SALAiMARTIN: LOS CAMBIOS EN EL IRPF

Xavier Sala i Martin ha publicado su análisis de la evolución de los tipos medios del IRPF ("Verdades y mentiras de la reforma fiscal de Montoro"), incluyendo la reforma anunciada.

Estas son sus:

"Conclusiones:

En este post me he limitado a analizar los cambios en los tipos impositivos del IRPF de las sucesivas reformas de don Cristóbal Montoro. No he analizado las consecuencias recaudatorias de esos cambios fiscales. Si no se ve compensada por una subida gigantesca del PIB (cosa que ahora mismo no parece muy probable), la reducción de los tipos impositivos entre 2014 i 2015 comportará una disminución de la recaudación en 2015. Eso creará tensiones en el déficit presupuestario del estado y, por lo tanto, generará un conflicto político con una Europa que ya ha anunciado sorpresa ante el anuncio de Montoro.

Tampoco he analizado las consecuencias sobre la financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas, cuyos ingresos dependen de la recaudación fiscal del estado. La previsible reducción de la recaudación por IRPF junto con la inflexibilidad a la hora de relajar los objetivos de déficit puede conllevar más recortes en los servicios que proporcionan las comunidades entre los que destacan la educación y la sanidad. Todos estos aspectos de la reforma son importantes pero no eran el foco del análisis del presente post. Con el presente post solamente he querido analizar cómo se han movido los tipos impositivos a lo largo de las diferentes reformas de Montoro.

A modo de resumen, la reforma fiscal propuesta por don Cristóbal Montoro significa que:

Primero, los tipos impositivos medios bajarán en 2015 y 2016 en relación a los de 2012. Montoro dice la verdad cuando afirma que los tipos impositivos se reducen y se confirma que dijo la verdad en 2012 cuando dijo que el aumento de impuestos de entonces tenía un carácter temporal. La reducción que propone ahora de alguna manera deshace la subida de 2012,tal como había prometido el gobierno.

Segundo, contrariamente a lo que prometió durante la campaña electoral, pues, durante tres de los cuatro años de gobierno del PP, los tipos impositivos medios del IRPF habrán sido más altos para todos los ciudadanos de lo que eran cuando Zapatero dejó la Moncloa. Durante el cuarto año de mandato (el 2015), los tipos impositivos medios serán iguales o superiores para todos los contribuyentes con bases imponibles superiores a los 40.000 euros.

Tercero, la subida de impuestos del PP en el año 2012 hizo que el IRPF fuera mucho más progresivo de lo que era en época del PSOE. Esa progresividad se ha mantenido en la reforma planeada para 2015 y 2016. Los partidos de izquierda (y particularmente el PSOE) no pueden decir que la reforma fiscal no es progresiva porque es más progresiva de lo que eran los impuestos cuando el PSOE estaba en el poder.

Cuarta, en relación al 2011, los tipos impositivos medios de 2015 serán un poco más bajos para las rentas bajas (con base imponible inferior a los 40.000 euros), se mantendrán igual para las clases medias (bases imponibles entre 40.000 y 65.000 euros) y aumentarán para las rentas altas (superior a 65,000 euros). Para muchos españoles, pues, los impuestos que dejará el PP cuando acabe la legislatura serán más altos que los impuestos que dejó el PSOE.

Quinto, en 2016 cuando la reforma anunciada esté totalmente implementada (si eso llega a suceder), los impuestos medios serán más bajos que en 2011para las rentas bajas (inferiores a 100.000 euros) y ligeramente superiores para las rentas altas (superiores a 100.000 euros). No es verdad que los impuestos serán más bajos para todos los contribuyentes.Y no es verdad lo que dicen los representantes de Izquierda Unida de que quien sale más beneficiado de la reforma son las rentas altas.

En definitiva, como con casi todas las políticas que he llevado a cabo el partido popular durante su mandato, la reforma tributaria de Montoro ha ido acompañada de medias verdades y medias mentiras por parte de los que la defienden y por parte de los que la atacan. Nada nuevo bajo el sol."

LA FALTA DE TRANSPARENCIA Y LAS AMENAZAS

Five minutes with Thomas Piketty: “We don’t need 19th century-style inequality to generate growth in the 21st century”

In an interview with EUROPP’s editor Stuart Brown and British Politics and Policy at LSE’s editor Joel Suss, Thomas Piketty discussesthe rise in income and wealth inequality outlined in his book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, and what policies should be adopted to prevent us returning to the kind of extreme levels of inequality experienced in Europe prior to the First World War. Professor Piketty recently gave a lecture at the LSE, the video of which can be seen online here.

Your research has shown that inequality is rising and that without government action this trend is likely to continue. However, are we correct to assume that inequality is a fundamentally negative development in terms of its consequences on society?

There is no problem with inequality per se. In actual fact, up to a point inequality is fine and perhaps even useful with respect to innovation and growth. The problem is when inequality becomes so extreme that it no longer becomes useful for growth.When inequality reaches a certain point it often leads to the perpetuation of inequality over timeacross generations, as well as to a lack of mobility within society. 

Moreover, extreme inequality can be problematic for democratic
institutions because it has the potential to lead to extremely unequal
access to political power and the ability for citizens to make their
voice heard.

There is no mathematical formula that tells you the point at which
inequality becomes excessive. All we have is historical experience and all I have tried to do through my research is to put together a large body of historical experience from over twenty countries across two centuries. We can only take imperfect lessons from this work, but it’s the best that we have. One lesson, for instance, is that the kind of extreme concentration of wealth that we experienced in most European countries up until World War One was excessive in the sense that it was not useful for growth, and probably even reduced growth and mobility overall.

This situation was destroyed by World War One, the Great Depression, and World War Two, as well as by the welfare state and progressive taxation policies which came after these shocks. As a consequence, wealth concentration was much lower in the 1950s and 1960s than it was in 1910, but this did not prevent growth from happening. If anything, this probably contributed to the inclusion of new social groups into theeconomic process and therefore to higher growth. So one important historical lesson from the 20^th century is that we don’t need 19^th century-style inequality to generate growth in the 21^st century, and we therefore don’t want to return to that level of inequality in Europe.

A video of Thomas Piketty’s recent LSE lecture is available here

Please read our comments policy before commenting.

Note: This article gives the views of the interviewee, and not
the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London
School of Economics.

Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1l0xKZV

EL TJUE Y EL "NE BIS IN IDEM" (SSTJUE DE 27-05 y 5-06-2014)

En dos Sentencias dictadas en un intervalo de 9 días (asuntos C-398/12 y C-129/14), el TJUE ha resuelto dos cuestiones prejudiciales con pronunciamientos de distinto signo sobre la aplicación del “ne bis in idem” recogido en la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y en el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos,

En la primera de ellas (C-129/14), el TJUE considera que la condición de ejecución de la pena contenida en el artículo 54 del CAAS no resulta contraria al derecho que prohíbe el doble enjuiciamiento y condena y no impide un segundo procedimiento penal en Alemania en relación con un delito que había sido objeto de condena firme en Italia mediante una multa satisfecha y una pena privativa de libertad que se encontraba pendiente de ejecución:

“1)      El artículo 54 del Convenio de aplicación del Acuerdo de Schengen de 14 de junio de 1985 entre los Gobiernos de los Estados de la Unión Económica Benelux, de la República Federal de Alemania y de la República Francesa relativo a la supresión gradual de los controles en las fronteras comunes, firmado en Schengen el 19 de junio de 1990 y que entró en vigor el 26 de marzo de 1995, que somete la aplicación del principio non bis in idem a la condición de que, en caso de condena, la sanción «se haya ejecutado» o «se esté ejecutando», es compatible con el artículo 50 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, que garantiza el referido principio.

2) El artículo 54 de ese Convenio debe interpretarse en el sentido de que el hecho de que se haya pagado únicamente la multa penal impuesta a una persona, condenada por la misma resolución de un tribunal de otro Estado miembro a una pena privativa de libertad que no se ha ejecutado, no permite considerar que la sanción se haya ejecutado o se esté ejecutando, en el sentido de esa disposición.”

Resulta en nuestra opinión difícil considerar que dicha condición sea compatible con el derecho fundamental.Si la misma resultaría incompatible en el marco de un solo Estado, no se comprende por qué la solución debe ser diferente en el marco del Derecho de la Unión. Si hay una sanción penal firme por los mismos hechos en un Estado, el único bien protegido debería ser la ejecución de dicha pena en alguno de los Estados miembros (cuestión ajena al “bis in idem”), pero la falta de ejecución en un Estado no debería justificar un nuevo procedimiento y una nueva sanción en otro Estado.

En la segunda sentencia el Tribunal declara, por el contrario, que un auto de sobreseimiento firme debe considerares como un pronunciamiento que impide el segundo enjuiciamiento y condena :

“37      Seguidamente, debe observarse que, según las explicaciones relativas al artículo 50 de la Carta, que deben tenerse en cuenta para la interpretación de ésta (sentencia Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, apartado 20 y jurisprudencia citada), «en lo que se refiere a las situaciones contempladas por el artículo 4 del Protocolo nº 7, es decir, la aplicación del principio en el interior de un mismo Estado miembro, el derecho garantizado tiene el mismo sentido y el mismo alcance que el derecho correspondiente del CEDH». En efecto, dado que, a efectos de la aplicación del principio non bis in idem a posibles diligencias incoadas por otro Estado contratante, el artículo 54 del CAAS supedita el carácter «firme» de la resolución judicial al carácter firme o no de dicha resolución en el Estado contratante en el que ha sido dictada, este punto de las explicaciones es pertinente en el presente asunto.

38      Pues bien, del artículo 4, apartado 2, del Protocolo nº 7 del CEDH se desprende que el principio non bis in idem reconocido en el apartado 1 de dicho artículo no se opone a la posibilidad de reapertura del proceso «si hechos nuevos o nuevas revelaciones» pudieran afectar a la sentencia dictada.

39      A este respecto, se ha declarado en la sentencia del TEDH Zolotoukhine c. Rusia (nº 14939/03, § 83, 10 de febrero de 2009) que el artículo 4 del Protocolo n°7 del CEDH «entra en juego cuando se abren nuevas diligencias y la sentencia anterior absolutoria o condenatoria ha adquirido fuerza de cosa juzgada». En cambio, los recursos extraordinarios no pueden tenerse en cuenta cuando se trata de determinar si el proceso ha concluido definitivamente. Aunque estas vías de recurso representan una continuación del primer procedimiento, el carácter «firme» de la sentencia no puede depender de su ejercicio (véase TEDH, sentencia Zolotoukhine c. Rusia de 10 de febrero de 2009, nº 14939/03, § 108).

40      En el presente asunto, la posibilidad de reapertura de la instrucción judicial debido a la aparición de nuevas pruebas, según se establece en los artículos 246 a 248 del CIC, no puede cuestionar el carácter firme del auto de sobreseimiento controvertido en el litigio principal. Es cierto que esta posibilidad no es un «recurso extraordinario» en el sentido de dicha jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, pero implica la incoación excepcional de un procedimiento distinto, sobre la base de pruebas diferentes, y no la mera continuación del procedimiento ya concluido. Por otra parte, dada la necesidad de comprobar el carácter verdaderamente nuevo de las pruebas invocadas para justificar la reapertura, cualquier nuevo procedimiento basado en esa posibilidad de reapertura, contra la misma persona y por los mismos hechos, sólo puede iniciarse en el Estado contratante en cuyo territorio se dictó dicho auto.

41        En vista de las consideraciones anteriores, procede responder a la cuestión planteada que el artículo 54 del CAAS debe interpretarse en el sentido de que un auto de sobreseimiento por el que se decide no remitir el asunto a un tribunal competente para conocer sobre el fondo que impide, en el Estado contratante en el que dictó dicho auto, nuevas diligencias por los mismos hechos contra la persona a la que ampara dicho auto, a menos que aparezcan nuevas pruebas contra ella, debe considerarse una resolución judicial firme, en el sentido de dicho artículo, que impide la apertura de nuevas diligencias contra la misma persona por los mismos hechos en otro Estado contratante.

(…)

En virtud de todo lo expuesto, el Tribunal de Justicia (Sala Cuarta) declara:
 

El artículo 54 del Convenio de aplicación del Acuerdo de Schengen, de 14 de junio de 1985, entre los Gobiernos de los Estados de la Unión Económica Benelux, de la República Federal de Alemania y de la República Francesa relativo a la supresión gradual de los controles en las fronteras comunes, firmado en Schengen (Luxemburgo) el 19 de junio de 1990, debe interpretarse en el sentido de que un auto de sobreseimiento por el que se decide no remitir el asunto a un tribunal competente para conocer sobre el fondo que impide, en el Estado contratante en el que dictó dicho auto, nuevas diligencias por los mismos hechos contra la persona a la que ampara dicho auto, a menos que aparezcan nuevas pruebas contra ella, debe considerarse una resolución judicial firme, en el sentido de dicho artículo, que impide la apertura de nuevas diligencias contra la misma persona por los mismos hechos en otro Estado contratante.”

Obviamente, en nuestra opinión, la doctrina de la última STJUE resultaría de aplicación en el ámbito interno siempre que se trate de la aplicación del Derecho de la Unión y/o del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos en relación con una sanción por unos mismos hechos en relación con los cuales se dictó un auto de sobreseimiento firme en otro Estado y/o en España.

PAULET V. REINO UNIDO (13-05-2014)

Case of paulet v. the united kingdom from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

PAULET v. REINO UNIDO (STEDH 13-05-2014)

El caso resuelto hoy por el TEDH se refiere al comiso de la renta ahorrada (21,699,60 GBP) por un trabajador originario de Ivory en el Reino Unido.La renta se obtuvo por trabajos realizados entre Abril de 2003 y Febrero de 2007 con un salario bruto de 73.293,17 GBP, por los que se pagaron impuestos y cotizaciones sociales por un importe total de 23,293,17 GBP.

Para la realización de los trabajos el trabajador hizo uso de un pasaporte falso, por lo que fue condenado a una pena privativa de libertad.

El comiso se acuerda en un procedimiento distinto y su objeto se considera un beneficio derivado del ilícito penal.

El órgano nacional desestimó considerar si el comiso era compatible con el justo equilibrio exigido por el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH,

Por esta infracción procedimental, la mayoría considera que se ha producido una violación del artículo 1 del Protocolo 1, pero al mismo tiempo no concede una justa compensación por el importe decomisado sino solo por el daño moral derivado del mismo, por entender que tampoco consta un vínculo directo entre la infracción y el daño.

Este último pronunciamiento es objeto de la opinión separada de los jueces Kalaydjieva (Bulgaria) y Bianku (Albania), que consideran que la infracción es sustancial y no solo procedimental y que la compensación debería haber incluido el importe indebidamente decomisado.

En un comentaruio de urgencia, otras cuestiones importantes del caso, no abordadas directamente por la Sentencia y/o los votos particulares, serían, en nuestra opinión, las siguientes:

1) Si la contraprestación por un trabajo efectivo y la renta disponible después de impuestos constituyen posesiones no legales en el sentido del artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 cuando en el inicio de la relación laboral se ha realizado una representación falsa mediante la utilización de un documento falsificado.Si el Estado tiene o no, en este sentido, un título adicional sobre la renta después de impuestos como consecuencia del ilícito previamente sancionado con una pena privativa de libertad.

2) Si a efectos del CEDH puede considerarse como un "beneficio ilícito" desde el punto de vista penal una renta de trabajo efectivo que ha pagado impuestos y cotizaciones sociales y si tal consideración de beneficio ilícito es compatible con el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH.

3) Si la privación de la renta de trabajo ahorrada después de impuestos puede considerarse proporcionada, una pena no prevista legalmente o una medida en el interés público adicional a los impuestos y cotizaciones sociales previamente satisfechos.

4) Si el "comiso" del producto del trabajo puede considerarse un impuesto o gravamen adicional a efectos del artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH.

5) Si la privación de la renta de trabajo ahorrada constituye en conjunto un gravamen desproporcionado incompatible con el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH.El demandante habría pagado en total más de un 61% de su renta de trabajo, perdiendo la totalidad del ahorro disponible (N.K.M. v. Hungría).

Los aspectos anteriores se sumarían a aquellos señalados por los jueces Kalaydjieva (Bulgaria) y Bianku (Albania) en su opinión separada.

Una cuestión similar había sido considerada previamente por el Tribunal Supremo del Reino Unido en el caso R. v. Waya , citado por la Sentencia.

Este es el voto separado de los jueces Kalaydjieva (Bulgaria) y Bianku (Albania) en cuanto a la infracción del artículo 1 del Protocolo 1:

"My reasons for finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 go further than those of the majority. In my understanding, the issues which this case raises are far from limited to the deficiencies in the procedural protection of the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of property that were reflected in the narrow scope of the review carried out by the domestic courts and their failure to seek and strike the “fair balance” inherent in the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 68).

I find myself unable to agree with the majority’s conclusions (see paragraph 64) that the present case is analogous to previous case-law of this Court on the confiscation of the proceeds of crime (see Phillips v. the United Kingdom, no. 41087/98, and Bongiorno and Others v. Italy, no. 4514/07, 5 January 2010).

The present case appears to depart substantially from this case-law on several major points which seem to be determinative for the proper analysis of the circumstances. In the case of Phillips the Court noted that “in respect of every item taken into account the [national] judge was satisfied ... that the obvious inference was that it had come from an illegitimate source”. In the present case (which concerns the application of different domestic legislation), it has not been contested that, having entered the territory of the United Kingdom by using a false passport, the applicant used it to obtain employment and thus earn his income. Unlike in Phillips, however, it has not been submitted that such employment constituted itself a crime on the part of the applicant, or that the regulation of the domestic labour market went so far as to make any irregularly obtained employment criminal or punishable in any manner. Likewise, it has not been contended that the applicant’s work caused any public or private harm rather than contributing to the public welfare. Notwithstanding this situation, the applicant’s genuinely earned savings were defined and confiscated as the “proceeds of the crime” of using a false passport – an act for which the applicant was punished in separate proceedings. The difference between the reasonable assumption as to the criminal origin of the confiscated property in the case of Phillips and the remote or indeed non-existent link between the use of a false passport and the genuine earning of the confiscated amounts in the present case appears quite obvious.

This difference raises questions as to whether the circumstances of the present case fall to be considered under the first or the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It is true that under the established case-law of the Court, the confiscation of the proceeds of crime is seen as a measure compatible in principle with the Convention and its Protocols. However, I find myself unable to agree that in the present case the confiscated amounts could be clearly and necessarily defined as the proceeds of crime. Such an assumption is apt to regard any irregular employment as criminal, with the result that any earnings from such employment would be subject to confiscation in the exercise of “the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In my understanding, the Court has hitherto regarded the confiscation of the “proceeds of crime” as compatible with the Convention where a direct link between criminal conduct and the proceeds could be established or reasonably assumed. In the absence of such a direct link, I would venture to express doubts as to the clarity of the law and the foreseeability of the imposed measure.

Given that the applicant’s employment as such was not of a criminal nature and that the criminal origin of the confiscated earnings cannot be established or reasonably assumed, a question arises whether the circumstances in the present case fall more appropriately to be examined under the first paragraph of this provision, which calls for closer scrutiny of the public interest pursued by the measure and of the clarity and foreseeability of the conditions provided for by law for the purposes of such confiscation. In assessing compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court normally makes an overall examination of the various interests in issue, bearing in mind that the Convention is intended to safeguard rights that are “practical and effective”. It must look behind appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained of, including the conduct of the parties, the means employed by the State and their implementation (see Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 151).

Limiting the scope of the present case to only some of its “procedural aspects”, the majority failed to express any views on whether the applicable legislation was sufficiently precise as to the conditions for forfeiture, whether the domestic courts were required to analyse the link between the assets proposed for forfeiture and the specific crime, and whether they did so in the present case.

It might be true that the findings of the majority with regard to the limited judicial scrutiny performed are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 69). However, the limited findings as to the “procedural nature” of the established violation (see paragraph 73) neither afford relevant redress in respect of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, nor do they seem to require a subsequent domestic review with a scope sufficiently wide to satisfy the requirement of seeking and striking a “fair balance” required by the said provision (see paragraph 68). In this regard the view that it is not necessary to reach any conclusions in respect of (the lawfulness and/or) the proportionality of the confiscation order leaves the applicant’s essential grievances unaddressed both at the domestic level and by the Court.

For these reasons I also disagree with the majority’s view as to the “absence of a proximate causal link between the procedural violation found and financial loss sustained by the applicant by reason of the confiscation order” (see paragraph 73). In the absence of any subsequent examination of this causal link and/or the proportionality of the uncontested interference, the applicant should have been awarded compensation in pecuniary damage, and not merely for moral damage."

STEDH AFFAIRE GRANDE STEVENS ET AUTRES C. ITALIE (4-03-2014)

Affaire grande stevens et autres c. italie from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

LAS CONSECUENCIAS ECONOMICAS DE LA DESIGUALDAD DE INGRESOS

Economic Consequences of Income Inequality - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

What is very clear from this analysis is that there are really only three sustainable solutions to the global crisis in demand. Either the world has to embark on a surge in productive investment, or we need to reduce the income share of the state and of the rich, or we must accept that unemployment will stay high for many more years.

 

The first is possible, but with so much excess manufacturing capacity and excess infrastructure in many parts of the world, and with significant debt constraints, we need to be very careful about how we do this. Certainly countries like the United States, India and Brazil lack infrastructure, but they do so largely because of political constraints, and it is unreasonable to assume that any of these countries will soon embark on an infrastructure-building boom.

Even if they do, the amount of excess savings is likely to be huge, and without a significant redistribution of income to the middle classes and the poor, it is hard to see how we can avoid high global unemployment for many more years. Because trade war is the form in which countries assign global unemployment, I would expect trade relations to continue to be very difficult over the next few years, as countries with high unemployment and low savings intervene in trade, thus forcing the savings back into countries with excess savings.

So what are the policy implications? Clearly Europe, the US, China, Japan, and the rest of the world must take steps to reduce income inequality. Just as clearly countries like China and Germany must take steps to force up the household income share of GDP (in fact polices aimed at doing this are at the heart of the Third Plenum reform proposals in China). Because it will be almost impossible to do these quickly, as a stopgap countries with productive investment opportunities must seize the initiative in a global New Deal to keep demand high as the structural distortions that force up the global savings rate are worked out.

But redistributing income downwards is easier said than done in a globalized world, especially one in which countries are competing to drive down wages. The first major economy to attempt to redistribute income will certainly see a surge in consumption, but this surge in consumption will not necessarily result in a commensurate surge in employment and growth. Much of this increased consumption will simply bleed abroad, and with it the increase in employment.

Less global trade, in other words, will create both the domestic traction and the domestic incentives to redistribute income. In a globalized world, it is much safer to “beggar down” the global economy than to raise domestic demand, and so I expect that there will continue to be downward pressure on international trade.

Until we understand this do not expect the global crisis to end anytime soon, except perhaps temporarily with a new surge in credit-fueled consumption in the US (which will cause the trade deficit to worsen) and more wasted investment in China (which, because it is financed with cheap debt, which comes at the expense of the household sector, may simply increase investment at the expense of consumption). These will only make the underlying imbalances worse. To do better we must revive the old underconsumption debate and learn again how policy distortions can force up the savings rate to dangerous levels, and we may have temporarily to reverse the course of globalization.

I will again quote Mariner Eccles, from his 1933 testimony to Congress, in which he was himself quoting with approval an unidentified economist, probably William Trufant Foster. In his testimony he said:

It is utterly impossible, as this country has demonstrated again and again, for the rich to save as much as they have been trying to save, and save anything that is worth saving. They can save idle factories and useless railroad coaches; they can save empty office buildings and closed banks; they can save paper evidences of foreign loans; but as a class they cannot save anything that is worth saving, above and beyond the amount that is made profitable by the increase of consumer buying.

It is for the interests of the well-to-do – to protect them from the results of their own folly – that we should take from them a sufficient amount of their surplus to enable consumers to consume and business to operate at a profit. This is not “soaking the rich”; it is saving the rich. Incidentally, it is the only way to assure them the serenity and security which they do not have at the present moment.

(…)

Inevitably some one will discover that Keynes and Krugman said many of these things, in which case the essay is the work of the devil and innocent young people should not be allowed to read it, or that it agrees with things that Laffer and Friedman have said, in which case ditto. In fact an awful lot of economists in the past 200 years and on every part of the political spectrum have agreed with some or all of this model, mainly because it is just basic economics. There should be no guilt by association here, please.

MICHAEL PETTIS
 
This article originally appeared in China Financial Markets.

VISTINS AND PEREPJOLKINS V. LATVIA, COMPENSACION EQUITATIVA

Case of vistins and perepjolkins v. latvia, just satisfaction 25 03-2014 from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

MARIA CRUZ ACHABAL PUERTAS V. ESPAÑA

COMO AFRONTAR LOS DESEQUILIBRIOS SOCIALES EN EUROPA

CARTA DE DERECHOS DE LA UNION EUROPEA

Principios y _derechos_ en la carta de la union europea 30-01-2014 cc sin cita from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

STJUE 15-01-2014, ASUNTO C-176/12, AMD Y HICHEM LABOUBI

Stjue c 176-12, 15-01-2014, amd y hichem laboubi from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

RECURSO EFECTIVO EN DEFENSA DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES

CONFERENCIA SOBRE VAN GEND EN LOOS

publication: QD30136442AC

PRESERVANDO LOS BIENES COMUNES (COMMONS)

"This textbook will discuss the main framework, concepts and applications of the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues for an undergraduate audience. We began teaching a course on collective and the commons in 2007 at Arizona State University. Initially we made use of Ostrom’s classic book “Governing the Commons”, but this book was not written for an undergraduate audience. Moreover, many new insights have been developed since the 1990 publication of “Governing the Commons”. Therefore we decided to write our own textbook, which we have been using since the Spring of 2012.

In this book you will learn about institutions–the rules and norms that guide the interactions among us. Those rules and norms can be found from traffic rules, rules in sports, regulations on when and where alcohol can be consumed, to constitutional rules that define who can become president of the United States of America. Rules and norms guide us to cooperative outcomes of so-called collective action problems. If we rely on voluntary contributions only to get anything done, this may not lead to the best results. But research also shows that coercion of people to comply to strict rules do not necessary lead to good outcomes. What combination of sticks and carrots is needed to be successful to solve collective action problems such as sustaining the commons?

The book is based on the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. Ostrom is best known as the 2009 co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”. Elinor Ostrom was a professor at Indiana University since the mid 1960s, and a part-time research professor at Arizona State University since 2006. She was active in research and teaching until her death at the age of 78 on June 12, 2012."

More information on the work of Elinor Ostrom can be found at:

Nobel Prize website
Website at Indiana University

Some related websites you may find of interest:
Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity (CSID), Arizona State University – the authors’ research center.
The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University – the research center founded by the Ostroms in 1973.
International Association to Study the Commons – an international society for scholars who study the commons.

Examples of  commons:
www.cancercommons.org
www.creativecommons.org
www.commonsrising.ning.com
www.otherworldsarepossible.org/defending-global-commons
www.onthecommons.org
www.flickr.com/commons/

Descargadel libro ·Sustaining the Commons”

Cuadro sobre tipos de reglas como variables exógenas que afectan a una situación, incluido en el libro:

EZ crisis and historical trilemmas | vox LA CRISIS DE LA EUROZONA Y LOS TRILEMAS HISTORICOS

EZ crisis and historical trilemmas | vox

The European crisis in the context of historical trilemmas

Michael Bordo, Harold James, 19 October 2013

The Eurozone’s tangle of conflicting goals – a series of ‘trilemmas’ – is not without precedent. This column argues that it is reminiscent of the interwar situation. The interwar slump was so intractable not just due to financial issues, but also a crisis of democracy, of social stability, and of the international political system. The big difference in the EZ is that nations cannot go off the euro as they went off the gold standard. That is why the initial EZ crisis may not have been so acute as some of the gold standard sudden stops, but the recovery or bounce back is painfully slow and protracted.

Esta columna sostiene que la crisis de objetivos contradictorios revive la situación de entreguerras.El deterioro del período no fue debido solo a cuestiones financieras sino también a un crisis de la democracia, de la estabilidad social y del sistema político internacional.La principal diferencia en la EZ es que las naciones no pueden abandonar el euro como abandonaron el patrón oro.Esta es la razón por la que la criss de la EZ puede no haber sido tan aguda como alguno de los repentinos parones del patrón oro, pero la recuperación o vuelta atrás es penosamente lenta y prolongada. 

The linkages of these issues can be summarized as a series of impossible trinities or trilemmas.

1. The macroeconomic classic – fixed exchange rates, capital flows, autonomous monetary policy;

2. The financial sector – fixed exchange rates, capital flows, financial stability;

3. The international relations setting – fixed exchange rates, capital flows, national policy independence; 

and

4. The political economy – fixed exchange rates, capital flows, democratization.

STEDH DELVINA V. ALBANIA, 8-03-2013

Case of delvina v. albania (merits) 8 03-2011 from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

60 ANIVERSARIO DE LA ENTRADA EN VIGOR DEL CEDH

The European Convention on Human Rights, which was signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953. Under Article 66 of the Convention, the Convention’s entry into force was triggered by the deposit in Strasbourg of the tenth instrument of ratification, which was deposited by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

President Dean Spielmann expressed satisfaction at the anniversary, saying: “Those who deposited the instrument of ratification believed that the Convention would form the bedrock of democratic Europe, an enterprise for peace and freedom. They considered it a great honour for Luxembourg to make possible the entry into force of what they described as ‘the finest European undertaking to date’. Sixty years on, we strive every day to continue on the course they charted for us.”

Since 1953, over 500,000 applications have been dealt with by the machinery set up under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Court has delivered approximately 16,500 judgments.

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4475019-5391788#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-4475019-5391788%22]}

To end the Eurozone crisis, bury the debt forever | vox

To end the Eurozone crisis, bury the debt forever | vox

La contribución completa de Pâris y Wiplosz

CRISIS DE DEUDA DE LA EUROZONA: UNA OPCION

 Lo más relevante de la contribución de Pâris y Wyplosz

 

To end the Eurozone crisis, bury the debt forever

Pierre Pâris, Charles Wyplosz, 6 August 2013

The Eurozone’s debt crisis is getting worse despite appearances to the contrary. How can we end it? This column presents five major options for reducing crisis countries’ debt. Looking into the details, it seems the only option that is both realistic and effective is for countries to default by selling monetised debt to the ECB. Moral hazard aside, burying the debt seems to be the only way we can end the crisis.

(…)

 

How to gauge the Eurozone debt crisis

This leaves us with a coarser measure – the evolution of public debts – as a ratio to GDP. Spreads were clearly better indicators before OMT. There are plenty of problems with debt-to-GDP ratios:

• Gross debts are gross, i.e. they ignore public assets.
• Gross debts ignore unfunded public liabilities such as pensions and healthcare.

In most countries the unfunded liabilities – which include the potential costs of bailing out banks when and if they fail – are vastly bigger than the public assets that can be disposed of.

• GDP is a static measure of the ability to pay; GDP growth also matters.³

Noting that Eurozone growth seems to have slipped into a go-slow phase, the GDP denominator is likely to grow slower than it did in the 1990s. 
The three points taken together suggest that debt-to-GDP ratios of the 2010s paint a more optimistic picture of sustainability than the same levels in the 1990s.
Be that as it may, Figure 1 displays the public debt to GDP ratio for the Eurozone as a whole, along with the highest and lowest member country ratios (ignoring the two special cases of Estonia and Luxembourg).

• Even including optimistic forecasts for 2013, the figure can only confirm that the situation is getting worse.

If public debt seemed likely to be unsustainable in 2008, the likelihood is even higher now. Strikingly, this holds even for Greece, in spite of the restructuring of its public debt in 2011, which was large enough to bankrupt the Cypriot banking system. Put differently, not only the initial problem has not been solved, it has also been made worse.
There can be no surprise here. Budget stabilisation cannot work during a recession as was pointed out at the outset of crisis (Giavazzi 2010, Wyplosz 2010).
Figure 1. Debt to GDP ratios in the Eurozone (%)

Source: AMECO-on-line, European Commission.
(…)

Option 5: Debt monetisation

As often when numbers become too big for governments, the central bank emerges as the lender of last resort. De Grauwe (2011) has made the crucial observation that the fundamental reason why the debt crisis has been circumscribed to the Eurozone is that the markets did not believe that the ECB was ready to backstop public debts.
The success of the ECB’s OMT programme so far, in spite of its conditional nature, shows the role that a central bank can play when it moves in the direction of accepting its role as a lender of last resort. But stabilising spreads is merely a temporary stopgap. The legacy of crippling and threatening public debts remains to be dealt with.
This is why debt monetisation emerges as another solution.⁵ But a mere purchase of bonds by the ECB will not work for two reasons:

• First, each country must pay interest on its bonds, including those held by the central bank.

These payments would go into the ECB’s profits to be paid back to its shareholders, i.e. to all member countries. As shown by De Grauwe and Ji (2013), this would be a transfer “in the wrong direction” from the country being “helped” to the “helping” countries. The only relief to a country would be through its own share of rebated payments.

• Second, when the debt matures, the country will have to pay back the principal.

All in all, the relief is bound to be very limited.⁶ 

How the ECB could deal with the debt

For debt monetisation to allow for relief, the debt must be somehow eliminated once it has been acquired by the ECB. One way of achieving this goal is as follows:

• First, the ECB buys bonds of a country, say for a value of €100.
• Second, it exchanges these bonds against a perpetual, interest-free loan of €100.

The loan will remain indefinitely as an asset on the book of the ECB but, in effect, it will never be paid back (unless the ECB is liquidated).
The counterpart of this operation will appear on the liability side of the ECB’s balance sheet as a €100 increase in the monetary base. This is the cost of the debt monetisation.
Debt monetisation has a bad reputation, which is justified by the fact that it has often led in the past to runaway inflation.
Under current conditions, this is most unlikely to be inflationary. Given the icy state of credit markets, increases in the money base do not translate into increases of the actual money supply; in effect, the money multiplier is about zero.
In addition, high unemployment has created a deflationary environment. But, hopefully, the credit market will be revived one day and the recession will come to an end. At this stage, the money base will have to be shrunk. This is the exit problem (Wyplosz 2013). An alternative is to raise reserve requirements to reduce the size of the money multiplier. Either way, the balance sheet expansion need not lead to inflation.
One solution is for the ECB to sterilise its entire bond buying under this programme by issuing its own debt instruments, leaving the size of the money base unchanged. This can be done at the time of bond purchases or later, when exit will be undertaken.
Of course, the ECB will have to pay interest on its debt instruments, which will reduce profits and seigniorage to all member countries, both the defaulting ones and the others. This transfer ‘in the right direction’ is the way all member countries will share the loss inherent to debt restructuring.⁷
As always, we have to accept the tyranny of numbers. Today’s balance sheet of the ECB amounts to €2430 billion. The big bang example examined above would add €1200 billion, an increase of 50%. This is huge, but not unprecedented. In July 2007, the ECB balance sheet was €1190 billion – half of what it is today.

Conclusion

At the end of the day, except for Option 1, which is the classic virtuous approach, and Option 2, the disposable of public assets, none of the other options is appealing.
But if Options 1 and 2 are impossible, one has to choose among bad options.
Option 3 is clearly the least desirable because it would shake the markets and possibly take down large segments of the banking system. Option 4 is not just politically explosive; it could trigger a debt crisis among the countries currently perceived as healthy. This leaves us with Option 5.
Of course, defaulting through the ECB is merely a fig leaf to hide the cost of debt restructuring. In addition to spreading the impact over the long run, it has the advantage that the non-virtuous countries will share the costs in the form of reduced profit transfers from the ECB over the long run.
Obviously, debt cancellation entails a huge moral hazard that needs to be dealt with. Here it bears to emphasise that bringing the crisis to an end requires two conceptually different actions:

• One is dealing with the legacy of unsustainable debts, which is what the options presented here do (note that it is proposed to deal with the debt stock legacy, not to finance on-going deficits. A once-for-all action is far less dangerous than a permanent moral hazard).
• The other is to make sure that it will never happen again.

This calls for the adoption of a rock-solid fiscal discipline framework. Solutions other than the ineffective Stability and Growth Pact exist, but this is not the topic of this article. The ECB must require that this be done, and done well, before stepping into the quagmire.
Topics: EU institutions, Macroeconomic policy
Tags: Debt crisis, debt monetisation, Eurozone crisis

Pierre Pâris

CEO and Founding partner, Banque Pâris Bertrand Sturdza

Charles Wyplosz

Professor of International Economics, Graduate Institute, Geneva; Director, International Centre for Money and Banking Studies; CEPR Research Fellow

ESPAÑA, UNA TEMPORADA EN EL INFIERNO

Comentario de Jordi Amat en La Vanguardia sobre el libro de Juan Pedro Quiñonero "Tú que no puedes"

"La confianza en las instituciones seguirá siendo la más baja de Europa" (es un decir)

Blog de Juan Pedro Quiñonero

JUSTICIA PARA ERIZOS DE RONALD DWORKIN

Iureamicorum: Justicia para erizos de Dworkin: Muy bueno el Link del blog de Roberto Gargarella sobre el Seminario que se realizó en la Boston University sobre el último libro de Ronal...


Referencias importantes del libro último del autor de "Tomando los derechos en serio"

STEDH "N.K.M. v HUNGRIA"

Case of n.k.m. v. hungary 14 05-2013 from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

SÏ ESPIAMOS, YES WE SCAN

Los medios reproducen con la mayor naturalidad las interceptaciones masivas de las comunicaciones electrónicas

Una de sus funciones es la de la "banalización del mal", de este en concreto y de todos los demás

No es verdad, sin embargo, como apenas mencionan, que las mismas sean legales

Al menos no lo eran en un pasado bien próximo, como consta en las siguientes noticias y casos aquí publicados

YOU CAN'T , WE CAN, 

YES WE SCAN

Sunday, January 22, 2012

SOPA AND PIPA, UN EXAMEN TECNICO

Sunday, June 15, 2008

LOS RASTREOS POLICIALES EN INTERNET SEGUN LA SENTENCIA DE LA SALA DE LO PENAL DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE 9 DE MAYO DE 2008

Saturday, July 5, 2008

LA SUPERVISION GENERALIZADA DE LAS TELECOMUNICACIONES SEGUN EL TRIBUNAL EUROPEO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS

Thursday, July 20, 2006

LA INTERCEPTACION MASIVA DE LAS COMUNICACIONES ELECTRONICAS EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DESPUES DE HAMDANCONTRA RUMSFELD

Monday, August 28, 2006

ACLU CONTRA NSA: LA JUEZ TAYLOR DECLARA INCONSTITUCIONAL EL PROGRAMA PRESIDENCIAL DE INTERCEPTACION MASIVA DE LAS COMUNICACIONES ELECTRONICAS EN USA

Sunday, January 15, 2006

LA INTERCEPTACION DE COMUNICACIONES ELECTRONICAS POR LA NSA EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS

ANALOGIA, FRAUDE Y SIMULACION NEGOCIAL EN EL DELITO FISCAL: SSTS Y STC 120/2005

DEMOCRACIA, SOLIDARIDAD Y LA CRISIS EUROPEA

WE THE PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC WE MUST RECLAIM

MEDITACIONES EN WALL STREET

Lo que queda detrás de nosotros y lo que  espera delante de nosotros son asuntos pequeños comparados con lo que está con nosotros

"What lies behind us and what lies before us are tiny matters compared to what lies within us"

Es el cerebro el que piensa, no el pensamiento; es el alma la que nos mueve adelante no nuestro yo

“It is the brain which does the thinking, not the thought; it is the soul which moves us forward, not ourself ”

La gloria reside en la estimación de los admiradores, Cuando los admiradores perecen como incontables generaciones lo han hecho, la gloria perece, como incontables glorias han perecido

Glory lies in the estimation of lookers-on. When lookers-on perish as countless generations have done, glory perishes, as countless glories have done.

Henry S. Haskins (1875-1957) in “Meditations in Wall Street.” (William Morrow & Co.1940)

En el link se explica la curiosa historia de la incorrecta atribución de la primera cita a diversos autores, incluidos los escritores Ralph Waldo Emerson y Henry David Thoreau

EL DERECHO A LA TUTELA JUDICIAL SEGUN LA CDFUE Y EL CEDH

EL LINK RECOGE LA RECIENTE PRESENTACION DEL PROFESOR STEVE PEERS
SOBRE "EU CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND ECHR: THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL"

STJUE C-399/11, ASUNTO MELLONI

Stjue c 3999 11, 26-02-2013, melloni, revision de condenas en rebeldia en el estado de remision de l from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero