LA RUINOSA CRISIS DE SOLVENCIA DE JAPÓN (1.9 TRILLONES DE USD)

BEYOND THE NIKKEI HIGHS: THE $ 1.9 TRILLION SOLVENCY CRISIS CRIPPLING JAPAN

Dario, January 20, 2026

Wonder who the major holders of JGBs in the world are? Here is the answer:

• ~50% held by the Bank of Japan
• ~17.5% held by Japanese insurance companies
• ~15% held by Japanese banks
• ~8% held by foreign investors

Wonder how underwater those financial institutions are, starting from the BOJ, holding JGBs in their books? A good proxy is the iShares Core Japan Government Bonds ETF (ticker: 2561), even if it was only listed in 2021.

According to the latest official data, back in September 2025, the total notional amount of Japan Government Bonds outstanding was JPY 1,088.2 trillion, roughly USD 7 trillion. If we use the 2561 ETF as a proxy to mark to market those JGBs, the total paper loss on JGBs holdings is roughly USD 1.9 trillion. Yes, my dear reader, ONE POINT NINE TRILLION UNITED STATES DOLLARS.

Now, based on recent estimates, the total amount of capital held by Japanese life insurance companies overall is between JPY 20 trillion and 25 trillion (USD 135 billion to 170 billion). Since non-life insurance companies don’t hold a significant amount of long-dated JGBs, let’s assume 17.5% of all the JGBs are held by life insurance companies and that the duration of that portfolio is 7 years (which we know is wrong, but let’s help them out a bit). Consequently, the total amount of losses in the system is equivalent to USD 332 billion on their JGBs alone. Yes, my dear reader, the whole Japanese life insurance system is theoretically insolvent. What about banks? Based on recent estimates, the total amount of capital held by Japanese banks overall is between JPY 30 trillion and 35 trillion (around USD 200 billion to 240 billion). The total amount of JGBs paper losses that all these banks are sitting on? Roughly USD 285 billion. Yes, my dear reader, the Japanese banking system as a whole is theoretically insolvent too. I am sure someone now would feel itchy to point out that, for sure, banks used hedging to cover their risk. However, those familiar with how hedging works will quickly reply that hedging with derivatives is a transfer of risks within the system; it does not eliminate them. Consequently, as a whole, the Japanese life insurance and banking systems remain theoretically insolvent. Furthermore, we are not even considering the mark-to-market losses rising yields are creating in all other assets they hold, like loans or foreign investments. What’s even more ridiculous is that the BOJ, a.k.a. their lender of last resort, is sitting on USD 800 billion of paper losses on its JGBs holdings.

In the post-GFC world, no one cares about paper losses on government bonds anymore since regulators like to assume that banks can hold those assets till maturity, and high-rated governments like Japan will never default. Hence, those losses will be dealt with over time. If this assumption were correct, then why, back in 2023, did the FED rush to set up the BTFP facility to bail out US banks that were falling like dominoes after Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic Bank defaults?

 Yes, as you can intuitively understand, higher and higher yields on government bonds lead to a liquidity crisis in the banking system. However, as I said many times, banks can remain insolvent for a very long time as long as they have liquidity to meet claims. Credit Suisse is the perfect example since it took over two years to default after the massive hole Archegos created in its books in 2021, on top of losses on assets generated by rising yields at a speed nobody at the time, except myself and a few others, expected, since central banks successfully brainwashed people to believe that after COVID, rates would have remained very low for a very long time since for many years they didn’t have to deal with that terrible beast called inflation.

 If anything, the JPY is too strong right now compared to fundamentals, and the only reason why it does not weaken at a faster pace is the Japanese government’s constant threat to intervene in the FX market using its “war chest” of roughly USD 1.5 trillion of US Treasury bonds (“Japan escalates forex intervention threat as yen nears 160 per dollar“). War chest that, unfortunately for them, is being eroded in value due to the out-of-control inflation in the US, even if it is government policy to deny it and fake the numbers to a level that hides the true reality people are living. Investors aren’t stupid, though; this is why long-term US Treasury yields aren’t coming down as everyone, except myself and a few others, again expected (“IF THE FED CUTS RATES, THE DAMAGES WILL BE FAR GREATER THAN THE BENEFITS“).

 Despite the Nikkei reaching an all-time high beyond 53,000, nobody in Japan is popping champagne bottles to celebrate that. The reason? Very few households in Japan hold stocks, while the vast majority sit on large cash savings. Cash savings in JPY that are being eroded at a blistering pace by the out-of-control monetary inflation created by the BOJ. So, yes, the population is being forced to bail out its own financial system, and I fear very few are aware of what’s happening. Perhaps when the government won’t be able to keep the JPY from collapsing in value anymore, similar to what happened to other countries in the past, like Argentina, Venezuela, or most recently Turkey, they will finally realise how they have been royally screwed. Sadly, it will be too late to deal with it at that time, and Japan, a country with very few natural resources, might sadly fall into economic oblivion.

 

 

For the first time in over a decade, the New York Fed is openly signaling intervention in the Japanese yen. https://t.co/FEljpfa5LL

— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) January 25, 2026

STS 12/12/2025 (SALA 2ª): INTERESES (MORATORIOS Y PROCESALES) Y DELITO DE DEFRAUDACIÓN A LA HACIENDA PÚBLICA

Id Cendoj: 28079120012025101041
Órgano: Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Penal
Sede: Madrid
Sección: 1
Fecha: 12/12/2025
Nº de Recurso: 1697/2023
Nº de Resolución: 1031/2025
Procedimiento: Recurso de casación
Ponente: EDUARDO DE PORRES ORTIZ DE URBINA
Tipo de Resolución: Sentencia

RECURSO DE LA ABOGADA DEL ESTADO

5. Único motivo de infracción de ley, al amparo del artículo 849.1 de la LECrim , por inaplicación del artículo 576 de la LEC , en relación con los artículos 26 y 58 de la Ley General Tributaria

5.1 La Abogacía del Estado, en representación de la Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria, ha
interpuesto recurso que ha sido apoyado por el Ministerio Fiscal, articulándose a través de un único motivo de impugnación, formulado por infracción de ley al amparo del artículo 849.1 de la LECrim.

En el desarrollo argumental de esta impugnación se expone que la sentencia impugnada declara la incompatibilidad de los intereses procesales del artículo 576 de la LEC con los intereses de demora regulados en los artículos 26 y 58 de la Ley General Tributaria. Estos últimos son exigibles desde el vencimiento del plazo de pago de la obligación tributaria en periodo voluntario hasta la firmeza de la sentencia condenatoria mientras que los primeros son exigibles desde esa firmeza hasta el completo pago de la deuda. Los intereses de demora. Los intereses de demora de la LGT derivan de la regulación general establecida en el artículo 1108 del Código Civil y son resarcitorios, porque indemnizan el lucro cesante y, en cambio, los intereses procesales tienen finalidad disuasoria o punitiva, para evitar la interposición de recursos innecesarios, y también cumplen con la finalidad de mantener el valor de la cantidad objeto de condena hasta el completo pago, de ahí que sean perfectamente compatibles.

En las alegaciones formuladas por la defensa en oposición al recurso formulado de contrario se exponen dos argumentos frente a la pretensión de la Abogacía del Estado. De un lado y con apoyo en la SAP Barcelona,sección tercera, número 557/2021, los intereses de demora de la Ley General Tributaria, que tienen una finalidad sancionatoria, no pueden imponerse en el proceso penal porque la sanción penal, que lleva aparejada una multa proporcional a la cuota defraudada, porque se produciría una infracción del non bis in idem, al sancionar al obligado tributario dos veces por la misma conducta y, de otro lado y de forma alternativa, de apreciarse la procedencia de los intereses procesales la base de cálculo ha de ser la deuda tributaria, sin capitalización de los intereses de demora.

5.2 Para dar respuesta a la cuestión debe recordarse que esta Sala tiene establecido de forma reiterada que en toda reclamación civil debe distinguirse entre los intereses que se derivan de la mora en el pago (arts.1100, 1101 y 1108 CC) y los intereses procesales imperativamente impuestos en el artículo 576 LEC. Los primeros resarcen del lucro cesante por privación del disfrute del numerario indebidamente apropiado y los segundos tienen una doble finalidad: Disuadir al condenado a la interposición de recursos (finalidad punitiva o disuasoria) y mantener el valor de aquello a lo que condena la sentencia. Estos intereses nacen por ministerio de la ley sin necesidad de que la parte los haya pedido previamente (STS 668/2018, de 19 de diciembre, por todas). Los intereses moratorios se computan tomando como base de cálculo la cantidad líquida fijada en la sentencia de primera instancia aun cuando desde 1997 la jurisprudencia de esta Sala giró en su interpretación de esta exigencia declarando que el principio "illiquidis non fit mora" debe regir cuando de un modo u otro esté determinada la cantidad reclamada o pueda determinarse aunque con una aproximación. Basta que se trate de un daño preexistente susceptible de determinación ( SSTS, Sala 1ª, número 88 de 13/10/1997; 1117de 3/12/2001; 1170 de 14/12/2001; 891 de 24/09/2002; 1006 de 25/10/2002; 1080 de 4/11/2002 y 1223 de 19/12/2002, entre otras).

Estos intereses serán exigibles en toda clase de procedimientos "salvo las especialidades establecidas para las Haciendas Públicas", conforme a lo previsto en el párrafo 3º de la LEC.

En el ámbito de esas especialidades no ofrece duda alguna que los intereses de demora del artículo 58 de la LGT son exigibles y así lo hemos proclamado en numerosas sentencias de la que es exponente la STS 632/2018, de 12 de diciembre, en la que, con cita de numerosos precedentes, entre otros la STS 832/2013,de 24 de octubre se precisa que la Disposición adicional décima de la Ley General Tributaria, 58/2003, de 17de diciembre, prescribe que "en los procedimientos por delito contra la Hacienda Pública, la responsabilidad civil, que comprenderá el importe de la deuda tributaria que la Administración Tributaria no haya liquidado por prescripción u otra causa legal en los términos previstos en esta Ley , incluidos sus intereses de demora, junto a la pena de multa, se exigirá por el procedimiento administrativo de apremio". La literalidad del texto, que se reproduce en el vigente artículo 305.7 del Código Penal no permite albergar duda alguna sobre la exigibilidad de los intereses de demora del citado artículo 58 LGT.

No es ese el problema que aquí se plantea. Lo que suscita el recurso es la compatibilidad entre los intereses moratorios del artículo 58 LGT y los procesales del artículo 576 LEC.

En el recurso del Abogado del Estado se afirma esa compatibilidad con apoyo en la Disposición Adicional,que antes hemos transcrito, en la que se emplea la locución "incluidos sus intereses de demora". Teniendo en cuenta que conforme al artículo 58 LGT la deuda tributaria incluye ya los intereses de demora, la citada locución debe referirse necesariamente a otros intereses, los procesales del artículo 576 LEC. Por tanto, según la argumentación del recurso, la literalidad del texto de la Disposición Adicional, que se reproduce en el vigente artículo 305.7 del Código Penal, permite afirmar que la expresión "incluidos los intereses de demora" se refiere a los intereses procesales.

El entendimiento de la norma que propugna el Abogado del Estado no es el único posible, ya que también pueden interpretarse ambos preceptos considerando que con la expresión "intereses de demora" lo que se hace es remarcar que la deuda a ejecutar por la administración tributaria, una vez declarada en la sentencia, es la deuda principal no satisfecha por el obligado tributario y los intereses de demora previstos en el artículo 58 LGT. La locución "incluidos", parece precisar una vez más el contenido de la deuda tributaria, y no la inclusión de otros intereses como los procesales ya que en tal caso hubiera sido más acertado y claro utilizar otras locuciones como "más" o alguna expresión similar.

Empero, son numerosas las sentencias que aplican conjuntamente los intereses moratorios y los procesales,aunque tampoco faltan sentencias que solo aplican los intereses moratorios.

Podría entenderse que la Disposición Adicional citada establece un contenido de la responsabilidad civil
singular, distinto del general, en cuanto concreta el contenido de la ejecución de condena, que comprendería exclusivamente la deuda principal y los intereses moratorios, con exclusión de los procesales, tesis que parece sostener la sentencia impugnada al excluir del fallo los intereses procesales y que estaría en congruencia con el artículo 576.3 LEC al disponer la posibilidad de un régimen especial en el caso de las deudas tributarias y con el artículo 26 LGT en cuanto los intereses de demora son exigibles "durante el tiempo al que se extienda el retraso del obligado", lo que posibilitaría su aplicación con posterioridad a la sentencia y hasta el completo pago de la deuda.

Pese a esos argumentos, la compatibilidad de las dos clases de intereses deriva de la diferente función que cumplen. Los moratorios resarcen hasta sentencia del lucro cesante por la indisponibilidad de la cantidad defraudada, con el razonable componente punitivo, expresamente dispuesto por la ley, por tratarse de una deuda contra la Hacienda Pública. Los procesales también compensan el lucro cesante y reiteran e incrementan el componente punitivo para disuadir al condenado de la interposición de recursos innecesarios,una vez dictada sentencia en primera instancia. No hay razón alguna para la exclusión de los intereses procesales ya que vienen impuestos por la ley sin que pueda entenderse que el artículo 305.7 CP y la Disposición Adicional Décima de la LGT establezcan su exclusión ya que nada precisan al respecto.

No apreciamos justificación alguna para hacer de mejor condición al condenado por otros delitos que al condenado por una defraudación fiscal. La diferencia de tratamiento sólo tendía justificación por una disposición legislativa expresa que en este caso no existe.No obstante lo anterior y de acuerdo con las alegaciones realizadas por la defensa, los intereses procesales precisan que la sentencia declare la obligación de pago de una cantidad líquida y, aun cuando este requisito ha sido modulado por la jurisprudencia, lo cierto es que los intereses moratorios precisan de una liquidación posterior por lo que los intereses procesales, al igual que los moratorios, deben aplicarse tomando como base de cálculo la deuda principal. Lo contrario supondría aplicar una doble sanción por un mismo hecho sin que exista tampoco una base normativa que justifique esa agregación punitiva.

En consecuencia, la deuda principal devengará primero los intereses moratorios hasta la sentencia de primera instancia y después los intereses procesales desde la sentencia hasta el completo pago. Por lo tanto, procede la estimación del recurso y debe revocarse la sentencia a fin de que la condena incluya, además de los intereses moratorios, los procesales previstos en el artículo 576 LEC.

 
El motivo se estima.

AATS 17/12/2025: Emisión de sentencia en directa contradicción con un supuesto precedente (Doctrina previa y breve comentario; II)

Id Cendoj: 18087330022024100589

Órgano: Tribunal Superior de Justicia. Sala de lo Contencioso
Sede: Granada
Sección: 2
Fecha: 09/07/2024
Nº de Recurso: 966/2020
Nº de Resolución: 2274/2024
Procedimiento: Procedimiento ordinario
Ponente: JESUS RIVERA FERNANDEZ
Tipo de Resolución: Sentencia

(relativa al Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas, del ejercicio 2016)

La Abogada del Estado cita los artículos 31 de la LIRP y 3.1 b) de la Orden HAP/2222/2014, de 27 de noviembre,por la que se desarrollan para el año 2015 el método de estimación del Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas y el régimen simplificado del Impuesto sobre el Valor Añadido, que establece la exclusión del método de estimación objetiva al superar la magnitud en función del volumen de ingresos para el conjunto de actividades agrícolas, forestales y ganaderas de 300.000 € en el ejercicio 2014.

 
Para la determinación del volumen de rendimientos íntegros y el de compras, expone la representante de la Administración, deberá computarse no sólo las operaciones correspondientes a las actividades económicas desarrolladas por el contribuyente, sino también las desarrolladas por el cónyuge, descendientes y ascendientes, así como por las entidades en régimen de atribución de rentas en las que participen cualesquiera de los anteriores, en las que concurran las siguientes circunstancias: - Que las actividades económicas desarrolladas sean idénticas o similares. A estos efectos, se entenderán que son idénticas o similares las actividades económicas clasificadas en el mismo grupo en el Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas. - Que exista una dirección común de tales actividades, compartiéndose medios personales y materiales.

Al respecto, dice la Abogada del Estado que, en el presente caso, la AEAT comprobó, sin prueba en contrario que permita desvirtuar lo en ella resuelto, que se debían tomar en consideración la suma de los ingresos delas actividades desarrolladas por el actor y su cónyuge, ya que se trata de actividades idénticas o similares (cultivo de olivar), clasificadas en el mismo grupo en el IAE y existe una dirección común de tales actividades,compartiendo medios personales y materiales, sin que se haya probado que la actividad de cultivo del olivar se ejerza de manera separada y diferenciada de la de su cónyuge.

(...) 

 Pues bien, el recurso, con vista de lo actuado, ha de prosperar. En efecto, la Sala no comparte que, de los hechos base de los que la Administración Tributaria extrae el hecho consecuencia, en concreto que el actor, D.Aureliano y su cónyuge, D.ª Amanda, tengan una dirección común en su actividad agrícola y, por esta razón,debe quedar excluido del régimen especial de agricultura, ganadería y pesca, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 3 b) de la Orden de Módulos aplicable, ya que supera el límite del volumen máximo de ingresos de la actividad agrícola, al computarse los ingresos de dicha actividad del Sr. Aureliano y su cónyuge. Nos referimos a que no se puede establecer ilación entre compartir una misma actividad y que en ambos sujetos pasivos exista dirección común, como tampoco existe una prueba indubitada de que los citados cónyuges compartan medios personales y materiales en el desarrollo de su actividad agrícola.

Los indicios que proclama la Administración Tributaria no pasan de ser meras conjeturas sin un respaldo probatorio convincente, ni directa ni indirectamente, de modo que la Administración Tributaria no ha desvirtuado la presunción establecida en el artículo 108.4, párrafo primero, de la LGT, a cuyo tenor"los datos y elementos de hecho consignados en las autoliquidaciones, declaraciones, comunicaciones y demás documentos presentados por los obligados tributarios se presumen ciertos para ellos y sólo podrán rectificarse por los mismos mediante prueba en contrario",prueba que no ha desplegado, de modo suficiente,la Administración.

Razones, todas las cuales, culminan en la estimación del presente recurso contencioso-administrativo, dado que el TEARA, incurriendo también en falta de motivación, ha avalado una resolución de la Administración no conforme a derecho. Ello comporta,también, la anulación de la resolución que impuso la sanción derivada de la indicada liquidación

Id Cendoj: 18087330022024100588
Órgano: Tribunal Superior de Justicia. Sala de lo Contencioso
Sede: Granada
Sección: 2
Fecha: 16/07/2024
Nº de Recurso: 976/2020
Nº de Resolución: 2486/2024
Procedimiento: Procedimiento ordinario
Ponente: JESUS RIVERA FERNANDEZ
Tipo de Resolución: Sentencia

 (relativa al Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas, del ejercicio 2016)

La Abogada del Estado cita los artículos 31 de la LIRP y 3.1 b) de la Orden HAP/2222/2014, de 27 de noviembre,por la que se desarrollan para el año 2015 el método de estimación del Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas y el régimen simplificado del Impuesto sobre el Valor Añadido, que establece la exclusión del método de estimación objetiva al superar la magnitud en función del volumen de ingresos para el conjunto de actividades agrícolas, forestales y ganaderas de 300.000 € en el ejercicio 2014.

Para la determinación del volumen de rendimientos íntegros y el de compras, expone la representante de la Administración, deberá computarse no sólo las operaciones correspondientes a las actividades económicas desarrolladas por el contribuyente, sino también las desarrolladas por el cónyuge, descendientes y ascendientes, así como por las entidades en régimen de atribución de rentas en las que participen cualesquiera de los anteriores, en las que concurran las siguientes circunstancias: - Que las actividades económicas desarrolladas sean idénticas o similares. A estos efectos, se entenderán que son idénticas o similares las actividades económicas clasificadas en el mismo grupo en el Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas. - Que exista una dirección común de tales actividades, compartiéndose medios personales y materiales.

Al respecto, dice la Abogada del Estado que, en el presente caso, la AEAT comprobó, sin prueba en contrario que permita desvirtuar lo en ella resuelto, que se debían tomar en consideración la suma de los ingresos delas actividades desarrolladas por el actor y su cónyuge, ya que se trata de actividades idénticas o similares(cultivo de olivar), clasificadas en el mismo grupo en el IAE y existe una dirección común de tales actividades,compartiendo medios personales y materiales, sin que se haya probado que la actividad de cultivo del olivar se ejerza de manera separada y diferenciada de la de su cónyuge.

(...) 

Pues bien, el recurso, con vista de lo actuado, ha de prosperar. En efecto, la Sala no comparte que, de los hechos base de los que la Administración Tributaria extrae el hecho consecuencia, en concreto que la actora,D.ª Angelica y su cónyuge, D. Marcial , tengan una dirección común en su actividad agrícola y, por esta razón,debe quedar excluida del régimen especial de agricultura, ganadería y pesca, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 3 b) de la Orden de Módulos aplicable, ya que supera el límite del volumen máximo de ingresos dela actividad agrícola, al computarse los ingresos de dicha actividad de la Sra. Angelica y su cónyuge. Nos referimos a que no se puede establecer ilación entre compartir una misma actividad y que en ambos sujetos pasivos exista dirección común, como tampoco existe una prueba indubitada de que los citados cónyuges compartan medios personales y materiales en el desarrollo de su actividad agrícola.

Los indicios que proclama la Administración Tributaria no pasan de ser meras conjeturas sin un respaldo probatorio convincente, ni directa ni indirectamente, de modo que la Administración Tributaria no ha desvirtuado la presunción establecida en el artículo 108.4, párrafo primero, de la LGT, a cuyo tenor"los datos y elementos de hecho consignados en las autoliquidaciones, declaraciones, comunicaciones y demás documentos presentados por los obligados tributarios se presumen ciertos para ellos y sólo podrán rectificarse por los mismos mediante prueba en contrario",prueba que no ha desplegado, de modo suficiente,la Administración.

Razones, todas las cuales, culminan en la estimación del presente recurso contencioso-administrativo, dado que el TEARA, incurriendo también en falta de motivación, ha avalado una resolución de la Administración no conforme a derecho. Ello comporta, también, la anulación de la resolución que impuso la sanción derivada dela indicada liquidación

 

(Ambas Sentencias tienen el siguiente voto particular) 

TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE JUSTICIA DE ANDALUCÍA, CEUTA Y MELILLA
SALA DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO GRANADA
Recurso Ordinario nº 976 / 2020
Sección 2ª
VOTO PARTICULAR
VOTO PARTICULAR que formula el Ilmo. Sr. Magistrado D. Luis Ángel Gollonet Teruel a la Sentencia de recaída en este recurso.

Por medio de este voto particular manifiesto mi respetuosa discrepancia con la decisión mayoritaria sobre la anulación de la Resolución del TEARA, de fecha 29 de junio de 2020, dictada en la reclamación económico administrativa nº NUM000 y acumulada NUM001 , voto particular que fundo en los siguientes motivos:

PRIMERO.-Este recurso seguido con el número 976/2020 es idéntico al recurso seguido con el número 965/2020 ante esta misma Sección Segunda, ya que se trata del mismo impuesto (IRPF), las mismas cuestiones controvertidas y la única diferencia está en el ejercicio concernido, que es el de 2015 en el recurso 965/2020 y el de 2016 en el recurso 966/2020. La recurrente es la cónyuge del recurrente en el recurso 965/2020.

Dada la evidente igualdad entre uno y otro recurso, el principio de seguridad jurídica ( art. 9.3 CE) así como el principio de igualdad ( art. 14 CE) exigen, a mi juicio, que se dé a ambos recursos la misma respuesta jurídica.

Máxime cuando el recurso 965/2020 fue resuelto mediante sentencia nº 643/2024, de 19 de marzo de 2024,que ha devenido firme al no haber sido recurrida.

La sentencia mayoritaria se aparta de lo resuelto previamente por este Tribunal en sentencia firme sin cumplir con los requisitos exigidos por la jurisprudencia constitucional para la modificación de un criterio jurídico.

(...)

CUARTO.-La sentencia mayoritaria no tiene en cuenta que, como señala la Sentencia nº 1421/2020, de 1 de septiembre de 2020, del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Valencia, que trata un asunto muy similar, corresponde a la parte actora la carga de la prueba de desvirtuar la conclusión que la administración sustenta en indicios racionales y suficientes de que hay una dirección común.

En este sentido, ha quedado probado que ambos cónyuges realizan la misma actividad agrícola de cultivo del olivar, incluida en el mismo epígrafe del IAE, y parte de la titularidad de las fincas es común, siendo el régimen económico matrimonial durante el año 2015 el de gananciales. Además, como señala el TEARA, no constan gastos de personal ni compras ni gastos en el ejercicio de 2014 de su cónyuge, lo que unido a que el domicilio profesional de ambos es el mismo lleva a la Administración a la conclusión, que se comparte, de que hay unidad de medios materiales y humanos en el ejercicio de 2014.

La parte actora no ha aportado ninguna prueba que acredite el empleo de medios materiales o personal distintos, máxime teniendo en cuenta que la titularidad de diversas fincas es común a ambos cónyuges casados en régimen de gananciales. No se ha probado que la actividad agrícola fuera realizada de manera independiente, pese a la facilidad probatoria al respecto, sin que sea suficiente la afirmación de que determinadas fincas son privativas de uno de los cónyuges o que otras son arrendadas.

(...)

(Breve comentario a los AATS

 

1) Las Sentencias de un mismo órgano jurisdiccional, aun contradictorias, no cumplen con el requisito casacional del artículo 88.2.a) de la LJCA, por lo que no se cumpliría el primer requisito de admisibilidad.

En efecto, así consta en

 

Id Cendoj: 28079130012017201721
Órgano: Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Contencioso
Sede: Madrid
Sección: 1
Fecha: 16/10/2017
Nº de Recurso: 2787/2017
Nº de Resolución:
Procedimiento: Recurso de Casación Contencioso-Administrativo (L.O. 7/2015)
Ponente: MANUEL VICENTE GARZON HERRERO
Tipo de Resolución: Auto

 

 2. Se trata de una cuestión que presenta interés casacional objetivo para la formación de la jurisprudencia,como sostiene el Sr. Ruperto , porque la sentencia recurrida fija, ante cuestiones sustancialmente iguales,una interpretación del artículo 27.5 LGT en la que se fundamenta el fallo contradictoria con la establecida por otros órganos jurisdiccionales, como lo es la Sección Sexta de la Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo de la Audiencia Nacional (no lo es en cambio la Sección Primera de la Sala de lo Contencioso- Administrativo del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña, porque es el mismo órgano jurisdiccional), por lo que se dala circunstancia de interés casacional objetivo para la formación de la jurisprudencia del artículo 88.2.a) LJCA, resultando conveniente un pronunciamiento de esta Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo del Tribunal Supremo que, a la vista de la finalidad pretendida con la reducción litigiosa, esclarezca la cuestión jurídica planteada, que no sido tratada aún en nuestra jurisprudencia, para servir de este modo al principio de seguridad jurídica y, por su intermediación, al de igualdad en la aplicación de la ley ( artículos 9.3 y 14 CE)

En el mismo sentido, según el documento más adelante citado, los ATTS dictados en los recursos 694/2017, 2787/2017 y 47/2018. 

Este último indica expresamente lo siguiente:

A lo anterior ha de añadirse que la sentencia aportada como contraste no resulta un parámetro válido a los efectos de la pretendida aplicación del artículo 88. 2 a) LJCA.

Hemos señalado (auto de 16 de octubre de 2017, RCA 2787/2017) que la operatividad de este supuesto se encuentra condicionada a la alteridad del órgano jurisdiccional cuya resolución se aporta como contraste. Se descarta el análisis del supuesto invocado cuando la sentencia que se aporta como contradictoria proviene del mismo órgano judicial, como es el caso al tratarse de sentencias de la Sección Cuarta del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Andalucía, sede en Sevilla.

Por tanto, la denegación acordada por el Tribunal a quo no vulnera el derecho de acceso a los recursos, que es el que en su caso resultaría afectado -y no el de acceso a la jurisdicción y el principio pro actione-. El mencionado derecho fundamental también se ve satisfecho por una resolución de inadmisión del recurso fundada en causa legal."

Todos ellos citados en el Documento Doctrina Judicial sistematizada sobre la nueva regulación del recurso de casación (5ª edición, revisada y ampliada, 22 de julio de 2019), elaborado por el Gabinete Técnico del Tribunal Supremo.

 

2) El voto particular discrepante de las Sentencias recurridas no puede integrar, por la misma razón el requisito del artículo 88.2.a) de la LJCA.

 

3) El motivo de admisibilidad del recurso -la sentencia contradictoria de la misma Sala y Sección- no habría sido invocado en la instancia por la Administración recurrente (artículo 89.2.b) y d) LJCA), ni consta que se pidiera su subsanación mediante el incidente de nulidad de actuaciones (artículo 89.2.c) LJCA).  

 

Se trataría, por tanto, de un cambio en los criterios de admisibilidad que pugna con la doctrina previa, pero que, mientras se mantenga, no debería negarse respecto de aquellos supuestos en que la igualdad y la doctrina contradictoria (distintos órganos) es clara, cuando se cumplan los requisitos a que se refieren los AATS (cosa juzgada) y todas las normas legales referidas a los mismos.

El contribuyente recurrido podrá, no obstante, oponerse al recurso por lo indicado, además de por los motivos de fondo que procedan.

En cuanto a estos últimos, resultaría también relevante, en nuestra opinión, la posible inconstitucionalidad del artículo 31 LIRPF referida a los supuestos de cónyuges, pues habría que justificar el diferente tratamiento cuando los medios y dirección común corresponden a contribuyentes no cónyuges que ponen en común cualesquiera medios en explotaciones agrarias. ¿Qué es lo que justifica la diferencia? Teniendo en cuenta la doctrina constitucional de la STC 45/1989:

Las consecuencias jurídicas que el legislador extraiga de tal diferencia, la diferencia de trato de los sujetos integrados en la unidad familiar en relación con quienes no lo están, sólo serán aceptables, en consecuencia, en la medida en la que sean también adecuadas y congruentes con tal diferencia, salvo en la medida en que, en cumplimiento del mandato contenido en el art. 39.1 C.E. ésta sea tomada también en consideración por el legislador para dispensar a los integrantes de la unidad familiar un trato fiscal más favorable que el que reciben los sujetos no integrados en unidad alguna.

 

AATS 17/12/2025: Emisión de sentencia en directa contradicción con un supuesto precedente

Roj: ATS 11861/2025 - ECLI:ES:TS:2025:11861A
Id Cendoj: 28079130012025202114
Órgano: Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Contencioso
Sede: Madrid
Sección: 1
Fecha: 17/12/2025
Nº de Recurso: 9080/2024
Nº de Resolución:
Procedimiento: Recurso de Casación Contencioso-Administrativo (L.O. 7/2015)
Ponente: RAFAEL TOLEDANO CANTERO
Tipo de Resolución: Auto

Roj: ATS 11853/2025 - ECLI:ES:TS:2025:11853A
Id Cendoj: 28079130012025202106
Órgano: Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Contencioso
Sede: Madrid
Sección: 1
Fecha: 17/12/2025
Nº de Recurso: 9079/2024
Nº de Resolución:
Procedimiento: Recurso de Casación Contencioso-Administrativo (L.O. 7/2015)
Ponente: RAFAEL TOLEDANO CANTERO
Tipo de Resolución: Auto

TERCERO.- Marco jurídico.

1.A estos efectos, el recurrente plantea la necesidad de interpretar el artículo 222.4 de la Ley 1/2000 de 7 de enero de Enjuiciamiento Civil, que dispone:

«Lo resuelto con fuerza de cosa juzgada en la sentencia firme que haya puesto fin a un proceso vinculará al tribunal de un proceso posterior cuando en éste aparezca como antecedente lógico de lo que sea su objeto,siempre que los litigantes de ambos procesos sean los mismos o la cosa juzgada se extienda a ellos por disposición legal».

2.También será preciso interpretar el artículo 108 en sus apartados 2 y 4, de la Ley 58/2003 General Tributaria,que señala:

«2. Para que las presunciones no establecidas por las normas sean admisibles como medio de prueba, es
indispensable que entre el hecho demostrado y aquel que se trate de deducir haya un enlace preciso y directo según las reglas del criterio humano. (...)

4. Los datos y elementos de hecho consignados en las autoliquidaciones, declaraciones, comunicaciones y demás documentos presentados por los obligados tributarios se presumen ciertos para ellos y sólo podrán rectificarse por los mismos mediante prueba en contrario.

Los datos incluidos en declaraciones o contestaciones a requerimientos en cumplimiento de la obligación de suministro de información recogida en los artículos 93 y 94 de esta ley que vayan a ser utilizados en la regularización de la situación tributaria de otros obligados se presumen ciertos, pero deberán ser contrastados de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en esta sección cuando el obligado tributario alegue la inexactitud o falsedad de los mismos. Para ello podrá exigirse al declarante que ratifique y aporte prueba de los datos relativos a terceros incluidos en las declaraciones presentadas.».

CUARTO.- Cuestiones en las que se entiende que existe interés casacional.

1.Conforme a lo indicado anteriormente, y de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 88.1 LJCA, en relación con el artículo 90.4 de la misma norma, esta Sección de admisión aprecia que este recurso presenta interés casacional objetivo para la formación de jurisprudencia, respecto de las siguientes cuestiones:

 
- La naturaleza vinculante que tiene una afirmación fáctica establecida en una sentencia firme precedente,en relación con otra sentencia ulterior dictada por la misma Sala y Sección, con idéntica composición y pronunciada cuatro meses después de la primera, con la que existe absoluta conexidad, al concurrir entre ambas sentencias identidad tanto subjetiva, como objetiva.

- En particular, la afirmación de la primera de las resoluciones judiciales, que advera la existencia de una dirección común en la actividad agrícola, no puede ser negada, en la segunda sentencia, porque así viene impuesto por la cosa juzgada material ex artículo 222.4 LEC.

 - Ad abundantiam,aunque la primera sentencia no fuese firme, no cabe cambiar de criterio sin justificación sino, antes bien al contrario, la segunda sentencia debe explicar las razones determinantes del cambio de los hechos, en su apreciación, o en el criterio del Tribunal sentenciador, so pena de originar con ello una valoración arbitraria de la prueba, en tanto que ningún hecho puede ser y no ser al mismo tiempo, con lesión del principio de seguridad jurídica del artículo 9.3 de la Constitución y con sacrificio del derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva sin indefensión del artículo 24 del propio Texto Fundamental.

 
QUINTO.- Justificación suficiente de que el recurso planteado cuenta con interés casacional objetivo para la formación de la jurisprudencia.

1.Esta cuestión presenta interés casacional objetivo, en tanto en cuanto la sentencia emitida en la instancia establece una doctrina (i) contradictoria con la establecida por otros órganos jurisdiccionales [ artículo 88.2.a)de la LJCA], cabiendo apreciar el requisito de ajenidad-entre distintos Tribunales- en tanto que la sentencia de contraste y la que ahora se impugna son emitidas por la misma Sala y Sección, con la misma composición,con solo cuatro meses de separación entre ellas, enjuiciando exactamente la misma cuestión jurídica, sobre la misma base fáctica y con el mismo impuesto (solo se diferencia el periodo impositivo) (ii) gravemente dañosa para los intereses generales [ artículo 88.2.b) de la LJCA], (iii) que afecta a un gran número de situaciones[ artículo 88.2.c) de la LJCA]. De las razones que ofrece para justificarlo se infiere la conveniencia de un pronunciamiento del Tribunal Supremo, para salvaguardar la seguridad jurídica ( artículo 9.3 de la Constitución)como la igualdad en la aplicación de normas (artículo 14 del mismo texto fundamental).

 
2.Así, se impone, por tanto, que la Sala se pronuncie para el particular supuesto que subyace en este recurso de casación, el de ponderar si, ante una constatada -o, al menos, no controvertida por el tribunal sentenciador-plena identidad de situaciones fácticas, una sentencia dictada en un litigio tributario debe respetar, como fundamento, la realidad fáctica y jurídica -devenida posteriormente firme- sostenida en otra precedente con la que existe una intensa conexidad, al existir identidad entre las partes y también sobre la cuestión enjuiciada,aunque se refieran a ejercicios económicos distintos.

En definitiva, está aquí en juego, decisivamente, no tanto la valoración de la prueba efectuada por el Tribunal de instancia en este concreto asunto, en sí misma considerada -y en la que, si le la toma aisladamente, no podríamos entrar sin quebrantar la esencia misma del recurso de casación, que excluye de su ámbito objetivo las cuestiones de hecho ( art. 87 bis.1 LJCA); sino, más bien, la abierta e insoluble contradicción que surge al ser comparada la sentencia ahora impugnada en casación con la de signo contrario, dictada por el mismo Tribunal, con identidad subjetiva, y en atención a unos mismos hechos.

 
Sea como fuere, resulta, en principio, contrario a las reglas de la lógica, que el Tribunal de esta jurisdicción con sede en Granada haya afirmado una cosa y su rigurosa contraria, en solo unos meses, y prescindiendo por completo de la motivación justificadora de este drástico viraje, por virtud del cual, algo puede ser y no ser a un mismo tiempo. Es en esa, cuando menos aparente, contradicción, así como desdén a las resoluciones propias,donde el recurso de casación puede penetrar, por excepción, en el ámbito de la valoración de la prueba.

SEXTO.- Admisión del recurso de casación. Normas que en principio serán objeto de interpretación.

1.En virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 88.1 de la LJCA, en relación con el artículo 90.4 de la LJCA, procede admitir este recurso de casación, cuyo objeto será, por presentar interés casacional objetivo para la formación de la jurisprudencia, la cuestión descrita en el razonamiento jurídico cuarto.

2.Las normas que en principio serán objeto de interpretación son, el artículo 222.4 de la Ley 1/2000 de 7 de enero de Enjuiciamiento Civil, regulador del efecto material y positivo de la cosa juzgada; y el artículo 108 en sus apartados 2 y 4, de la Ley 58/2003 General Tributaria, en relación a la carga de la prueba.

Ello sin perjuicio de que la sentencia haya de extenderse a otras si así lo exigiere el debate finalmente trabado en el recurso, ex artículo 90.4 de la LJCA.

TRUMP V. COOK Y LA INDEPENDENCIA DE LA FED (¿ES LA FED ESPECIAL?)

 

On Jan. 21, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in the case of Lisa Cook, a member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors whom President Donald Trump has attempted to fire based on unproven allegations of mortgage fraud. Although Trump sought to terminate Cook “for cause,” the question of whether the president has the power to fire a governor of the Federal Reserve for any reason at all will likely come up at oral argument.

Indeed, this question was raised in the context of the Federal Trade Commission earlier this month in a dispute over the scope of the president’s power to fire members of that agency. Under federal law, FTC commissioners can only be removed for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” – restrictions that, Trump argues, violate the constitutional separation of powers between the three branches of government because they prevent the president from having complete control over the executive branch. At oral argument, Justice Brett Kavanaugh told U.S. Solicitor General D. John Sauer – the federal government’s top lawyer before the Supreme Court – that he shared “concerns” expressed by Rebecca Slaughter, the FTC commissioner whom Trump fired, about the possibility that the government’s position would also “undermine the independence of the Federal Reserve.”

So where has the court traditionally stood on the issue of the Fed’s independence from presidential control?

The answer is muddled at best – addressed through mere footnotes and with little explanation by the court. One of the early discussions of a special role for the Federal Reserve came – albeit in a slightly different context – in 2018, in a dissent by then-Judge Kavanaugh from a ruling by the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the case of a mortgage lender that had been ordered by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to pay $109 million for violations of a federal mortgage law.

A three-judge panel, in an opinion by Kavanaugh, initially ruled in favor of the lender, which challenged both the structure of the CFPB, headed by a single director who could only be removed by the president “for cause,” and the $109 million order.

But the full D.C. Circuit reversed the panel’s ruling on the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure. Kavanaugh dissented. As part of his dissent, he rejected the CFPB’s assertion that, like the head of the CFPB, the chair of the Federal Reserve cannot be removed from his position as chair by the president at any time. “[E]ven assuming the CFPB’s assertion is correct,” Kavanaugh wrote in a footnote, an exception for the Fed “would simply reflect the unique function of the Federal Reserve Board with respect to monetary policy.”

Two years later, the Federal Reserve surfaced in another opinion, this time in a challenge to the structure of the CFPB that made its way to the Supreme Court. By a vote of 5-4, the court in Seila Law v. CFPB ruled that the CFPB’s leadership by a single director removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers.

In a dissent joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, Justice Elena Kagan argued that federal agencies charged with financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve, the FTC, and now the CFPB, had been “historically given—with this Court’s permission—a measure of independence.” The majority pushed back against that assertion in a footnote, however, writing that “even assuming financial institutions like … the Federal Reserve can claim a special historical status [which was otherwise left unaddressed], the CFPB is in an entirely different league.”

In 2024, Justice Samuel Alito addressed the distinctive role of the Federal Reserve – at least, in his view, with regard to its funding, in CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association of America, in which the majority upheld the constitutionality of the structure used to fund the CFPB. In doing so, Alito, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch – and again in a footnote – rejected the CFPB’s argument that the Fed “is a close historical analog for the CFPB,” writing instead (with little explanation) that the Fed’s “setup should not be seen as a model for other Government bodies. The Board, which is funded by the earnings of the Federal Reserve Banks, is a unique institution with a unique historical background.”

Fast-forward one year, when the justices were considering the Trump administration’s request to pause a ruling by a federal court in Washington, D.C., that barred the president from firing Cathy Harris and Gwynne Wilcox, members of the Merit Systems Protection Board and the National Labor Relations Board, while their challenges to their firings moved forward in the lower courts. Both officials, as well as a “friend of the court” brief filed by law professors to support them, told the court that allowing the president to fire the officials would call the structure of other independent, multi-member agencies into question as well – including the Federal Reserve. Indeed, the law professors wrote, putting the lower court’s ruling on hold “would immediately call into question the Fed’s independence from the White House, with potentially disastrous consequences for economic and financial stability.”

In its reply brief, the Trump administration countered that Harris and Wilcox had “ignore[d] Seila Law’s observation that the Federal Reserve’s tenure protection presents a distinct question with a unique historical pedigree.”

The majority’s order, issued five weeks later, emphasized that it did not threaten the structure of the Fed. Echoing the language that the Trump administration had used in its brief, it described the Fed as “a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.”

Kagan dissented, in an eight-page opinion joined by Sotomayor and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson. Kagan noted that the court’s language regarding the Fed was “out of the blue,” though she did “not doubt the majority’s intention to avoid imperiling [it].” But she questioned the majority’s reliance on Seila Law to support what she characterized as “the creation of a bespoke Federal Reserve exception.” Seila Law, Kagan stressed, “provides no support” for such an exception. “Its only relevant sentence rejects an argument made in the dissenting opinion ‘even assuming [that] financial institutions like the Second Bank and Federal Reserve can claim a special historical status.’ And so an assumption made to humor a dissent gets turned into some kind of holding.”

Despite Kagan’s efforts to highlight the tenuousness of the majority’s statement in its Wilcox order, the Trump administration seized on it in its brief on the merits in the FTC case. Citing the Wilcox order and the section of Seila Law on which that order relied, Sauer wrote that the Supreme Court “has described the Federal Reserve System as a ‘uniquely structured, quasi-private entity’ that ‘follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.’ If a historical exception to the removal power exists for the Federal Reserve Board—a question the Court need not decide—it would be an agency-specific anomaly based on the Federal Reserve System’s history and ‘unique function’ ‘with respect to monetary policy.’”

In Cook’s case, both sides agree that the constitutionality of the for-cause removal restriction for the members of the Fed’s Board of Governors is not directly before the justices. In the government’s application seeking to pause a lower-court ruling preventing the president from firing Cook, Sauer emphasized that the Supreme Court had “left open whether an exception to the removal power, grounded in history and tradition, allows Congress to restrict the President’s power to remove members of the Federal Reserve Board.”

And on Nov. 19, after the justices had set the case for argument, Cook pushed back – in a footnote – against a suggestion, made in a “friend of the court” brief, that the justices should invalidate the for-cause removal restriction for Fed governors. “That argument is neither presented here nor correct,” she emphasized in an earlier brief – citing the court’s decision in Wilcox, which had “recognized that the Federal Reserve’s ‘unique[] structure[]’ and ‘quasi-private’ status distinguish it from other agencies when assessing ‘the constitutionality of for-cause removal protections.’”

Amy Howe, The Supreme Court and whether the Fed is special, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 30, 2025, 9:30 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/12/the-supreme-court-and-whether-the-fed-is-special/

Pleno No Jurisdiccional de la Sala Tercera del TS de 26-11-2025 (cautelares durante la tramitación de un recurso de casación)

 

Acuerdos del Pleno No Jurisdiccional de la Sala Tercera del Tribunal Supremo de 26-11-2025, sobre competencia de la Sala para conocer y resolver sobre la petición de medidas cautelares y cautelarísimas solicitadas durante la tramitación de un recurso de casación y sobre el cobro de deudas en relación con el poder general para pleitos

1ºEl Tribunal Supremo no es competente para conocer de las medidas cautelares o cautelarísimas solicitadas en un recurso de casación. La competencia corresponde al órgano judicial que conoció del litigio en primera instancia o en única instancia. De solicitarse estas medidas al Tribunal Supremo y la urgencia de la situación así lo requiriera, se podrá acordar la inmediata remisión al órgano judicial competente para conocer de ellas a los efectos de que resuelva con la mayor urgencia posible.

2º En definitiva, en los casos de sentencias de instancia que anulan o modifican el acto administrativo, recurridas en casación, la parte favorecida por la sentencia debe solicitar su ejecución provisional ante el tribunal de instancia y la parte perjudicada podrá oponerse a la misma en los términos previstos en el artículo 91 de la LJ, sin que en estos casos resulte procedente la solicitud de medida cautelar alguna ante el Tribunal Supremo

3º En los casos de sentencias de instancia que confirman la actuación administrativa, recurrida en casación, el particular puede solicitar la medida cautelar, pero como se dijo, ante el órgano judicial de instancia. Y si se efectúa «erróneamente» de forma directa ante la sala tercera del Tribunal Supremo, cuando » la urgencia de la situación así lo requiriera, se podrá acordar la inmediata remisión al órgano judicial competente para conocer de ellas a los efectos de que resuelva con la mayor urgencia posible».

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA DE LA UE: CASO C-560/25 (I)

 

Recurso interpuesto el 20 de agosto de 2025 — Parlamento Europeo / Consejo de la Unión Europea

(Asunto C-560/25)

Lengua de procedimiento: inglés

Partes

Demandante: Parlamento Europeo (representantes: F. Drexler, L. Visaggio, A. Tamás, R. Crowe y O. Denkov, agentes)

Demandada: Consejo de la Unión Europea

Pretensiones de la parte demandante

Que se anule el Reglamento (UE) 2025/1106 del Consejo, ¹ de 27 de mayo de 2025, por el que se crea el instrumento «Acción por la Seguridad de Europa (SAFE) mediante el Refuerzo de la Industria Europea de Defensa».

Que se mantengan los efectos de este Reglamento hasta su sustitución por un acto adoptado sobre una base jurídica apropiada.

Que se condene en costas al Consejo.

Motivos y principales alegaciones

En apoyo de su recurso, la parte demandante invoca dos motivos.

Primer motivo, basado en que el acto recurrido se basa incorrectamente en el artículo 122 TFUE. La demandante defiende que, en aplicación de la jurisprudencia pertinente sobre la elección de la base jurídica y atendiendo a su propósito y contenido, el acto recurrido no cumple los requisitos para sustentarse en el artículo 122 TFUE y, en cambio, se refiere al desarrollo de la política industrial de la Unión en el ámbito de la defensa con arreglo al artículo 173 TFUE.

Segundo motivo, basado en el incumplimiento de la obligación de motivación. La demandante alega que el Consejo, en infracción del artículo 296 TFUE, no ha expuesto debidamente los motivos que justifican la elección de la base jurídica para el acto recurrido. En particular, la fundamentación que da el Consejo no es suficiente para determinar si sería correcto basar el acto recurrido en el artículo 122 TFUE.

____________

¹     DO L, 2025/1106, 28.5.2025.

United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property

 

The States Parties to the present Convention, 

Considering that the jurisdictional immunities of States and their property are generally accepted as a principle of customary international law, 

Having in mind the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, 

Believing that an international convention on the jurisdictional immunities of States and their property would enhance the rule of law and legal certainty, particularly in dealings of States with natural or juridical persons, and would contribute to the codification and development of international law and the harmonization of practice in this area, 

Taking into account developments in State practice with regard to the jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, 

Affirming that the rules of customary international law continue to govern matters not regulated by the provisions of the present Convention, 

Have agreed as follows: 

 (...) 

Article 5 

State immunity 

A State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State subject to the provisions of the present Convention. 

Article 6 

Modalities for giving effect to State immunity 

1. A State shall give effect to State immunity under article 5 by refraining from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before its courts against another State and to that end shall ensure that its courts determine on their own initiative that the immunity of that other State under article 5 is respected. 2. A proceeding before a court of a State shall be considered to have been instituted against another State if that other State: (a) is named as a party to that proceeding; or (b) is not named as a party to the proceeding but the proceeding in effect seeks to affect the property, rights, interests or activities of that other State. 

(...) 

Article 18 

State immunity from pre-judgment measures of constraint 

No pre-judgment measures of constraint, such as attachment or arrest, against property of a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State unless and except to the extent that: (a) the State has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated: (i) by international agreement; (ii) by an arbitration agreement or in a written contract; or (iii) by a declaration before the court or by a written communication after a dispute between the parties has arisen; or (b) the State has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of that proceeding. 

Article 19 

State immunity from post-judgment measures of constraint 

No post-judgment measures of constraint, such as attachment, arrest or execution, against property of a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State unless and except to the extent that: (a) the State has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated: (i) by international agreement; (ii) by an arbitration agreement or in a written contract; or (iii) by a declaration before the court or by a written communication after a dispute between the parties has arisen; or (b) the State has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of that proceeding; or (c) it has been established that the property is specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes and is in the territory of the State of the forum, provided that post- judgment measures of constraint may only be taken against property that has a connection with the entity against which the proceeding was directed. 

(...) 

 Article 21 

Specific categories of property 

1. The following categories, in particular, of property of a State shall not be considered as property specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes under article 19, subparagraph (c): (a) property, including any bank account, which is used or intended for use in the performance of the functions of the diplomatic mission of the State or its consular posts, special missions, missions to international organizations or delegations to organs of international organizations or to international conferences; (b) property of a military character or used or intended for use in the performance of military functions; (c) property of the central bank or other monetary authority of the State; (d) property forming part of the cultural heritage of the State or part of its archives and not placed or intended to be placed on sale; (e) property forming part of an exhibition of objects of scientific, cultural or historical interest and not placed or intended to be placed on sale. 2. Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to article 18 and article 19, subparagraphs (a) and (b).

https://www.dipublico.org/3370/convencion-de-las-naciones-unidas-sobre-las-inmunidades-jurisdiccionales-de-los-estados-y-de-sus-bienes/ 

Artículo 18 

Inmunidad del Estado respecto de medidas coercitivas anteriores al fallo 

No podrán adoptarse contra bienes de un Estado, en relación con un proceso ante un tribunal de otro Estado, medidas coercitivas anteriores al fallo como el embargo y la ejecución, sino en los casos y dentro de los límites siguientes: a) cuando el Estado haya consentido expresamente en la adopción de tales medidas, en los términos indicados: i) por acuerdo internacional; ii) por un acuerdo de arbitraje en un contrato escrito; o iii) por una declaración ante el tribunal o por una comunicación escrita después de haber surgido una controversia entre las partes; o b) cuando el Estado haya asignado o destinado bienes a la satisfacción de la demanda objeto de ese proceso.

ArtII.S2.C1.1.11 Presidential Power and Commander in Chief Clause

Article II, Section 2, Clause 1:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

The President’s power with regard to the armed forces has long been debated. In defense of executive action in Indochina, the Legal Adviser of the State Department, in a widely circulated document, contended:

Under the Constitution, the President, in addition to being Chief Executive, is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. He holds the prime responsibility for the conduct of United States foreign relations. These duties carry very broad powers, including the power to deploy American forces abroad and commit them to military operations when the President deems such action necessary to maintain the security and defense of the United States.

In 1787 the world was a far larger place, and the framers probably had in mind attacks upon the United States. In the 20th century, the world has grown much smaller. An attack on a country far from our shores can impinge directly on the Nation’s security. In the SEATO treaty, for example, it is formally declared that an armed attack against Viet Nam would endanger the peace and security of the United States.

Under our Constitution it is the President who must decide when an armed attack has occurred. He has also the constitutional responsibility for determining what measures of defense are required when the peace and safety of the United States are endangered. If he considers that deployment of U.S. forces to South Viet Nam is required, and that military measures against the source of Communist aggression in North Viet Nam are necessary, he is constitutionally empowered to take those measures.¹

Opponents of such expanded presidential powers have contended, however, that the authority to initiate war was not divided between the Executive and Congress but was vested exclusively in Congress. The President had the duty and the power to repel sudden attacks and act in other emergencies, and in his role as Commander in Chief he was empowered to direct the armed forces for any purpose specified by Congress.² Though Congress asserted itself in some respects, it never really managed to confront the President’s power with any sort of effective limitation, until the 1970s.

 Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet Nam, 54 Dep’t State Bull. 474, 484–485 (1966). See also John N. Moore, The National Executive and the Use of the Armed Forces Abroad, 21 Naval War College Rev. 28 (1969); Quincy Wright, The Power of the Executive to Use Military Forces Abroad, 10 Va. J. Int. L. 43 (1969); Documents Relating to the War Powers of Congress, The President’s Authority as Commander in Chief and the War in Indochina, S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 91st Cong. 1 (1970) (Under Secretary of State Katzenbach), 90 (J. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, Department of State), 120 (Professor Moore), 175 (Asst Att’y Gen. Rehnquist).

E.g., F. Wormuth & E. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War (1989), F.J. Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of the Vietnam War and its Aftermath (1993); U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 90th Cong. 9 (1967) (Bartlett); War Powers Legislation: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 92d Cong. 7 (1971).

 https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S2-C1-1-11/ALDE_00013473/

 

This is about wether the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy can order an act of agression against a foreign country that is -as signatory of NATO- an ally of the United States. It should be clear that he can not constitutionally order that.

 "But, even supposing, for a moment, that our laws had required an entry of The Apollon, in her transit, does it follow that the power to arrest her was meant to be given, after she had passed into the exclusive territory of a foreign nation? We think not. It would be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of seizing vessels which had offended against our laws. It cannot be presumed that congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the laws of nations." 

The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 370-371 (1824)

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (DISSENTING OPINION: STEVENS,BLACKMUN AND O'CONNOR)

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (DISSENTING OPINION: STEVENS,BLACKMUN AND O'CONNOR)

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.

The Court correctly observes that this case raises a question of first impression. See ante, at 659. The case is unique for several reasons. It does not involve an ordinary abduction by a private kidnaper, or bounty hunter, as in Ker v. Illinois,119 U. S. 436 (1886); nor does it involve the apprehension of an American fugitive who committed a crime in one State and sought asylum in another, as in Frisbie v. Collins,342 U. S. 519 (1952). Rather, it involves this country's abduction of another country's citizen; it also involves a violation of the territorial integrity of that other country, with which this country has signed an extradition treaty. A Mexican citizen was kidnaped in Mexico and charged with a crime committed in Mexico; his offense allegedly violated both Mexican and American law. Mexico has formally 

 sels as well as domestic within the territorial waters of the United States, and that therefore the carrying of intoxicating liquors by foreign passenger ships violated those laws. A treaty was then successfully negotiated, giving the United States the right to seizure beyond the 3-mile limit (which it desired), and giving British passenger ships the right to bring liquor into United States waters so long as the liquor supply was sealed while in those waters (which Great Britain desired). Cook v. United States, supra.

 671

demanded on at least two separate occasions 1 that he be returned to Mexico and has represented that he will be prosecuted and, if convicted, punished for his offense.2 It is clear that Mexico's demand must be honored if this official abduction violated the 1978 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. In my opinion, a fair reading of the treaty in light of our decision in United States v. Rauscher,119 U. S. 407 (1886), and applicable principles of international law, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the District Court, United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (CD Cal. 1990), and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 946 F.2d 1466 (1991) (per curiam), correctly construed that instrument. I The extradition treaty with Mexico3 is a comprehensive document containing 23 articles and an appendix listing the

1 The abduction of respondent occurred on April 2, 1990. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599,603 (CD Cal. 1990). Mexico responded quickly and unequivocally. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33; Brief for 

 Respondent 3. On April 18, 1990, Mexico requested an official report on the role of the United States in the abduction, and on May 16, 1990, and July 19, 1990, it sent diplomatic notes of protest from the Embassy of Mexico to the United States Department of State. See Brief for United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae (Mexican Amicus) 5-6; App. to Mexican Amicus 1a-24a. In the May 16th note, Mexico said that it believed that the abduction was "carried out with the knowledge of persons working for the U. S. government, in violation of the procedure established in the extradition treaty in force between the two countries," id., at 5a, and in the July 19th note, it requested the provisional arrest and extradition of the law enforcement agents allegedly involved in the abduction. Id., at 9a-15a.

2 Mexico has already tried a number of members involved in the conspiracy that resulted in the murder of the Drug Enforcement Administration agent. For example, Rafael Caro-Quintero, a co-conspirator of AlvarezMachain in this case, has already been imprisoned in Mexico on a 40-year sentence. See Brief for Lawyers Committee for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae 4.

3 Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, [1979] United States-United Mexican States, 31 U. S. T. 5059, T. I. A. S. No. 9656 (Treaty or Extradition Treaty).

 672

extraditable offenses covered by the agreement. The parties announced their purpose in the preamble: The two governments desire "to cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to this end, to mutually render better assistance in matters of extradition." 4 From the preamble, through the description of the parties' obligations with respect to offenses committed within as well as beyond the territory of a requesting party,5 the delineation of the procedures and evidentiary requirements for extradition,6 the spe- 4 Id., at 5061. In construing a treaty, the Court has the "responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties." Air France v. Saks, 470 U. S. 392, 399 (1985). It is difficult to see how an interpretation that encourages unilateral action could foster cooperation and mutual assistance-the stated goals of the Treaty. See also Presidential Letter of Transmittal attached to Senate Advice and Consent 3 (Treaty would "make a significant contribution to international cooperation in law enforcement").

Extradition treaties prevent international conflict by providing agreed upon standards so that the parties may cooperate and avoid retaliatory invasions of territorial sovereignty. According to one writer, before extradition treaties became common, European states often granted asylum to fugitives from other states, with the result that "a sovereign could enforce the return of fugitives only by force of arms .... Extradition as an inducement to peaceful relations and friendly cooperation between states remained of little practical significance until after World War I." M. Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order 6 (1974). This same writer explained that such treaties further the purpose of international law, which is "designed to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and [to] restrict impermissible state conduct." 1 M. Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, ch. 5, § 2, p. 194 (2d rev. ed. 1987).

 The object of reducing conflict by promoting cooperation explains why extradition treaties do not prohibit informal consensual delivery of fugitives, but why they do prohibit state-sponsored abductions. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations (Restatement) § 432, and Comments a-c (1987).

5 Treaty, 31 U. S. T., at 5062, 5063 (Articles 2 and 4).6Id., at 5063, 5064-5065, 5066-5068, 5069 (Articles 3, 7, 10, 12, and 13).

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673

cial provisions for political offenses and capital punishment,7 and other details, the Treaty appears to have been designed to cover the entire subject of extradition. Thus, Article 22, entitled "Scope of Application," states that the "Treaty shall apply to offenses specified in Article 2 committed before and after this Treaty enters into force," and Article 2 directs that "[e]xtradition shall take place, subject to this Treaty, for willful acts which fall within any of [the extraditable offenses listed in] the clauses of the Appendix." 8 Moreover, as noted by the Court, ante, at 663, Article 9 expressly provides that neither contracting party is bound to deliver up its own nationals, although it may do so in its discretion, but if it does not do so, it "shall submit the case to its competent authorities for purposes of prosecution." 9

 The Government's claim that the Treaty is not exclusive, but permits forcible governmental kidnaping, would transform these, and other, provisions into little more than verbiage. For example, provisions requiring "sufficient" evidence to grant extradition (Art. 3), withholding extradition for political or military offenses (Art. 5), withholding extradition when the person sought has already been tried (Art. 6), withholding extradition when the statute of limitations for the crime has lapsed (Art. 7), and granting the requested country discretion to refuse to extradite an individual who would face the death penalty in the requesting country (Art. 8), would serve little purpose if the requesting country could simply kidnap the person. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized in a related case, "[e]ach of these provisions would be utterly frustrated if a kidnapping were held to be a permissible course of governmental conduct." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 (1991). In addition, all of these provisions "only make sense if they are understood as requiring each treaty signatory to

7Id., at 5063-5064, 5065 (Articles 5 and 8). 8Id., at 5073-5074, 5062.

9Id., at 5065.

 674

comply with those procedures whenever it wishes to obtain jurisdiction over an individual who is located in another treaty nation." Id., at 1351. It is true, as the Court notes, that there is no express promise by either party to refrain from forcible abductions in the territory of the other nation. See ante, at 664, 665-666. Relying on that omission,lO the Court, in effect, concludes that the Treaty merely creates an optional method of obtaining jurisdiction over alleged offenders, and that the parties silently reserved the right to resort to self-help whenever they deem force more expeditious than legal process.ll If the United States, for example, thought it more expedient to torture or simply to execute a person rather than to attempt extradition, these options would be equally available because they, too, were not explicitly prohibited by the Treaty.12

10 The Court resorts to the same method of analysis as did the dissent in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407 (1886). Chief Justice Waite would only recognize an explicit provision, and in the absence of one, he concluded that the treaty did not require that a person be tried only for the offense for which he had been extradited: "The treaty requires a delivery up to justice, on demand, of those accused of certain crimes, but says nothing about what shall be done with them after the delivery has been made. It might have provided that they should not be tried for any other offences than those for which they were surrendered, but it has not." Id., at 434. That approach was rejected by the Court in Rauscher and should also be rejected by the Court here.

 11 To make the point more starkly, the Court has, in effect, written into Article 9 a new provision, which says: "Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, either Contracting Party can, without the consent of the other, abduct nationals from the territory of one Party to be tried in the territory of the other."

12 It is ironic that the United States has attempted to justify its unilateral action based on the kidnaping, torture, and murder of a federal agent by authorizing the kidnaping of respondent, for which the American law enforcement agents who participated have now been charged by Mexico. See App. to Mexican Amicus 5a. This goes to my earlier point, see n. 4, supra, that extradition treaties promote harmonious relations by providing for the orderly surrender of a person by one state to another, and without such treaties, resort to force often followed.

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That, however, is a highly improbable interpretation of a consensual agreement,13 which on its face appears to have been intended to set forth comprehensive and exclusive rules concerning the subject of extradition.14 In my opinion, "the manifest scope and object of the treaty itself," Rauscher, 119 U. S., at 422, plainly imply a mutual undertaking to respect the territorial integrity of the other contracting party. That opinion is confirmed by a consideration of the "legal context" in which the Treaty was negotiated.15 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 699 (1979).

 II

In Rauscher, the Court construed an extradition treaty that was far less comprehensive than the 1978 Treaty with Mexico. The 1842 treaty with Great Britain determined the boundary between the United States and Canada, provided for the suppression of the African slave trade, and also con- 13 This Court has previously described a treaty as generally "in its nature a contract between two nations," Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (1829); see Rauscher, 119 U. S., at 418; it is also in this country the law of the land. 2 Pet., at 314; 119 U. S., at 418-419. 14 Mexico's understanding is that "[t]he extradition treaty governs comprehensively the delivery of all persons for trial in the requesting state 'for an offense committed outside the territory of the requesting Party.''' Brief for United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 1991, No. 91-670, p. 6. And Canada, with whom the United States also shares a large border and with whom the United States also has an extradition treaty, understands the treaty to be "the exclusive means for a requesting government to obtain ... a removal" of a person from its territory, unless a nation otherwise gives its consent. Brief for Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae 4.

15 The United States has offered no evidence from the negotiating record, ratification process, or later communications with Mexico to support the suggestion that a different understanding with Mexico was reached. See Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, ch. 2, §4.3, at 82 ("Negotiations, preparatory works, and diplomatic correspondence are an integral part of thEe] surrounding 

 circumstances, and [are] often relied on by courts in ascertaining the intentions of the parties") (footnote omitted).

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676 tained one paragraph authorizing the extradition of fugitives "in certain cases." 8 Stat. 576. In Article X, each nation agreed to "deliver up to justice all persons" properly charged with anyone of seven specific crimes, including murder. 119 U. S., at 421.16 After Rauscher had been extradited for murder, he was charged with the lesser offense of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on a member of the crew of a vessel on the high seas. Although the treaty did not purport to place any limit on the jurisdiction of the demanding state after acquiring custody of the fugitive, this Court held that he could not be tried for any offense other than murder.17 Thus, the treaty constituted the exclusive means by which

16 Article X of the Treaty provided:

 "It is agreed that the United States and Her Britannic Majesty shall, upon mutual requisitions by them, or their ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found, within the territories of the other: provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offence had there been committed: and the respective judges and other magistrates of the two Governments shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or person so charged, that he may be brought before such judges or other magistrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered; and if, on such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to certify the same to the proper Executive authority, that a warrant may issue for the surrender of such fugitive. The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requisition, and receives the fugitive." 8 Stat. 576.

17The doctrine defined by the Court in Rauscher-that a person can be tried only for the crime for which he had been extradited-has come to be known as the "doctrine of specialty."

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the United States could obtain jurisdiction over a defendant within the territorial jurisdiction of Great Britain.

The Court noted that the treaty included several specific provisions, such as the crimes for which one could be extradited, the process by which the extradition was to be carried out, and even the evidence that was to be produced, and concluded that "the fair purpose of the treaty is, that the person shall be delivered up to be tried for that offence and for no other." Id., at 423. The Court reasoned that it did not make sense for the treaty to provide such specifics only to have the person "pas[s] into the hands of the country which charges him with the offence, free from all the positive requirements and just implications of the treaty under which the transfer of his person takes place." Id., at 421. To interpret the treaty in a contrary way would mean that a country could request extradition of a person for one of the seven crimes covered by the treaty, and then try the person for another crime, such as a political crime, which was clearly not covered by the treaty; this result, the Court concluded, was clearly contrary to the intent of the parties and the purpose of the treaty. Rejecting an argument that the sole purpose of Article X was to provide a procedure for the transfer of an individual from the jurisdiction of one sovereign to another, the Court stated:

"No such view of solemn public treaties between the great nations of the earth can be sustained by a tribunal called upon to give judicial construction to them.

"The opposite view has been attempted to be maintained in this country upon the ground that there is no express limitation in the treaty of the right of the country in which the offence was committed to try the person for the crime alone for which he was extradited, and that once being within the jurisdiction of that country, no matter by what contrivance or fraud or by what pretence of establishing a charge provided for by the extra-678

dition treaty he may have been brought within the jurisdiction, he is, when here, liable to be tried for any offence against the laws as though arrested here originally. This proposition of the absence of express restriction in the treaty of the right to try him for other offences than that for which he was extradited, is met by the manifest scope and object of the treaty itself." Id., at 422.

Thus, the Extradition Treaty, as understood in the context of cases that have addressed similar issues, suffices to protect the defendant from prosecution despite the absence of any express language in the Treaty itself purporting to limit this Nation's power to prosecute a defendant over whom it had lawfully acquired jurisdiction.18 Although the Court's conclusion in Rauscher was supported by a number of judicial precedents, the holdings in these cases were not nearly as uniform 19 as the consensus of international opinion that condemns one nation's violation of the territorial integrity of a friendly neighbor.20 It is 18 In its opinion, the Court suggests that the result in Rauscher was dictated by the fact that two federal statutes had imposed the doctrine of specialty upon extradition treaties. Ante, at 660. The two cited statutes, however, do not contain any language purporting to limit the jurisdiction of the court; rather, they merely provide for protection of the accused pending trial.19 In fact, both parties noted in their respective briefs several authorities that had held that a person could be tried for an offense other than the one for which he had been extradited. See Brief for United States in United States v. Rauscher, O. T. 1885, No. 1249, pp. 6-10 (citing United States v. Caldwell, 8 Blatchford 131 (SDNY 1871); United States v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchford 295 (SDNY 1876); Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N. Y. 110 (1874)); Brief for Respondent in United States v. Rauscher, O. T. 1885, No. 1249, pp. 8-16.20 This principle is embodied in Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948,2 U. S. T. 2394, T. 1. A. S. No. 2361, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967,21 U. S. T. 607, T. 1. A. S. No. 6847, as well as numerous provisions of the United Nations Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T. S. No. 993 (to which both the679 shocking that a party to an extradition treaty might believe that it has secretly reserved the right to make seizures of citizens in the other party's territory.21 Justice Story found it shocking enough that the United States would attempt to justify an American seizure of a foreign vessel in a Spanish port:

"But, even supposing, for a moment, that our laws had required an entry of The Apollon, in her transit, does it follow that the power to arrest her was meant to be given, after she had passed into the exclusive territory of a foreign nation? We think not. It would be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of seizing vessels which had offended against our laws. It cannot be presumed that congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the laws of nations." The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 370-371 (1824) (emphasis added).22

United States and Mexico are signatories). See generally Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law, in International Law at a Time of Perplexity 407 (Y. Dinstein & M. Tabory eds. 1989).21 When Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser of the State Department, was questioned at a congressional hearing, he resisted the notion that such seizures were acceptable: "'Can you imagine us going into Paris and seizing some person we regard as a terrorist ... ? [H]ow would we feel if some foreign nation-let us take the United Kingdom-came over here and seized some terrorist suspect in New York City, or Boston, or Philadelphia, ... because we refused through the normal channels of international, legal communications, to extradite that individual?'" Bill To Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U. S. Government Employees and Citizens Abroad: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 63 (1985). 22Justice Story's opinion continued: "The arrest of the offending vessel must, therefore, be restrained to places where our jurisdiction is complete, to our own waters, or to the ocean, the common highway of all nations. It is said, that there is a revenue

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680 The law of nations, as understood by Justice Story in 1824, has not changed. Thus, a leading treatise explains:

 

 

"A State must not perform acts of sovereignty in the territory of another State.

"It is ... a breach of International Law for a State to send its agents to the territory of another State to apprehend persons accused of having committed a crime. Apart from other satisfaction, the first duty of the offending State is to hand over the person in question to the State in whose territory he was apprehended." 1 Oppenheim's International Law 295, and n. 1 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).23

Commenting on the precise issue raised by this case, the chief reporter for the American Law Institute's Restatement of Foreign Relations used language reminiscent of Justice Story's characterization of an official seizure in a foreign jurisdiction as "monstrous":

 jurisdiction, which is distinct from the ordinary maritime jurisdiction over waters within the range of a common shot from our shores. And the provisions in the Collection Act of 1799, which authorize a visitation of vessels within four leagues of our coasts, are referred to in proof of the assertion. But where is that right of visitation to be exercised? In a foreign territory, in the exclusive jurisdiction of another sovereign? Certainly not; for the very terms of the act confine it to the ocean, where all nations have a common right, and exercise a common sovereignty. And over what vessels is this right of visitation to be exercised? By the very words of the act, over our own vessels, and over foreign vessels bound to our ports, and over no others. To have gone beyond this, would have been an usurpation of exclusive sovereignty on the ocean, and an exercise of an universal right of search, a right which has never yet been acknowledged by other nations, and would be resisted by none with more pertinacity than by the American." The Apollon, 9 Wheat., at 371-372.

23 See Restatement § 432, Comment c ("If the unauthorized action includes abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may demand return of the person, and international law requires that he be returned").

 681

"When done without consent of the foreign government, abducting a person from a foreign country is a gross violation of international law and gross disrespect for a norm high in the opinion of mankind. I t is a blatant violation of the territorial integrity of another state; it eviscerates the extradition system (established by a comprehensive network of treaties involving virtually all states)." 24

In the Rauscher case, the legal background that supported the decision to imply a covenant not to prosecute for an offense different from that for which extradition had been granted was far less clear than the rule against invading the territorial integrity of a treaty partner that supports Mexico's position in this case.25 If Rauscher was correctly decided-and I am convinced that it was-its rationale clearly dictates a comparable 

 result in this case.26

24 Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 John Marshall L. Rev. 215, 231 (1992) (footnote omitted). 25 Thus, the Restatement states in part: "(2) A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state. "c. Consequences of violation of territorial limits of law enforcement. If a state's law enforcement officials exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's consent, that state is entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation from the offending state. If the unauthorized action includes abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may demand return of the person, and international law requires that he be returned. If the state from which the person was abducted does not demand his return, under the prevailing view the abducting state may proceed to prosecute him under its laws." § 432, and Comment c.

26Just as Rauscher had standing to raise the treaty violation issue, respondent may raise a comparable issue in this case. Certainly, if an individual who is not a party to an agreement between the United States and another country is permitted to assert the rights of that country in our courts, as is true in the specialty cases, then the same rule must apply to

 682

III A critical flaw pervades the Court's entire OpInIOn. It fails to differentiate between the conduct of private citizens, which does not violate any treaty obligation, and conduct expressly authorized by the Executive Branch of the Government, which unquestionably constitutes a flagrant violation of internationallaw,27 and in my opinion, also constitutes a breach of our treaty obligations. Thus, at the outset of its opinion, the Court states the issue as "whether a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this country's courts." Ante, at 657. That, of course, is the question decided in Ker v. Illinois,119 U. S. 436 (1886); it is not, however, the question presented for decision today. The importance of the distinction between a court's exercise of jurisdiction over either a person or property that has been wrongfully seized by a private citizen, or even by a state law enforcement agent, on the one hand, and the attempted exercise of jurisdiction predicated on a seizure by federal officers acting beyond the authority conferred by treaty, on the other hand, is explained by Justice Brandeis in his opinion for the Court in Cook v. United States,288 U. S. 102 (1933). That case involved a construction of a Prohibition Era treaty with Great Britain that authorized American agents to board certain British vessels to ascertain whether they were engaged in importing alcoholic beverages. A

the individual who has been a victim of this country's breach of an extradition treaty and who wishes to assert the rights of that country in our courts after that country has already registered its protest.

 27 "In the international legal order, treaties are concluded by states against a background of customary international law. Norms of customary international law specify the circumstances in which the failure of one party to fulfill its treaty obligations will ,permit the other to rescind the treaty, retaliate, or take other steps." Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1157 (1992).

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683 British vessel was boarded 111/2 miles off the coast of Massachusetts, found to be carrying unmanifested alcoholic beverages, and taken into port. The Collector of Customs assessed a penalty which he attempted to collect by means of libels against both the cargo and the seized vessel.

The Court held that the seizure was not authorized by the treaty because it occurred more than 10 miles off shore.28 The Government argued that the illegality of the seizure was immaterial because, as in Ker, the court's jurisdiction was supported by possession even if the seizure was wrongful. Justice Brandeis acknowledged that the argument would succeed if the seizure had been made by a private party without authority to act for the Government, but that a different rule prevails when the Government itself lacks the power to seize. Relying on Rauscher, and distinguishing Ker, he explained:

 

"Fourth. As the Mazel Tov was seized without warrant of law, the libels were properly dismissed. The Government contends that the alleged illegality of the seizure is immaterial. It argues that the facts proved show a violation of our law for which the penalty of forfeiture is prescribed; that the United States may, by filing a libel for forfeiture, ratify what otherwise would have been an illegal seizure; that the seized vessel having been brought into the Port of Providence, the federal court for Rhode Island acquired jurisdiction; and that, moreover, the claimant by answering to the merits waived any right to object to enforcement of the penalties. The argument rests upon misconceptions.

"It is true that where the United States, having possession of property, files a libel to enforce a forfeiture resulting from a violation of its laws, the fact that the possession was acquired by a wrongful act is immaterial.

28 The treaty provided that the boarding rights could not be exercised at a greater distance from the coast than the vessel could traverse in one hour, and the seized vessel's speed did not exceed 10 miles an hour. Cook v. United States, 288 U. S., at 107, 110.

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Dodge v. United States, 272 U. S. 530, 532 [(1926)]. Compare Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 444. The doctrine rests primarily upon the common-law rules that any person may, at his peril, seize property which has become forfeited to, or forfeitable by, the Government; and that proceedings by the Government to enforce a forfeiture ratify a seizure made by one without authority, since ratification is equivalent to antecedent delegation of authority to seize. Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 310 [(1818)]; Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197, 205-206 [(1845)]. The doctrine is not applicable here. The objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because made by one upon whom the Government had not conferred authority to seize at the place where the seizure was made. The objection is that the Government itself lacked power to seize, since by the Treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority. The Treaty fixes the conditions under which a 'vessel may be seized and taken into a port of the United States, its territories or possessions for adjudication in accordance with' the applicable laws. Thereby, Great Britain agreed that adjudication may follow a rightful seizure. Our Government, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to subject the vessel to our laws. To hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty. Compare United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407." Cook v. United States, 288 U. S., at 120-122.

The same reasoning was employed by Justice Miller to explain why the holding in Rauscher did not apply to the Ker case. The arresting officer in Ker did not pretend to be acting in any official capacity when he kidnaped Ker. As Justice Miller noted, "the facts show that it was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretence of authority under the treaty or from the government

 685

of the United States." Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S., at 443 (emphasis added).29 The exact opposite is true in this case, as it was in Cook.30 The Court's failure to differentiate between private abductions and official invasions of another sovereign's territory also accounts for its misplaced reliance on the 1935 proposal made by the Advisory Committee on Research in International Law. See ante, at 665-666, and n. 13. As the text of that proposal plainly states, it would have rejected the rule of the Ker case.31 The failure to adopt that recommendation does not speak to the issue the Court decides today. The

29 As the Illinois Supreme Court described the action:

 "The arrest and detention of [Ker] was not by any authority of the general government, and no obligation is implied on the part of the Federal or any State government .... The invasion of the sovereignty of Peru, if any wrong was done, was by individuals, perhaps some of them owing no allegiance to the United States, and not by the Federal government." Ker v. Illinois, 110 Ill. 627, 643 (1884).

30 The Martinez incident discussed by the Court, see ante, at 665, n. 11, also involved an abduction by a private party; the reference to the Ker precedent was therefore appropriate in that case. On the other hand, the letter written by Secretary of State Blaine to the Governor of Texas in 1881 unequivocally disapproved of abductions by either party to an extradition treaty. In 1984, Secretary of State Schultz expressed the same opinion about an authorized kidnaping of a Canadian national. He remarked that, in view of the extradition treaty between the United States and Canada, it was understandable that Canada was "outraged" by the kidnaping and considered it to be "a violation of the treaty and of international law, as well as an affront to its sovereignty." See Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 78 Am. 31 Article 16 of the draft provides:

"In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by such measures." Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 435, 623 (Supp. 1935).

 686

Court's admittedly "shocking" disdain for customary and conventional international law principles, see ante, at 669, is thus entirely unsupported by case law and commentary. IV As the Court observes at the outset of its opinion, there is reason to believe that respondent participated in an especially brutal murder of an American law enforcement agent. That fact, if true, may explain the Executive's intense interest in punishing respondent in our courts.32 Such an explanation, however, provides no justification for disregarding the Rule of Law that this Court has a duty to uphold.33 That the Executive may wish to reinterpret 34 the Treaty to 32 See, e.g., Storm Arises Over Camarena; U. S. Wants Harder Line Adopted, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Mar. 8, 1985, p. 10; U. S. Presses Mexico To Find Agent, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 20, 1985, p. 10. 33 As Justice Brandeis so wisely urged:

"In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the 

 whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).

34 Certainly, the Executive's view has changed over time. At one point, the Office of Legal Counsel advised the administration that such seizures were contrary to international law because they compromised the territorial integrity of the other nation and were only to be undertaken with the consent of that nation. 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 549, 556 (1980). More recently, that opinion was revised, and the new opinion concluded that the President did have the authority to override customary international law. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1989) (statement of William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U. S. Department of Justice).

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allow for an action that the Treaty in no way authorizes should not influence this Court's interpretation.35 Indeed, the desire for revenge exerts "a kind of hydraulic pressure ... before which even well settled principles of law will bend," Northern Securities Co. v. United States,193 U. S. 197, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting), but it is precisely at such moments that we should remember and be guided by our duty "to render judgment evenly and dispassionately according to law, as each is given understanding to ascertain and apply it." United States v. Mine Workers,330 U. S. 258, 342 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The way that we perform that duty in a case of this kind sets an example that other tribunals in other countries are sure to emulate. The significance of this Court's precedents is illustrated by a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of the Republic of South Africa. Based largely on its understanding of the import of this Court's cases-including our decision in Kerthat court held that the prosecution of a defendant kidnaped by agents of South Africa in another country must be dismissed. S v. Ebrahim, S. Afr. L. Rep. (Apr.-June 1991).36 The Court of Appeal of South Africa-indeed, I suspect most courts throughout the civilized world-will be deeply disturbed by the "monstrous" decision the Court announces today. For every nation that has an interest in preserving the Rule of Law is affected, directly or indirectly, by a deci-

35 Cf. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325 (1939) (construing treaty in accordance with historical construction and refusing to defer to change in Executive policy); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U. S. 309 (1907) (rejecting Executive's 

 interpretation).

36 The South African court agreed with appellant that an "abduction represents a violation of the applicable rules of international law, that these rules are part of [South Mrican] law, and that this violation of the law deprives the Court ... of its competence to hear [appellant's] case .... " S. Afr. L. Rep., at 8-9.

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688 sion of this character.37 As Thomas Paine warned, an "avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty" because it leads a nation "to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws."3S To counter that tendency, he reminds us:

"He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself." 39

I respectfully dissent.

37 As Judge Mansfield presciently observed in a case not unlike the one before us today: "Society is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the law." United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (CA2 1974).

382 The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 588 (P. Foner ed. 1945). 39 Ibid.

 

List of United States extradition treaties