Reseñamos y comentamos brevemente tres recientes artículos sobre la crisis del euro.El orden es deliberado y no cronológico.El criterio que los ordena es, en primer lugar, un relativo optimismo sobre la capacidad de fijar el problema español principalmente motivado por los atavismos resistentes a la profundización de la "europeización " (Europa sería, invocando a Ortega, la solución y no el problema).El artículo de Fernandez-Villaverde, Garicano y Santos quiere enfatizar que no hay salida al margen de Europa, pero queriendo enfatizar este aspecto omite cuestiones muy importantes que son necesarias en cualquier hoja de ruta.
En primer lugar la profunda crisis institucional española y europea, que sobria pero certeramente señala Torreblanca.Sin una solución de ésta ninguna crisis financiera y fiscal tendrá solución.Y este un problema que está más allá de la capacidad de los líderes nacionales.
Finalmente,por contraposición, "El final del Euro: guía de supervivencia" de los norteamericanos Jhonson y Boone enfatiza que, en su opinión, la crisis del euro ya está en un punto de no retorno desde un punto de vista económico y político y lo argumenta en detalle y de forma bastante plausible.No está mal que los europeos empecemos por considerar cómo ven nuestros problemas nuestros rivales, aunque sean aliados.Esa es una forma de pensar más necesaria ahora que nunca.Hasta ahora estamos por encima del bien y del mal con muy poca fortuna.
Seguramente Nada es Gratis puede aportar también su informada visión sobre las cuestiones políticas y económicas abajo detalladas.Ignoro si viene de los años cincuenta, pero uno de los principales problemas de nuestro país y de Europa es la falta de debate.Las cuestiones son de los técnicos o de los políticos y, en último termino, solo de estos últimos.Y punto final.Así es como hemos llegado hasta aquí. No es ni mucho menos seguro que pueda revertirse la tendencia.
Para empezar, necesitamos cambiar radicalmente nuestra estrategia de
negociación con Europa. Este es un juego cooperativo, con ganancias potenciales
enormes para todos si encontramos la solución, no un juego de suma cero. En la
construcción europea no hay acuerdo posible sin confianza mutua, no hay rescate
sin alianza. Contrariamente a la propaganda que escuchamos, Alemania no quiere
dominar Europa. El problema es precisamente el contrario, que Alemania desea
que le dejen en paz y asegurarse que no se impone una solución en la que le
toman el pelo y en la que debe hacer transferencias al resto de Europa hasta el
fin de los tiempos.
Nos conviene mantener el euro,
única forma de control de los desmanes de nuestros dirigentes
Segundo, debemos abandonar el populismo. Olvidémonos de Gibraltar: entran
más españoles a vivir en Londres en un año que la entera población del Peñón.
¿Queremos hablar de esto cuando empresas cruciales españolas dependen de la
voluntad del regulador financiero, energético o aeroportuario inglés? Igualmente,
dejemos de clamar a gritos nuestra soberanía en peleas abiertas a pecho
descubierto con el BCE —que es el único que provee ahora mismo de financiación
a la economía española— y con nuestros socios. La histeria debe pasar a mejor
vida.
Y no acusemos a Bruselas por lo que nos piden hacer. Las reformas hay que
defenderlas en sí, porque es en el interés de España que el estado sea
sostenible. España debe expresar un claro compromiso con la construcción
europea y con soluciones que minimicen en lo posible las transferencias a largo
plazo. España debe decir un claro sí a Europa, que es lo único que nos protege
del peronismo empobrecedor, y que estamos dispuestos a pagar el precio que esto
acarrea.
Para ello, necesitamos urgentemente un nuevo gobierno, con apoyo de todos
los partidos mayoritarios y de nuestros expresidentes, compuesto por políticos
competentes y técnicos intachables con amplios conocimientos de su cartera.
Este gobierno debe trabajar con tres prioridades. Primero, poner de verdad en
marcha las reformas necesarias reconstruyendo la confianza de inversores
extranjeros, contribuyentes españoles y socios europeos. Segundo, afirmar, sin
ambigüedad, el compromiso absoluto con el euro y la construcción europea. Y,
tercero, plantear a nuestros socios, desde la confianza generada por un
gobierno coherente y serio, una ayuda económica en condiciones para resolver el
único problema que no podemos resolver solos: el agujero creado por la burbuja
inmobiliaria en el sistema financiero, a cambio de un control europeo de los
bancos rescatados y de un sistema regulador común.
La sociedad española debe decidir qué España quiere. Hay una España posible
por la que queremos luchar, una España moderna, con instituciones fuertes e
independientes, con un nivel de vida elevado, un sistema educativo abierto pero
exigente y con un Estado del bienestar sostenible. Este modelo de España está
en su misma esencia ligado a Europa.
Y esta respuesta debería ser obvia, pues ya la dio Ortega hace 102 años en
un discurso al club de opinión de Bilbao. Frente a los que acusan a Europa de
todos nuestros males, hoy como ayer, España es el problema, Europa la solución.
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde es catedrático de
Economía, University of Pennsylvania; Luis Garicano es
catedrático de Economía y Estrategia, London School of Economics; Tano
Santos es catedrático de Economía y Finanzas de la Escuela de Negocios de la Universidad de
Columbia.
Reparar Europa antes de usarla
(El País Jueves 31 de Mayo)
Jose Ignacio Torreblanca
"No saldremos de la
crisis sin unas instituciones europeas renovadas a todos los niveles
Despreciar el 15-M o
fijarse en sus aspectos más atrabiliarios es un error pues este movimiento no
es revolucionario sino profundamente democrático y, si se quiere, incluso
conservador ya que su mensaje central es tan sencillo y verdadero como que
esta democracia no funciona como dice que funciona ni tampoco como debería
funcionar.
(...)
Es hoy evidente que no
saldremos de esta crisis solo con más y mejores políticas, ni en el ámbito
nacional ni en el europeo, sino con nuevas, renovadas o reforzadas instituciones
a tdoso los niveles.Antes de usar Europa, la debemos reparar, lo que nos obliga
a pensar y actuar en dos niveles al mismo tiempo:lo mismo ocurre en el
contexto estrictramente naional.En España y en Europa debemos reconstruir las instituciones y la confianza pues es evidente que con los diseños
institucionales actuales y las actuales relaciones de poder no saldremos de
ella.
… en España y en Europa
está crisis es política, luego su solución está en la política y, por tanto, al
alcance de la mano.¿Voluntarismo?.Sí eso exactamente es lo que necesitamos, en
España y en Europa."
¿Pero realmente está al alcance?
"Some European politicians are now telling us that an orderly exit for Greece
is feasible under current conditions, and Greece will be the only nation that
leaves. They are wrong. Greece’s exit is simply another
step in a chain of events that leads towards a chaotic dissolution of the euro
zone.
During the next stage of
the crisis, Europe’s electorate will be rudely
awakened to the large financial risks which have been foisted upon them in
failed attempts to keep the single currency alive. If Greece quits
the euro later this year, its government will default on approximately 300 billion
euros of external public debt, including roughly 187 billion euros owed to the
IMF and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).
More importantly and currently less obvious to German taxpayers, Greece will
likely default on 155 billion euros directly owed to the euro system (comprised
of the ECB and the 17 national central banks in the euro zone). This
includes 110 billion euros provided automatically to Greece through the Target2 payments
system – which handles settlements between central banks for countries using
the euro. As depositors and lenders flee Greek banks, someone needs
to finance that capital flight, otherwise Greek banks would fail. This
role is taken on by other euro area central banks, which have quietly leant
large funds, with the balances reported in the Target2 account. The vast
bulk of this lending is, in practice, done by the Bundesbank since capital
flight mostly goes to Germany,
although all members of the euro system share the losses if there are defaults.
The ECB has always
vehemently denied that it has taken an excessive amount of risk despite its
increasingly relaxed lending policies. But between Target2 and direct bond purchases alone, the euro system
claims on troubled periphery countries are now approximately 1.1 trillion euros
(this is our estimate based on available official data). This amounts
to over 200 percent of the (broadly defined) capital of the euro system.
No responsible bank would claim these sums are minor risks to its capital or to
taxpayers. These claims also
amount to 43 percent of German Gross Domestic Product, which is now around 2.57
trillion euros. With Greece
proving that all this financing is deeply risky, the euro system will appear
far more fragile and dangerous to taxpayers and investors.
Jacek Rostowski, the Polish
Finance Minister, recently warned that the calamity of a Greek default is
likely to result in a flight from banks and sovereign debt across the
periphery, and that – to avoid a greater calamity – all remaining member
nations need to be provided with unlimited funding for at least 18
months. Mr. Rostowski expresses concern, however, that the ECB is not
prepared to provide such a firewall, and no other entity has the capacity,
legitimacy, or will to do so.
We agree: Once it dawns
on people that the ECB already has a large amount of credit risk on its books,
it seems very unlikely that the ECB would start providing limitless funds to
all other governments that face pressure from the bond market. The Greek
trajectory of austerity-backlash-default is likely to be repeated elsewhere –
so why would the Germans want the ECB to double- or quadruple-down by suddenly
ratcheting up loans to everyone else?
The most likely scenario is
that the ECB will reluctantly and haltingly provide funds to other nations – an
on-again, off-again pattern of support — and that simply won’t be enough to
stabilize the situation. Having seen the destruction of a Greek exit, and
knowing that both the ECB and German taxpayers will not tolerate unlimited additional
losses, investors and depositors will respond by fleeing banks in other
peripheral countries and holding off on investment and spending.
Capital flight could last
for months, leaving banks in the periphery short of liquidity and forcing them
to contract credit – pushing their economies into deeper recessions and their
voters towards anger. Even as the ECB refuses to provide large amounts of
visible funding, the automatic mechanics of Europe’s payment system will mean
the capital flight from Spain
and Italy
to German banks is transformed into larger and larger de facto loans by the
Bundesbank to Banca d’Italia and Banco de Espana– essentially to the Italian
and Spanish states. German taxpayers will begin to see through this
scheme and become afraid of further losses.
The end of the euro system
looks like this. The periphery suffers ever deeper recessions — failing
to meet targets set by the troika — and their public debt burdens will become
more obviously unaffordable. The euro falls significantly against other
currencies, but not in a manner that makes Europe
more attractive as a place for investment.
Instead, there will be
recognition that the ECB has lost control of monetary policy, is being forced
to create credits to finance capital flight and prop up troubled sovereigns —
and that those credits may not get repaid in full. The world will no
longer think of the euro as a safe currency; rather investors will shun bonds
from the whole region, and even Germany
may have trouble issuing debt at reasonable interest rates. Finally,
German taxpayers will be suffering unacceptable inflation and an apparently
uncontrollable looming bill to bail out their euro partners.
The simplest solution will
be for Germany
itself to leave the euro, forcing other nations to scramble and follow
suit. Germany’s
guilt over past conflicts and a fear of losing the benefits from 60 years of
European integration will no doubt postpone the inevitable. But here’s
the problem with postponing the inevitable – when the dam finally breaks, the
consequences will be that much more devastating since the debts will be larger
and the antagonism will be more intense.
A disorderly break-up of the euro area will be far more damaging to
global financial markets than the crisis of 2008. In fall 2008 the
decision was whether or how governments should provide a back-stop to big banks
and the creditors to those banks. Now some European governments face
insolvency themselves. The European economy accounts for almost 1/3 of
world GDP. Total euro sovereign debt outstanding comprises about $11
trillion, of which at least $4 trillion must be regarded as a near term risk
for restructuring.
Europe’s rich capital
markets and banking system, including the market for 185 trillion dollars in
outstanding euro-denominated derivative contracts, will be in turmoil and there
will be large scale capital flight out of Europe into the United States and Asia.
Who can be confident that our global megabanks are truly ready to
withstand the likely losses? It is almost certain that large numbers of
pensioners and households will find their savings are wiped out directly or
inflation erodes what they saved all their lives. The potential for political turmoil and human hardship is staggering.
For the last three years Europe’s
politicians have promised to “do whatever it takes” to save the euro. It
is now clear that this promise is beyond their capacity to keep – because it
requires steps that are unacceptable to their electorates. No one knows
for sure how long they can delay the complete collapse of the euro, perhaps
months or even several more years, but we are moving steadily to an ugly end.
Whenever nations fail in a crisis, the blame game starts. Some in Europe and the IMF’s leadership are already covering
their tracks, implying that corruption and those “Greeks not paying taxes”
caused it all to fail. This is wrong: the euro system is generating
miserable unemployment and deep recessions in Ireland,
Italy, Greece, Portugal
and Spain
also. Despite Troika-sponsored adjustment programs, conditions continue
to worsen in the periphery. We cannot blame corrupt Greek politicians for
all that.
It is time for European and
IMF officials, with support from the US and others, to work on how to
dismantle the euro area. While no dissolution will be truly orderly,
there are means to reduce the chaos. Many technical, legal, and financial
market issues could be worked out in advance. We need plans to deal with:
the introduction of new currencies, multiple sovereign defaults,
recapitalization of banks and insurance groups, and divvying up the assets and
liabilities of the euro system. Some nations will soon need foreign
reserves to backstop their new currencies.
Most importantly, Europe needs to salvage its
great achievements, including free trade and labor mobility across the
continent, while extricating itself from this colossal error of a single
currency.
Unfortunately for all of us, our politicians refuse to go there – they
hate to admit their mistakes and past incompetence, and in any case, the job of
coordinating those seventeen discordant nations in the wind down of this
currency regime is, perhaps, beyond reach.
Forget about a rescue in the form of the G20, the G8, the G7, a new
European Union Treasury, the issue of Eurobonds, a large scale debt
mutualisation scheme, or any other bedtime story. We are each on our own."
Peter Boone is chair of Effective Intervention,
a UK-based charity, an associate at the Centre for Economic Performance, London
School of Economics, and a principal in Salute Capital Management Limited.
A version of this
material appears also on the Huffington Post.
