AUTO TS 26-09-2024: INTERESES DE DEMORA DE LIQUIDACIONES ANULADAS Y "REFORMATIO IN PEIUS" (I)

Id Cendoj: 28079130012024202196
Órgano: Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Contencioso
Sede: Madrid
Sección: 1
Fecha: 26/09/2024
Nº de Recurso: 6791/2023
Nº de Resolución:
Procedimiento: Recurso de Casación Contencioso-Administrativo (L.O. 7/2015)
Ponente: DIMITRY TEODORO BERBEROFF AYUDA
Tipo de Resolución: Auto

CUARTO.- Cuestiones en las que se entiende que existe interés casacional.

1. Conforme a lo indicado anteriormente, y de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 88.1 LJCA, con relación al artículo 90.4 de la misma norma, esta Sección de admisión aprecia que este recurso presenta interés casacional objetivo para la formación de jurisprudencia, respecto de las siguientes cuestiones:

1.1. Determinar a la luz de la naturaleza jurídica de los intereses del artículo 26.5 LGT, si son intereses compensatorios o remuneratorios, intereses moratorios, de demora o indemnizatorios o intereses sancionadores, aclarando, asimismo, si su devengo tiene un carácter objetivo, desvinculado de la conducta del contribuyente y de la administración o si, por el contrario, presentan un carácter subjetivo en el que deba valorarse la conducta del contribuyente y la administración.

1.2. Aclarar si la exigencia de intereses de demora del artículo 26.5 LGT cuando resulte necesaria la práctica de una nueva liquidación como consecuencia de haber sido anulada en parte por motivos sustantivos una liquidación previa por una resolución administrativa o judicial resulta contraria a los artículos 14, 24, 31 y 33de la Constitución Española.

 QUINTO. - Justificación suficiente de que el recurso planteado cuenta con interés casacional objetivo para la formación de la jurisprudencia.

1. Las cuestiones enunciadas presentan interés casacional objetivo para la formación de jurisprudencia,
porque las cuestiones planteadas afectan a un gran número de situaciones [ artículo 88.2.c) LJCA], siendo así que la resolución de instancia resuelve un debate que ha versado sobre la validez constitucional de una norma con rango de ley, sin que la improcedencia de plantear la pertinente cuestión de inconstitucionalidad aparezca suficientemente esclarecida [ artículo 88.2.d) LJCA], lo que hace conveniente un pronunciamiento del Tribunal Supremo que las esclarezca, en beneficio de la seguridad jurídica y de la consecución de la igualdad en la aplicación judicial del Derecho ( artículos 9.3 y 14 CE).
2. Así, respecto a la primera cuestión que plantea este recurso de casación, debemos precisar que el Tribunal Constitucional en la ya antigua STC 76/1990, al analizar la constitucionalidad del artículo 58.2.b) de la LGT de 1963 en la redacción dada por la Ley 10/1985, de 26 de abril -(que igualmente cuantificaba el interés de demora en el interés legal del dinero incrementado en el 25%)- declaró que:

 "Las consideraciones anteriores obligan a rechazar también la pretendida infracción del art. 25.1 de la
Constitución. Como ya se ha dicho, la norma cuestionada no trata de sancionar una conducta ilícita, pues su sola finalidad consiste en disuadir a los contribuyentes de su morosidad en el pago de las deudas tributarias y compensar al erario público por el perjuicio que a éste supone la no disposición tempestiva de todos los fondos necesarios para atender a los gastos públicos. Los intereses de demora no tienen naturaleza sancionadora,sino exclusivamente compensatoria o reparadora del perjuicio causado por el retraso en el pago de la deuda tributaria, y así lo admite expresamente la Sala de lo Contencioso de la Audiencia Territorial de Valencia.
Más que una penalización en sentido estricto, son una especie de compensación específica, con arreglo a un módulo objetivo, del coste financiero que para la Administración tributaria supone dejar de disponer a tiempo cantidades dinerarias que le son legalmente debidas. En suma, no hay aquí sanción alguna en sentido técnico-jurídico, y ello excluye sin más cualquier transgresión del art. 25.1 de la Constitución".
Por su parte, la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 31 de octubre de 2006, recurso de casación núm. 4686/01,también bajo la vigencia de la LGT/1963, calificó los intereses de demora como indemnizatorios:

"En efecto, siendo indemnizatoria la finalidad de los intereses de demora, no cabe en dicha finalidad que se devenguen intereses por una exigencia del acreedor más allá de lo debido, y mientras no se determine la cuantía de la deuda de forma definitiva, al estar vinculados a la denominada mora debitoris o mora del deudor,que responde precisamente al plazo de tiempo que media entre el ingreso de una deuda tributaria y el momento en que debería haberse producido la misma.
Por tanto, si la Administración es la causante del retraso en el pago, por haber cometido errores, es ella quién debe hacerse única responsable del mismo, sin que pueda trasladarse dicha responsabilidad al deudor, por lo que la nueva liquidación, en la fecha en que se practique, es la única que debe tomarse en cuenta a la hora de calcular los intereses de demora".

3. Sin embargo, debemos tener presente que la Ley 58/2003, de 17 de diciembre, General Tributaria ha
procedido a establecer una completa regulación de los intereses de demora. La Ley cataloga los intereses de demora como una obligación accesoria ( artículo 25 LGT), y, por lo que respecta a las obligaciones accesorias se contiene, en primer lugar, una definición de las mismas, que las caracteriza como aquéllas cuya exigencia se impone en relación con otra obligación tributaria. En definitiva, se viene a acoger la concepción del derecho de obligaciones que considera que son accesorias aquéllas cuyo devengo se encuentra vinculado al cumplimiento de otra obligación. De esta forma, se califican expresamente como accesorias las de satisfacer el interés de demora, los recargos por declaración extemporánea y los recargos del período ejecutivo.

En la regulación actual de los intereses de demora el artículo 26.1 LGT parece establecer un carácter objetivo en su devengo, desvinculado del ánimo subjetivo del deudor, pero, a la vez, limita o excluye su exigencia en varios supuestos en que el retraso resulta imputable a la Administración acreedora ( artículos 26.4 o 240.2LGT), incidiendo en una dimensión subjetiva.

Asimismo, la regulación actual resulta mucho más completa que la prevista en el LGT/1963, aclarando diversos aspectos no explicitados de manera satisfactoria en la LGT/1963, tales como el presupuesto de hecho de esta prestación, su base de cálculo o el período de su exigencia.
 

Así, respeto a esta primera cuestión debemos indicar que, si bien nos hallamos ante una cuestión que no es totalmente nueva, los expresados matices e interpretaciones perfilan un debate jurisprudencial y doctrinal no totalmente solventado, que reclama una respuesta por parte de esta Sala.
 

Conviene, por lo tanto, un pronunciamiento del Tribunal Supremo que, cumpliendo su función uniformadora,sirva como criterio orientador y pacificador sobre la naturaleza jurídica de los referidos intereses de demora.
4. Respecto a la segunda cuestión suscitada debemos recordar que este Tribunal Supremo ha dictado las
sentencias de 10 de diciembre de 2015 (recursos de casación nº 3050/2014 y 1450/2015) -anteriores por tanto a la reforma casacional vigente- donde se han analizado los intereses de demora previstos en la LGT/2003desde la perspectiva del cómputo temporal de los mismos. Indican dichas sentencias que:
""En cualquier caso, debe precisarse que en la referida Sentencia de 9 de diciembre de 2013 se resolvió
la cuestión del cómputo temporal de intereses en los casos de anulación parcial de liquidaciones en los
siguientes términos:
"En cuatro sentencias de 14 de junio de 2012 (casaciones 2413/10, 6386/09, 6219/09 y 5043/09, FJ 8º, en los cuatro casos), y como resultado de un lento proceso de reflexión jurisprudencial del que son exponentes los votos particulares a las sentencias de 28 de junio de 2010 (casación 2841/05), 18 de octubre de 2010( 5704/07) y 23 de mayo de 2011 (casación 250/08), hemos afirmado que "aun cuando el procedimiento tributario se haya iniciado mediante una autoliquidación [...], en el supuesto de que la misma, como consecuencia de la actividad inspectora, haya dado lugar a una liquidación practicada por la Administración,ahí termina el recorrido de las consecuencias en cuanto a la mora del sujeto pasivo del tributo, de modo que si esta liquidación administrativa es a su vez anulada en la vía económico-administrativa o jurisdiccional ya no será posible imputar el retraso consecuente en el pago de la deuda tributaria al contribuyente sorprendido por la ilegalidad cometida por la propia Administración". Conforme con este modo de razonar, en dichos pronunciamientos fijamos como día final para el cómputo de los intereses de demora la fecha en que se dictó la liquidación definitiva después anulada.

En principio, tal forma de decidir parece contrariar el tenor del artículo 26.5 de la Ley General Tributaria de2003, que, en los casos de anulación administrativa o judicial de liquidaciones, ordena computar los intereses sobre el importe resultante de la nueva liquidación desde el día que resulte conforme a las reglas contenidas en el apartado 2 y hasta que se dicte la nueva, sin que el dies ad quem pueda ser posterior al plazo máximo para ejecutar la resolución anulatoria.

Debemos, por ello, explicitar y matizar nuestra jurisprudencia.

Una liquidación tributaria puede ser anulada por razones de (a) forma o de (b) fondo y, en este segundo caso,(i) total o (ii) parcialmente.
(a) La anulación por motivos formales afecta a la liquidación en su conjunto y la expulsa en cuanto tal del universo jurídico, para que, en su caso, si procede, se dicte otra nueva cumpliendo las garantías ignoradas al aprobarse la primera o reparando la falla procedimental que causó su anulación. En estas situaciones, en puridad no existió hasta la aprobación de la nueva liquidación una deuda del obligado tributario frente a la Hacienda legítimamente liquidada, al no poderse entender efectuado conforme a derecho el procedimiento de cuantificación por la Administración de la obligación tributaria de aquél.
En otras palabras, en tales tesituras la Administración tributaria no convirtió válidamente en deuda la
preexistente obligación. Por ello, y teniendo a la vista la doctrina sentada en las mencionadas cuatro sentencias de 14 junio de 2012, en dichos supuestos no cabe hablar de demora imputable al obligado tributario, salvo la que, en su caso, medie por el transcurso del tiempo entre la autoliquidación y la liquidación practicada por la Administración en el ejercicio de sus facultades de comprobación e inspección, después anulada por causas formales.
Tal vez por ello, el artículo 150.5 de la Ley General Tributaria de 2003, al regular el tiempo en el que debe dictarse nueva resolución en el caso de retroacción de actuaciones, nada dice sobre los intereses de demora y, ciertamente por ello, el apartado 3 del mismo precepto impide exigirlos al contribuyente por el tiempo en que la Administración se exceda de los plazos de que dispone para desarrollar las actuaciones inspectoras. Si el legislador impide reclamar intereses por el tiempo de ese exceso con mayor razón no cabe exigirlos cuando se manifiesta un "exceso" a posteriori como consecuencia de la anulación de la decisión administrativa por motivos formales.
Las anteriores pautas traslucen en el artículo 66 del Reglamento General de Desarrollo de la Ley 58/2003en materia de revisión en vía administrativa, que al tratar de la ejecución de las resoluciones administrativas prevé la exigencia de intereses de demora cuando se anulen liquidaciones por razones de fondo (apartado 3),guardando el más absoluto silencio cuando la estimación lo sea por vicio de forma (apartado 4).
(b.1) Si la anulación tiene lugar por razones de fondo pero es total, el criterio debe ser el mismo, pues tampoco hay en tal caso una deuda legítimamente liquidada. En dichos supuestos podrá fijarse la deuda de nuevo, si es que la potestad para hacerlo no ha prescrito, pero deberá serlo por conceptos distintos de los sustantivamente anulados, sin que, por ello, quepa hablar de un pago fuera de plazo en el sentido del artículo 26.1 de la Ley,pues por el concepto debido no existía deuda liquidada alguna y, por ello, mora del deudor.
(b.2) Distinto es el escenario si la anulación por razones sustantivas es parcial, porque en tales tesituras sí que existe una deuda del contribuyente legítimamente liquidada desde la decisión inicial, en la parte no anulada,a la que lógicamente se contrae la exigencia de intereses de demora. A este supuesto es, por tanto, al que se refiere el artículo 26.5 de la vigente Ley General Tributaria cuando dice que, en tales casos y siendo necesaria una nueva liquidación, los intereses se exigirán sobre el nuevo importe, desde el día que resulte conforme a las reglas previstas en el apartado 2 y hasta que sea dictada la nueva, sin que este dies ad quem pueda situarse más allá del plazo de que dispone la Administración para ejecutar la resolución anulatoria parcial por razones sustantivas.
Claro está que, para no hacer de peor condición al contribuyente que se ve obligado a litigar en la vía
administrativa y, en su caso, en la jurisdiccional para obtener la razón que a aquel que simplemente recibe tardíamente una liquidación que no necesita discutir, se ha de aplicar también en este caso las previsiones de apartado 4 del artículo 26. En el cálculo de los intereses, realizados con arreglo al apartado 5, no se tendrán en cuenta los retrasos imputables a la Administración Tributaria en los términos previstos en ese apartado 4.
Estos criterios interpretativos complementan los ya sentados por esta Sala en las cuatro sentencias de 14 de junio de 2012, pronunciamientos seguidos en la resolución que el Pleno del Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Central ha dictado el 28 de octubre de 2013, en el recurso extraordinario de alzada para unificación de criterio(registro 4659/12). Por lo demás, este Tribunal Supremo es consciente de que alguna de las conclusiones de esta sentencia no son coincidentes con el criterio sostenido en pronunciamientos previos, pero se ha de reparar, como ya se ha apuntado, en que tales pronunciamientos fueron dictados en aplicación de la Ley General Tributaria de 1963."
Lo anteriormente expuesto, y teniendo en cuenta que también en el presente caso el acuerdo de ejecución es posterior a la entrada en vigor de la Ley General Tributaria (que tuvo lugar en 1 de julio de 2004) conduce, tal como se ha anunciado previamente, a la desestimación del motivo.""

5. Sin embargo este recurso somete a nuestra consideración el examen de los intereses de demora desde la perspectiva constitucional.

En efecto el párrafo segundo del apartado 1 del art. 26 LGT dispone que "[l]a exigencia del interés de demora tributario no requiere[...] la concurrencia de un retraso culpable en el obligado".

El recurrente plantea, -citando como fundamento de su pretensión la opinión de algunos sectores de la
doctrina-, que tal disposición legal puede vulnerar al principio constitucional de igualdad consagrado en el artículo 14 CE , en la medida en que va a ser tratado de igual manera a estos efectos quien incumple de manera negligente sus obligaciones tributarias que aquel en quien no concurre tal elemento culpabilísimo, como en el caso del recurrente en casación, que tuvo que acudir a la tramitación de un procedimiento judicial que duró 7años para obtener la anulación parcial de la liquidación por motivos de fondo.

Destaca el recurrente en casación que la aplicación de ese precepto le supuso la exigencia adicional como intereses de demora de 16.290,45 euros, a mayores del importe ya plasmado de 13.753,78 euros que se fijaba en los primitivos acuerdos de liquidación anulados por la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, indicando que los nuevos intereses de demora (con el carácter de suspensivos) suponían casi un 120% adicional sobre los inicialmente girados.

El recurrente sostiene que estamos en un supuesto de mora accipiens o credendi que se produce cuando el incumplimiento de la obligación -en este caso dineraria- es imputable a la Administración y uno de sus efectos es el de que queda compensada la mora del deudor si estuviese incurso en ella y se excluye para lo sucesivo.

Y si bien en primer lugar -el apartado 4- excluye los intereses de demora en el caso de que la Administración tributaria incumpla por causa imputable a la misma alguno de los plazos fijados en la ley para resolver hasta que se dicte dicha resolución o se interponga recurso contra la resolución presunta, en cambio -acto seguido-en el apartado 5 se establece que en los casos en que resulte necesaria la práctica de una nueva liquidación como consecuencia de haber sido anulada otra liquidación por una resolución administrativa o judicial, se conservarán íntegramente los actos y trámites no afectados por la causa de la anulación, con mantenimiento íntegro de su contenido, y exigencia del interés de demora sobre el importe de la nueva liquidación. En esto scasos, la fecha de inicio del cómputo del interés de demora será la misma que, de acuerdo con lo establecido en el apartado 2 de este artículo, hubiera correspondido a la liquidación anulada y el interés se devengará hasta  el momento en que se haya dictado la nueva liquidación.

El recurrente aduce que la regulación de los intereses de demora vulnera el artículo 24 CE , razona que
el reproche de inconstitucionalidad que infructuosamente formuló ante el Tribunal Superior de Justicia
frente a las previsiones del artículo 26.5 LGT conectan íntima y estrechamente, con "el principio de Derecho Comunitario europeo recogido en la sentencia Factortame del Tribunal de Justicia de Luxemburgo, de 19 de junio de 1990, principio que hace suyo nuestro Tribunal Supremo y que se resume en "la necesidad del proceso para obtener la razón no debe convertirse en un daño para el que tiene la razón".

Denuncia el recurrente que el artículo 26.5 LGT podría vulnerar también los artículos 31 y 33 CE .

Así las cosas, conviene un pronunciamiento del Tribunal Supremo que, cumpliendo su función uniformadora,sirva para dar respuesta a las cuestiones que suscita este recurso de casación a fin de completar su jurisprudencia sobre los intereses de demora.

SENTENCIA TS 11-11-2020: LIQUIDACIONES TRIBUTARIAS CONEXAS Y PRESCRIPCIÓN

Id Cendoj: 28079130022020100536
Órgano: Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Contencioso
Sede: Madrid
Sección: 2
Fecha: 11/11/2020
Nº de Recurso: 5171/2018
Nº de Resolución: 1484/2020
Procedimiento: Recurso de Casación Contencioso-Administrativo (L.O. 7/2015)
Ponente: FRANCISCO JOSE NAVARRO SANCHIS
Tipo de Resolución: Sentencia

TERCERO.- Consideraciones jurídicas de la Sala

(...)

 2) Al margen de lo anterior, la Administración pretende aplicar a hechos producidos entre 2007 y 2012 el apartado 9 del artículo 68 de la Ley 58/2003, de 17 de diciembre, General Tributaria (LGT), que fue añadido por la Ley 34/2015, de 21 de septiembre, de modificación parcial de la LGT, con vigencia desde el 12 de octubre de 2015. Para ello, además de forzar la proyección retroactiva de una norma para empeorar la situación jurídica del contribuyente, se parte de una confusión de los tributos conexos con los tributos alternativos, sin perjuicio de la valoración de a quien cabe imputar el transcurso del plazo de prescripción para liquidar, con presunción iuris et de iure de abandono de la acción por parte de la Administración.

3) La redacción dada al artículo 68.1.a) de la LGT por la Ley 7/2012 prevé un supuesto en el que la Administración se dirige inicialmente a una obligación tributaria distinta como consecuencia de la incorrecta declaración del obligado tributario (por ejemplo, operación inmobiliaria autoliquidada por IVA que debió tributar por ITP), declaración incorrecta que no concurre en el presente caso.

Tal artículo dispone:

"El plazo de prescripción del derecho a que se refiere el párrafo a) del artículo 66 de esta Ley se interrumpe: ...
a) Por cualquier acción de la Administración tributaria, realizada con conocimiento formal del obligado
tributario, conducente al reconocimiento, regularización, comprobación, inspección, aseguramiento y
liquidación de todos o parte de los elementos de la obligación tributaria que proceda, aunque la acción se dirija inicialmente a una obligación tributaria distinta como consecuencia de la incorrecta declaración del obligado tributario".

4) Así, la autoliquidación formulada por las cesionarias del inmueble no era incorrecta, ya que no indujo a la Administración a liquidar por un concepto tributario distinto y erróneo, ya que a las hermanas Angustia Zulima sólo les incumbía autoliquidar el ITP -no el ISD-, que debe liquidar la Administración, por mandato legal, dados los términos del art. 14.6 del TRLITP -con base en una pretendida gratuidad parcial -valga la extravagancia conceptual- que, además, la Administración tributaria no acreditó, por lo que las liquidaciones se anularon por el TEAR al no haberse aportado el dictamen pericial que debía servir de soporte a la comprobación de valores.

5) En utilización del llamado argumento por reducción al absurdo, seguir la tesis de la Administración nos llevaría a señalar que, de no haber presentado nunca las hermanas Angustia Zulima la autoliquidación del ITP, nunca habría comenzado a correr el plazo de prescripción de la Administración para liquidar el ISD, al no poder conocer la Administración, según su letrada legalmente habilitada, ni "la existencia del negocio jurídico" ni "los datos necesarios para practicar la liquidación por el impuesto de Donaciones".

6) Contrariamente a lo que afirma la Comunidad de Castilla-La Mancha, existe un plazo de un mes para
autoliquidar tanto el ITP como el ISD por adquisiciones inter vivos, plazo que en el presente caso finalizó el 20de octubre de 2007. A partir de esta fecha, conforme al artículo 67.1 de la LGT, comienza a correr el plazo de prescripción del derecho de la Administración a liquidar tanto una obligación tributaria como la otra, y ello a partir de la información contenida en la escritura pública de 20 de septiembre de 2007 y con independencia de que los obligados tributarios autoliquidasen o no el ITP.

7) Además, aciertan las recurridas al citar, a propósito del necesario conocimiento de la Administración, el artículo 91.3 del Reglamento del ISD (RD 1629/1991), que dispone que "Los Notarios (...) estarán obligados a remitir, dentro de la primera quincena de cada trimestre, relación o índice comprensivo de todos los documentos autorizados en el trimestre anterior que se refieran a actos o contratos que pudieran dar lugar a los incrementos patrimoniales que constituyen el hecho imponible del Impuesto (...)".

Tal precepto concuerda con el artículo 114.2 del Reglamento del ITP (Real Decreto 828/1995): "Los notarios están obligados a remitir a las oficinas liquidadoras del impuesto, dentro de la primera quincena de cada trimestre, relación o índice comprensivo de todos los documentos por ellos autorizados en el trimestre anterior,con excepción de los actos de última voluntad, reconocimiento de hijos y demás exceptuados de la presentación conforme a este Reglamento (...)".

8) Por tanto, habiéndose otorgado el 20 de septiembre 2007 la escritura pública, al menos desde el 16 de
octubre siguiente -si computamos el plazo atendiendo a este deber notarial- la Administración tributaria pudo estar en posición de conocer la existencia del hecho imponible común para ambos tributos, y liquidar el ITP y, eventualmente, la donación especial que se pueda hallar implícita por superar en determinado porcentaje y cuantía la diferencia entre el valor del bien cedido a las hermanas Angustia Zulima y el de la obligación contractual de alimentos constituida a favor de la Sra. Reyes , dado que la escritura debió ser remitida por la notaria Sra. Casero Nuño en la 1ª quincena de octubre de 2007, según los mencionados artículos y contiene el valor del bien cedido, el tipo de pensión que se constituye y la edad de la pensionista, todos ellos datos que permitían a la Administración, dentro del plazo de prescripción de 4 años contados desde el 20 de octubre de2007, liquidar el ITP y, eventualmente, aplicar el artículo 14.6 de su texto refundido, aunque el contribuyente no hubiere presentado la autoliquidación por el ITP.
Al margen de tal conocimiento, en todo caso, tras la presentación de la autoliquidación el 21 de junio de 2010,la Hacienda autonómica no actuó para aplicar el artículo 14.6 -aplicable o no, es cuestión que no abordamos-hasta el 27 de febrero de 2012, fecha en que notificó a las Sras. Angustia Zulima el inicio del procedimiento de comprobación limitada que dio lugar a las liquidaciones impugnadas y anuladas por el Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional.

9) El conocimiento del hecho imponible por la Comunidad de Castilla-la Mancha no depende en exclusiva de la conducta del contribuyente, según presente o no las autoliquidaciones a que esté obligado, ni la doctrina de la sentencia recurrida provoca dicho efecto dejando solo a la voluntad del contribuyente que el hecho imponible puedan conocerse por la Administración.

10) Así, el dies a quo del plazo de prescripción para determinar la deuda tributaria por ISD sólo puede ser el momento en el que se autoliquidó el ITP. En contra de la tesis recurrente, la sentencia de instancia considera con acierto como dies a quo el 20-10-2007 , fin del plazo para autoliquidar ITP, no siendo necesario autoliquidar el ISD, como sostiene la letrada de la Administración, para que la Hacienda autonómica pueda actuar sus competencias en materia de liquidación del ISD. Ello para el caso, verdaderamente sorprendente, de que un único negocio jurídico, fruto de la autonomía de la voluntad, pueda ser, fragmentariamente, en parte oneroso y en parte gratuito a los efectos fiscales, como ya hemos anticipado. Sobre la dudosa constitucionalidad del art. 14.6 TR no hacemos pronunciamiento ni adoptamos iniciativa alguna, dada la completa ausencia de juicio de relevancia en este asunto.

CUARTO.- Interpretación jurídica de la cuestión planteada en el auto de admisión.

La cuestión de interés casacional es la siguiente:

"[...] Determinar si la presentación de una autoliquidación del ITPAJD conlleva la interrupción del plazo de prescripción del derecho de la Administración para liquidar el ISD, al considerar que se trata de tributos conexos[...]".
La doctrina procedente es que, para un caso como el examinado, atendida la legislación aplicable ratione
temporis, la presentación de una autoliquidación del ITPAJD no conlleva la interrupción del plazo de
prescripción del derecho de la Administración para liquidar el ISD, en relación con unos mismos hechos.

QUINTO.- Aplicación de la doctrina jurisprudencial que hemos establecido al caso concreto que nos ocupa.A tal efecto, debemos desestimar el recurso de casación, por ser correcta y acertada la sentencia de instancia,fundamentalmente en su interpretación del artículo 68.1.a) LGT, en la versión aplicable al caso,En efecto, no estamos ante figuras fiscales conexas -en sentido formal y cronológico- ni ante una defectuosa declaración del impuesto por el sujeto pasivo, que se proyecta sobre el contrato oneroso celebrado, pues no le era exigible a las adquirentes de la parte indivisa del inmueble a cambio de su obligación alimenticia la adivinación de un hecho posterior relevante al caso, como que la diferencia de valor entre las recíprocas prestaciones superaba, a juicio posterior de la Administración, cierto umbral cuantitativo y, por tal razón, era preciso seccionar o fragmentar el contrato, suponer en él la insólita presencia de dos causas negociales antagónicas y formular dos declaraciones, una por cada impuesto.

REVISIÓN DE DATOS, ESTADÍSTICAS E INVESTIGACIÓN SOBRE SEXO Y GÉNERO (APÉNDICE LEGAL, UK, (III))

 

 

Appendix 1. Legal advice

IN THE MATTER OF
THE SULLIVAN REVIEW

Advice

1. I have been instructed to provide written Advice in relation to an independent Review of Data, Statistics and Research and Gender (“the Review”) which is being carried out by Alice Sullivan, Professor of Sociology and Head of Research at the UCL Social Research Institute.

2. The Review examines a number of issues relating to the collection of data on sex, gender, gender reassignment, gender identity, and related matters. I understand that its purpose is to consider the impact of a move by both public bodies and private organisations, away from collecting data on sex, and instead towards collecting data that conflates sex with gender identity.

3. The Review has three main aims:

(1) To provide an overview of the current situation regarding data collection on sex and gender identity in theUK;

(2) To identify barriers to research and to make recommendations to assist universities, research
organisations and other relevant bodies in overcoming these; and

(3) To provide clear guidance to help public bodies and other data owners to collect accurate and consistent data on sex and gender identity.

The third aim is of particular relevance to this Advice.

4. This Advice is in three main sections. The first section discusses the current legal understanding of sex, gender, gender reassignment, gender identity, and related concepts. The second section discusses the main legal areas that are relevant to the subject matter of the Review, including the Equality Act 2010, the Human Rights Act 1998, the tort of misuse of private information (or “MOPI”), data protection law, and the Gender Recognition Act 2004. The third specifically addresses some of the proposed recommendations in the Review (these are also referred to at various points in the first two sections). I end with some concluding points, including as to the limitations of this Advice.
 

5. This Advice discusses the legal position in the UK. There are three UK jurisdictions: England and Wales; Scotland; and Northern Ireland. I refer to these separately where appropriate. Where I refer simply to the legal position in the UK, I am referring to the position across all three jurisdictions.

 Section 1: current legal understanding of key concepts

6. This section discusses the current legal definition and understanding of the following concepts: sex; gender;gender reassignment; gender identity; and transgender (or trans).

Sex 1016

7. This concept is best understood historically, by reference to three successive stages of legal development.

 

8. First, there is the common law understanding, as set out in cases such as Corbett v Corbett [1970] 2 All ER33, R v Tan [1983] QB 1053, and Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21. This approach to the concept of sex has three main elements to it: (a) sex is a biological category, determined by physiological considerations, and not by an individual’s mode of living or self-perception; (b) sex is fixed at birth (at the latest), and cannot be changed by subsequent surgical or hormonal intervention; and (c) sex is binary, i.e. no sexes are recognised other than male or female. This common law understanding of sex equates with what is sometimes referred toas “biological sex”, or “natal sex”, or “sex at birth”. In this Advice I shall use the term “sex at birth”.

 9. Secondly, there is the modification to the concept of sex as a result of the Gender Recognition Act 2004(“GRA 2004”), enabling individuals to apply for a gender recognition certificate (“GRC”). The effect of a GRC is that the person in question is treated for various legal purposes as having changed their sex. Hence there may now be a difference between a person’s sex at birth, and their legal sex (i.e. their sex as modified for certain legal purposes by a GRC). Note that in this Advice when I refer to “legal sex” I mean sex as modified by any GRC: I am not referring to situations where other official documents (e.g. passports) may record a sex that differs from sex at birth, even where a GRC has not been issued. I note recommendation 9, which (rightly) emphasises the need for clarity as to what is meant by any reference to “legal sex”.

10. The background to GRA 2004 was that in Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 447, the European Court of Human Rights held that the UK was in breach of both Article 8 (respect for private life) and Article12 (right to marry) of the European Convention on Human Rights, arising from the fact that the applicant (described in the judgment as a post-operative male to female transsexual) was treated in UK law as a man. GRA 2004 was introduced to give effect to this decision. As indicated above, it modified the legal understanding of sex, by enabling those who satisfied specified conditions (set out in section 2 of that Act) to apply for a GRC.

11. The effect of a GRC is stated to be as follows (see section 9):

(1) Where a full gender recognition certificate is issued to a person, the person’s gender becomes for all
purposes the acquired gender (so that, if the acquired gender is the male gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a man and, if it is the female gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a woman).

(2) Subsection (1) does not affect things done, or events occurring, before the certificate is issued; but it does operate for the interpretation of enactments passed, and instruments and other documents made, before the certificate is issued (as well as those passed or made afterwards).

(3) Subsection (1) is subject to provision made by this Act or any other enactment or any subordinate
legislation.
 

Note that section 2 does not require a person to undergo any particular hormonal, surgical, or other medical treatment, as a precondition for obtaining a GRC.

12. The issuing of a GRC will not, however, alter a person’s legal sex in all circumstances. GRA 2004 itself sets out various exceptions: for instance, section 12 provides that the issue of a GRC does not affect the status of the person as the father or mother of a child. Moreover, section 9(3) provides that the effect of a GRC is subject to any provision made by other legislation. It is therefore open to the Courts to construe other legislation as having effectively excluded the effect of any GRC, so that (for the purposes of that legislation) a person’s sex is unaffected by the issuing of a GRC.

13. As set out above, GRA 2004 section 9(1) provides for the issue of a GRC in either a male or a female “acquired gender”. There is no provision for any other form of GRC (e.g. a non-binary GRC). In R (Castelucci)v Gender Recognition Panel and the Minister for Women and Equalities [2024] EWHC 54 (Admin), the Divisional Court confirmed that GRA 2004 was limited in this way, holding that an individual whose change of gender from male to non-binary had been recognised by the State of California was not entitled to be issued with a non-binary GRC in the UK 1017.

 

14. Thirdly, it is relevant to consider how “sex” is defined in the Equality Act 2010 (“EA 2010”), and the interaction between GRA 2004 and EA 2010.

15. The EA 2010 sets out nine “protected characteristics”, in relation to which various forms of conduct (including direct and indirect discrimination) are prohibited in specified contexts (e.g. in employment). For further details about the protected characteristics and about prohibited conduct under EA 2010, see section 2 of this Advice.
 

16. One of the nine protected characteristics is sex, defined as follows by EA 2010 section 11:

 In relation to the protected characteristic of sex—

(a) a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a man or to a woman;

(b) a reference to persons who share a protected characteristic is a reference to persons of the same sex.
Section 212 (general interpretation) further provides that “man” means a male of any age, and “woman” means a female of any age.

17. For a person who does not have a GRC, my view is that their “sex” for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 will be their sex at birth. This is so even if the person has the protected characteristic of “gender reassignment” under the Equality Act 2010 (as to which, see below): see R (Green) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWHC 3491 (Admin), and For Women Scotland v The Lord Advocate [2022] CSIH 4, e.g. at paragraph 38, and see generally the article by Michael Foran referred to at note 1, above.

18. There is ongoing litigation as to whether a GRC has the legal effect of changing a person’s sex for the purposes of the protected characteristic in EA 2010 section 4. In For Women Scotland Limited v The Scottish Ministers [2023] CSIH 37 the Inner House of the Court of Session held that a GRC did have this effect, but the case is currently being appealed to the Supreme Court. Until the Supreme Court determines the point, there is uncertainty as to whether “sex” as a protected characteristic in EA 2010 means sex at birth, or legal sex. There is a difference between these two concepts in the case of individuals with a GRC, but (in my view) not otherwise.

Gender

19. There are three points to make in relation to this concept.

20. First, in ordinary usage, the term “gender” is used in a variety of ways. Sometimes it is used as a synonym for biological sex. Sometimes it is used to denote the social expectations that are applied to those whoare biologically male or female: “gender” in this sense is about “gender roles”, or “gender stereotypes”, or“gender norms”. Sometimes it is used to denote “gender identity”, understood as a person’s innate sense ofbeing a man, a woman, or neither: see further the discussion of this concept below. And sometimes it refers to a person’s “gender expression”: whether they dress, behave, etc., in a manner that reflects the social norms that are currently applied to the male or female sex.

 

21. The World Health Organisation (WHO) explains some of these different senses of “gender” on its website, as follows1018:

Gender refers to the characteristics of women, men, girls and boys that are socially constructed. This includes norms, behaviours and roles associated with being a woman, man, girl or boy, as well as relationships with each other. As a social construct, gender varies from society to society and can change over time.
Gender is hierarchical and produces inequalities that intersect with other social and economic inequalities. Genderbased discrimination intersects with other factors of discrimination, such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, disability, age, geographic location, gender identity and sexual orientation, among others. This is referred to as intersectionality.
Gender interacts with but is different from sex, which refers to the different biological and physiological
characteristics of females, males and intersex persons, such as chromosomes, hormones and reproductive organs.
Gender and sex are related to but different from gender identity. Gender identity refers to a person’s deeply felt, internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond to the person’s physiology or designated sex at birth.

22. The different meanings of “gender”, as set out at paragraph 20 above, mean that the term risks giving rise to considerable confusion when used in a policy context or in data collection. Recommendations 18 and 38-39 (rightly) recognise this uncertainty, and the difficulties to which it could give rise.

23. Secondly, the GRA 2004 itself gives rise to further potential confusion by using the terms sex and gender interchangeably. See the wording of section 9(1) of GRA 2004, set out above. That said, it is reasonably clear that in GRA 2004 “gender” is being used simply as a synonym for “sex”.

 24. Thirdly, as explained above the protected characteristic in EA 2010 is sex not gender. It is surprisingly common to see the term “gender”, rather than “sex”, in what purport to be lists of the protected characteristics (e.g. as set out by public authorities on their websites). It would be preferable to refer to “sex”, reflecting the language of EA 2010. Referring to sex, rather than gender, will assist in compliance with the Public Sector Equality Duty (discussed below).

25. It is true that at various points EA 2010 refers to “gender” instead of or as well as “sex”.
 

• Section 79 is headed “Gender pay gap information”. It provides that regulations may require employers to publish information relating to the pay of employees for the purpose of showing whether there are difference in the pay of male and female employees. The Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017 have been made under this provision.

• EA 2010 section 195 (sport) defines a category of “gender-affected activity” (see section 195(3)):

A gender-affected activity is a sport, game or other activity of a competitive nature in circumstances in which the physical strength, stamina or physique of average persons of one sex would put them at a disadvantage compared to average persons of the other sex as competitors in events involving the activity.
In both section 79 and section 195, “gender” is clearly being used as a synonym for “sex”. This does not alter the fundamental point that the protected characteristic under EA 2010 section 4 is sex, not gender.
 

Gender reassignment

26. Gender reassignment is one of the nine protected characteristics under the EA 2010. It is defined as follows, by section 7(1):

A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.

27. A person with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment is referred to in EA 2010 as a “transsexualperson”: see section 7(2). The terms “transgender” or “trans” do not appear in EA 2010.

28. The fact that a person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment does not in itself alter the person’s sex for the purposes of EA 2010: these are different questions (see paragraph 17 above).
 

29. A person who understands their gender identity1019 as being at variance with their biological sex will not necessarily have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. Such a person may not have undergone (or be undergoing or proposing to undergo) a process as referred to in section 7(1). Similarly, a person who understands themselves to be transgender or trans will not necessarily have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, given the breadth of the terms transgender and trans in current usage: see further the discussion at paragraphs 36-41 below.

30. There is room for some uncertainty as to whether the protected characteristic of gender reassignment covers an individual who is non-binary (i.e. who does not identity either as a man or a woman). The statutory definition refers to the reassignment of a person’s sex. Given that sex has historically been viewed in law as a binary concept 1020, the statutory wording would suggest that the concept applies to male-to-female transsexuals1021, or female-to-male transexuals, but not to non-binary individuals. The decision of the Employment Tribunal in Taylor v Jaguar (1304471/2018) has been treated by some commentators1022 as supporting the proposition that a non-binary individual can have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. However, it is strongly arguable that the point did not arise on the specific facts of that case; and in any event an Employment Tribunal decision has no binding authority as a precedent and cannot, in itself, make new law. As matters stand, therefore, there is no authoritative legal ruling as to whether non-binary individuals can have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. If not,then this increases the cohort of individuals who: (a) assert a gender identity that is at variance with their biological sex; but (b) fall outside the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

Gender identity

 
31. Gender identity is widely deployed as a concept in discussions regarding sex and gender.

32. For instance, the widely-cited Yogyakarta Principles ( a document published following a meeting of international human rights groups in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in November 2006) define “gender identity” as follows:

Gender identity is understood to refer to each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender,which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (whichmay involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.

33. However, the concept of gender identity does not currently feature in any statutory provision in any of the UK jurisdictions. In other words, there are no legal rights in the UK that are conferred by reference to genderidentity, and no UK statutory definition of the concept.

34. Broadly speaking, the concept is usually seen as denoting a person’s interior sense of themselves as being a man, a woman, or something else. See the WHO and Yogyakarta definitions set out above, and see also the following text from the NHS Digital website1023:

Gender identity is a way to describe a person’s innate sense of their own gender, whether male, female, or nonbinary,which may not correspond to the sex registered at birth.

35. As the Review points out, there are a range of views in relation to the concept of gender identity. There are a number of people who would not claim to have a gender identity themselves: e.g. because they reject the concept as incoherent, or because they assert that it applies in relation to some people but not to themselves, or because the concept is unfamiliar to them and not understood. Any assertion that everyone has a gender identity 1024 is therefore contentious, and carries significant legal risks in relation to compliance with the public sector equality duty, and data protection law (see discussion below): recommendation 25 (rightly) warns against making any such assumption.

Transgender or trans

36. In current discussions regarding sex and gender identity, there are frequent references to individuals as being “transgender” or “trans”. Currently, it appears to more common for individuals to self-describe using these terms, rather than to describe themselves as transsexual.

37. That said, as indicated above, EA 2010 uses the term “transsexual” to refer to a person with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. The terms “transgender” and “trans” are not used in EA 2010.

38. I note that the Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021 defines the term “transgender identity” in section 11(7) as follows:

A person is a member of a group defined by reference to transgender identity if the person is—
(a) a female-to-male transgender person,
(b) a male-to-female transgender person,
(c) a non-binary person,
(d) a person who cross-dresses,
and references to transgender identity are to be construed accordingly.
 

39. To illustrate the wide understanding current usage of the terms “transgender” or “trans”, the Review quotes the following definition from Stonewall:

“Trans people may describe themselves using one or more of a wide variety of terms, including (but not limited to) transgender, transsexual, gender-queer (GQ), gender-fluid, non-binary, gender-variant, crossdresser, genderless, agender, nongender, third gender, bi-gender, trans man, trans woman, trans masculine, trans feminine and neutrois.”1025

40. In the light of the broad understanding of the terms “transgender” and “trans”, it cannot safely be assumed that every person who asserts a transgender identity: (a) would have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment under EA 2010; or (b) would themselves assert that they had that protected characteristic.

41. Conversely, there may be individuals who would have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment,but who would not assert a transgender identity. One potential example is detransitioners, i.e. people who embark on a transition process but then abandon or reverse that process. There could very well be detransitioners who would not currently assert a transgender identity, but who would nevertheless have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, on the basis that they had (at some point in the past) undergone a process falling within section 7(1) of EA 2010.

 Section 2: main relevant legal provisions

(...)

HRA 1998 and and the Convention

53. Article 8 of the ECHR provides as follows:

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
 

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

 54. As will be apparent, this is a qualified not an absolute right: i.e. interference with the right may nevertheless be justified, in the circumstances set out in Article 8(2). Where there is interference that is not justified under Article 8(2), then there is a violation of the right.

55. Under the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA 1998”), it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right: HRA 1998 section 6(1). If a public authority interferes with the Article 8 right, and the interference cannot be justified under Article 8(2), then the public authority will be in breach of HRA 1998 section 6(1).

56. The duty under section 6(1) does not extend beyond public authorities. However, the UK courts have developed the common law so as to give effect to the values underpinning Article 8 in cases not involving public authorities: the effect of this development is that the common law now recognises a tort of misuse of private information (or “MOPI”). This tort is separately discussed below.

57. The collection and storage of information about individuals by public authorities is highly likely to engage Article 8(1) (i.e. to constitute an interference with the right to respect for private life): see e.g. Rotaru v Romania (2000) 8 BHRC 449 and R (on the application of Catt) (AP) (Respondent) v Commissioner of Policeof the Metropolis and another (Appellants) [2015] UKSC 9. It follows from this wide approach to the scope ofArticle 8(1) that the collection by a public authority of data about sex (whether by reference to sex at birth, or legal sex) is likely to engage Article 8(1). The same applies as regards the collection of data by reference to any of the other concepts discussed above, i.e. gender, gender reassignment, gender identity, or transgender/ trans status.

58. Where there is an interference with the Article 8(1) right, the question is whether the interference can be justified under Article 8(2): if it cannot, then the interference will be unlawful. This will require consideration of whether the interference is: (a) necessary for one of the matters set out in Article 8(2); (b) “in accordance with the law”; and (c) proportionate. The test of necessity is one of reasonable rather than absolute necessity. Interference will be “in accordance with the law” if (put shortly) it is governed by a sufficiently accessible and foreseeable framework of law and policy: see e.g. the summary in R (ota Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and others [2020] EWCA Civ 1058, at paragraph 55. As to proportionality, the test is set out in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013]UKSC 39, paragraph 20, as follows:

The question depends on an exacting analysis of the factual case advanced in defence of the measure, in order to determine (i) whether its objective is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right; (ii) whether it is rationally connected to the objective; (iii) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used; and (iv) whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of the consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community. These four requirements are logically separate, but in practice they inevitably overlap because the same facts are likely to be relevant to more than one of them.

59. It follows from all of the above that there is nothing in Article 8 that imposes an absolute barrier on the collection by public authorities of data about sex, or any of the others matters discussed in section 1 above.In practice, the question will be whether such collection can be justified under Article 8(2).

60. Note for example the decision of the Supreme Court in R (C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2017] UKSC 72, which considered the policies of the Department for Work and Pensions (“DWP”) regarding the retention of, and access to, information about individuals with GRCs (including their sex at birth, the fact that they had a GRC, and the date of the GRC). Those policies were held to constitute an interference with the Article 8(1) right (see judgment, paragraph 31). However, the relevant policies were held to be justified on the basis of the requirements for administration of the benefits system, including properly calculating state pension entitlement and identifying and detecting fraud (see judgment, paragraphs 32-38).

61. In relation to justification under Article 8(2), one important consideration will be data accuracy. When data is inaccurate, and where this is because of the way in which the public authority has gone about collecting the data (e.g. by failing clearly to specific what data it is seeking to collect), then: (a) it will be difficult to establish that the collection, retention and monitoring of the data is necessary for any of the purposes specified in Article 8(2); and (b) it will likewise be difficult to satisfy the proportionality test summarised in Bank Mellat, in particular (i) the requirements that there must be a rational connection between the collection and retention of the data and the objective being pursued, and (ii) the requirement that there must be a fair balance between individual rights and community interests.

62. In relation to proportionality more generally, I would make the following points.

(1) The points made below apply in particular to the collection of data about the sex of individuals who assert a transgender identity, or who have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment (including, but not confined to, individuals with a GRC). For individuals who do not assert a transgender identity and do not have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, the collection of data about sex is likely to be much easier to justify.
(2) These points apply in particular as regards data about sex at birth, or about the fact that an individual has a GRC (thereby revealing that there is a difference between the individual’s legal sex and their sex at birth). As to GRC status, see also the provisions of GRA 2004 section 22 (discussed below).
(3) There is an important difference between questions that seek to elicit the simple fact of someone’s sex at birth or GRC status, and questions that seek to elicit further details (such as whether a person has had specific hormonal or surgical treatment). The latter will be considerably harder to justify.
(4) A question that gives individuals the option of withholding information (e.g. by way of a “prefer not to say” option) will be easier to justify than a question that gives no such option.
(5) Where (a) there is no option to withhold information, and (b) the information must be provided as a
precondition for obtaining a benefit (e.g. employment, or a service) or for avoiding some legal liability, then the threshold for justification will be particularly high.
(6) It is considerably easier to justify collecting data in circumstances where the data will not be used to make decisions about individuals (as will usually be the case where data is collected for research purposes).
(7) The more widely data is to be disseminated (in a form that allows individual identification), the harder it is likely to be to justify the collection of that data.
(8) It will be particularly difficult to justify the collection of data where the intention is to make that data public.
(9) In considering whether the proportionality test is met (particularly in relation to the dissemination of data, or making data public) it is important to take into account any impact on third parties. In particular, it is important to consider whether third parties have an interest in knowing the sex of a particular individual (e.g. where the third parties are receiving intimate care or medical treatment from that individual).

Data protection law

71. Data protection law (as set out in the UK GDPR and in DPA 2018) does not prohibit the collection of data about either sex at birth or legal sex. However, it imposes various requirements that need to be satisfied if such data is to be lawfully collected and used. Those requirements go beyond those imposed by Article 8 of the ECHR.

72. Data protection law imposes various obligations on controllers (persons or bodies who determine the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data). Personal data, put shortly, means informationrelating to an identified or identifiable natural person: and information about an identified or identifiable person’s sex (whether sex at birth or legal sex) would be personal data about that individual. Note that in order to be personal data, information does not need to be private or confidential: the scope of the concept is therefore very wide.

73. The obligations imposed by data protection law relate to the processing of personal data: again, this is a wide concept, extending (among other matters) to the collection, retention, and use of personal data.
 

74. Controllers must comply with various principles set out in UK GDPR Article 5(1) in relation to their processing of personal data. For instance, processing must be lawful, fair and transparent (Article 5(1)(a)); and every reasonable step must be taken to rectify data inaccuracy (Article 5(1)(d)). The processing of personal data must, in every case, satisfy one of the conditions in Article 6(1). The processing of “special category data”(defined in Article 9(1)) must, in addition, satisfy one of the conditions in Article 9(2). The provisions of Article 9(2) are complex, as they need to be read in conjunction with DPA 2018, which sets out in more detail the circumstances in which there will be compliance with the Article 9(2) conditions: see in particular DPA 2018 section 10 and Schedule 1.

75. Many of the conditions in Article 6 and 9 depend on the processing of data being “necessary” for various specific matters. It is well-settled that this imports a proportionality test comparable to that discussed abovein relation to Article 8 of the Convention. Controllers (whether public or private sector) will therefore have to engage with considerations of proportionality – taking account of the matters discussed above in the context of Article 8 – when determining whether processing of personal data is necessary for one of the matters set out in Article 6 or Article 9.

76. Will data about sex constitute special category personal data? This is defined by Article 9(1) as: personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or  trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation

 

77. As will be apparent, data relating to sex is not in itself categorised as special category data. However, such data might be special category data if it revealed one of the matters referred to in Article 9(1). For instance, if a dataset included the information that Bob’s sex is male, and that Bob’s partner’s sex is also male, then these two items of information (taken together) disclose Bob’s sexual orientation, and constitute special category data.

78. Does information about a person’s transgender status constitute special category information about that person? Usually the answer to this question will be yes, and it is advisable for controllers to proceed on this basis. This question requires separate consideration in relation to the information that: (a) a person has a GRC; (b) a person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment; and (c) a person asserts a transgender identity.

79. The information that a person has a UK GRC will almost certainly constitute information about that person’s health, and hence will constitute special category data on that basis. This is because one of the conditions for the grant of such a certificate is that the person has or has had gender dysphoria: see GRA 2004 section 2(1)(a). Gender dysphoria is currently defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR) (American Psychiatric Association 2022)1026. The information that a person has or has had gender dysphoria would in my view constitute information concerning that person’s health, for the purposes of UK GDPR Article 9(1).

80. There is a theoretical possibility that a person might have been granted a GRC on the basis of a foreign certificate not dependent on such a diagnosis (by way of section 1(1)(b) of GRA 2004). However, I would expect such cases to be rare (and non-existent from 20241027). For practical purposes, the information that a person has a UK GRC (or information that makes clear that this is the case) should in my view be regarded as special category data.
 

81. It is more questionable whether the information that a person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, or asserts a transgender identity, is special category data. That said, I note that the International Classification of Diseases Eleventh Revision (ICD-11) (World Health Organization, 2022) uses the term “gender incongruence” to describe “a marked and persistent incongruence between an individual’s experienced gender and the assigned sex”. This condition has been moved out of the “Mental and behavioural disorders” chapter and into the “Conditions related to sexual health” chapter so that it isnot perceived as a mental health disorder. Nevertheless, the information that a person satisfies the ICD-11definition of gender incongruence would in my view constitute information about their health. Further, it seems to me very likely that a person who has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, or who asserts a transgender identity, would satisfy the definition of “gender incongruence”1028; hence the prudent course for a controller is to treat this information as being information about health, and therefore special category data.

 

82. Where information is special category personal data, the threshold for processing it is higher than in relation to ordinary personal data. For special category data, a condition in UK GDPR Article 9(2) needs to be satisfied,in addition to the conditions in Article 6(1). Article 9(2) cannot be read in isolation, but needs to be considered in conjunction with the relevant provisions of DPA 2018: see in particular section 10 of, and Schedule 1 to,DPA 2018. The conditions in Article 9(2) that are most likely to be relevant for information relating to gender reassignment or transgender identity are these:

(g) processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of domestic law which shall beproportionate to the aim pursued and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject;
(h) processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis of domestic law or pursuant to contract with a health professional and subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3;
(i) processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such as protecting againstserious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products or medical devices, on the basis of domestic law which provides for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular professional secrecy;
(j) processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) (as supplemented by section 19 of the 2018 Act) based on domestic law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject.

83. Processing based on limb (g) will need to satisfy a condition in Part 2 of Schedule 1 to DPA 2018.

• One of these conditions is satisfied where (put shortly) processing is necessary for the exercise of a function conferred on a person by an enactment or rule of law or for various governmental purposes, but
only where the processing is in the substantial public interest: Schedule 1, Part 2, paragraph 6.

• There is also a provision allowing the processing of specified categories of personal data, where the processing is necessary for the purposes of identifying or keeping under review the existence or absence of equality of opportunity or treatment between groups of people specified in relation to that category
with a view to enabling such equality to be promoted or maintained: Schedule 1, Part 2, paragraph 7. This paragraph provides a basis for data concerning health to be processed in relation to equality of opportunity or treatment between people with different states of physical or mental health; and for personal data concerning an individual’s sexual orientation to be processed in relation to equality of opportunity or treatment between people of different sexual orientations.

84. Processing based on limb (h), (i) or (j) will need to satisfy a condition in DPA 2018 Schedule 1 Part 1. These conditions include that the processing is necessary for certain specified health or social care purposes (Schedule 1, Part 1, paragraph 2). There is also a condition in relation to research (Schedule 1, Part 1, paragraph 4), as follows:

This condition is met if the processing—

(a) is necessary for archiving purposes, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes,
(b) is carried out in accordance with Article 89(1) of the UK GDPR (as supplemented by section 19), and
(c) is in the public interest.

Article 89(1) and section 19, read together, impose two main requirements. First, the processing must not belikely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to a data subject. Secondly, the processing must notbe carried out for the purposes of measures or decisions with respect to a particular data subject, unless thepurposes for which the processing is necessary include the purposes of approved medical research (defined by DPA 2018 section 19(4)).

(...)

 Section 3: proposed recommendations in the Review

117. I have reviewed the 59 proposed recommendations in the Review. The recommendations are, in my view, consistent with the legal analysis set out above. I have referred to some of the individual recommendations inthe discussion above. I add some general comments. I have also referred to instances where failing to follow one of the recommendations could be unlawful.

118. The recommendations reflect the importance of: (a) being clear in every case about what data is being sought, and why it is being sought; and (b) being careful, when devising questions, to ensure that those questions appropriately target the data that is being sought. Leaving aside their obvious practical importance, these are key considerations when ensuring compliance with data protection law and with the other legal regimes discussed above. These practical concerns are reflected all through the recommendations in the Review: see e.g. recommendations 3, 8, 9, 16, 17, and 24-37.
 

119. The recommendations reflect the concerns expressed above about the ambiguities associated with the term “gender” (see recommendation 18) and about the need to avoid conflating sex and gender identity (recommendation 17). These are important points, both in relation to ensuring compliance with the PSED, and more generally in ensuring that data collection complies with human rights and data protection considerations.

 

120. Recommendation 6 indicates that there may be cases where omitting or discouraging the option of nonresponse might be appropriate. Rightly, the recommendation recognises that this approach would require careful and case-specific justification: in this regard, see the discussion above about proportionality under Article 8 of the Convention. Particular care needs to be taken in circumstances where a refusal to answer has specific adverse consequences for an individual (e.g. by making it impossible for them to obtain a benefit or a service); this could result in unlawful sex or belief discrimination.

Conclusion

121. This Advice discusses the relevant legal framework, and considers the propos in the Review by reference to that framework.

122. Both the relevant legal framework, and the proposed recommendations, are highly fact-sensitive and will need to be applied in a wide range of different situations. This Advice is not intended to address whether the practices adopted by specific organisations or persons regarding the collection of data about sex and gender, and related issues, are legally compliant, and it should not be relied upon for that purpose. In case of doubt, organisations and individuals will need to seek legal advice that is tailored to their own factual circumstances.

TIMOTHY PITT-PAYNE KC
11KBW
28th August 2024

REVISIÓN DE DATOS, ESTADÍSTICAS E INVESTIGACIÓN SOBRE SEXO Y GÉNERO, (UK, (II))

 

 

Full recommendations

The majority of these recommendations have broad relevance across government. A number of recommendations are directed particularly towards specific bodies. These are:

• recommendation 12 (NHS);
• recommendation 13 (Home Secretary and Police Forces);
• recommendation 23 (Scottish Government and Scotland’s Chief Statistician);
• recommendation 24 (EHRC);
• recommendation 51, 53, 54 and 55 (Office for National Statistics);
• recommendation 55, 56 and 59 (UK Statistics Authority).

Sex

1. In line with the UK Statistics Authority (UKSA) Inclusive Data Taskforce recommendations, ^{[footnote 7]} data on ‘sex, age and ethnic group should be routinely collected and reported in all administrative data and in-service process data, including statistics collected within health and care settings and by police, courts and prisons’.

2. Data on sex should be collected by default in all research and data collection commissioned by government and quasi-governmental organisations. By default, both sexes should be included in all research, including clinical trials, and sex should be considered as a factor in analysis and reporting. As a general rule (with some obvious exceptions), a 50/50 sex ratio is desirable in studies.

3. The default target of any sex question should be sex (in other words, biological sex, natal sex, sex at birth). Questions which combine sex with gender identity, including gender identity as recognised by a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) have a mixed target. Sex as a biological category is constant across time and across jurisdictions, whereas the concept of ’legal sex’ subject to a GRC may be subject to change in the future and varies across jurisdictions. Using natal sex future-proofs data collection against any such change, ensuring consistency.

4. The form of the question should follow the UK Censuses (England and Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland) question and response categories.

What is your sex?
Response categories: Female, Male

5. For some purposes, it may be appropriate to make providing information on sex optional for respondents. This can be done by allowing non- response, for example by allowing respondents to move to the next item in an online survey without responding to the sex question, by stating that responding to any question is optional, or more explicitly, via a ‘prefer not to say’ option. Different approaches may have different implications for non-response in different contexts, and data owners will need to consider these.

6. Omitting or discouraging the option of non- response may be appropriate where failing to collect data on sex would be unsafe, either for the respondent or for others. Examples where a non-response option may not be appropriate would include medical information and data used for safeguarding purposes.

7. Guidance for the sex question should provide clarity on the target of the question as follows.

‘This question is about your sex at birth’.

8. We recommend against using the phrase ‘sex assigned at birth’. This phrasing is inaccurate and misleading, as sex is determined at conception and typically observed in utero or at birth. An individual’s sex is not determined by their birth certificate, it is merely recorded on their birth certificate. In very rare cases an infant’s sex may be inaccurately recorded at birth, but this does not imply that sex is merely an assigned label rather than an inborn characteristic.

9. The concept of ‘legal sex’ is contested and has been subject to change over time and differences between jurisdictions. Therefore, advice on capturing this variable could change. In addition, the concept of ‘legal sex’ has been seen as ambiguous because, in the UK, state- issued documents, such as passports and birth certificates, can record a different sex for the same individual. If data on a person’s sex modified by GRC status, rather than simply their sex, is identified as being required for a specific purpose, we recommend using the England and Wales Census question on sex as above, with the guidance that was used in the Census: ‘If you are considering how to answer, use the sex recorded on your birth certificate or Gender Recognition Certificate.’

10. Whenever sex is recorded, it should be made clear what is intended: whether this refers simply to sex, or to ‘legal sex’ modified for some individuals by a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC). If a document or record is intended to refer to the latter, this should be subject to change only on provision of a GRC.

11. Organisations that allow sex markers to be changed on official documents should keep records of the number of documents changed annually with basic demographic information attached such as age and sex.

12. The NHS should cease the practice of issuing new NHS numbers and changed ‘gender’ markers to individuals, as this means that data on sex is lost, thereby putting individuals at risk regarding clinical care, screening, and safeguarding, as well as making vital research following up individuals who have been through a gender transition across the life course impossible. In the case of children, this practice poses a particularly serious safeguarding risk, and should be suspended as a matter of urgency.

13. The Home Secretary should issue a mandatory Annual Data Requirement (ADR) requiring the 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales and the British Transport Police (BTP) to record data on sex in all relevant administrative systems. Relatedly, police forces should cease the practice of allowing changes to be made to individual sex markers on the Police National Computer (PNC).

14. In some cases, changing data on sex held within administrative systems may have been motivated by a desire to ensure that service users are addressed as they wish to be addressed. Service users should of course be treated with respect and addressed by their preferred name and title. It should be possible to store information on forms of address as distinct from information on sex and ensure that relevant people have access to this as required.

15. We are advised that, from a legal perspective, data on sex is close enough to data on sex subject to modification by a GRC to fulfil the public sector equality duty (PSED), even if a GRC is held to affect a person’s status under the Equality Act. Given the desirability of a single meaningful and constant target for any question on sex both within and between organisations, a question on sex (i.e. natal, biological sex) is preferable for all purposes. Particularly if data on sex is multi- purpose, for example if it is designed to be used for research and/or operational reasons as well as compliance with the PSED, data on sex, (for the avoidance of doubt, meaning natal/biological sex), only should be collected. Collecting both sex and ’legal sex’ would be unduly onerous and would risk identifying individuals with GRCs.

16. As noted by the Office for Statistics Regulation’s guidance on ‘Collecting and reporting data about sex and gender identity in official statistics’, the conflation of terms relating to sex and gender leads to a lack of clarity for both respondents and users of data:

Through our work, we have seen instances where there is a lack of consistency and clarity around the term ‘gender’, both in data collection, and in statistical reporting. In some cases, it is not clear whether producers are using the term gender as a substitution for sex or gender identity.^{[footnote 8]}

Sex and gender identity are distinct concepts and, in line with the Office for Statistics Regulation guidance, these concepts should not be conflated or combined.

17. As sex and gender identity are distinct concepts, questions which combine sex and gender identity in one question should not be asked. We have observed a trend for questions which attempt to combine sex and gender diverse identities in one question. Such hybrid questions aim to solicit information on sex from the majority of respondents but on gender identity from some respondents. As such, the target of the question is muddled. Questions that mix sex and gender risk organisations being in breach of the PSED, as they do not identify either the protected characteristic of sex or the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

18. The word ‘gender’ should be avoided in question wording, as it has multiple distinct meanings, including:

• a synonym for sex
• social structures and stereotypes associated with sex
• gender identity

If a question targeting gender identity is worded as a question on gender, this is likely to mislead many respondents. Questions on sex have also often been labelled as ‘gender’. Change in the use of the term ‘gender’ means that it is important that questions on sex are labelled explicitly as such.

19. Questions on sex and/or gender identity should not contain an additional category for people with DSD conditions, sometimes also known as ‘intersex’. People with DSD have a sex, they are not a third sex or sexless category, and to imply that they are is likely to cause offence. DSD is an umbrella term without a single agreed definition, and the question of which conditions are included is contested. Under conventional definitions, people with DSD are estimated to make up 0.018% of births, i.e. fewer than 2 in 10,000. Asking for DSD status is highly intrusive, poses a risk of identifiability, and is unwarranted given the lack of analytical use for data on such a small group. Asking for this information would need to be via a distinct question, not part of a question on sex or gender identity, and is likely to be justified only in the context of specialist medical studies.

20. In some face-to-face contexts, sex is recorded based on observation rather than by asking a question. Asking for a person’s sex in the context of a face-to-face interaction can be perceived as rude. Observed sex is used in operational contexts where asking for an individual’s sex may reduce rapport or exacerbate a potentially fractious situation, for example in the context of policing. Similarly, in face-to-face surveys, sex is sometimes recorded based on the interviewer’s observation. The potential dissonance and break of rapport generated by asking a person’s sex in the context of a face-to-face interaction may be particularly undesirable in surveys which contain sensitive or potentially distressing questions.

21. Data owners should be reassured that it is lawful to collect observational data on sex in both operational and research settings. However, the record must state that this is based on observation only. This is in line with the general principle that the way in which a variable has been captured should be recorded explicitly in all datasets. Further detail on this point is available in the legal appendix.

22. We have noted some apparent confusion between the concepts of self-reported sex and self-identified gender identity. These are distinct concepts and should not be confused in data collection or guidance. Self-report simply means that the information is reported by the respondent.

23. The Office for Statistics Regulation has written to Scotland’s Chief Statistician regarding the Scottish Government’s 2021 guidance for public bodies on the data collection and publication of sex, gender identity and trans status, suggesting that this guidance would benefit from clarification taking on board developments since the guidance was published. ^{[footnote 9]} Further to this, the Scottish Government guidance should be reviewed to take account of the recommendations of this review, and to consider our legal advice.

24. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) should review the material available on its website and either archive or clearly flag documents and guidance that are not consistent with its current view that sex in the Equality Act 2020 refers to ‘legal sex’ meaning sex subject to modification by a GRC.

Gender identity

25. Data providers often default to using ONS Census questions. However, the ONS 2021 Census question ‘Is the gender you identity with the same as your sex registered at birth’ has been shown to be flawed. ^{[footnote 10]} The Office for Statistics Regulation (OSR) has stated that the statistics produced by this Census variable do not comply with important quality aspects of the Code of Practice for Statistics and has de-accredited these as official statistics. This question (and variants of it) should not be used.

26. Questions on gender identity should recognise that the concept of gender identity as such will be unfamiliar, unclear or irrelevant to some respondents, and that many respondents may not perceive themselves as having a gender identity. Questions should not assume that respondents will agree that they have a gender identity.

27. As organisations increasingly seek to collect data on gender identity, the problems identified with the ONS 2021 Census question have left a user need for a simple question which can be used in data collection with the general population. Organisations wishing to collect data on gender identity will need to be clear on the target of their question. We have identified 3 distinct possible targets for such a question:

• The protected characteristic of gender reassignment
  
• Trans identification
  
• Identification as trans and/or gender diverse

28. For organisations wishing to capture the protected characteristic of gender reassignment for the purposes of equalities monitoring, a question on trans status lacks sufficient specificity, and therefore will not assist in compliance with the PSED. To capture the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, we recommend asking a direct question addressed to this target, such as:

Do you have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment?’ Response options: Yes/No/ Don’t know/Prefer not to say.

29. We acknowledge that gender reassignment will be an unfamiliar concept for many respondents. A guidance note should be included prominently alongside the above question as follows:

‘A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex’.

30. For organisations wishing to capture trans identification, we recommend asking a question clearly directed towards this target. Questions which meet this specification would follow the following format:

‘Are you’ [or ‘Do you identify as’ or ‘Do you consider yourself to be’] ‘transgender’ [or ‘trans’]?’ With response options such as: Yes, Trans woman/Yes, Trans man/Yes, Non-binary/Yes, Other, please specify if you wish [open text]/ No/Don’t know/ Prefer not to say.

31. The small differences in the options provided above reflect the fact that different formulations have been used and recommended across different data collection exercises, with apparent success, and we are not in a position to know whether these differences may affect response in any way. In order to settle on a single agreed formulation, it would be desirable to conduct question testing.

32. Further quantitative research should be undertaken to assess what the general public takes as the meaning of key words which may be used in data collection in this area, including ‘transgender man’, ‘trans man’, transgender’, ‘trans’, ‘transsexual’, and ‘gender reassignment’, along the lines of polling which has already been carried out on the words ‘trans woman’ and ‘transgender woman’.^{[footnote 11]}

33. If guidance is required, we recommend the following: ‘Some people describe themselves as transgender when they do not identify with their sex at birth’.

34. If there is a need and sufficient space for more detailed guidance, we suggest providing the Stonewall definition:

Trans people may describe themselves using one or more of a wide variety of terms, including (but not limited to) transgender, transsexual, gender-queer (GQ), gender-fluid, non-binary, gender-variant, crossdresser, genderless, agender, nongender, third gender, bi-gender, trans man, trans woman, trans masculine, trans feminine and neutrois.

35. It is likely that, for some research purposes, a broader question will be desirable. A question on wider gender-diverse identities may be required, for example to identify respondents expressing a non-binary identity who may or may not identify as trans. If the target of the question is to identify those with gender-diverse identities including, but not limited to, those who identify as trans, we recommend asking a question which makes this clear. For example:

‘Are you [or ‘Do you identify as’ or ‘Do you consider yourself to be’] transgender [or trans], non-binary or gender diverse?’, with response options: Yes, Trans woman/Yes, Trans man/ Yes, Non-binary/Yes, Other, please specify if you wish [open text]/No/Don’t know/Prefer not to say. As this question is novel, it will require full question testing.

36. Organisations considering collecting data on gender reassignment or trans status will need to consider both the fact that this is sensitive personal information and that it identifies a small group. Whether it is appropriate to collect this data will depend on a number of factors, including the:

• size of the dataset
• prevalence of trans identities in the population of interest
• proposed use of the data

Organisations should only collect data which they intend to process. The PSED does not imply a duty to collect data which is unlikely to be useful.

Reporting on data

37. All databases should provide a clear record of how data on sex is defined and collected. All reports using data analysis on sex should provide a clear account of how data on sex is defined and collected, and whether and how this varies between different databases or systems. Any changes to how data on sex is defined over time should be made clear. Data producers should provide a clear audit trail on how data on sex is collected. For example, where appropriate, reporting should include copies of questionnaires and instructions to interviewers. If survey data is collected by a third party using pre-recruited panellists, the source definition should be stated.

38. Analysts must be able to use clear and familiar language in reporting findings on sex. Terms such as women, men, boys and girls are synonymous with (respectively) adult human females and males and children of each sex. Similar considerations apply to terms such as mothers and fathers, sons and daughters. While all language concerning sex and gender has become contested to some degree, those reporting on sex-disaggregated data should not be dissuaded from using familiar sexed terms. Sensitivities which may apply when referring to specific individuals should not apply at the aggregate level. Any guidelines on language use in reporting on data and research should foreground clarity and ease of communication.

Clear language in legislation, guidance and discourse

39. Previously a polite synonym for sex, ‘gender’ now has multiple distinct meanings. Legislation referring to ‘gender’ is now open to misinterpretation, even in cases where it may appear clear that, at the time the legislation was enacted, gender meant sex. It is desirable that legislation should refer clearly to sex and/ or to gender reassignment as appropriate rather than using the term ‘gender’. This has direct implications where data collection is mandated via legislation. Where organisations feel constrained by the use of ‘gender’ in relevant governing statutes when it comes to collecting data, the government should consider amending that legislation so that it refers to sex.

40. When reporting on or discussing issues relating to sex, it would be desirable to see a shift to using the term ‘sex’ instead of gender, given the ambiguity of the term ‘gender’. This should be reflected in government language and guidance. For example, guidance for employers on ‘gender pay gap’ reporting should refer to ‘sex pay gap’ reporting.

Publishing data on individuals

41. Some organisations may wish to publish data on individual sex. For example, in athletics, race organisers typically publish results according to sex/age categories which are used for competition purposes and to compute sex/ age adjusted performance gradings. In other contexts, the sex of a practitioner may be published so that members of the public can be informed of this information where relevant.

42. Published information on individuals must be accurate and accurately recorded and conveyed. Data on sex should not be reported as being data on gender identity or vice versa, and the 2 concepts must not be combined.

43. Individuals should typically be given the option of not having their sex published.