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Sunday, October 23, 2011

EL FRACASO DEL RESCATE GRIEGO

Leaked Greek bailout document: Expansionary fiscal consolidation has failed | Credit Writedowns

EL DOCUMENTO PREPARADO POR LA "TROIKA" PARA LA CUMBRE DEL MIERCOLES Y EL COMENTARIO SOBRE EL MISMO DE ROB PARENTAU:

"This leaked Troika "debt sustainability analysis" submitted to the EU Summit yesterday will no doubt be a part of the deliberations in the Greek debt restructuring proposals to be hammered out by Oct. 26th.

Point 1. A. on the first page is a pretty open and blatant admission that expansionary fiscal consolidation (EFC) has proven to be a contradiction in terms, at least in Greece. Moreover, there is a serious policy incompatibility problem, at least over the intermediate term horizon, with efforts at internal devaluation (ID) - that is, attempting nominal domestic private income deflation in order to improve trade prospects when one has a fixed exchange rate constraint.

This latter point is further amplified in the "stress test" scenario discussed on the bottom of page 5, which I think we all know is soon to become the Troika's base case scenario. They stop short of recognizing that their demands and the actions they have imposed on Greek policymakers are setting off a Fisher debt deflation implosion of the Greek economy. But clearly, the EFC policy is rupturing any semblance of a social contract, and ripping the social fabric to shreds as well.

This is a very large step for the Troika to have taken; admitting that EFC is not working, and that pursuing internal devaluation will aggravate matters further, including the ability of Greece to hit fiscal targets, is a fairly large step in the recognition of the reality of the situation. This is not something that Troika economists are often prone to do. It is not what their incentive structures, formal and informal, tend to encourage them to do.

More importantly, this admission by the Troika shows the rest of the periphery, the UK, the US, and even Japan that the road to debt deflation hell is paved with good intentions - intentions the Troika appears even now prepared to question - but of course, only in the very special conditions of Greece.

We must argue Greece is not a special case, but rather a case in point of what happens when you impose fiscal consolidation on countries with high private debt to GDP ratios, high desired private net saving rates, and large, stubborn current account déficit.

With this document, now it is evident that analysts at the EU, the IMF and the ECB understand these points as well."

ROB PARENTAU

Saturday, October 22, 2011

EL TRILEMA EUROPEO

¿POR QUÉ NO ES POSIBLE HACER UN MONEDERO DE SEDA CON EL PELO DE UNA OREJA DE CERDO?

1) POR LA FALTA DE ACTUACION DEL BANCO CENTRAL EUROPEO COMO PRESTAMISTA DE ULTIMO RECURSO, SEGÚN PAUL DE GRAUWE

This leads to a vicious circle: recapitalisations undermine the creditworthiness of governments and this then feeds back in to the banks, which see the value of their assets (government bonds) decline further. The more governments recapitalise, the more the value of the banks’ assets falls, leading to the need for further recapitalisations.

To stop the downward spiral a floor has to be put on the price of government bonds in the eurozone and the European Central Bank is the only institution capable of implementing it. To prevent further drops in government bond prices, the bank should announce that it is ready to intervene in the market. The ECB is the only institution capable of doing this because it can create money without limit. In announcing its unconditional commitment, the bank would stop the spiral of decline. And when investors were convinced of the resolve of the ECB, they would stop selling sovereign bonds because they would trust that a floor had been put on their prices.

The ECB has no excuse not to act. In trying to keep its monetary virginity intact, the bank threatens to destroy the eurozone. If that happens, nobody will be able to profit from its virginity.

Paul de Grauwe

http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/10/19/the-eurozone-rescue-fund-is-still-not-big-enough/#axzz1bXgoxxQr

2) PORQUE NO SON, NI PUEDEN SER, SUFICIENTES LOS FONDOS DE RESCATE EUROPEO (EFSF), SEGÚN GAVIN DAVIES

The €200bn will apparently be used to insure future purchasers of Italian and Spanish bonds against the first tranche of any losses they may suffer in a sovereign default. If the first 20 per cent of losses are insured, the EFSF could cover €1,000bn of bond purchases.

The key question is whether this would be a sufficient inducement to bring a large amount of fresh capital into the troubled bond markets. The subsidy would be worth 180 basis points on new Italian bonds, according to Andrew Bevan, Fulcrum’s bond specialist, given the market’s assumption that a sovereign default is 40 per cent likely over the next five years, and assuming that there would be a 50 per cent recovery to bond holders after that default.

It is not clear that this will be enough to transform the market’s perceptions of government debt in these struggling economies. The eurozone could increase the incentives to future bond purchasers by increasing the insured amount of any future loss from 20 per cent to (say) 40 per cent. But that would automatically reduce the amount of bonds covered from €1,000bn to a modest €500bn.

At its absolute maximum, the subsidy can never be worth more than €200bn, which is equal to 8 per cent of the current outstanding debt of Italy and Spain. The eurozone cannot make this subsidy any bigger by using the smoke and mirrors involved in leverage. Talk of trillions of new money, apparently conjured out of thin air by financial engineering, is inherently misleading.

If this is Germany’s final word, then the fund will remain too small, and the eurozone will once again discover that it cannot make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear.

Gavin Davies

http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/10/19/the-eurozone-rescue-fund-is-still-not-big-enough/#axzz1bXgoxxQr

3) PORQUE LAS MEDIDAS DE CONSOLIDACION FISCAL NO PUEDEN RESOLVER LOS DEFICITS DE BALANZA DE PAGOS, SEGÚN MARTIN WOLF (VER CUADROS SOBRE DEFICITS Y DEUDA NETA PUBLICADOS POR EL AUTOR)

First, external deficits mean that residents are spending more than their income and financing the difference abroad. If creditors decide such borrowers are no longer creditworthy (be they private or public), they will cut them off, thereby causing a recession and a plunge into – or deepening of – fiscal deficits. Second, prolonged external deficits also shape the structure and competitiveness of an economy.

Third, sustained deficits lead to huge net external liabilities, often intermediated by banks. When the external lending halts, the banks are likely to implode, undermining both the economy and the fiscal position. As Goldman Sachs notes, the inability to devalue also rules out a way of adjusting net liability positions that has proved helpful to the US and UK. Worse, the only available mechanism – an “internal devaluation” (or falling domestic price level) – will make the burden of external debt even greater. The improvement in the current account balance must then be even bigger than it would otherwise need to be.

Most important of all, people care about what happens to their own country. The inhabitants of a depressed member country will hardly console themselves with the thought that others are booming.

Inside the eurozone, adjustment of imbalances remains essential. But it is also vastly difficult, because the exchange rate has gone. In its place, comes adjustment via depression and default. A currency union with structural mercantilists in the core now threatens a permanent slump in the periphery. Solving that is the true cure. Can it be done? I wonder.

Martin Wolf

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d09c8910-f972-11e0-bf8f-00144feab49a.html#axzz1bXCz5zVy

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011.


Sunday, October 9, 2011

SATYAHIT DAS: EL MOMENTO DE LA VERDAD

EconoMonitor : EconoMonitor » Economic Dystopia – The “Stick Shaker Moment”


Exit Via The Japanese Door …

Current concerns, most readily observable in wild gyrations of equity prices, are driven by the identified concerns but also the lack of credible policy options.

The most likely outcome is a protracted period of low, slow growth, analogous to Japan’s Ushinawareta Jūnen – the lost decade or two. The best case is a slow decline in living standards and wealth as the excesses of the past are paid for. The risk of instability is very high; a more violent correction and a breakdown in markets like 2008 or worse are possible. Frequent bouts of panic and volatility as the global economy deleverages –reduces debt- are likely. Problems created gradually over more than the last three decades can only be corrected slowly and painfully.

The eerie sound of the stick shaker can sometime be heard on cockpit voice recordings of doomed flights just before they crash. The global economy’s control stick is shaking violently. It remains to be seen whether the economic pilots can regain control and land the flight safely or whether it ends in a crash.

Satyajit Das is author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk (August 2011)

ENTREVISTA DE LA BBC A ROBERT SHAPIRO SOBRE LA CRISIS EUROPEA

Sunday, September 25, 2011

EL INFORME VICKERS


El Informe Vickers de la Comisión Indepediente sobre la Actividad Bancaria en el Reino Unido ha sido hecho público este mes.El Informe resalta la necesidad de separar las actividades de banca minorista de las de banca de inversión con objeto de evitar reproducir en el futuro la situación que ha llevado a la actual crisis y que los contribuyentes queden prendidos del anzuelo del riesgo así generado.

Las conclusiones del Informe son introducidas así por Sir John Vickers:

"Future stability requires that UK banks should have more equity capital and loss-absorbing debt – beyond what has so far been internationally agreed – and that their retail banking activities should be structurally separated, by a ring-fence, from wholesale and investment banking activities. As many have commented, the big question is how. Structural separation would bring three main benefits:

it would help insulate vital UK retail banking services from global financial shocks, which is of particular importance given the way that major UK banks combine retail banking with global wholesale/investment banking;

it would make it easier and less costly to sort out banks – whether retail or investment banks – that still got into trouble despite greater loss-absorbing capacity. This is all part of getting taxpayers off the hook for the banks; and

it would be good for competitiveness because UK retail banking can be made safer while international standards apply to the global wholesale and investment banking activities of UK banks.

So why not go for total separation? Because a strong ring-fence can get the same, if not more, stability benefits at much lower economic cost. In particular, if one part of the bank is doing well, it can still support the other. We are recommending a strong ring-fence – otherwise there would be little point in having one – but also a flexible one.

This in essence is how it would work.

Only ring-fenced banks would supply the core domestic retail banking services of taking deposits from ordinary individuals and SMEs and providing them with overdrafts.

Ring-fenced banks could not undertake trading or markets business, or do derivatives (other than hedging retail risks) or supply services to overseas (in the sense of non-European) customers, or services (other than payments services) resulting in exposures to financial companies.

Other activities – such as lending to large domestic non-financial companies – would be allowed either side of the fence.

The aggregate balance sheet of UK banks exceeds £6 trillion – more than four times annual UK output. On the basis above, between a sixth and a third of the balance sheet would be inside the fence. Ring-fenced banks could be self-standing, or subsidiary companies in wider banking groups. They would have their own capital, which could not be depleted below safe limits, and governance arrangements to ensure independence. To protect the integrity of the ring-fence, their dealings with other parts of their banking group would be limited to those generally permissible between third parties. As well as helping insulate UK retail banking from global shocks, ring-fencing would provide a sound long-term framework for the supply of credit in the economy. In particular, retail deposits – now around £1 trillion – would fund loans to households and businesses in the domestic economy, not investment banking.

The other element of reform for financial stability concerns the ability of banks, especially those of systemic importance, to bear losses. On this our main recommendations are:

that large ring-fenced banks should have equity capital of at least 10% of risk-weighted assets and corresponding limits on overall leverage;

that the retail and other activities of large banks should have primary loss-absorbing capacity – equity plus long-term unsecured debt (‘bail-in bonds’) that readily bears loss at the point of failure – of 17%-20% of risk-weighted assets. Remaining unsecured debt should also bear loss on failure if necessary; and

depositor preference, so that insured deposits rank above all other unsecured debt.

There is a strong case for higher capital requirements internationally than we propose for UK banks, and without ring-fencing we would have recommended substantially higher levels. As with our proposals as a whole, however, we have taken full account of UK competitiveness in the context of international regulation,

and of transitional issues. Our recommendations reinforce and go substantially beyond other reform initiatives under way, and we have had careful regard to their cumulative impact. Our financial stability proposals may increase some banks’ costs of capital and unsecured debt, especially outside the ring-fence. But that is largely a consequence of returning risk-bearing to where it should be – with investors and not taxpayers. This is a benefit, not a cost, to the economy as a whole, and will better discipline risk-taking. That said, improved financial stability does not come for free. But its costs are greatly outweighed by the gains of fewer crises, less damaging crises, and a healthier environment for investment in the UK economy. Just as financial stability benefits the economy overall, it is good for the City too. A more stable domestic banking system will underpin, not jeopardise, the competitiveness of the UK as an international financial centre. Competition Our competition recommendations are also in accord with the Interim Report. Competition in UK retail banking has not been properly effective. Markets for personal current accounts and SME banking services are concentrated, the more so since the crisis, which saw challengers to the large incumbents fail or be taken over. Conditions for well-informed customer choice are not good, in part because of difficulties of switching between banks. Some competition has been misdirected – to exploit lack of consumer awareness or poor financial regulation. And the implicit government guarantee favours larger banks. Our financial stability proposals address this last point. Our other main competition recommendations are:

that the Government seeks agreement with Lloyds to ensure that the divestiture that is under way leads to the emergence of a strong challenger bank. This is not likely to happen with the divestiture as it stands, in view of its prospective share of personal current accounts and large funding gap;

the introduction within two years of a switching system based on redirection for personal and small business current accounts. This would provide customers with a seamless switching service free of cost and risk. This should be complemented by measures to enhance transparency so that customers can make well-informed choices about the services that best meet their banking needs; and

that competition is made central to financial regulation by giving the new Financial Conduct Authority a clear duty to promote effective competition. Among other things this would give the necessary impetus to efforts to promote transparency and tackle barriers to entry and growth by rivals to the incumbents.

We are not at this point recommending that markets for banking services be referred to the Competition Commission, but a referral should be actively considered if any of these conditions is not met by 2015. Implementation Policy decisions following our Report are for Government and Parliament to make. It would be good all round, not least for financial markets, if the Government could establish its policy by the end of this year, and if legislation could be passed well within the current Parliament. A separate question is the timetable for implementation if the proposed reforms are adopted. The package of recommendations to promote financial stability consists of moderate elements but is fundamental and far-reaching. It could not all sensibly be implemented by 2015 even with legislation enacted next year.

The deadline for implementation of the internationally-agreed Basel III capital standards is the start of 2019. Our recommendations on capital, loss-absorbing debt and depositor preference go considerably further, but we see no case for extending that deadline. Neither would we require acceleration ahead of Basel. In any case, once policy is clear, market disciplines might operate sooner than regulatory timetables. Structural reform would inevitably take time following legislation and subsequent regulatory rule-making, but should be complete by the Basel date of 2019 at the latest, and preferably sooner. This may seem a long time. It is. But short-termism got us into this mess and we need long-termism to build a more stable system for the future. On this basis the reforms that we recommend pose no significant risk to the economic recovery. The lesson from recent weakness, and the strains shown by banks, is just how important it is to reform the banking system. The ‘too big to fail’ problem must not be recast as a ‘too delicate to reform’ problem. Ring-fencing will strengthen, not weaken, the framework for the supply of bank credit to households and businesses in the economy. Retail deposits will fund that flow of domestic credit, separate from global wholesale and investment banking. Higher capital standards, which can be achieved over seven years, represent just a few percentage points of bank balance sheets. The most rapid growth of those balance sheets has related to global wholesale and investment banking, and bank lending to other financial institutions. Credit supply to the domestic economy now accounts for a fraction of UK banks’ balance sheets. In many respects, then, our recommendations would restore UK banking closer to how it used to be – with better-capitalised, less leveraged banking more focused on the needs of savers and borrowers in the domestic economy. At the same time UK banks would be free to flourish in global markets, but without UK taxpayer support. Our banks are at the heart of the financial system and hence of the market economy. The opportunity must be seized to establish a much more secure foundation for the UK banking system of the future. "

Sir John Vickers

Final Report Publication

Independent Commission on Banking

EL INFORME VICKERS COMPLETO

LA ENTREVISTA A VIRAL ACHARYA SOBRE LAS CONCLUSIONES DEL INFORME Y SOBRE LA NECESIDAD DE TENER EN CUENTA NO SOLO LA SEPARACION DE ACTIVIDADES SINO TAMBIEN LA PONDERACION DE RIESGOSEnlace

Sunday, September 18, 2011

COMPENSACION DE DEUDA PUBLICA ENTRE PAISES DE LA ZONA EURO













ESCP EUROPE BUSINESS SCHOOL ha
apoyado un estudio sobre las hipotéticas consecuencias de compensar las posiciones acreedoras y deudoras en deuda pública que mantienen los países de la eurozona con la idea de aclarar la situación y ver si los resultados sugieren una vía de salida a la crisis menos traumática.

La situación de partida, en Mayo de 2011, y la situción final, después de la hipotética compensación, son las que se resumen en los cuadros arriba reproducidos.El primero es el de la situación "neta" después de compensaciones y el segundo el de la situación previa.

Los autores resumen los resultados así:


"The EU countries in the study can reduce their total debt by 64% through cross cancellation of interlinked debt;

Six countries – Ireland, Italy, Spain, Britain, France and Germany – can write off more than 50% of their outstanding debt;

Three countries - Ireland, Italy, and Germany – can reduce their obligations such that they owe more than €1bn to only 2 other countries.

Additionally:

Around 50% of Portugal’s debt is owed to Spain;

Ireland and Italy can write off all of their debt to other PIIGS countries, and Ireland can reduce its debt from almost 130% of GDP to under 20% of GDP;

Greece can reduce their debt by 20%, with 60% owed to France and 30% to Germany;

Britain has the highest absolute amount of debt before and after the write off (owed mostly to Spain and Germany) but can reduce their debt to GDP ratio by 34 percentage points;

France can virtually eliminate its debt (by 99.76%) – reducing it to just 0.06% of GDP;"

Es un inicio para intentar desmadejar la tela de araña de la deuda.La circunstancia de que mucha deuda esté interrelacionada ofrece una oprtunidad para resolver el problema.

La web del estudio

Un link al estudio completo

Friday, September 16, 2011

LA LIQUIDEZ Y LA CRISIS DEL SISTEMA MONETARIO EUROPEO


Uno de los problemas más graves de Europa es que los verdaderos debates sobre la situación actual de la crisis del sistema monetario tienen lugar, más frecuentemente, fuera de sus fronteras.

Así lo pone de manifiesto el comentario y los cuadros del mismo aquí reproducidos, después de que la crisis haya sido dilatada de nuevo con el nuevo programa de liquidez de los bancos centrales a los bancos de la eurozona.

El comentario se refiere, agudamente, al momento “Lehman” europeo y a la envergadura y aparente imposibilidad de un programa como el TARP americano a nivel europeo.

“The most scathing report describing in exquisite detail the coming financial apocalypse in Europe comes not from some fringe blogger or soundbite striving politician, but from perpetual bulge bracket wannabe, Jefferies and specifically its chief market strategist David Zervos.

The bottom line is that it looks like a Lehman like event is about to be unleashed on Europe WITHOUT an effective TARP like structure fully in place. Now maybe, just maybe, they can do what the US did and build one on the fly - wiping out a few institutions and then using an expanded EFSF/Eurobond structure to prevent systemic collapse. But politically that is increasingly feeling like a long shot. Rather it looks like we will get 17 TARPs - one for each country. That is going to require a US style socialization of each banking system - with many WAMUs, Wachovias, AIGs and IndyMacs along the way. The road map for Europe is still 2008 in the US, with the end game a country by country socialization of their commercial banks. The fact is that the Germans are NOT going to pay for pan European structure to recap French and Italian banks - even though it is probably a more cost effective solution for both the German banks and taxpayers....Expect a massive policy response in Europe and a move towards financial market nationlaization that will make the US experience look like a walk in the park. " Must read for anyone who wants a glimpse of the endgame. Oh, good luck China. You'll need it.”

Esta es la historia completa