In 1933, Carl Schmitt joined the Nazi Party. In 1936, he was essentially run out of the Party. Why? Because he was not crazy enough. Schmitt discovered that you can't outcrazy the crazies. There is a lesson here.
— Scott Shapiro (@scottjshapiro) November 19, 2020

"You can" but in this case it took WW II to overcome them
Heidegger also joined the NP
Schmitt was tried at Nuremberg ("Ex captivitate salus")
Jünger said Schmitt uttered the words of Oxenstierna when referring to that period https://t.co/2B4fleGVjs pic.twitter.com/hL8kZTBAuM
— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) November 20, 2020

Thursday, November 19, 2020

CARTA DE LOS DERECHOS DIGITALES

Wednesday, November 18, 2020

LA "EPOPEYA" DEL ESTADO ADMINISTRATIVO Y LAS ELECCIONES PRESIDENCIALES AMERICANAS (III)

LA "EPOPEYA" DEL ESTADO ADMINISTRATIVO Y LAS ELECCIONES PRESIDENCIALES AMERICANAS (II)

LA "EPOPEYA" DEL ESTADO ADMINISTRATIVO Y LAS ELECCIONES PRESIDENCIALES AMERICANAS (I)

Sunday, November 15, 2020

PARA ATAJAR LA SIGUIENTE PANDEMIA NECESITAMOS DESVELAR LOS ORÍGENES DEL COVID-19 (Y III)

PARA ATAJAR LA SIGUIENTE PANDEMIA NECESITAMOS DESVELAR LOS ORÍGENES DEL COVID-19 (II)

PARA ATAJAR LA SIGUIENTE PANDEMIA NECESITAMOS DESVELAR LOS ORÍGENES DEL COVID-19 (I)

Wednesday, November 11, 2020

LAS VACUNAS DE RNA MENSAJERO (COVID-19) Y LAS CUESTIONES PLANTEADAS POR LAS MISMAS

Wednesday, November 4, 2020

LA DEFICIENTE TIPIFICACIÓN DEL DELITO FISCAL : ALTERNATIVAS PROPUESTAS (Y 4)

LA DEFICIENTE TIPIFICACIÓN DEL DELITO FISCAL: ALTERNATIVAS PROPUESTAS (3)

LA DEFICIENTE TIPIFICACIÓN DEL DELITO FISCAL: ALTERNATIVAS PROPUESTAS (2)

LA DEFICIENTE TIPIFICACIÓN DEL DELITO FISCAL: ALTERNATIVAS PROPUESTAS (I)

Tuesday, November 3, 2020

EQUAL RIGHTS: CAST YOUR WHOLE VOTE, YOUR WHOLE INFLUENCE

Monday, November 2, 2020

Saturday, October 31, 2020

Friday, October 30, 2020

PROTECCIÓN INTERNACIONAL CONTRA LA INTERFERENCIA DIGITAL EN PROCESOS ELECTORALES

Tuesday, October 27, 2020

CUESTIÓN PREJUDICIAL C-366/20 DEL TJUE SOBRE CONSECUENCIAS OMISIÓN MODELO 720

Monday, October 19, 2020

LAS DECLARACIONES DE IMPUESTOS DE TRUMP PODRÍAN EVIDENCIAR ILEGALIDADES EN LA FINANCIACIÓN DE SU CAMPAÑA

Saturday, October 17, 2020

TEDH: LAGUNA GUZMAN CONTRA ESPAÑA

Sunday, October 11, 2020

ENTREVISTA DEL DR. FRANCIS BOYLE EN INFOWARS SOBRE EL COVID-19

FRANCIS BOYLE SOBRE EL ORIGEN ARTIFICIAL DEL COVID-19

TRIBUNAL SUPREMO: DOCTRINA SOBRE REQUISITOS Y VALIDEZ DE LAS NOTIFICACIONES TRIBUTARIAS

"(...)

B) La segunda situación a tener en cuenta para valorar si el acto o resolución llegó a conocimiento tempestivo del interesado, es aquella en la que no se cumplen en la notificación del acto o resolución todas y cada una de las formalidades previstas en la norma. En este caso hay que diferenciar, a su vez, según las formalidades incumplidas por el poder público sean de carácter sustancial o secundario .

1) Cuando en la notificación se han desconocido formalidades de carácter sustancial , en la medida en que éstas se consideran imprescindibles como medio para garantizar que la comunicación del acto o resolución tiene lugar, hay que presumir que estos no han llegado a conocimiento tempestivo del interesado, causándole indefensión y lesionando, por tanto, su derecho a obtener la tutela judicial efectiva garantizado en el art. 24.1 CE . Ahora bien, esta presunción admite prueba en contrario que, naturalmente, corresponde a la Administración [así se desprende de la STC 21/2006, de 30 de enero , FJ 4, y de la Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 30 de octubre de 2009 ( RJ 2009, 7712) (rec. cas. núm. 7914/2003 ), FD Tercero], lo que sucedería, por ejemplo, cuando la Administración acredite suficientemente que el acto llegó a conocimiento del interesado. De igual forma, los defectos sustanciales carecen de trascendencia cuando no se cuestiona -o, lo que es igual, se admite expresa o implícitamente- que el acto o resolución llegó tempestivamente a su destinatario [ Sentencias de esta Sala de 25 de septiembre de 2009 ( RJ 2009, 5487) (rec. cas. núm. 3545/2003), FD Cuarto ; de 4 de marzo de 2010 (rec. cas. núm. 2421/2005 ), FD Quinto], o, en fin, pese a las irregularidades serias que pudieran haber existido en la notificación, se recurre el acto o resolución dentro del plazo legalmente establecido (supuesto específicamente previsto en el art. 58.3 de la LRJ-PAC ).

De la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional y del Tribunal Supremo pueden extraerse algunos ejemplos de defectos calificables como sustanciales . Así:

a) La notificación en un domicilio que no es el del interesado a un tercero que no se demuestra que cumpla el requisito de la "cercanía" o "proximidad" geográfica con el destinatario que ha venido exigiendo la jurisprudencia (entre otras, SSTC 21/2006, de 30 de enero, FJ 4 ; 111/2006, de 5 de abril ( RTC 2006, 111) , FJ 5 ; y 113/2006, de 5 de abril , FJ 6).

b) La notificación que se efectúa en un domicilio que no es el del interesado, no haciéndose además constar la relación que el receptor de la comunicación tiene con el mismo [ Sentencia de esta Sala de 8 de noviembre de 2006 ( RJ 2006, 9638) (rec. cas. núm. 4201/2001 ), FD Segundo].

c) La notificación en las dependencias de la Administración a un tercero, no constando que sea el representante de la sociedad interesada ni la relación que tiene con el destinatario [ Sentencia de 30 de octubre de 2009 ( RJ 2009, 7712) (rec. cas. núm. 7914/2003 ), FD Cuarto].

d) La notificación que se realiza en el domicilio del obligado tributario a tercera persona que no hace constar su identidad, consignando el nombre y apellido/s y/o el DNI [art. 111.1 LGT ; Sentencias de 8 de marzo de 1997 ( RJ 1997, 2955) (rec. apel. núm. 5256/1991), FD Primero ; de 25 de febrero de 1998 (rec. apel. núm. 11658/1991), FD Primero ; de 15 de octubre de 1998 ( RJ 1998, 7915) (rec. apel. núm. 6555/1992), FD Segundo ; de 2 de octubre de 1999 (rec. cas. núm. 131/1995), FD Primero ; de 9 de marzo de 2000 (rec. apel. núm. 2017/1992), FD Tercero ; de 11 de diciembre de 2001 ( RJ 2001, 10141) (rec. cas. núm. 4239/1996), FD Segundo ; de 9 de diciembre de 2003 (rec. cas. núm. 4459/1998), FD Tercero ; y de 27 de noviembre de 2008 ( RJ 2008, 8041) (rec. cas. núm. 5565/2006 ), FD Cuarto].

e) Notificación edictal o por comparecencia sin que se intentara dos veces [ STC 65/1999, de 26 de abril , FJ 3; y Sentencias de esta Sala de 8 de octubre de 2009 ( RJ 2009, 7497) (rec. cas. núm. 10087/2003), FD Tercero ; de 21 de junio de 2010 (rec. cas. núm. 4883/2006), FJ Tercero ; de 28 de junio de 2010 (rec. cas. núm. 3341/2007), FJ Tercero ; y de 28 de octubre de 2010 (SIC) ( RJ 2007, 4296) (rec. cas. núm. 2270/2002 ), FD Sexto] la notificación en el domicilio fiscal del interesado o en el designado por el mismo [art. 112.LGT ; Sentencia de 30 de junio de 2009 ( RJ 2009, 5811) (rec. cas. núm. 6144/2006 ), FJ Quinto]; o no habiéndose producido el segundo intento transcurrida una hora desde el primero [ Sentencia de 28 de octubre de 2004 (rec. cas. en interés de ley núm. 70/2003 ), FJ Cuarto]; o no constando la hora en la que se produjeron los intentos [ Sentencia de 11 de noviembre de 2009 ( RJ 2009, 7985) (rec. cas. núm. 4370/2003 ), FJ Tercero]; o, en fin, no habiéndose publicado el anuncio en el Boletín Oficial correspondiente [ SSTC 65/1999, de 26 de abril ( RTC 1999, 65) , FJ 3 ; y 223/2007, de 22 de octubre , FJ 3].

f) Notificación que se considera válida, pese a que ha sido rechazada por una persona distinta del interesado o su representante (ats. 111.2 LGT y 59.4 de la LRJ-PAC).

g) Notificación de un acto en el que no consta o consta erróneamente los recursos que proceden contra el mismo ( SSTC 158/2000, de 12 de junio, FJ 6 ; y 179/2003, de 13 de octubre , FFJJ 1 y 4), el plazo para recurrir ( SSTC 194/1992, de 16 de noviembre ( RTC 1992, 194) , FFJJ 2 y 3; y 214/2002, de 11 de noviembre ( RTC 2002, 214) , FFJJ 5 y 6) o el órgano ante el que hacerlo [art. 58.2 de la LRJ-PAC ; Sentencia de esta Sala de 8 de noviembre de 2006 ( RJ 2006, 9638) (rec. cas. núm. 4201/2001 ), FD Segundo].

2) En cambio, cuando las quebrantadas son formalidades de carácter secundario, debe partirse de la presunción de que, en principio, el acto o resolución ha llegado a conocimiento tempestivo del interesado, en la medida en que las formalidades obviadas no se consideran garantías imprescindibles para asegurar que el destinatario recibe a tiempo la comunicación, sino mero refuerzo de aquéllas. En este sentido, esta Sala ha señalado que « no puede elevarse a rito lo que no es más que un requisito formal de garantía no determinante de nulidad, cuando se trata de una omisión intrascendente, en cuanto la realidad acredita el conocimiento por el destinatario del contenido del acto y de todas las exigencias para su impugnación desde el momento de la notificación » [ Sentencias de 6 de junio de 2006 ( RJ 2006, 6996) (rec. cas. núm. 2522/2001), FD Tercero ; de 12 de abril de 2007 ( RJ 2007, 4117) (rec. cas. núm. 2427/2002), FD Tercero ; de 27 de noviembre de 2008 (rec. cas. núm. 5565/2006), FD Cuarto ; y de 16 de diciembre de 2010 (rec. cas. núm. 3943/2007 ), FD Tercero].

De acuerdo con la doctrina sentada por el Tribunal Supremo y el Tribunal Constitucional, puede inferirse que, en principio , no puede entenderse que lesionen el art. 24.1 CE las notificaciones que padecen los siguientes defectos:

a) La notificación que se entrega una vez transcurridos diez días desde que se dictó el acto (art. 58.2 de la LRJ-PAC ).

b) Notificación que se entrega, no al portero (art. 111.1 LGT ), sino a un vecino ( a sensu contrario , SSTC 39/1996, de 11 de marzo ( RTC 1996, 39) , FJ 1 ; 19/2004, de 23 de febrero, FJ 4 ; y 21/2006, de 30 de enero , FJ 4), salvo cuando exista duda sobre la relación de vecindad ( STC 19/2004 ( RTC 2004, 19) , cit., FJ 4).

c) Notificación de la Resolución del TEAC en un domicilio distinto del designado por el interesado (art. 234.3 LGT ), pero sí en otro adecuado -v.g.r. su domicilio fiscal o el de su representante- ( STC 130/2006, de 24 de abril ( RTC 2006, 130) , FJ 6).

d) Notificación a un tercero que se identifica con el nombre y un apellido, y hace constar su relación con el destinatario, pero no hace constar su DNI [art. 41.2 RD 1829/1999 ; Sentencias de 7 de abril de 2001 ( RJ 2001, 5330) (rec. cas. núm. 3749/1995 ), FJ Segundo (vecina); de 1 de febrero de 2003 (rec. cas. núm. 482/1998 ), FD Tercero (hija); de 4 de marzo de 2010 (rec. cas. núm. 2421/2005 ), FD Quinto (portero)]; o a un tercero que, hallándose en el domicilio del destinatario, no señala su relación con éste, aunque se identifica perfectamente [ Sentencias de 10 de marzo de 2010 (rec. cas. núm. 585/2008), FD Cuarto ; de 25 de febrero de 1998 ( RJ 1998, 1408) (rec. apel. núm. 11658/1991), FD Primero ; y de 15 de octubre de 1998 (rec. apel. núm. 6555/1992 ), FD Segundo; en contra, con matices, Sentencia de 30 de octubre de 2009 ( RJ 2009, 7712) (rec. cas. núm. 7914/2003 ), FD Tercero]; o notificación al empleado de una entidad que, pese a que se identifica sólo con un nombre y el NIF de la entidad, está perfectamente identificado [ Sentencia de 6 de junio de 2006 (rec. cas. núm. 2522/2001 ), FD Cuarto].

e) Notificación en el domicilio de una sociedad mercantil no constando que la recogiera un empleado [ Sentencia de 24 de mayo de 2010 ( RJ 2010, 5200) (rec. cas. para la unificación de doctrina núm. 318/2005 ), FD Tercero], o no figurando la correcta identificación de la persona que la recibe, sino únicamente el sello de la entidad [ Sentencias de 25 de abril de 2000 ( RJ 2000, 3785) (rec. cas. núm. 6050/1995), FD Segundo ; de 29 de abril de 2000 (rec. cas. núm. 5440/1995), FD Cuarto ; de 11 de diciembre de 2001 (rec. cas. núm. 4239/1996), FD Segundo ; de 11 de octubre de 2005 (rec. cas. núm. 4628/2000), FD Cuarto ; de 30 de octubre de 2009 ( RJ 2010, 3) (rec. cas. núm. 2574/2003), FD Quinto ; y de 3 de noviembre de 2010 (rec. cas. núm. 2338/2007 ), FD Segundo]; o la notificación a un ente público en su propia sede recogida por persona que se identifica perfectamente pero no expresa su relación con aquel ni el motivo de hallarse en el lugar de recepción [ Sentencia de 30 de septiembre de 2003 ( RJ 2003, 7567) (rec. cas. núm. 6647/1998 ), FD Tercero]; o notificación en el domicilio de otra entidad que tiene el mismo administrador [ Sentencia de 19 de diciembre de 2002 (rec. cas. núm. 7692/1997 ), FD Segundo]; o notificación dirigida a una sociedad recibida por un empleado de una sociedad distinta de la destinataria (matriz), con domicilio coincidente y con la que comparte servicio general de recepción ( Sentencia de 11 de octubre de 2005 , cit., FD Cuarto); o notificación al administrador único de la sociedad cuando se desconoce el domicilio de ésta [ Sentencia de 7 de mayo de 2009 ( RJ 2009, 5287) (rec. cas. núm. 7637/2005 ), FD Sexto].

f) Notificación del acto sin especificar si es o no definitivo en vía administrativa, pero indicando los recursos procedentes [ Sentencia de 12 de abril de 2007 ( RJ 2007, 4117) (rec. cas. núm. 2427/2002 ), FD Tercero]; o indicando que cabe recurso ante el "Tribunal Regional" en lugar de ante el Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional de Madrid, aunque era obvio que se refería a este último ( Sentencia de 12 de abril de 2007 , cit., FD Tercero).

g) Notificación dirigida al domicilio del interesado, constando en el aviso de recibo de Correos el nombre de éste y el de su representante legal [ Sentencia de 10 de junio de 2009 ( RJ 2009, 6564) (rec. cas. núm. 7305/2003 ), FD Segundo]; o notificación dirigida al destinatario, identificado correctamente con nombre y apellidos, pero también a nombre de una sociedad mercantil de la que no es representante [ Sentencia de 21 de julio de 2010 (rec. cas. núm. 4367/2005 ), FD Segundo].

h) Notificación realizada en un domicilio que anteriormente tenía la entidad, y que sigue siendo de empresas del mismo grupo empresarial, habiéndose firmado por quien se identifica como empleado, consigna su DNI y estampa el sello de la empresa [ Sentencia de 3 de noviembre de 2010 , cit., FD Segundo]; o incluso cuando, en idéntica situación, no se ha estampado el anagrama o logotipo de la empresa [ Sentencia de 14 de marzo de 2011 (rec. cas. núm. 5455/2007 ), FD Cuarto]."

(Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 5 de mayo de 2011(rec.de casa.5824/2019, FD QUINTO)

Saturday, October 10, 2020

NOTIFICACIONES TRIBUTARIAS POR ANUNCIO O ANUNCIO DE NOTIFICACIONES TRIBUTARIAS

Friday, October 9, 2020

ÓRGANOS LEGISLATIVOS Y LEYES

Monday, October 5, 2020

LA ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL EN UN ALARMANTE RESUMEN

Friday, October 2, 2020

SENTENCIAS DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE 17-09-2020: BIS IN IDEM EN EL ÁMBITO SANCIONADOR TRIBUTARIO

SENTENCIAS DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE 17-09-2020: BIS IN IDEM EN EL AMBITO SANCIONADOR TRIBUTARIO

Monday, September 28, 2020

LOS IMPUESTOS DE DONALD TRUMP

Friday, September 25, 2020

EL TRATAMIENTO DE LOS EMBARGOS SALARIALES NO FIRMES EN EL IRPF

Thursday, September 24, 2020

THE WEAPONIZATION OF THOUGHTS BEFORE THE SOCIAL MEDIA

Wednesday, September 23, 2020

COMUNICACIÓN EDICTAL ELECTRÓNICA

Thursday, September 10, 2020

EL CRECIMIENTO ECONÓMICO Y EL QE DEL BANCO CENTRAL EUROPEO EN UN SENCILLO GRÁFICO

Wednesday, September 9, 2020

LA DEFENSA DE JULIAN ASSANGE EN OLD BAILEY : MARK SUMMERS QC (1)

The court resumed with a new defence application, led by Mark Summers QC , about the new charges from the US governments new superseding indictment. Summers took the court back over the history of this extradition hearing. The first indictment had been drawn up in March of 2018. In January 2019 a provisional request for extradition had been made, which had been implemented in April of 2019 on Assange’s removal from the Embassy. In June 2019 this was replaced by the full request with a new, second indictment which had been the basis of these proceedings before today. A whole series of hearings had taken place on the basis of that second indictment.

The new superseding indictment dated from 20 June 2020. In February and May 2020 the US government had allowed hearings to go ahead on the basis of the second indictment, giving no warning, even though they must by that stage have known the new superseding indictment was coming. They had given neither explanation nor apology for this.

The defence had not been properly informed of the superseding indictment, and indeed had learnt of its existence only through a US government press release on 20 June. It had not finally been officially served in these proceedings until 29 July, just six weeks ago. At first, it had not been clear how the superseding indictment would affect the charges, as the US government was briefing it made no difference but just gave additional detail. But on 21 August 2020, not before, it finally became clear in new US government submissions that the charges themselves had been changed.

There were now new charges that were standalone and did not depend on the earlier allegations. Even if the 18 Manning related charges were rejected, these new allegations could still form grounds for extradition. These new allegations included encouraging the stealing of data from a bank and from the government of Iceland, passing information on tracking police vehicles, and hacking the computers both of individuals and of a security company.

“How much of this newly alleged material is criminal is anybody’s guess”, stated Summers, going on to explain that it was not at all clear that an Australian giving advice from outwith Iceland to someone in Iceland on how to crack a code, was actually criminal if it occurred in the UK. This was even without considering the test of dual criminality in the US also, which had to be passed before the conduct was subject to extradition.

It was unthinkable that allegations of this magnitude would be the subject of a Part 2 extradition hearing within six weeks if they were submitted as a new case. Plainly that did not give the defence time to prepare, or to line up witnesses to these new charges. Among the issues relating to these new charges the defence would wish to address, were that some were not criminal, some were out of time limitation, some had already been charged in other fora (including Southwark Crown Court and courts in the USA).

Summers said all these matters should be ventilated in these hearings if the new charges were to be heard, but the defence simply did not have time to prepare its answers or its witnesses in the brief six weeks it had since receiving them, even setting aside the extreme problems of contact with Assange in the conditions in which he was being held in Belmarsh prison.

The defence would plainly need time to prepare answers to these new charges, but it would plainly be unfair to keep Assange in jail for the months that would take. The defence therefore suggested that these new charges should be excised from the conduct to be considered by the court, and they should go ahead with the evidence on criminal behaviour confined to what conduct had previously been alleged.

Summers argued it was “entirely unfair” to add what were in law new and separate criminal allegations, at short notice and “entirely without warning and not giving the defence time to respond to it. What is happening here is abnormal, unfair and liable to create real injustice if allowed to continue.”

(...)

Baraitser adjourned the court “for ten minutes” while she went out to consider her judgement. In fact she took much longer. When she returned she looked peculiarly strained.

Baraitser ruled that on 14 August she had given the defence the opportunity to apply for an adjournment, and given them seven days to decide. On 21 August the defence had replied they did not want an adjournment. They had not replied that they had insufficient time to consider. Even today the defence had not applied to adjourn but rather had applied to excise charges. They “cannot have been surprised by my decision” against that application. Therefore they must have been prepared to proceed with the hearing. Their objections were not based on new circumstance. The conditions of Assange in Belmarsh had not changed since 21 August. They had therefore missed their chance and the motion to adjourn was refused.

The courtroom atmosphere was now highly charged. Having in the morning refused to cut out the superseding indictment on the grounds that the remedy for lack of time should be more time, Baraitser was now refusing to give more time.

How the defence will deal with the new charges we shall see. It seems impossible that they can do this without calling new witnesses to address the new facts. But the witness lists had already been finalised on the basis of the old charges. That the defence should be forced to proceed with the wrong witnesses seems crazy, but frankly, I am well past being surprised by anything in this fake process.

https://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2020/09/your-man-in-the-public-gallery-the-assange-hearing-day-6/

h ttps://www.matrixlaw.co.uk/member/mark-summers/

Tuesday, September 8, 2020

EL FANTASMA DEL ESTALLIDO DE LA BURBUJA DOTCOM DE 2000 A 2002

Monday, September 7, 2020

LA STS DE 23/07/2020 SOBRE CONFORMIDAD A DERECHO DE LIQUIDACIONES Y SANCIONES TRIBUTARIAS COETÁNEAS

Wednesday, September 2, 2020

LA STS DE 23/07/2020 SOBRE CONFORMIDAD A DERECHO DE LIQUIDACIONES Y SANCIONES TRIBUTARIAS COETÁNEAS

Monday, July 27, 2020

EL TEDH Y LA DOBLE INSTANCIA DE REVISIÓN EN EL ÁMBITO TRIBUTARIO SANCIONADOR (3)

EL TEDH Y LA DOBLE INSTANCIA DE REVISIÓN EN EL ÁMBITO TRIBUTARIO SANCIONADOR (2)

EL TEDH Y LA DOBLE INSTANCIA DE REVISIÓN EN EL ÁMBITO TRIBUTARIO SANCIONADOR (1)

Thursday, July 23, 2020

EL RD 463/2020 Y LA SUSPENSIÓN DE LOS PLAZOS DE PRESCRIPCIÓN Y CADUCIDAD EN EL AMBITO TRIBUTARIO SANCIONADOR

Wednesday, July 22, 2020

EL NUEVO RESCATE DE LA FED A WS 10 AÑOS DESPUÉS DE LA LEY DODD-FRANK

Monday, July 13, 2020

SUSPENSIÓN DE PLAZOS EN NOTIFICACIONES ELECTRÓNICAS DURANTE EL ESTADO DE ALARMA (DGT V1698/2020)

Friday, July 10, 2020

INVIOLABILIDAD REAL Y DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (5)

Wednesday, July 8, 2020

EL CAPITALISMO AMERICANO DE LOS GESTORES DE ACTIVOS

Monday, July 6, 2020

EL DERECHO A SER OÍDO Y EL USO DE LA VIDEOCONFERENCIA (2)

EL DERECHO A SER OÍDO Y EL USO DE LA VIDEOCONFERENCIA (1)

#ELDERECHOASEROÍDO Y EL USO DE #LAVIDEOCONFERENCIAÇ #ARTICULO100 #CODIGOEUROPEOCOMUNICACIONESELECTRÓNICAS https://t.co/oUqTLDQmrx
— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) July 6, 2020

Thursday, July 2, 2020

EL CAPITALISMO DESTROZADO (2)

EL CAPITALISMO DESTROZADO (1)

Wednesday, July 1, 2020

PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL E INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL

ENTER THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

EXPRESSIONS BELONG ONLY TO EMBODIED INDIVIDUALS https://t.co/acthiMO2rf
— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) July 1, 2020

Monday, June 29, 2020

EL SECRETO MANIFESTADO : EL COLAPSO DE LA FED (1)

Friday, June 26, 2020

INVESTIGACIÓN DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA SOBRE WIRECARD

Thursday, June 25, 2020

BLOCKCHAIN: LIBRO RESUMEN OBSERVATORIO EUROPEO

Wednesday, June 24, 2020

LA DERIVACIÓN DE SANCIONES TRIBUTARIAS NO FIRMES (AUTO TS 4-06-2020)

Sunday, June 21, 2020

LA BURBUJA DE LA FED

Thursday, June 18, 2020

EL REY EMÉRITO Y LA PRESUNCIÓN DE INOCENCIA

https://confilegal.com/20200618-tambien-el-rey-emerito-tiene-derecho-a-la-presuncion-de-inocencia/

Monday, June 15, 2020

INVIOLABILIDAD REAL Y DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (4)

INVIOLABILIDAD REAL Y DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (3)

Friday, June 12, 2020

LA DEMOCRACIA Y LOS BANCOS CENTRALES TRAS EL COVID-19

Thursday, June 11, 2020

LA CONSTITUCIÓN Y LOS BANCOS CENTRALES TRAS EL COVID (3)

LA CONSTITUCIÓN Y LOS BANCOS CENTRALES TRAS EL COVID (2)

LA CONSTITUCIÓN Y LOS BANCOS CENTRALES TRAS EL COVID (1)

Tuesday, June 9, 2020

EL PLAN DE RESCATE DE BLACKROCK ANTES DE QUE HUBIERA CRISIS

Monday, June 8, 2020

LA BRECHA ENTRE LA BOLSA Y LOS BENEFICIOS DE LA ECONOMÍA (CHART)

Sunday, June 7, 2020

FED: LA BURBUJA DE POWELL

Saturday, June 6, 2020

THERE IS NO SUCH A THING AS A (DEAD) SOCIETY

Thursday, June 4, 2020

ON LIBERTY IN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE

OPINION LEGAL: CRISIS CONSTITUCIONAL: ESPERANZAS FALSAS https://t.co/wK5nKFy1nX #LEARNEDHAND
And now in that spirit, that #spirit of an #America which has never been, and which may never be; nay, which never will be except as the #conscience and #courage of #Americans create it
— Guillermo Ruiz Zapatero (@ruiz_zapatero) June 3, 2020

Wednesday, June 3, 2020

ON RESISTANCE AND CITIZENSHIP (SINCE DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD)

Tuesday, June 2, 2020

LAS SENTENCIAS DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE 18-05-2020 Y EL ARTICULO 217 DE LA LGT (2)

El TS acaba de dictar tres sentencias –STS 973/2020, STS 970/2020, STS 984/2020, las tres de 18 de mayo–– en las que concluye que la declaración de inconstitucionalidad parcial de los artículos 107.1, 107.2 a) y 110.4, del TRLRHL, que hace la STC 59/2017, no determina la nulidad de pleno derecho de las liquidaciones firmes de este impuesto, por lo que no cabe la revisión de oficio prevista en el artículo 217.1 LGT.

Según las SSTS, las liquidaciones firmes del IVTNU, a pesar de la declaración de inconstitucionalidad, no vulneraban ningún derecho susceptible de recurso de amparo -causa de nulidad de la letra a)-.

(…)

II.-CONCLUSIONES

PRIMERA.- Según la STC 126/2019 las liquidaciones tributarias firmes derivadas de la ley tributaria del IIVTNU declarada inconstitucional pueden afectar al derecho de propiedad e infringir la protección dispensada al mismo por el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH y por el TEDH:

“se está exigiendo al sujeto pasivo que cumpla con su deber de contribuir al sostenimiento de los gastos públicos mediante la imposición de una carga “excesiva” o “exagerada” [en la terminología del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (por ejemplo, en sentencias de 3 de julio de 2003, asunto Buffalo Srl c. Italia; de 9 de marzo de 2006, asunto Eko-Elda AVEE c. Grecia; de 14 de mayo de 2013, asunto N.K.M. c. Hungría, y de 2 de julio de 2013, asunto R.Sz. c. Hungría”

Habiéndolo declarado así el TC expresamente respecto del IIVTNU, parece que el TS debería haber interpretado –en sus sentencias de 18 de mayo de 2020- el artículo 217 de la LGT en el sentido de que respecto de dicho impuesto y situación protegía el derecho constitucional a la propiedad con el mismo alcance que el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH.

Y confería una acción de nulidad sin limitación temporal, con base en el artículo 217 de la LGT.

Salvo que se convierta la inconstitucionalidad en una derogación o mera irregularidad condicionada al contenido de un fallo judicial.

¿La STC 59/2017 (no lo hizo) –o la 126/2019 (sí lo ha hecho)-puede excluir el régimen del artículo 217 de la LGT e impedir la revisión de liquidaciones tributarias firmes afectadas de inconstitucionalidad?

Las SSTC no pueden excluir la aplicación del régimen del artículo 217 de la LGT, sobre el que el TC no se habría pronunciado nunca en un supuesto de estas características.

El resultado conjunto de la STC 126/2019 y las SSTS de 18-05-2020, por el contrario, es que el derecho de propiedad, aunque pueda ser un derecho protegido por el artículo 1 del Protocolo 1 del CEDH, no es un derecho constitucional protegido por el artículo 217 de la LGT y carece, por tanto, de la protección efectiva del artículo 13 del CEDH.

Es verdad que en este resultado no es el TC quien dice que el derecho de propiedad no está protegido por el CEDH, sino que es el TS quien dice que el artículo 217 no protege contra los tributos inconstitucionales cuando sus liquidaciones son firmes -únicamente y exclusivamente por ser firmes y por no considerarse nulas de pleno derecho por no considerar protegido el derecho de propiedad en amparo-.

Esta separación de funciones entre los dos tribunales sería sistemáticamente incongruente y se lleva a efecto, en nuestra opinión, a expensas del derecho constitucional de propiedad de los contribuyentes.

SEGUNDA.- En nuestra opinión –por las razones comentadas y a pesar de la STC 38/2011- cabría plantear recurso de amparo contra las SSTS de 18-05-2020 por infracción de la STC 126/2019-que se remite a la doctrina del TEDH en el ámbito tributario-, de los derechos constitucionales y del CEDH (artículo 6.1 del CEDH y artículo 1 del Protocolo 1).

El agotamiento de dicha vía es legalmente obligatorio si se quiere llevar luego la cuestión al TEDH.

LAS SENTENCIAS DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE 18-05-2020 Y EL ARTÍCULO 217 DE LA LGT

Monday, June 1, 2020

LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y LAS PLATAFORMAS DIGITALES (5)

LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y LAS PLATAFORMAS DIGITALES (4)

LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y LAS PLATAFORMAS DIGITALES (3)

LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y LAS PLATAFORMAS DIGITALES (2)

LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y LAS PLATAFORMAS DIGITALES (1)

Thursday, May 28, 2020

EL ARTÍCULO 12 DEL REAL DECRETO-LEY 19/2020 Y EL IS A FALTA DE RESULTADO CONTABLE APROBADO

Wednesday, May 27, 2020

EL ARTÍCULO 12 DEL REAL DECRETO-LEY 19/2020 Y EL IS A FALTA DE RESULTADO CONTABLE APROBADO

Friday, May 22, 2020

EL CAMBIO EN LA ECONOMÍA MUNDO (RAY DALIO) (3)

EL CAMBIO EN LA ECONOMÍA MUNDO (RAY DALIO) (2)

EL CAMBIO EN LA ECONOMÍA MUNDO (RAY DALIO)

Wednesday, May 20, 2020

DESTRUCCIÓN DESTRUCTIVA EN LUGAR DE CREACIÓN DESTRUCTIVA

DESTRUCCIÓN DESTRUCTIVA (3)

DESTRUCCIÓN DESTRUCTIVA (2)

DESTRUCCIÓN DESTRUCTIVA (1)

Thursday, May 14, 2020

LA MUERTE DEL MITO DEL BANCO CENTRAL (4)

LA MUERTE DEL MITO DEL BANCO CENTRAL (3)

LA MUERTE DEL MITO DEL BANCO CENTRAL (2)

LA MUERTE DEL MITO DEL BANCO CENTRAL (1)

Tuesday, May 12, 2020

INVERSORES DE ÚLTIMO RECURSO: LA LÍNEA DE LOS BONOS DE RIESGO (II)

INVERSORES DE ÚLTIMO RECURSO: LA LÍNEA DE LOS BONOS DE RIESGO (I)

EUROPA Y JAN PATOCKA

Monday, May 11, 2020

TIENEN LOS BANCOS CENTRALES LEGITIMIDAD DE EJERCICIO EN EL MERCADO DE VALORES (III)

Sunday, May 10, 2020

LOS BANCOS CENTRALES COMO INVERSORES DE ÚLTIMO RECURSO Y LA FED (II)

LOS BANCOS CENTRALES COMO INVERSORES DE ULTIMO RECURSO Y LA FED (I)

LA OFICINA DE INVESTIGACIÓN FINANCIERA Y WALL STREET COMO NUEVO SOBERANO

Saturday, May 9, 2020

EL BCE Y LA CRISIS CONSTITUCIONAL DE EUROPA

Friday, May 8, 2020

EL TJUE, EL BCE Y EL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL ALEMÁN

Thursday, May 7, 2020

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Wednesday, May 6, 2020

LA HORA DE LA VERDAD POLITICA DE EUROPA (Y DE ITALIA Y ESPAÑA)

Tuesday, May 5, 2020

SENTENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL ALEMÁN DE 5-5-2020 (III)

SENTENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL ALEMÁN SOBRE QE DEL BCE (II)

SENTENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL ALEMÁN SOBRE QE DEL BCE

ECB decisions on the Public Sector Purchase Programme exceed EU competences

Press Release No. 32/2020 of 05 May 2020

Judgment of 05 May 2020
2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 1651/15

In its judgment pronounced today, the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court granted several constitutional complaints directed against the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB). The Court found that the Federal Government and the German Bundestag violated the complainants’ rights under Art. 38(1) first sentence in conjunction with Art. 20(1) and (2), and Art. 79(3) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG) by failing to take steps challenging that the ECB, in its decisions on the adoption and implementation of the PSPP, neither assessed nor substantiated that the measures provided for in these decisions satisfy the principle of proportionality. In its Judgment of 11 December 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has taken a different stance in response to the request for a preliminary ruling from the Federal Constitutional Court; however, this does not merit a different conclusion in the present proceedings. The review undertaken by the CJEU with regard to whether the ECB’s decisions on the PSPP satisfy the principle of proportionality is not comprehensible; to this extent, the judgment was thus rendered ultra vires. As regards the complainants’ challenge that the PSPP effectively circumvents Art. 123 TFEU, the Federal Constitutional Court did not find a violation of the prohibition of monetary financing of Member State budgets. The decision published today does not concern any financial assistance measures taken by the European Union or the ECB in the context of the current coronavirus crisis.

Facts of the case:

The PSPP is part of the Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (EAPP), a framework programme of the Eurosystem for the purchase of assets on financial markets. As set out in the reasoning communicated by the ECB, the EAPP is meant to increase money supply and intended to support consumption and investment spending in the euro area and ultimately contribute to achieving an inflation target of levels below, but close to, 2%. The ECB launched the PSPP with its decision of 4 March 2015, which was later amended by five subsequent decisions. Under the PSPP, the Eurosystem central banks – subject to the framework set out in detail in the ECB decisions – purchase government bonds or other marketable debt securities issued by central governments of euro area Member States, by ‘recognised agencies’ and international organisations or by multilateral development banks located in the euro area. The PSPP accounts for the largest share of the EAPP’s total volume. As of 8 November 2019, the total value of the securities purchased under the EAPP by the Eurosystem amounted to EUR 2,557,800 million, including purchases under the PSPP in the amount of EUR 2,088,100 million.

With their constitutional complaints, the complainants claim that the PSPP violates the prohibition of monetary financing (Art. 123 TFEU) and the principle of conferral (Art. 5(1) TEU in conjunction with Art. 119, Art. 127 et seq. TFEU). In its Order of 18 July 2017, the Second Senate referred several questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. In particular, these concerned the prohibition of monetary financing of Member State budgets, the monetary policy mandate of the ECB, and a potential encroachment upon the Members States’ competences and sovereignty in budget matters. In its Judgment of 11 December 2018, the CJEU held that the PSPP neither exceeded the ECB’s mandate nor violated the prohibition of monetary financing. Following this, the Federal Constitutional Court conducted an oral hearing in Karlsruhe on 30 and 31 July 2019 (cf. press release no. 43/2019).

Key considerations of the Senate:

I. In light of Art. 119 and Art. 127 et seq. TFEU as well as Art. 17 et seq. ESCB Statute, the ECB Governing Council’s Decision of 4 March 2015 (EU) 2015/774 and the subsequent Decisions (EU) 2015/2101, (EU) 2015/2464, (EU) 2016/702 and (EU) 2017/100 must be qualified as ultra vires acts, despite the CJEU’s judgment to the contrary.

1. While the Federal Constitutional Court must review substantiated ultra vires challenges regarding acts of institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union, the Treaties confer upon the CJEU the mandate to interpret and apply the Treaties and to ensure uniformity and coherence of EU law (cf. Art. 19(1) subpara. 2 TEU, Art. 267 TFEU). According to the Federal Constitutional Court’s established case-law, it is imperative that the respective judicial mandates be exercised in a coordinated manner (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfGE 126, 286 <302 em="" nbsp="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">et seq

.>; 134, 366 <382 em="" nbsp="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">et seq. para. 22 et seq. >; 142, 123 <198 em="" nbsp="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">et seq. para. 143 et seq.>; Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 July 2019 - 2 BvR 1685/14, 2 BvR 2631/14 -, para. 140 et seq.). If any Member State could readily invoke the authority to decide, through its own courts, on the validity of EU acts, this could undermine the precedence of application accorded to EU law and jeopardise its uniform application. Yet if the Member States were to completely refrain from conducting any kind of ultra vires review, they would grant EU organs exclusive authority over the Treaties even in cases where the EU adopts a legal interpretation that would essentially amount to a treaty amendment or an expansion of its competences. Though cases where EU institutions exceed their competences are exceptionally possible, it is to be expected that these instances remain rare due to the institutional and procedural safeguards enshrined in EU law. Nevertheless, where they do occur, the constitutional perspective might not perfectly match the perspective of EU law given that, even under the Lisbon Treaty, the Member States remain the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ and the EU has not evolved into a federal state (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <370 371="" and="">). In principle, certain tensions are thus inherent in the design of the European Union; they must be resolved in a cooperative manner, in keeping with the spirit of European integration, and mitigated through mutual respect and understanding. This reflects the nature of the European Union, which is based on the multi-level cooperation of sovereign states, constitutions, administrations and courts (Staaten-, Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungsverbund) (BVerfGE 140, 317 <338 44="" para.="" span="">

The interpretation and application of EU law, including the determination of the applicable methodological standards, primarily falls to the CJEU, which in Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU is called upon to ensure that the law is observed when interpreting and applying the Treaties. The methodological standards recognised by the CJEU for the judicial development of the law are based on the (constitutional) legal traditions common to the Member States (cf. also Art. 6(3) TEU, Art. 340(2) TFEU), which are notably reflected in the case-law of the Member States’ constitutional and apex courts and of the European Court of Human Rights. The application of these methods and principles by the CJEU cannot and need not completely correspond to the practice of domestic courts; yet the CJEU also cannot simply disregard such practice. The particularities of EU law give rise to considerable differences with regard to the importance and weight accorded to the various means of interpretation. However, the mandate conferred in Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU is exceeded where the traditional European methods of interpretation or, more broadly, the general legal principles that are common to the laws of Member States are manifestly disregarded. Against this backdrop, it is not for the Federal Constitutional Court to substitute the CJEU’s interpretation with its own when faced with questions of interpreting EU law, even if the application of accepted methodology, within the established bounds of legal debate, would allow for different views (BVerfGE 126, 286 <307>). Rather, as long as the CJEU applies recognised methodological principles and the decision it renders is not arbitrary from an objective perspective, the Federal Constitutional Court must respect the decision of the CJEU even when it adopts a view against which weighty arguments could be made.

2. In its Judgment of 11 December 2018, the CJEU held that the Decision of the ECB Governing Council on the PSPP and its subsequent amendments were still within the ambit of the ECB’s competences. This view manifestly fails to give consideration to the importance and scope of the principle of proportionality (Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU) – which applies to the division of competences between the European Union and the Member States – and is simply untenable from a methodological perspective given that it completely disregards the actual economic policy effects of the programme.

The CJEU’s approach to disregard the actual effects of the PSPP in its assessment of the programme’s proportionality, and to refrain from conducting an overall assessment and appraisal in this regard, does not satisfy the requirements of a comprehensible review as to whether the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the ECB observe the limits of their monetary policy mandate. Applied in this manner, the principle of proportionality (Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU) cannot fulfil its corrective function for the purposes of safeguarding the competences of the Member States, which renders meaningless the principle of conferral (Art. 5(1) first sentence and Art. 5(2) TEU).

Moreover, by completely disregarding all economic policy effects arising from the programme, the Judgment of 11 December 2018 contradicts the methodological approach taken by the CJEU in virtually all other areas of EU law. It fails to give effect to the function of the principle of conferral as a key determinant in the division of competences, and to the methodological consequences this entails for the review as to whether that principle is observed.

3. Therefore, the interpretation of the principle of proportionality undertaken by the CJEU, and the determination of the ESCB’s mandate based thereon, exceed the judicial mandate conferred upon the CJEU in Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU. With self-imposed restraint, the CJEU limits its judicial review to whether there is a “manifest” error of assessment on the part of the ECB, whether the PSPP “manifestly” goes beyond what is necessary to achieve its objective, and whether its disadvantages are “manifestly” disproportionate to the objectives pursued. This standard of review is by no means conducive to restricting the scope of the competences conferred upon the ECB, which are limited to monetary policy. Rather, it allows the ECB to gradually expand its competences on its own authority; at the very least, it largely or completely exempts such action on the part of the ECB from judicial review. Yet for safeguarding the principle of democracy und upholding the legal bases of the European Union, it is imperative that the division of competences be respected.

II. In light of the aforementioned considerations, the Federal Constitutional Court is not bound by the CJEU’s decision but must conduct its own review to determine whether the Eurosystem’s decisions on the adoption and implementation of the PSPP remain within the competences conferred upon it under EU primary law. As these decisions lack sufficient proportionality considerations, they amount to an exceeding of the ECB’s competences.

A programme for the purchase of government bonds, such as the PSPP, that has significant economic policy effects requires that the programme’s monetary policy objective and economic policy effects be identified, weighed and balanced against one another. By unconditionally pursuing the PSPP’s monetary policy objective – to achieve inflation rates below, but close to, 2% – while ignoring its economic policy effects, the ECB manifestly disregards the principle of proportionality.

In the decisions at issue, the ECB fails to conduct the necessary balancing of the monetary policy objective against the economic policy effects arising from the programme. Therefore, the decisions at issue violate Art. 5(1) second sentence and Art. 5(4) TEU and, in consequence, exceed the monetary policy mandate of the ECB.

The decisions at issue merely assert that the inflation target of levels below, but close to, 2% sought by the ECB has not yet been achieved and that less intrusive means are not available. They contain neither a prognosis as to the PSPP’s economic policy effects nor an assessment of whether any such effects were proportionate to the intended advantages in the area of monetary policy. It is not ascertainable that the ECB Governing Council did in fact consider and balance the effects that are inherent in and direct consequences of the PSPP, as these effects invariably result from the programme’s volume of more than two trillion euros and its duration of now more than three years. Given that the PSPP’s negative effects increase the more it grows in volume and the longer it is continued, a longer programme duration gives rise to stricter requirements as to the necessary balancing of interests.

The PSPP improves the refinancing conditions of the Member States as it allows them to obtain financing on the capital markets at considerably better conditions than would otherwise be the case; it thus has a significant impact on the fiscal policy terms under which the Member States operate. In particular, the PSPP could have the same effects as financial assistance instruments pursuant to Art. 12 et seq. ESM Treaty. The volume and duration of the PSPP may render the effects of the programme disproportionate, even where these effects are initially in conformity with primary law. The PSPP also affects the commercial banking sector by transferring large quantities of high-risk government bonds to the balance sheets of the Eurosystem, which significantly improves the economic situation of the relevant banks and increases their credit rating. The economic policy effects of the PSPP furthermore include its economic and social impact on virtually all citizens, who are at least indirectly affected, inter alia as shareholders, tenants, real estate owners, savers or insurance policy holders. For instance, there are considerable losses for private savings. Moreover, as the PSPP lowers general interest rates, it allows economically unviable companies to stay on the market. Finally, the longer the programme continues and the more its total volume increases, the greater the risk that the Eurosystem becomes dependent on Member State politics as it can no longer simply terminate and undo the programme without jeopardising the stability of the monetary union.

It would have been incumbent upon the ECB to weigh these and other considerable economic policy effects and balance them, based on proportionality considerations, against the expected positive contributions to achieving the monetary policy objective the ECB itself has set. It is not ascertainable that any such balancing was conducted, neither when the programme was first launched nor at any point during its implementation. Unless the ECB provides documentation demonstrating that such balancing took place, and in what form, it is not possible to carry out an effective judicial review as to whether the ECB stayed within its mandate.

III. The Federal Constitutional Court at present cannot definitely determine whether the Federal Government and the Bundestag did actually violate their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung) by failing to actively advocate for the termination of the PSPP. This determination is contingent upon the proportionality assessment by the Governing Council of the ECB, which must be substantiated with comprehensible reasons. In the absence of such an assessment, it is not possible to reach a conclusive decision as to whether the PSPP, in substance, is compatible with Art. 127(1) TFEU.

IV. To the extent that the CJEU concludes in its Judgment of 11 December 2018 that the PSPP does not violate Art. 123(1) TFEU, the manner in which it applies the “safeguards” developed in its Gauweiler Judgment raises considerable concerns because it neither subjects these “safeguards” to closer scrutiny nor does it test them against counter indications. Nevertheless, the Federal Constitutional Court accepts the CJEU’s findings as binding in this respect, given the real possibility that the ECB observed the “safeguards” set out by the CJEU, which means that, for now, a manifest violation of Art. 123(1) TFEU is not ascertainable.

The approach taken by the CJEU may render some of these “safeguards” largely ineffective in practice; this is true, for instance, with regard to the prohibition of prior announcements, the blackout period, the holding of bonds until maturity and the requirement to decide on an exit strategy. Nonetheless, the determination whether a programme like the PSPP manifestly circumvents the prohibition in Art. 123(1) TFEU is not contingent on a single criterion; rather, it requires an overall assessment and appraisal of the relevant circumstances. Ultimately, a manifest circumvention of the prohibition of monetary financing is not ascertainable, especially because:

- the volume of the purchases is limited from the outset;

- only aggregate information on the purchases carried out by the Eurosystem is published;

- the purchase limit of 33% per international securities identification number (ISIN) is observed;

- purchases are carried out according to the ECB’s capital key;

- bonds of public authorities may only be purchased if the issuer has a minimum credit quality assessment that provides access to the bond markets; and

- purchases must be restricted or discontinued, and purchased securities sold on the markets, if continuing the intervention on the markets is no longer necessary to achieve the inflation target.

V. It is not ascertainable that the PSPP violates the constitutional identity of the Basic Law in general or the overall budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag in particular. In light of the volume of bond purchases under the PSPP, which amounts to more than two trillion euros, a risk-sharing regime between the ECB and the national central banks, at least if it were subject to (retroactive) changes, would affect the limits set by the overall budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag, as recognised by the Federal Constitutional Court’s case-law, and be incompatible with Art. 79(3) GG. However, the PSPP does not provide for such a risk-sharing regime – which would also be impermissible under primary law – in relation to bonds of the Member States purchased by the national central banks.

VI. Based on their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung), the Federal Government and the German Bundestag have a duty to take active steps against the PSPP in its current form.

1. In the event of a manifest and structurally significant exceeding of competences by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union, the constitutional organs must, within the scope of their competences and the means at their disposal, actively take steps seeking to ensure adherence to the European integration agenda (Integrationsprogramm) and respect for its limits, work towards the rescission of acts not covered by the integration agenda and – as long as these acts continue to have effect – take suitable action to limit the domestic impact of such acts to the greatest extent possible.

2. Specifically, this means that, based on their responsibility with regard to European integration (Integrationsverantwortung), the Federal Government and the Bundestag are required to take steps seeking to ensure that the ECB conducts a proportionality assessment. This applies accordingly with regard to the reinvestments under the PSPP that began on 1 January 2019 and the restart of the programme as of 1 November 2019. In this respect, the Federal Government and the Bundestag also have a duty to continue monitoring the decisions of the Eurosystem on the purchases of government bonds under the PSPP and use the means at their disposal to ensure that the ESCB stays within its mandate.

3. German constitutional organs, administrative authorities and courts may participate neither in the development nor in the implementation, execution or operationalisation of ultra vires acts. Following a transitional period of no more than three months allowing for the necessary coordination with the Eurosystem, the Bundesbank may thus no longer participate in the implementation and execution of the ECB decisions at issue, unless the ECB Governing Council adopts a new decision that demonstrates in a comprehensible and substantiated manner that the monetary policy objectives pursued by the PSPP are not disproportionate to the economic and fiscal policy effects resulting from the programme. On the same condition, the Bundesbank must ensure that the bonds already purchased and held in its portfolio are sold based on a – possibly long-term – strategy coordinated with the Eurosystem.

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