TEDH: MELGAREJO MARTINEZ DE ABELLANOSA V. ESPAÑA (RESOLUCIONES CONTRADICTORIAS)

32. The Court considers that the applicant raised two issues that require a separate examination: (i) the breach of legal certainty on account of the disparity between his judgment of 19 June 2017 and his siblings’ judgments of 28 September 2017, and (ii) the lack of reasoning by the Audiencia Nacional with respect to his submission concerning the ancillary nature of the surcharge and interest. The Court will analyse those issues consecutively.

i) On divergent judgments in his case and his siblings’ cases

33. The Court notes that the parties did not dispute the fact that the applicant’s siblings, despite being in identical or similar situations to the applicant, obtained favourable judgments from the Audiencia Nacional, in contrast to the outcome in the applicant’s case. The two judgments in the applicant’s siblings’ cases were delivered within a short period of time aftert he judgment in the applicant’s case.

34. While that divergence is a matter of concern for those involved, as already noted above, the possibility of conflicting court decisions is an inherent trait of any judicial system and cannot in itself be considered in breach of the Convention (see Svilengaćanin and Others v. Serbia,nos. 50104/10 and 9 others, § 80, 12 January 2021).

35. In the present case, the Court observes that the alleged divergencea ffected the applicant’s appeal as compared to the ones lodged by his siblings.
The judgment on the applicant’s appeal had been adopted two months earlier than the judgment on his siblings’ appeals. The applicant did not submit that the divergence on that specific issue went against a well-established case-law on which he could have reasonably relied to expect a specific outcome of his
appeal and even less that such divergence extended over any longer period than between the judgment in his case and the judgments in his siblings’cases, and he did not provide any further examples of judgments in whichsuch a divergence might have taken place, either before the judgment in his case of 19 June 2017 or after. In sum, the only element that could raise the issue of legal certainty is the divergent outcomes in the interpretation of aspecific point of law in parallel proceedings of the applicant’s siblings, who had been subject to similar tax claims (compare to Borg v. Malta, no. 37537/13, §§ 110-11, 12 January 2016).

36. Given these circumstances, and bearing in mind that it is not its function to compare different decisions delivered by national courts, th eCourt concludes that there were no “profound and long-standing differences”in the relevant case-law and no breach of the principle of legal certainty to an extent incompatible with the guarantees of Article 6 § 1.

37. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of theConvention on this account.

(ii) On the reasoning of the Audiencia Nacional

38. In respect of the reasoning of the Audiencia Nacional in the applicant’s case, the Court observes that, on 8 September 2016, the TEAC declared the applicant’s payment of the main debt null and void. On the basis of that decision, the applicant submitted his pleadings before the Audiencia Nacional on 2 February 2017, arguing, among other things that, as the surcharge and interest were ancillary to the main debt, they should equally be declared null and void.
 

39. The Audiencia Nacional, in its judgment of 19 June 2017, addressed the same issues the administrative bodies had dealt with previously, but did not provide any reasoning concerning the applicant’s new argument that derived from the annulment of the main debt. In this respect, the judgment included the phrase “the allegations made at this time should have been madeat the time when the tax was demanded ...”. However, the Audiencia Nacional failed to explain why despite the fact that the surcharge and interest were considered ancillary under section 25 of the General Tax Act, the enforcement proceedings concerning the surcharge and interest could be pursued even in the absence of a valid enforcement title for the main debt, as declared in the TEAC’s decision of 8 September 2016 (see paragraph 11above).

40. The Court further observes that, when the applicant lodged the application for annulment with the Audiencia Nacional, he complained of the lack of a reply to his submission concerning the ancillary nature of the surcharge and interest in the judgment of 19 June 2017. The AudienciaNacional, in its decision of 3 April 2018, did not expressly respond to that particular submission made by the applicant.

41. As stated above, the obligation to give reasons does not require a detailed answer to every argument advanced by the complainant, but only aspecific and explicit reply to the arguments which are decisive for the outcome of those proceedings. In the present case, the applicant’s argument concerning the ancillary nature of the surcharge and interest was potentially decisive for the outcome of the case, as shown by the judgments of2 8 September 2017 in the applicant’s siblings’ cases, which allowed their appeals precisely on the basis of that specific argument.

 42. It is not the Court’s task to determine whether the applicant’s claimsshould have been allowed or not. It is not even its task to examine whether his submissions were well‑founded. However, it is not necessary for the Court to conduct such an examination in order to conclude that the applicant’ssubmission concerning the ancillary nature of the surcharge and interest was in any event relevant and, as noted above, potentially decisive for the outcome of the case. It therefore required a specific and express reply, which the domestic courts did not provide. In such circumstances, it is impossible to ascertain whether the Audiencia Nacional failed to examine the applicant’ssubmission at all, or whether it assessed and dismissed it and, if so, what were the reasons for so deciding (see, mutatis mutandis, Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan,no. 29620/07, § 39, 28 May 2020).

43. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court toconclude that the applicant’s right to a reasoned judgment has been breached.

44. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of theConvention on this account.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

45. Article 41 of the Convention provides:“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocolsthereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows onlypartial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction totheinjured party.”

A. Damage
46. The applicant submitted no claim in respect of pecuniary or non pecuniarydamage.

47. The Court therefore does not award any sum under this head.

48. On the other hand, the Court has consistently held that where, as inthe instant case, an individual has been the victim of proceedings that haveentailed breaches of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, the mostappropriate form of redress would, in principle, be a retrial or the reopening of the case, at the request of the interested person (see, among otherauthorities, Gençel v. Turkey, no. 53431/99, § 27, 23 October 2003). In this connection, it notes that paragraph 2 of section 102 of the Spanish Administrative Procedure Act, as amended by Organic Law no. 7/2015 of21 July 2015, provides for the possibility of revision of a final decision where it has been determined in a ruling of the Court that there has been a violation of the Convention or one of the Protocols thereto.

 FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention admissible;

2. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Conventionas regards the complaint about a breach of the principle of legal certainty;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention asregards the complaint about insufficiently reasoned judgment of theAudiencia Nacional;

4. Dismisses the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 December 2021, pursuantto Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

TEDH: De LEGÉ V. THE NETHERLANDS (SANCIONES TRIBUTARIAS, DERECHO A NO DECLARAR CONTRA SÍ MISMOS)

In today’s Chamber judgment1 in the case of De Legé v. the Netherlands (application no. 58342/15)

the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been:

no violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The case concerned tax fines imposed on the applicant, a Dutch national, following his failure to

comply with his legal obligation to provide all relevant information for the purpose of tax levying,

including documents relating to a bank account he held in Luxembourg. As those documents had

eventually been obtained from him under threat of substantial penalty payments, the applicant

alleged disrespect of the privilege against self-incrimination, the nemo tenetur principle.

The Court found that the use of the bank statements and portfolio summaries concerning the

applicant’s foreign bank account that had been obtained from him by a judicial order did not fall

within the scope of the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court therefore

concluded that it could not be said that, due to the use of those documents, Mr de Legé had been

deprived of a fair trial.

A legal summary of this case will be available in the Court’s database HUDOC (link).

de Legé v. the Netherlands - 58342/15

Judgment 4.10.2022 [Section IV]

Article 6

Criminal proceedings

Article 6-1

Fair hearing

Use of bank documents, for the re-setting of a tax fine, obtained by a judicial order on pain of penalty payments, not within scope of protection of privilege against self-incrimination: no violation

Facts – In 2005 the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration obtained from their Belgian counterparts information concerning bank accounts held by residents of the Netherlands with X Bank in Luxembourg that included balances of those accounts on 21 December 1994, 5 September 1996 and 28 November 1996. The account information had been stolen from the bank and had been found in Belgium during a criminal investigation. On the basis of that information, the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration identified the applicant as one of the account holders.

In 2007 the applicant was requested by the Tax Inspector to declare any foreign bank accounts held after 31 December 1994 and submit copies of all relevant bank statements covering the period between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2000. The applicant, however, invoked the privilege against self‑incrimination informing them that “in the given circumstances” the request for information would not be complied with.

The Tax Inspector then issued tax adjustments for the fiscal years 1995 and 1996 and imposed tax fines. The applicant’s objections thereto were dismissed, as were his appeals.

In the meantime, in intervening civil summary injunction proceedings, pending which the objection proceedings were adjourned, the provisional measures judge ordered the applicant, on pain of penalty payments, to disclose all information concerning bank accounts held abroad and to provide the required documents. In compliance with this order the applicant submitted two forms indicating that he had held a bank account at X Bank in Luxembourg as well as bank statements and portfolio summaries relating to that account.

Law –

Article 6 § 1:

(a) Admissibility –

(i) The bank statements and portfolio summaries relating to 1995 – To the extent that the applicant’s complaint of a breach of the privilege against self-incrimination concerned the tax fine for the fiscal year 1995, it could not be said that this had been based on evidence provided under coercion as he had only been ordered to the disclose information on bank accounts held after 31 December 1995.

Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly-ill founded).

(ii) Applicability – In so far as the proceedings at issue had concerned a tax fine, they fell within the scope of Article 6 under its criminal head. The determination of the “criminal charge” against the applicant had become final through the judicial rulings on his appeals against the (re-setting of the) tax fine that had allegedly been grounded on information coerced from him. The question, however, of whether the case fell within the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination was closely connected to the merits of the applicant’s complaint.

Conclusion: Article 6 § 1 applicable.

(iii) Objection based on the lack of significant disadvantage – Although the amount of the tax fine imposed in relation to the fiscal year 1996 had been reduced after the applicant, on the basis of the judicial order, had provided the materials requested by the fiscal authorities, he had remained liable to pay the fine imposed for his failure to comply in time with his obligations under tax law. In addition, whether or not the punitive fine had been imposed in breach of the privilege against self-incrimination, it had constituted an issue of principle for the applicant. It also fell to be considered from an objective point of view, given the importance which the Court’s case-law attached to the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself.

Having regard to the above as well as the particular circumstances of the case, the Court was of the opinion that, whether or not the applicant had suffered a significant disadvantage, respect for human rights within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention required that the examination of the application be continued. The present case concerned a question of interpretation of the Court’s case-law and the Court’s ruling on the issue raised would provide national jurisdictions with guidance as to the applicability and scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.

Conclusion: preliminary objection dismissed (no significant disadvantage).

(b) Merits –

(i) General principles – The Court set out the approach taken in its case-law to the privilege against self-incrimination in general but also specifically in relation to coercion in supplying documents in the context of financial law matters. It took the opportunity to clarify the scope and application of that privilege. It summarised the approach to be taken as follows.

In order for an issue to arise from the perspective of the privilege against self-incrimination, there must be, firstly, some form of coercion or compulsion exerted on the person concerned Secondly, the person must be subjected to existing or anticipated criminal proceedings – a “criminal charge” within the autonomous meaning of Article 6 § 1 – or incriminating information compulsorily obtained outside the context of criminal proceedings was used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. These might be considered the two prerequisites for the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination.

Where these prerequisites were met, it was necessary to determine whether the use of evidence obtained by means of coercion or compulsion should nevertheless be considered as falling outside the scope of protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. The right not to incriminate oneself was primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent. When methods of coercion were used with the aim of having an accused person answer questions or make testimonial statements, either orally or in writing, the will to remain silent was clearly not respected and the privilege against self-incrimination thus applied. The privilege did not, however, extend to the use in criminal proceedings of materials obtained from an accused through methods of coercion when these materials had an existence independent of his or her will.

Where the use of documentary evidence obtained under threat of penalties in the context of financial law matters was concerned, such use did not fall within the scope of protection of the privilege against self‑incrimination where the authorities were able to show that the compulsion was aimed at obtaining specific pre-existing documents – thus, documents that had not been created as a result of the very compulsion for the purpose of the criminal proceedings – which documents were relevant for the investigation in question and of whose existence those authorities were aware. That situation was to be distinguished from “fishing expeditions”, that is, situations where the authorities attempted to compel an individual to provide the evidence of offences, he or she had allegedly committed by forcing him or her to supply documents which they believed must exist, although they were not certain of it. In that context a parallel might be drawn with testimonial evidence.

Lastly, regardless of whether or not the authorities were aware of the existence of documentary or other material evidence, if this had been obtained by methods in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, its use would always fall within the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.

If the prerequisites for the applicability of the privilege against self‑incrimination were met, and the use of evidence obtained through coercion or compulsion fell within the scope of protection of that privilege, it was necessary to examine whether the procedure did not extinguish the “very essence” of the privilege, that is, to determine the manner in which the overall fairness of the proceedings had been affected. For that purpose, it would be necessary to have regard, in turn, to the following factors: the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence; the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure; and the use to which any material so obtained was put.

(ii) Application of the above principles to the present case – No use had been made of the forms submitted by the applicant for the imposition of the tax fine. The domestic proceedings had solely concerned the use of bank statements and portfolio summaries that had been drawn up by X Bank and related to an account of which the applicant had already been identified as an account holder. No issue thus arose as to a breach of the right not to incriminate oneself in relation to those forms.

In so far as the bank statements and portfolio summaries were concerned, first, when the applicant had been ordered to provide them on pain of penalty payments, the tax fine for 1996 had already been imposed on him. Second, although the order had not been related to the capital tax adjustment and the above tax fine in respect of which objection proceedings had been pending, those latter proceedings had been adjourned awaiting the outcome of the summary injunction proceedings. Because of this the Tax Inspector was able subsequently to make use, in the decision on the objection lodged by the applicant, of the bank statements and portfolio summaries that had been provided by the latter pursuant to the order of the provisional measures judge, and reduce the tax adjustment and the fine imposed for the year 1996.

The proceedings determining the applicant’s objection and appeals against the tax fine imposed on him fell within the scope of Article 6 under its criminal head. Further, the bank statements and portfolio summaries that had been used for re-setting the fine had been obtained from the applicant by means of compulsion, namely the order of the provisional measures judge for disclosure on pain of substantial penalty payments. Article 6 § 1 – and the right not to incriminate oneself – applied throughout the entirety of proceedings for “the determination of ... any criminal charge”, including proceedings whereby a sentence had been fixed. As such, the two prerequisites for applicability of the privilege against self‑incrimination had been met.

Nonetheless, in the circumstances of case, the use of those documents did not fall within the scope of the protection provided by that privilege. They had been pre-existing documents which the authorities had been aware of since it had already been established that the applicant had held a bank account in Luxembourg at the relevant time. It could therefore not be said that the authorities had engaged in a “fishing expedition” when they had instituted summary injunction proceedings seeking an order for the applicant to submit certain documents in relation to that account. Moreover, the order issued had specifically indicated what documents the applicant had to supply. The present case could thus be distinguished from the cases of J.B. v. Switzerland and Chambaz v. Switzerland in which “all documents” had been sought. Lastly, the imposition of penalty payments which the applicant would have incurred if he had failed to comply with the order could not amount to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

There was, therefore, no reason for the Court to examine the manner in which the overall fairness of the proceedings had been affected.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, due to the use of the aforementioned documents, the applicant had not been deprived of a fair trial.

Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).

(See also Funke v. France, 10828/84, 25 February 1993, Legal summary; Saunders v. the United Kingdom [GC], 19187/91, 17 December 1996, Legal summary; J.B. v. Switzerland, 31827/96, 3 May 2001; Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 41087/98, 5 July 2001; Jalloh v. Germany [GC], 54810/00, 11 July 2006, Legal summary; O’Halloran and Francis v. the United Kingdom [GC], 15809/02 and 25624/02, 29 June 2007, Legal summary; Chambaz v. Switzerland, 11663/04, 5 April 2012; Eklund v. Finland (dec.), 56936/13, 8 December 2015)

 

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

TEDH: DUNGVECKIS V.LITUANIA

Case of dungveckis v. lithuania from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero

PAULET v. REINO UNIDO (STEDH 13-05-2014)

El caso resuelto hoy por el TEDH se refiere al comiso de la renta ahorrada (21,699,60 GBP) por un trabajador originario de Ivory en el Reino Unido.La renta se obtuvo por trabajos realizados entre Abril de 2003 y Febrero de 2007 con un salario bruto de 73.293,17 GBP, por los que se pagaron impuestos y cotizaciones sociales por un importe total de 23,293,17 GBP.

Para la realización de los trabajos el trabajador hizo uso de un pasaporte falso, por lo que fue condenado a una pena privativa de libertad.

El comiso se acuerda en un procedimiento distinto y su objeto se considera un beneficio derivado del ilícito penal.

El órgano nacional desestimó considerar si el comiso era compatible con el justo equilibrio exigido por el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH,

Por esta infracción procedimental, la mayoría considera que se ha producido una violación del artículo 1 del Protocolo 1, pero al mismo tiempo no concede una justa compensación por el importe decomisado sino solo por el daño moral derivado del mismo, por entender que tampoco consta un vínculo directo entre la infracción y el daño.

Este último pronunciamiento es objeto de la opinión separada de los jueces Kalaydjieva (Bulgaria) y Bianku (Albania), que consideran que la infracción es sustancial y no solo procedimental y que la compensación debería haber incluido el importe indebidamente decomisado.

En un comentaruio de urgencia, otras cuestiones importantes del caso, no abordadas directamente por la Sentencia y/o los votos particulares, serían, en nuestra opinión, las siguientes:

1) Si la contraprestación por un trabajo efectivo y la renta disponible después de impuestos constituyen posesiones no legales en el sentido del artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 cuando en el inicio de la relación laboral se ha realizado una representación falsa mediante la utilización de un documento falsificado.Si el Estado tiene o no, en este sentido, un título adicional sobre la renta después de impuestos como consecuencia del ilícito previamente sancionado con una pena privativa de libertad.

2) Si a efectos del CEDH puede considerarse como un "beneficio ilícito" desde el punto de vista penal una renta de trabajo efectivo que ha pagado impuestos y cotizaciones sociales y si tal consideración de beneficio ilícito es compatible con el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH.

3) Si la privación de la renta de trabajo ahorrada después de impuestos puede considerarse proporcionada, una pena no prevista legalmente o una medida en el interés público adicional a los impuestos y cotizaciones sociales previamente satisfechos.

4) Si el "comiso" del producto del trabajo puede considerarse un impuesto o gravamen adicional a efectos del artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH.

5) Si la privación de la renta de trabajo ahorrada constituye en conjunto un gravamen desproporcionado incompatible con el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH.El demandante habría pagado en total más de un 61% de su renta de trabajo, perdiendo la totalidad del ahorro disponible (N.K.M. v. Hungría).

Los aspectos anteriores se sumarían a aquellos señalados por los jueces Kalaydjieva (Bulgaria) y Bianku (Albania) en su opinión separada.

Una cuestión similar había sido considerada previamente por el Tribunal Supremo del Reino Unido en el caso R. v. Waya , citado por la Sentencia.

Este es el voto separado de los jueces Kalaydjieva (Bulgaria) y Bianku (Albania) en cuanto a la infracción del artículo 1 del Protocolo 1:

"My reasons for finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 go further than those of the majority. In my understanding, the issues which this case raises are far from limited to the deficiencies in the procedural protection of the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of property that were reflected in the narrow scope of the review carried out by the domestic courts and their failure to seek and strike the “fair balance” inherent in the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 68).

I find myself unable to agree with the majority’s conclusions (see paragraph 64) that the present case is analogous to previous case-law of this Court on the confiscation of the proceeds of crime (see Phillips v. the United Kingdom, no. 41087/98, and Bongiorno and Others v. Italy, no. 4514/07, 5 January 2010).

The present case appears to depart substantially from this case-law on several major points which seem to be determinative for the proper analysis of the circumstances. In the case of Phillips the Court noted that “in respect of every item taken into account the [national] judge was satisfied ... that the obvious inference was that it had come from an illegitimate source”. In the present case (which concerns the application of different domestic legislation), it has not been contested that, having entered the territory of the United Kingdom by using a false passport, the applicant used it to obtain employment and thus earn his income. Unlike in Phillips, however, it has not been submitted that such employment constituted itself a crime on the part of the applicant, or that the regulation of the domestic labour market went so far as to make any irregularly obtained employment criminal or punishable in any manner. Likewise, it has not been contended that the applicant’s work caused any public or private harm rather than contributing to the public welfare. Notwithstanding this situation, the applicant’s genuinely earned savings were defined and confiscated as the “proceeds of the crime” of using a false passport – an act for which the applicant was punished in separate proceedings. The difference between the reasonable assumption as to the criminal origin of the confiscated property in the case of Phillips and the remote or indeed non-existent link between the use of a false passport and the genuine earning of the confiscated amounts in the present case appears quite obvious.

This difference raises questions as to whether the circumstances of the present case fall to be considered under the first or the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It is true that under the established case-law of the Court, the confiscation of the proceeds of crime is seen as a measure compatible in principle with the Convention and its Protocols. However, I find myself unable to agree that in the present case the confiscated amounts could be clearly and necessarily defined as the proceeds of crime. Such an assumption is apt to regard any irregular employment as criminal, with the result that any earnings from such employment would be subject to confiscation in the exercise of “the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In my understanding, the Court has hitherto regarded the confiscation of the “proceeds of crime” as compatible with the Convention where a direct link between criminal conduct and the proceeds could be established or reasonably assumed. In the absence of such a direct link, I would venture to express doubts as to the clarity of the law and the foreseeability of the imposed measure.

Given that the applicant’s employment as such was not of a criminal nature and that the criminal origin of the confiscated earnings cannot be established or reasonably assumed, a question arises whether the circumstances in the present case fall more appropriately to be examined under the first paragraph of this provision, which calls for closer scrutiny of the public interest pursued by the measure and of the clarity and foreseeability of the conditions provided for by law for the purposes of such confiscation. In assessing compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court normally makes an overall examination of the various interests in issue, bearing in mind that the Convention is intended to safeguard rights that are “practical and effective”. It must look behind appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained of, including the conduct of the parties, the means employed by the State and their implementation (see Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 151).

Limiting the scope of the present case to only some of its “procedural aspects”, the majority failed to express any views on whether the applicable legislation was sufficiently precise as to the conditions for forfeiture, whether the domestic courts were required to analyse the link between the assets proposed for forfeiture and the specific crime, and whether they did so in the present case.

It might be true that the findings of the majority with regard to the limited judicial scrutiny performed are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 69). However, the limited findings as to the “procedural nature” of the established violation (see paragraph 73) neither afford relevant redress in respect of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, nor do they seem to require a subsequent domestic review with a scope sufficiently wide to satisfy the requirement of seeking and striking a “fair balance” required by the said provision (see paragraph 68). In this regard the view that it is not necessary to reach any conclusions in respect of (the lawfulness and/or) the proportionality of the confiscation order leaves the applicant’s essential grievances unaddressed both at the domestic level and by the Court.

For these reasons I also disagree with the majority’s view as to the “absence of a proximate causal link between the procedural violation found and financial loss sustained by the applicant by reason of the confiscation order” (see paragraph 73). In the absence of any subsequent examination of this causal link and/or the proportionality of the uncontested interference, the applicant should have been awarded compensation in pecuniary damage, and not merely for moral damage."

JUSTICIA CAUTELAR Y SANCIONES TRIBUTARIAS

Comentario ssts gru 31 01-2012, limpio final, cc

View more documents from Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero.

STEDH "TENDAM V. ESPAÑA"

La STEDH "TENDAM V. ESPAÑA", de 13 de Julio de 2010, estima la demanda planteada por un nacional aleman y residente en Canarias por la falta de indemnizacion por la prision provisional y absolucion posterior por falta de pruebas en dos procesos penales y por la perdida o deterioro de los bienes embargados como consecuencia de los mismos.

Sobre el mismo asunto se habian pronunciado previa y negativamente tanto el Tribunal Supremo como el Tribunal Constitucional (inadmision).

La parte relativa a la violacion de la presuncion de inocencia es muy importante en relación con el alcance constitucional de la misma en todo tipo de procesos posteriores a una absolución penal.

La STEDH significa en realidad, ademas, la inconstitucionalidad del art. 294 de la LOPJ que exige la ausencia probada de participacion de la persona absuelta en los hechos delictivos para tener derecho a la indemnizacion por prision preventiva indebida.

La declaración de la violacion del derecho a la propiedad por los daños causados por embargos indebidos tambien tiene gran trascendencia en relación con el derecho de amparo por violación del derecho de propiedad.

La sentencia condena a España por daño moral y reserva la determinacion posterior de los daños materiales reclamados, no inferiores a 2 millones de euros.

Se reproducen los parágrafos referidos al alcance constitucional, según la CEDH suscrita por España, del derecho a la presunción de inocencia:

"35. El Tribunal recuerda de entrada que se ignoraría la presunción de inocencia si una resolución judicial relativa a un acusado reflejara cierto convencimiento sobre su culpabilidad, aun cuando no se hubiera probado previamente su culpabilidad. Es suficiente, aún en ausencia de constatación formal, que exista una reflexión que dé pie a pensar que el juez considera al interesado culpable (vid, entre muchos otros, Puig Panella, antes citado, §51).

36. Además, el Tribunal recuerda que el ámbito de aplicación del artículo 6 § 2 no se limita a los procedimientos penales pendientes, sino que se extiende a los procesos judiciales consecutivos a la absolución definitiva del acusado (vid, entre muchas otras, las sentencias Sekanina, antes citada, Rushiti c. Austria, no 28389/95, 21 de marzo de 2000, y Lamanna c. Austria,no 28923/95, 10 de julio de 2001) en la medida en que las cuestiones planteadas en dichos procesos constituían un corolario y un complemento de los procesos penales en cuestión en los que el demandante ostentaba la calidad de «acusado». Aún cuando ni el artículo 6 § 2 ni ninguna otra cláusula del Convenio otorgan derecho a una indemnización por una prisión provisional adoptada legalmente en caso de absolución (vid, mutatis mutandis, Dinares Peñalver c. España (dic.), no 44301/98, 23 de marzo de 2000), no puede admitirse la expresión de sospechas sobre la inocencia de un acusado tras una absolución firme (vid, en este sentido, Sekanina, antes citado, § 30). El Tribunal ya ha tenido ocasión de señalar que una vez que la absolución sea firme- incluso cuando se trate de una absolución basada en el principio de presunción de inocencia conforme al artículo 6 § 2 – la expresión de dudas sobre la culpabilidad, incluidas las derivadas de los motivos de la absolución, no son compatibles con la presunción de inocencia (Rushiti, antes citado, § 31). En efecto, las resoluciones judiciales posteriores o las declaraciones emanadas de las autoridades públicas pueden plantear un problema bajo el ángulo del artículo 6 § 2, si equivalen a una constatación de culpabilidad que desconoce, deliberadamente, la previa absolución del acusado (vid Del Latte c. Países-Bajos, n􀀀 44760/98, § 30, 9 de noviembre de 2004).

37. Además, el Tribunal señala que en virtud del principio « in dubio pro reo », el cual constituye una expresión concreta del principio de presunción de inocencia, no debe existir ninguna diferencia entre una absolución basada en la falta de pruebas y una absolución que derive de la constatación sin ningún género de dudas de la inocencia de una persona. En efecto, las sentencias absolutorias no se diferencian en función de los motivos que hayan sido tenidos en cuenta en cada ocasión por el juez penal. Al contrario, en el marco del artículo 6 § 2 del Convenio, toda autoridad que se pronuncie directa o indirectamente o de forma incidental sobre la responsabilidad penal del interesado debe respetar la parte resolutiva de una sentencia absolutoria, (Vassilios Stavropoulos c. Grecia, no 35522/04, § 39, 27 de septiembre de 2007). Por otro lado, el hecho de exigir a una persona que aporte la prueba de su inocencia en el marco de un procedimiento tendente a obtener una indemnización por prisión provisional no es razonable y denota una violación de la presunción de inocencia (Capeau c.Bélgica, no 42914/98, § 25, TEDH 2005-I).

38. El Tribunal observa que el presente asunto se diferencia del asunto Puig Panella, citado por el Gobierno, en el que la solicitud de indemnización se introdujo por el demandante tras una sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional que había anulado, una vez cumplida la pena de prisión, las resoluciones de condena de las que fue objeto. Sin embargo, en este caso, el demandante fue absuelto en apelación y no ha cumplido nunca una pena de prisión firme. A pesar de estas diferencias, el Tribunal debe examinar en este caso si, por su forma de actuar, por la motivación de sus resoluciones o por el lenguaje utilizado en sus razonamientos, el Ministerio de Justicia y las jurisdicciones internas han sembrado dudas sobre la inocencia del demandante, vulnerando así el principio de presunción de inocencia, tal y como viene garantizado por el artículo 6 § 2 del Convenio(Puig Panella, antes citado, § 54).

39. El Tribunal constata que el Ministerio de Justicia e Interior, en su resolución de 17 de noviembre de 1995, se basó en el hecho de que el demandante había sido absuelto en apelación por ausencia de pruebas de cargo suficientes y no por la inexistencia objetiva o subjetiva del hecho delictivo. Para denegar la solicitud de indemnización del demandante, el Ministerio señaló que según la sentencia absolutoria, « no se había acreditado suficientemente la ausencia de participación del demandante en los hechos delictivos » (vid § 18 anterior). A pesar de que se apoya en el artículo 294 § 1 de la LOPJ, el cual prevé que solo tienen derecho a una indemnización las personas que hayan sido absueltas o con respecto a las cuales haya sido dictado auto de sobreseimiento libre por inexistencia de los hechos que les hayan sido imputados, tal motivación, sin matices ni reservas, deja latente una duda sobre la inocencia del demandante (Puig Panella, antes citado, § 55). El Tribunal considera que este razonamiento, que realiza una distinción entre una absolución por falta de pruebas y una absolución derivada de la inexistencia de hechos delictivos, no tiene en cuenta la previa absolución del acusado, debiendo respetarse por toda autoridad judicial la parte dispositiva, cualquiera que sean los motivos aducidos por el juez penal (vid Vassilios Stavropoulos, antes citado, § 39).

40. El Tribunal señala por otro lado que el razonamiento del Ministerio de Justicia e Interior fue confirmado posteriormente por las jurisdicciones internas que intervinieron, las cuales suscribieron este análisis. Las jurisdicciones contencioso-administrativas suscribieron la reiterada jurisprudencia en materia de aplicación del artículo 294 de la LOPJ, basado en el criterio de la inexistencia subjetiva, esto es en la ausencia probada de participación de la persona que resultó absuelta en los hechos delictivos. En consecuencia, las jurisdicciones internas, ratificando el razonamiento del Ministerio en aplicación de esta jurisprudencia, no solucionaron el problema que se planteaba (vid, mutatis mutandis, Ismoïlov y otros c. Rusia, no2947/06, § 169, 24 de abril de 2008).

41. Estos elementos son suficientes para que el Tribunal concluya que ha habido una violación del artículo 6 § 2 del Convenio."