.

For these reasons Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and I are of opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Islands should be affirmed."

A la vista del caso, mi primera impresión es que el Juez Taft llevaba razón con la mayoría y el tributo exigido a la compañía española era en parte constitucional y en parte no.Ello también proporciona una idea adecuada de la complejidad de la "vida civilizada" y de la simplificación de las "frases hechas".

Quizás otra frase de Holmes compañera de la cita de Hand, Dworkin y Habermas sea ésta:

"I always say, as you know, that if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job."

Letter to Harold J. Laski (March 4, 1920); reported in Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., Holmes-Laski Letters (1953), vol. 1, p. 249.

Pero lo que Learned Hand, a su vez, dijo, como ciudadano, de las esperanzas sobre la libertad, también puede decirse de las esperanzas sobre los tributos en la medida que afectan a la organización de la libertad en una sociedad civilizada:

 "¿Qué queremos decir cuando decimos que lo primero que buscamos es la libertad?.A menudo me pregunto si no ponemos demasiadas esperanzas sobre las constituciones, las leyes y los tribunales.Estas son falsas esperanzas, creédme, son esperanzas falsas. La libertad reside en los corazones de las mujeres y los hombres, y cuando muere allí, ninguna constitución, ninguna ley, ni ningún tribunal puede hacer mucho por ayudar.Mientras reside allí no necesita cosntitución, ni ley, ni tribunal para salvarla."

 Learned Hand ( "I am an American Day", Speech delivered at Central Park, May 21 1944)
 

Heráclito ya afirmó que "el pueblo debe combatir más por la ley que por los muros de su ciudad"

TEDH: ASUNTO MANZANAS MARTIN CONTRA ESPAÑA

Case of manzanas martin v. spain spanish translation from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

TEDH: MANZANAS MARTIN CONTRA ESPAÑA

El TEDH mediante Sentencia de fecha 3 da Abril de 2012 (demanda 17966/10) ha declarado la infracción por España de los artículos 14 del CEDH y 1 del Protocolo 1 de Convenio por el distinto tratamiento dado en la normativa de pensiones a los sacerdotes católicos y a los pastores evangélicos.

El recurso de amparo previo ante el Tribunal Constitucional fue inadmitido por falta de especial trascendencia cosntitucional del mismo.

El caso plantea la peculiar situción de nuestro sistema de amparo, como consecuencia del cual el TEDH tiene que pronunciarse sobre casos que nuestro Tribunal Constitucional considera que no tiene obligación de examinar, alterando el sistema institucional del CEDH, en el que el TEDH solo actúa como consecuencia de enjuicimaientos previos de los Tribunales de los Estados miembros.

El artículo 13 del CEDH exige un recurso nacional efectivo y resulta que nuestro sistema de amparo no cumple actualmente el misno como consecuencia del requisito de "especial trascendencia constitucional" introducido por primera en 2007 y que plantea dudas de constitucionalidad y, desde luego, de compatibilidad con las obligaciones internacionales asumidas por el Estado español como consecuencia del artículo 13 del CEDH.

Estos son los apartados de la STEDH que declaran la infracción:

"55. Ninguna de estas posibilidades ofrecidas a los sacerdotes católicos para que sean computados, a efectos de pensión de jubilación, los años anteriores a su integración al régimen de la Seguridad Social se concede a los pastores evangélicos en la legislación española. El Tribunal considera, por lo tanto, probado, habida cuenta de las circunstancias del caso, que esta diferencia normativa desfavorable constituye una diferencia de trato al demandante, basada en la confesión religiosa, no justificada en relación al trato reservado a los sacerdotes católicos, en la medida en que el demandante no dispone de ningún medio para que se tengan en cuenta, a efectos de el cálculo de su pensión de jubilación, sus años de actividad pastoral como pastor evangélico antes de su integración en el régimen de la Seguridad Social. El Tribunal aprecia, por tanto, una desproporción en el hecho de que el Estado español, que había reconocido en 1977 (párrafo 17 anterior) la integración de los Ministros de Iglesias y confesiones religiosas distintas a la católica en el Régimen general de la Seguridad Social, no esté dispuesto a reconocer, pese a la integración de los pastores evangélicos efectuada veintidós años más tarde, los efectos de tal integración en cuanto a la pensión de jubilación en las mismas condiciones que los previstos para los sacerdotes católicos, en particular, por lo que se refiere a la posibilidad de completar las anualidades que falten para alcanzar el período mínimo de cotizacón mediante el pago por el demandante del capital-coste que corresponda a los años de cotización reconocidos. Si bien las razones del retraso en la integración de los pastores evangélicos al Régimen general de la Seguridad Social están incluidas en el margen de apreciación del Estado (apartado 53 arriba), el Gobierno no justifica, sin embargo, las razones por las cuales, una vez efectuada dicha integración, se mantuvo una diferencia de tratamiento entre situaciones similares, basada solamente en razones de confesión religiosa.

56. Por lo que se refiere a la afirmación del Gobierno según la cual los Reales Decretos de 1998 contemplan el caso del cese de la actividad religiosa de los sacerdotes católicos por razones personales o de secularización, y no el supuesto de jubilación, por edad, como ocurre en el presente asunto, el Tribunal considera, habida cuenta de lo que precede, que tal diferencia no es relevante en la medida en que la diferencia de trato, a efectos de la pensión de jubilación, entre los sacerdotes católicos y los pastores evangélicos, desfavorable a estos últimos, no se limita a los decretos citados por el Gobierno. En cualquier caso, ni el Juez de lo Social de Barcelona cuando estimó la demanda, ni el Tribunal Superior de Justicia, cuando rechazó la pensión, hicieron referencia a este hecho para justificar el diferente tratamiento otorgado a los sacerdotes católicos y a los pastores evangélicos, en situaciones similares de falta de años de cotización que causan derecho a la pensión de jubilación. En efecto, estas resoluciones no excluyeron, en ningún caso, al demandante de las condiciones establecidas in abstracto por la discutida legislación que establecía la posibilidad de completar las anualidades de cotización efectiva a la Seguridad Social.

57. En consecuencia, el Tribunal concluye que en el presente caso existe una violación del artículo 14 del Convenio en relación con el artículo 1 del Protocolo n 1.

(...)

 A. Daño

1. Reparación solicitada
62. El demandante reclama 64 797,44 € en concepto de daños materiaes sufridos. Esta suma se divide del siguiente modo: por una parte, 30 360,44€ correspondientes al importe de las pensiones mensuales no percibidas desde la fecha en que solicitó la pensión de jubilación ante los órganos jurisdiccionales nacionales, el 22 de julio de 2004, y la interposición de la demanda ante el Tribunal, el 31 de marzo de 2010, calculada en razón de la suma de 398,44€ mensuales, fijada en la sentencia de 12 de diciembre de 2005 por el Juez de lo Social y, por otra parte, 34.436,86€ correspondientes al capital-coste requerido para garantizar a una persona de la edad y el sexo del demandante una pensión mensual actualizada al 31 de marzo de 2010 en función de su esperanza de vida (se adjunta cálculo actuarial).

63. El demandante reclama también 3.000€ en concepto de daños morales.

64. Por lo que se refiere al perjuicio material solicitado, el Gobierno alega que la restitutio in integrum sería posible y que la satisfacción equitativa sólo tiene un carácter subsidiario. Ningún obstáculo podría oponerse al pago del importe de la pensión debida. Considera, por el contrario, que el importe que corresponde al coste del capital requerido pro futura no puede ser compensado, por cuanto que no es, por el momento, un perjuicio real y efectivo. El Gobierno considera que, en cualquier caso, como reconoció la sentencia dictada por el Juez de lo Social de Barcelona dictada en el asunto, dichos importes sólo serían exigible a condición de pagar el capital correspondiente a los años de cotización reconocidos.

65. Por lo que se refiere al daño moral, el Gobierno considera que no está justificada su existencia, ni la suma reclamada por el demandante por este concepto.

2. Conclusión del Tribunal

a) Daño material

66. Habida cuenta de las circunstancias del caso, el Tribunal no se considera suficientemente ilustrado sobre los criterios que deben aplicarse para evaluar el perjuicio material sufrido por el demandante, en la medida en que no tiene ninguna información sobre los importes que el demandante debería pagar para cumplir el período mínimo de cotización exigido para el reconocimiento de la pensión en cuestión.

Considera que, por lo que respecta a la indemnización del daño material no se encuentra en situación de resolver, por lo que se reserva su pronunciamiento, considerando la posibilidad de un acuerdo entre el Estado demandado y el demandante.

b) Daño moral

67. El Tribunal considera que el demandante sufrió, debido a la violación constatada, un daño moral que no puede ser reparado por el mero reconocimiento de la violación. Resolviendo en equidad, tal como prevé el artículo 41 del Convenio, el Tribunal concede al demandante la suma de 3.000€, por daños morales.

B. Gastos y costas

68. El demandante solicita, aportando justificantes de la minuta de honorarios y factura, 3 976,48€ por los gastos y costas sufridos ante los órganos jurisdiccionales internos y 4.000€ correspondientes al procedimiento ante el Tribunal. Aporta los justificantes de estas cantidades.

69. El Gobierno considera excesiva la suma reclamada por el demandante.

70. Según la jurisprudencia del Tribunal, un demandante únicamente puede obtener el reembolso de sus gastos y costas en la medida en que se acredite su realidad, su necesidad y el carácter razonable de su cuantía. En el presente caso, y habida cuenta de los documentos en su posesión y de los criterios previamente mencionados, el Tribunal considera razonable la suma de 6.000 € por el concepto de gastos y costas efectuados en el marco del procedimiento nacional y ante el Tribunal, y la reconoce al demandante."

TEDH: VISTINS AND PEREPJOLKINS V. LATVIA

En esta relevante sentencia del TEDH (demanda nº 71243/01), la Gran Sala estimó (25 de octubre de 2012) la demanda de los recurrentes, a pesar de la desestimación previa de la misma por la la Sala de la Sección 3ª.Lo que es más importante, la sentencia se separa de la doctrina contenida en el caso previo de "Jahn and others v. Germany" en la que el Tribunal consideró que, dada la situación de transición del régimen legal en la antigua RDA, no había exisitido una infracción del artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH en relación con una "expropiación legislativa".

Este es el resumen de esta importante STEDH:

"Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

The Court acknowledged that the disputed expropriation had been carried out on the basis of the Law of 30 October 1997 on expropriation, for the needs of the State, of land within the Free Commercial Port of Riga. The Court noted that in Latvian law the formal decision on expropriation was taken not by the executive but by Parliament in the form of a special law. The Court observed that this was a feature of the Latvian legal system, dating back to 1923, and enshrined in the Constitution in 1998. It found that the general principles and objectives of the expropriation system set up by Latvian law did not, as such, raise any issue of lawfulness within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

However, the Court noted that on 5 August 1997 the Cabinet had adopted a regulation ordering the expropriation of all the properties at issue in the present case, and that, together with the Law of 30 October 1997 by which it was confirmed, the regulation had been interpreted by the domestic courts as providing for a derogation from the General Expropriation Act of 1923. It had thus been possible to disregard the usual expropriation procedure in the applicants’ case and to limit the amount of the compensation by reference to Article 2 of the Supreme Council’s decision of 1992. Prior to the adoption of the regulation and the enactment of the special Law, the applicants could have expected that any expropriation of their property would be carried out in accordance with the 1923 General Expropriation Act. The Court had doubts as to whether the expropriation at issue had been carried out “subject to the conditions provided for by law”, having regard in particular to the derogation applied to the applicants and to the procedural safeguards that were – or were not – attached to it.

The Court reiterated that an interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions always had to strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the general interest and the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.

The Court observed that the value of the properties at issue had been assessed on three separate occasions. It took the view that the Latvian authorities had been justified in deciding not to compensate the applicants for the full market value of the expropriated property and that much lower amounts could suffice to fulfil the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Nevertheless, the Court noted an extreme disproportion between the official cadastral value of the land and the compensation received by the applicants: the sum received by Mr Vistiņš was less than one thousandth of the cadastral value of his land, and Mr Perepjolkins had received a sum some 350 times lower than the total cadastral value of all his properties. In the Court’s view, such disproportionate awards were virtually tantamount to a complete lack of compensation.

The Court further noted that shortly after being deprived of their properties, the applicants had received significant amounts from the Free Commercial Port of Riga for the rent arrears due to them. Those amounts – calculated this time on the basis of the current value, and not that of 1940 – were respectively 95 times higher than the compensation granted to Mr Vistiņš and 40 times higher than that granted to Mr Perepjolkins. In any event, the disproportion between the rent arrears and the compensation awarded confirmed that the compensation had been unreasonably low.The Government had failed to show that the legitimate aim relied on, namely that of optimising the management of the port infrastructure in the general context of the State’s economic policy, could not be fulfilled by less drastic measures than expropriation compensated for by purely symbolic sums. In that connection the Court dismissed the Government’s argument that the expropriation had been carried out in a particular historical context. It took the view that, as the events at issue had taken place well after the end of the period of historic upheaval, the legislature could nevertheless have been expected to uphold the principle of legal certainty and to refrain from imposing excessive burdens on individuals.

The authorities could have calculated the compensation on the basis of the cadastral value of the land at the date on which the applicants had actually lost their title, instead of using the cadastral value from 1940. Even though Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 did not,in the present case, require the reimbursement of the full cadastral or market value of the expropriated properties, the Court considered that the disproportion between their current cadastral value and the compensation awarded was too significant for it to find that a “fair balance” had been struck between the interests of the community and the applicants’ fundamental rights.

The Court concluded that the State had overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to it and that the expropriation complained of by the applicants had imposed on them a disproportionate and excessive burden, upsetting the “fair balance” to be struck between the protection of property and the requirements of the general interest. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

Article 14 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

The Court was of the view that the inequality of treatment of which Mr Vistiņš and

Mr Perepjolkins claimed to be victims had been sufficiently taken into account in its

assessment leading to the finding of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It thus

found that there was no need for a separate examination of the same facts under

Article 14 of the Convention.

Just satisfaction (Article 41)

The court held that the question of the application of Article 41 of the Convention was

not ready for decision and reserved it in its entirety for future consideration.

Separate opinion

Judges Bratza, Garlicki, Lorenzen, Tsotsoria and Pardalos expressed a joint partly

dissenting opinion, which is annexed to the judgment.

En el asunto "Jahn and others v. Germany" (demandas nº 46720/99,72203/01 and 72552/01), el juez alemán George Ress ya disintió de la opinión mayoritaria con la opinión siguiente:

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE RESS

(Translation)

"1.  I share the dissenting opinion of Judges Costa and Borrego Borrego joined by Judge Botoucharova, except regarding a violation of Article 14. I still find the reasoning of the Chamber, which adopted a judgment on 22 January 2004 in the present case holding unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on the ground that the State had compelled the applicants to assign their property to the State without any compensation, more convincing than the Grand Chamber's judgment.

2.  The applicants had not acquired property rights illegally, but entirely legally under the Law of 6 March 1990. It would be possible to speak of an illegal acquisition or – as the Grand Chamber has done – a “windfall” if the former laws and regulations of the GDR were taken as a decisive criterion. Such was not the intention of the legislature or the purpose of the Law of 6 March 1990, however. The legislature had to create true ownership in the sense of a free market economy to prepare the GDR for the signing of economic, currency and social union with the FRG, which was finally done on 18 May 1990. It is far-fetched to consider that there is a loophole in that Law concerning the question of ownership of heirs to that land and to see in that a whole series of uncertainties regarding their legal position. Although the Law of 6 March 1990 is very short, or even succinct, all the issues were discussed by the parliamentary commission and were therefore known to the legislature. There is no evidence of a loophole in the structure of that Law. Otherwise, it would be possible to find all sorts of loopholes in short laws if the results of the law appear unsatisfactory. Naturally the legislature can correct those results in such a case, but in doing so it must respect the individual rights it has created. Furthermore, from the Law of 6 March 1990 until the 1992 Act, the applicants were able to exercise their property rights in good faith for two years. Considering that the period during which the Italian authorities left Mr Beyeler in the dark as to whether he had become the lawful owner (see Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 119, ECHR 2000-I) was just over four years, I think that in the present case the applicants, whose property rights were not called into question, were also entitled to compensation for the legitimate expectation created by the State.

3.  My biggest reservation concerns the reference to the “unique” context of the unification of Germany and the “exceptional circumstances” of this case. As my colleagues Judges Costa and Borrego Borrego have rightly pointed out, this expression should not be misused. The unification of Germany is no more “unique” than the dissolution of the USSR or of Yugoslavia or the change of political regime that occurred in many countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

If a State like the FRG is bound by the Convention, such events cannot in general justify a vague interpretation or less strict application of the Convention. Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004-VII), the context of which could also have been described as “unique” following the dissolution of the USSR, is a good example of this firm approach on the part of the Court. With the notion of “exceptional circumstances”, the Court could have arrived at different results in that case as well. It seems to me that the Court has been less firm in its decision in Von Maltzan and Others v. Germany ((dec.) [GC], nos. 71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02, §§ 77 and 111-12, ECHR 2005-V), in which it did not acknowledge the applicants' legitimate expectation of compensation (as a property right), even though the Federal Constitutional Court had in principle recognised that right of property, and in the present case.

4.  The introduction of the concept of “exceptional circumstances” as a ratio decidendi justifying an exception under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is a very dangerous step in the development of the interpretation of the Convention. The Court has used it very rarely, for example in The former King of Greece and Others v. Greece ([GC], no. 25701/94, § 89, ECHR 2000-XII), where it did nonetheless award just satisfaction. If the Court accepts that exceptional circumstances may justify interferences by the State with the individual's rights, this is a State-orientated concept that is a far cry from the concept of human rights protection. In James and Others, which has been mentioned as a case in which a parallel can be drawn (James and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98), the rights of private individuals were weighed against each other. In that case it could be said that there was not a fair balance between the persons concerned because the tenants had already invested so heavily in the buildings that the right of the formal owner could justifiably be overridden. In that case as well, however, the Court did not rule out just satisfaction even if it was less than the market value. That particular case concerned a situation in which the State could be considered as the just arbitrator between competing private interests. In the present case, the State itself engineered the interference on the ground that the Modrow Law had created inequalities in society. The situation is far from being comparable to James and Others and I do not understand how the Court could have overlooked that profound difference.

The concept of “exceptional circumstances” is one that does not lend itself to generalisations. Moreover, if an attempt is made to generalise the notion of “exceptional circumstances” as a ratio decidendi, the Court will lose its status as an organ of justice. It will no longer be possible to determine when and in what circumstances the Court will accept that there were “exceptional circumstances”. Is the fight against terrorism an exceptional situation? Does such an exceptional situation justify interferences with human rights with the result that there is no longer a violation? From what I can see of past rulings, the Court has never justified such an interference with human rights to the State's benefit on account of “exceptional circumstances”. On the contrary, the Court has justified, in for example D. v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III), an extension of the protection of individuals in “exceptional circumstances”, which is more in keeping with the protection of human rights, even if the justification can hardly be generalised.

5.  That a law creates inequalities is not an exceptional situation. There are many such laws and the legislature can be required to correct the inequality. However, the correction must be done while respecting human rights. Such a correction is not an “exceptional situation”. It is in itself an entirely normal situation in which the legislature – under political pressure or because of constitutional objections – corrects an error by the legislature that has led to unacceptable consequences for society. But all that is done at a political level and such considerations should not be brought into play through the notion of an “exceptional situation” when interpreting the Convention.

6.  What is exceptional in a transitional period? There may be greater possibilities of mistakes by the legislature, which future legislatures would be inclined to correct, but does this give carte blanche to commit violations of human rights or to regard violations as non-violations? The Court has also referred to the nature of the right or rather to its unclear nature and character and introduced a classification of weak and normal or strong rights. That distinction makes things even less clear. One of the big mistakes of the Court was to turn to the law of the GDR, which of course was not bound by the Convention. The starting-point for the Court should have been the Unification Treaty, when the Convention also came into force on the territory of the former GDR. The Unification Treaty included the Modrow Law as part of the federal legislation and, as the Government have confirmed, established the full property rights of the applicants. It was not only futile to refer to the legal situation in the GDR but also unjustified to go back further than the entry into force of the Convention on the territory of the GDR.

7.  The Court also regarded as an exceptional circumstance the fact that the Modrow Law was passed by a regime that did not have democratic legitimacy and no one could therefore have confidence in the legal stability of such a law. The decisive moment, however, was the Unification Treaty and the incorporation of the Modrow Law into FRG law by the fully democratically elected German parliament, which makes that argument futile. The fact that the German legislature reacted promptly, within less than two years, to correct the so-called unacceptable consequences of the Modrow Law does not justify referring to “exceptional circumstances”. On the contrary, a parliament which promptly corrects errors that have become evident is not in an “exceptional situation” and this does not justify concluding that interferences may not be violations of human rights. To sum up, the whole argumentation is rather circular. The situation has nothing in common with Rekvényi v. Hungary ([GC], no. 25390/94, ECHR 1999-III) where the restriction of the right to vote was justified by the argument that otherwise the whole election process could be jeopardised. In the present case, the Government did not advance the idea that they had to protect individual property rights but, on the contrary, the State thought of a solution from which it could derive the greatest advantage from the taking of property.

8.  The Chamber did not rule on the question of the amount of just satisfaction, but confirmed the principle that a disproportionate interference with the right of property would in principle entitle the victim to redress. All the considerations relating to the nature of the applicants' rights and their legitimate expectations might play a role in the application of Article 41, as the Chamber pointed out, but not in the interpretation and application of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

If the Court is now going to say that a kind of expropriation is proportionate because the State has an interest in correcting errors, that is not very far from the defence plea rejected in Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany ([GC], nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, ECHR 2001-II), in which the applicants relied on the raison d'état (the State concerned was the GDR) to justify the interferences. If the Court is going to accept that there may be reasons for the State to disregard human rights (whether it calls them exceptional or whatever), who then will protect the individual against interferences with these rights?"

Fotografía de George Ress

TEDH: APLICACION DEL PROCEDIMIENTO PILOTO

La aplicación del procedmiento piloto permite al TEDH ejercer un mayor control sobre aquellos problemas estructurales que representan incumplimientos reiterados por los Estados del Convenio Europeo de Derechos HUmanos.

Así se aprecia en la reciente STEDH de 30 de Octubre de 2012 en el caso Glykantzi v. Greece:

"In today’s Chamber judgment in the case of Glykantzi v. Greece (application no. 40150/09), which is not final1, the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been:

a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time) in conjunction with Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The case concerned the length of pay-related proceedings in the civil courts that lasted more than twelve years.

The Court found that the excessive length of proceedings in the civil courts, and the lack of a remedy by which to complain about this issue, had arisen from failings in the Greek legal system. It requested Greece to put in place, within one year, an effective remedy that could provide appropriate and sufficient redress in such cases of excessively lengthy proceedings. The Court has now adjourned, for that period, its examination of all cases which solely relate to the length of civil proceedings in the Greek courts. Over 250 applications against Greece in which at least part of the complaints are about the length of judicial proceedings are currently pending before the Court, including 70 that specifically concern civil cases.

(...)

Whilst the present case could be distinguished from the pilot cases examined previously by the Court, in so far as individuals in Ms Glykantzi’s situation did not belong to a “precise category of citizen” and also as this case was not the first to highlight the structural problem at issue, the Court nevertheless found that it was appropriate to apply the pilot judgment procedure, particularly in view of the persistent nature of the problems in question, the significant number of individuals concerned and the urgent need to provide them with swift and appropriate redress at national level."

Sentencia Glykantzi v. Greece